# Eperio: Mitigating Technical Complexity in Cryptographic Election Verification

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## Abstract

Cryptographic (or end-to-end) election verification is a promising approach to providing transparent elections in an age of electronic voting technology. In terms of execution time and software complexity however, the technical requirements for conducting a cryptographic election audit can be prohibitive. In an effort to reduce these requirements we present Eperio: a new, provably secure construction for providing a tally that can be efficiently verified using only a small set of primitives. We show how common-place utilities, like the use of file encryption, can further simplify the verification process for election auditors. Using Python, verification code can be expressed in 50 lines of code. Compared to other proposed proof-verification methods for end-to-end election audits, Eperio lowers the technical requirements in terms of execution time, data download times, and code size. As an interesting alternative, we explain how verification can be implemented using TrueCrypt and the built-in functions of a spreadsheet, making Eperio the first end-to-end system to not require special-purpose verification software.

## 1 Introduction

Voting and cryptography make strange bedfellows. One has been the manifest duty of the members of free societies since antiquity. The other is a specialized and mostly recent discipline of mathematics. As such, designing a *cryptographically verifiable election* is as much of a technical pursuit as it is a negotiation between scientists and citizenry.

In the experience of ourselves and others, cryptographic election verification has faced criticism and resistance engendered by an ostensible lack of understandability as a result of the use of cryptography. We therefore consider improving understandability among the general public a critical direction of research and that as a step in this direction, we must examine approaches to reduce the technical complexity of implementing and conducting cryptographic election audits.

In this paper we present Eperio, a protocol for cryptographic election verification with this goal in mind. In its basic form, verifying an election with Eperio involves an auditor downloading a set of encrypted audit files from an election website, opening a subset of them by entering a password and comparing the files to one another for consistency using a spreadsheet application or small software script. We believe this can greatly simplify the typically in-depth technical component of cryptographic election verification, especially relative to related systems.

We approach the design of Eperio in two related settings. Firstly, the system should be secure under standard computational assumptions, while using cryptographic primitives that are simple and efficient. Secondly, the verification software of the desired system should be implementable, wherever possible, using either familiar software tools, or custom open-source software with an emphasis on compact code size.

**Contributions** The contributions of this paper include:

- The Eperio cryptographic election verification protocol and a proof of its security,
- A proposal for implementing cryptographic commitments using symmetric-key encryption,
- A software implementation of the Eperio system, which includes,
  - An election verification script written in 50 lines of Python,
  - An election verification procedure using TrueCrypt and OpenOffice Calc spreadsheet application as an alternative to an automated script,
- A performance analysis of Eperio demonstrating that it requires fewer cryptographic operations, smaller audit datasets, less execution time and fewer lines of software than other recently deployed cryptographic election verification systems.

## 2 Challenges and Approaches to Voting with Electronics

Electronic vote-counting methods have become increasingly prominent. By 2006, less than 1% of the United States voting-age population still voted by hand-counted paper ballot, with over 88% of the votes being tallied either by optical-scan, or some other form of electronic ballot tabulation [22]. However, software execution is not inherently observable, which has generated widespread concern over its use in elections. Furthermore, beginning in 2004 with Kohno *et al.* [33], independent reviews have continued to uncover serious security vulnerabilities in widely-used commercial systems; vulnerabilities that allow, among other things, undetectable tally manipulation if an attacker gains access to the system under reasonable threat scenarios. Recent studies have examined systems by ES&S [5], Premier/Diebold [11, 12], Sequoia [4, 10], and Hart-InterCivic [11, 29].

In response, a return to hand-counted paper ballots has been suggested; however tallying by hand can be time-consuming for the long, multi-contest ballots common in many US precincts. Furthermore, while offering greater transparency than electronic voting, full confidence in an election result would require observing the process end-to-end, which is a large time-commitment, extends to only a single polling place, and is nullified if the ballots are recounted at a later date. We seek a solution that offers full confidence for all precincts and whose audit can be conducted at any convenient time after the election using commonplace computer software.

Our solution rests in cryptographic election verification, which allows voters, and other public organizations, to audit election *results* through the addition of three specialized components in the election process: an enhanced ballot, a privacy-preserving vote receipt, and a cryptographic proof of robustness. Through these components, a voter can be convinced that their vote was counted without being able to reveal to anyone how they voted.

Over two decades after the seminal groundwork was laid by Chaum [14], Benaloh [7] and others, cryptographic election verification has been used in real elections with binding results. An early Internet voting system to use cryptographic verification was RIES, used in a parliamentary election for about 70,000 absentee ballots in 2004 in the Netherlands [28]. In 2007, a university election in Canada used the optical-scan system Punchscan for 154 voters [24]. In 2009, the Internet system Helios was used in a university election in Belgium for 5,142 registered voters [2], and in a university election in the United States for 567 voters.[1] In 2009, the optical scan system Scantegrity was used in a municipal election in the United States for 1,722 voters [13].

Despite these important milestones, cryptographic voting is often criticized, among other things, for being difficult to implement and conduct. The recent municipal election in the United States provides a good example: the two independent auditors of that election each wrote several hundred lines of software code to pore over the two and a half gigabytes of cryptographic audit data.[2] Many systems in the literature employ advanced cryptographic primitives and techniques not typically found in standard software libraries. This often results in the cryptographic software components of such protocol needing to be custom coded, and has pointed us toward being less reliant on custom implementations.

Is simplicity central to the acceptance of cryptographic voting? On the one hand, there are examples of the general population accepting cryptography without understanding the protocols that enable it (e.g., online banking or wireless network privacy). It is also the case that some citizens do not fully appreciate current voting procedures (e.g., statistical recounts or ballot counterfoils) used to add some level of election integrity.

We contend that *universal verification*—the ability of anyone to participate in the election audit—is fundamental to the spirit of cryptographic election audits, and that lowering the technical complexity of the audits follows in that spirit.

### 2.1 End-to-End Election Verification

Eperio implements what the United States Election Assistance Commission defines as *end-to-end (E2E) verification* [44]. We consider E2E verification to be the conjunction of two properties: voter verifiable robustness and ballot secrecy. The notation of robustness requires that proof, or strong evidence, is made available to any voter that his/her voting intent is included, unmodified, in the election outcome. Simultaneous to this proof, ballot secrecy should maintain anonymous association between a voter and his/her voting intent. The security guarantees of these properties range from computational to unconditional (with robustness and ballot secrecy never being simultaneously unconditional). For the purposes of this paper we pursue robustness and privacy in a computational setting.

As a formal definition of ballot secrecy, Benaloh and Tuinstral define *receipt-freeness* as the property that a voter is not able to provide useful information about their vote after it is cast [9]. This definition is strengthened

[1] `http://princeton-helios.appspot.com`

[2] Software and audit results available online at `http://github.com/benadida/scantegrity-audit/` and `http://zagorski.im.pwr.wroc.pl/scantegrity/`

by Moran and Naor to account for an adversary that interacts with the voter before and after casting [34]. An even stronger notion, *coercion resistance*, is possible to achieve in remote and Internet voting settings [31].

With regards to robustness, a prevalent model for E2E voter verifiable robustness is to ensure three sequential properties. Firstly an auditor must be able to be convinced that if a voter were to attempt to obfuscate their vote, it would be obfuscated correctly (*Marked-as-Intended*). Secondly a voter must be able to be convinced that the obfuscation of their vote is included in a collection of obfuscated votes (*Collected-as-Marked*). Finally an auditor must be able to be convinced that the collection of obfuscated votes is properly deobfuscated, producing a self-consistent and correct tally (*Counted-as-Collected*). When these properties are individually and simultaneously shown to hold on the same data set we say the election was *Counted-as-Intended*.

**E2E Ballot and Receipt** In addition to being a means for a voter to register their vote, an E2E ballot provides a means for generating a privacy-preserving receipt of their vote. The literature proposes several methods for obfuscating a ballot to create an E2E ballot receipt such as encrypting a reference to the candidate and retaining only the ciphertext (*e.g.,* [1]), applying a randomized permutation to a canonical list of candidates and retaining only the position marked (*e.g.,* [17]), substituting a randomized code for each candidate and retaining just the code (*e.g.,* [16]), and splitting the vote into randomized partial shares and retaining only one of the shares (*e.g.,* [39]).

Although randomized candidate orderings are not legal in all jurisdictions, its simplicity facilitates our discussion. In this paper we will consider a ballot to be a paper ballot similar to the Prêt à Voter system [17] in which the list of candidates is independently shuffled on each ballot. To use this ballot style, a voter first locates their preferred candidate and marks the associated position. The voter then tears off just the marks (Figure 1 illustrates this), which is scanned and then retained as a receipt. The candidate list is shredded by the voter before leaving the polling place. We refer to each position (bubble) on the ballot that can be marked as a unique markable region (UMR). Adapting Eperio to accommodate a range of ballot styles (both paper and electronic) we leave for future work.

## 2.2 Election Auditors (A Who's Who)

At first glance it may seem necessary for average voters to understand the underlying cryptographic protocol in order to meaningfully participate. Although ideally every participant would possess such a knowledge base, realistically we see it as a *collaboration* between three user types: voter, election auditor and protocol analyst, each of which is associated with different knowledge and technical requirements.

**Voter** A voter is someone who casts a ballot (and receives a receipt) in an election. The primary responsibility of a voter with regard to E2E verification is to substantiate their contribution to the election using their ballot receipt. At a technical level this requires a voter to confirm the election's audit dataset is consistent with their ballot receipt. Conceptually they should be aware of the E2E properties and what role checking their receipt plays in the broader verification process. A voter may also participate as an election data auditor and/or protocol analyst, or delegate it to someone they trust. Alternatively they may choose to ignore the verification process altogether.

**Election Data Auditor** An election data auditor undertakes to substantiate the outcome of a *particular* election using the E2E protocol and the public audit dataset for that election. At a technical level they must be able to perform each of the audits either by using existing verification software, or by creating it themselves based on a protocol specification and be able to interpret the results. If using existing verification software, they must trust its correctness (or review the source code). They must understand the technical details of each audit and be convinced, at a high level, that the protocol is sound (i.e., convincing).

**Protocol Analyst** The role of the protocol analyst is to substantiate the security properties of the E2E protocol to the voters and elections auditors. They must poses sufficient expertise to decide at a formal level whether the protocol is complete, sound and secret.

As we demonstrate in section 7, Eperio simplifies the technical requirements of the election data auditor through smaller data and code sizes, execution times, and wider implementation options.

# 3 The Eperio Protocol

Eperio is closely related to the Punchscan and Scantegrity cryptographic election verification protocols. Unlike Punchscan and Scantegrity which use a mixnet-like structure to achieve the E2E integrity and privacy properties, Eperio combines its audit data into a single cryptographic table structure. This in turn permits a coarser, more efficient, cryptographic commitment scheme. It also facilitates interesting implementation options such

as cryptographic commitments based on file-encryption and E2E verification in a spreadsheet.

As an intuition of this structure consider several ballot boxes, each of which contains a photocopy of each ballot cast in an election. If you shake one of the ballot boxes, the ballots will land with and ordering that is random and independent of the other boxes. However if you were to open that box and tally up the ballots, it will still produce the same winner as all the other boxes. In this way, verifying an election tally with Eperio constitutes proving that each such ballot box is a shuffled copy of (i.e., is *isomorphic* to) every other box.

This physical analogy is inherited from Aperio, a non-electronic, non-cryptographic E2E protocol upon which Eperio is based [23]. Aperio achieves the E2E properties based on physical security assumptions which, in the following sections, we will translate into a cryptographic setting.

## 3.1 Protocol Sketch

As a brief overview of the protocol, a set of trustees will jointly generate a table with three columns. The first column will contain a unique reference for each markable region (*e.g.*, optical scan bubble) on each ballot in the election. The second column will indicate whether a given region was marked or not marked (or alternatively if the ballot was selected for an audit). Finally the third column will contain the candidate/choice associated with each markable region.

The rows of this table are randomly shuffled (analogous to shaking a ballot box). It is easy to see that if the first two columns are revealed, the information should correspond to the set of all of the receipts in the election. If the last two columns are revealed, the information should correspond to the final tally. If all three columns are revealed (or the contents of an unrevealed column are implied through some functional dependency), then ballot secrecy is compromised. The Eperio protocol proves the correct formation of all three columns by only revealing the information implied in two of the three columns. It uses a composition of cut-and-choose and random audit techniques inspired by randomized partial checking [30].

## 3.2 Entities

The Eperio protocol relies on the following entities, which are standard in most E2E voting systems:

- A set of $n$ **election trustees** (or the prover), $\mathcal{P}$, tasked with generating a verifiable tally. $\mathcal{P}$ is assumed to be a set of mutually distrustful and non-collusive trustees. However the protocol can tolerate $t \leq \frac{n-1}{2}$ trustees who collude or refuse to participate.
- The set of authenticated **voters** who cast ballots in the election.
- The first set of **verifiers**, $\mathcal{V}_1$, who verify that their receipts were collected correctly (*Collected-as-Marked*). $\mathcal{V}_1$ are either voters, or auditors that were given access to a copy of a voter's receipt.
- The second set of **verifiers**, $\mathcal{V}_2$, who verify that the ballots are printed correctly (*marked-as-intended*). $\mathcal{V}_2$ are either voters or auditors who went in person to obtain a ballot to audit.
- The third set of **verifiers**, $\mathcal{V}_3$, who verify that the tally is computed correctly from the collected receipts (*Counted-as-Collected*). $\mathcal{V}_3$ can include anyone in any location with access to the election data.
- A malicious **adversarial prover**, $\mathcal{P}'$, who will attempt to convince the verifiers that an incorrect tally is correct.
- A malicious **adversarial verifier**, $\mathcal{V}'$, who will attempt to break voter privacy and determine which candidate was selected on a given receipt (or any non-negligible information about this selection).

## 3.3 Functions

The Eperio protocol requires a set of standard functions from the cryptographic literature: a threshold key agreement modeled after the one due to Pedersen [37], a cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator (PRNG), a perfect shuffle algorithm, a message commitment scheme (either perfectly binding or perfectly hiding), and a public coin (or random beacon) to generate non-interactive challenges.

### 3.3.1 Distributed Key Generation/Reconstruction

- $(y_1, \ldots, y_n, \kappa) \leftarrow \mathsf{DKG}(n, t, l, f_1, \ldots, f_n)$
- $\kappa \leftarrow \mathsf{KeyRec}(y_1, \ldots, y_{t+1})$

$\mathsf{DKG}$ accepts from each of the $n$ trustees a polynomial of degree $t$, $f_i$, with coefficients of bit-length $l$. The coefficients are summed together, $\mod 2^l$, to produce a new polynomial $\hat{f}$. Each trustee $i$ receives $y_i = \hat{f}(i)$ as their share and the value $\kappa = \hat{f}(0)$ forms a shared secret of bit-length $l$. $t$ should be set such that $n \geq 2t+1$. $\mathsf{KeyRec}$ accepts at least $t+1$ shares, $y_1, \ldots, y_{t+1}$, from a subset of the trustees and outputs the shared secret $\kappa$.

### 3.3.2 Pseudorandom Number Generation

- $\{0,1\}^l \leftarrow \mathsf{PRNG}(\kappa, l)$




Figure 1: **Left: E2E-enabled optical scan ballots.** Each ballot consists of a unique serial number, a candidate list printed in an independent random order, and a perforation between the optical scan ovals and the candidate list. Upon marking the ballot, the candidate list is detached and shredded. The remaining piece is scanned and granted as a receipt. Because the candidate orderings are independent across ballots, knowing the mark position alone does not reveal how a voter voted. **Right: Eperio table.** Each optical scan oval (referenced by a serial number and absolute position), its mark-state (marked or unmarked) and the corresponding candidate name are recorded in a randomly assigned row.

PRNG is a stateful function which takes as input the shared secret, $\kappa$, as a seed and returns $l$ new pseudo-random bits each time it is invoked. For simplicity, we omit $l$ if the size of the output is clear from the context.

#### 3.3.3 Permutation

- $\pi(\mathbf{W}_i) \leftarrow \mathsf{Permute}(w_1, \ldots, w_u, \Pi)$
- $\pi(\mathbf{W}_i) \leftarrow \mathsf{PermuteBlock}(w_1, \ldots, w_u, s, \Pi)$

Permute accepts as input a list $\mathbf{W}_i$ of $u$ elements and a number, $\Pi = \mathcal{O}(u \log(u))$, of random bits sufficient to perfectly shuffle the list[3] and returns a list containing elements $w_1, \ldots, w_u$ in permuted order. For some $s$ which divides $u$, PermuteBlock applies Permute independently to each of the $u/s$ non-overlapping sub lists in $\mathbf{W}_i$.

#### 3.3.4 Commitment

- $c \leftarrow \mathsf{Commit}(m, r)$
- $\{0, 1\} \leftarrow \mathsf{Reveal}(c, r, m)$

[3]Generating a random integer from random bits is non-deterministic when the integer is not a perfect power of 2. Perfect shuffling algorithms, like Fisher-Yates, require random integers. An upper bound on the *expected* number of bits is $2(\log_2 u!)$.

Commit takes as input an arbitrary length message $m$ and a random factor $r$. It outputs a commitment to the message $c$. Reveal accepts values $m, r$, and $c$, and outputs 1 iff $c$ is a valid commitment to $m$ and $r$. Otherwise it outputs 0.

#### 3.3.5 Public Coin Toss

- $\{0, 1\} \leftarrow \mathsf{PublicCoin}()$

PublicCoin returns a uniformly random bit. The output should be unpredictable prior to being invoked and verifiable *a posteriori*.

### 3.4 Lists and Tables

The Eperio protocol relies on a particular data structure, called the Eperio table, which is constructed from a set of private inputs by the trustees. The Eperio table is a novel data structure and the primary contribution of this paper. It is shown in Figure 1 with a permutation-style ballot, which we use to illustrate the protocol.

To facilitate clarity, we also denote some intermediate lists and tables used in its construction. We use a bold typeface to denote ordered lists and tables, and a script typeface to denote unordered sets.

The following list and set are public inputs to the system decided on prior to the election.

**UMR List:** $\mathbf{U}$ is the list of each *unique markable region* (UMR) for the $s$ candidates on each of the $b$ ballots. Elements are encoded as a ballot serial number and a position, and are listed in ascending order. The length of the list is $u = s \cdot b$.

**Candidate/Selection Roster:** $\mathbb{S}$ is the set of selections or candidates to appear on the ballot, for each contest. Elements are encoded as a character string of arbitrary length. The size of the set is $s$. Without loss of generality, we assume a single contest.

These are used by the trustees, in conjunction with the functions defined above, to create the following private list.

**Candidate/Selection List:** $\mathbf{S} \leftarrow \mathbf{U} \times \mathbb{S}$ is the list of candidates for each position on a ballot composed by randomly selecting, without replacement per ballot, an element from $\mathbb{S}$. It is ordered by $\mathbf{U}$. The length of the list is $u$.

The marks list will denote the final status of a markable region. It is empty prior to the election and is provided as a public input to the system after every ballot has been cast.

> **Marks List:** $\mathbf{M}$ is the list of marks corresponding to each markable region in $\mathbf{U}$. Elements include marked (1), unmarked (0), and print audited (-1). The length of the list is $u$.

The concatenation of these three lists defines a table that collects all the private information of the election.

> **Print Table:** $\mathbf{P}$ is a table formed by joining $\mathbf{U}, \mathbf{M}$, and $\mathbf{S}$. The dimensions of the table are $u \times 3$.

A proof of election integrity subsumes a proof that the relations between each list in $\mathbf{P}$ is consistent with a universal view of the election. Pairwise, a correct $\mathbf{U}$-$\mathbf{M}$ relation implies ballots were collected as marked (*Collected-as-Marked*), a correct $\mathbf{U}$-$\mathbf{S}$ relation implies ballots were printed correctly (*Marked-as-Intended*), and a correct $\mathbf{M}$-$\mathbf{S}$ relation implies the ballots were counted as collected (*Counted-as-Collected*). Note that revealing $\mathbf{P}_{(i,j)}$ for all $i$ and $j$ is sufficient, under our assumptions, for independently verifying the correctness of the tally. Unfortunately, this trivial approach would also destroy the privacy preserving property of the ballot receipt—in conjunction with $\mathbf{P}$, receipts would provide proof of which candidate was selected. Instead, we require a non-trivial approach that can both establish integrity and preserve ballot secrecy.

The Eperio table is a data structure that, with a set of queries, can prove the correct formation of $\mathbf{P}$ while maintaining the same level of privacy provided by only revealing the list of receipts and the final tally. Specifically, it is a collection of $x$ instances of $\mathbf{P}$ that have been independently shuffled row-wise. By revealing portions of and relations on this structure, we will show that a complete and robust proof of integrity can be established with this minimal disclosure.

> **Eperio Table:** $\mathbf{E}$ is a table formed by $x$ instances of $\mathbf{P}$, each of them independently shuffled row-wise. The dimensions of the table are $u \times 3 \times x$.

## 3.5 Protocol

We now outline the protocol for generating an Eperio table and the various outputs required for proving it encodes a correct tally. The focus of this paper is on the protocol for verifying this proof, which is orthogonal to the issue of how the data is generated. However the security proof we provide in the next section encompasses the generation of the data, and so we give it consideration. The first three steps of the protocol are conducted prior to the election: initial setup, generating the Eperio table, and generating the commitments to the Eperio table. These steps are performed with a *blackbox computation* (for more on this primitive, see Section 5).

### 3.5.1 Initial Setup

The setup assumes that a list of candidates, $\mathbb{S}$, is available as well as the number of ballots, $b$, to be used in the election. The first task is for the trustees to generate an election secret and receive shares of this secret.

- $(y_1, \ldots, y_n, \kappa) \leftarrow \mathsf{DKG}(n, t, l, f_1, \ldots, f_n)$

### 3.5.2 Generate Eperio table

Next, the trustees generate the Eperio table $\mathbf{E}$. $\mathbf{U}$ is formed by listing the ballot and position numbers in order. To form $\mathbf{S}$, the candidate list is repeated $b$ times and then randomly permuted on a ballot-by-ballot basis.

- $\Pi_S \leftarrow \mathsf{PRNG}(\kappa)$
- $\mathbf{S}_i \leftarrow \mathsf{PermuteBlock}(\mathbb{S}^b, s, \Pi_S)$

Table $\mathbf{P}$ is created by placing $\mathbf{U}$, $\mathbf{M}$, and $\mathbf{S}$ beside each other in columns. $\mathbf{M}$ is initially empty, but in future meetings will include the marks recorded during the election. $\mathbf{P}$ is used to print the ballots. We use the symbol : to denote an entire vector within a matrix.

- $\mathbf{P}_{(:,1)} \leftarrow \mathbf{U}$
- $\mathbf{P}_{(:,2)} \leftarrow \mathbf{M}$
- $\mathbf{P}_{(:,3)} \leftarrow \mathbf{S}$

Finally, $x$ independent row-wise shufflings of $\mathbf{P}$ are generated. Each shuffled instance of $\mathbf{P}$ is stored in the Eperio table, $\mathbf{E}_{(i,j,k)}$.

- For $k = 1$ to $x$,
  - $\Pi_E \leftarrow \mathsf{PRNG}(\kappa)$
  - $\mathbf{E}_{(:,1,k)} \leftarrow \mathsf{Permute}(\mathbf{P}_{(:,1)}, \Pi_E)$
  - $\mathbf{E}_{(:,2,k)} \leftarrow \mathsf{Permute}(\mathbf{P}_{(:,2)}, \Pi_E)$
  - $\mathbf{E}_{(:,3,k)} \leftarrow \mathsf{Permute}(\mathbf{P}_{(:,3)}, \Pi_E)$

We define, for future use, the following function. It encapsulates all the steps in this 'generate Eperio table' section.

- $\mathbf{E} \leftarrow \mathsf{GenE}(\kappa)$

### 3.5.3 Generate Commitments

The trustees are now ready to commit to the data in $\mathbf{E}$. For each instance $1 < k < x$, they will commit to both

the $\mathbf{E}_{(:,1,k)}$ and $\mathbf{E}_{(:,3,k)}$ columns. This requires $x \times 2$ commitments. The random factors for these commitments are stored in an $x \times 2$ table $\mathbf{R}$. The resulting commitment is stored in the corresponding table $\mathbf{C}$.

- For $i = 1$ to 2, $j = 2i - 1$, and $k = 1$ to $x$,
  - $\mathbf{R}_{(i,k)} \leftarrow \mathsf{PRNG}(\kappa)$
  - $\mathbf{C}_{(i,k)} \leftarrow \mathsf{Commit}(\mathbf{E}_{(:,j,k)}, \mathbf{R}_{(i,k)})$
- `Publish` $\mathbf{C}$

Note that $2i - 1$ is simply the mapping $\{1 \rightarrow 1, 2 \rightarrow 3\}$, used to denote that commitments to the first and third columns of $\mathbf{E}$ are stored, respectively, in the first and second rows of $\mathbf{C}$. $\mathbf{C}$ is published to the bulletin board.

#### 3.5.4 Voting

Registered and authenticated voters are issued a paper ballot with a randomized candidate list according to $\mathbf{P}$. After marking the ballot, the candidate list is detached and destroyed (*e.g.,* placed in to a paper shredder). The remaining strip is scanned by an optical scanner and the strip is retained by the voter as a receipt. The optical scanners will record for each ballot which position was marked, as well as the ballots that were print audited. After the election, these are placed into the list $\mathbf{M}$. Without knowing $\mathbf{P}_{(:,3)}$, this information does not reveal which candidate was voted for and can be published.

- `Publish` $\mathbf{M}$

#### 3.5.5 Compute Tally

At least $t + 1$ trustees submit their election secrets to the blackbox computation, which regenerates the key and the Eperio table. This time, the completed marks list is shuffled along with the rest of the table.

- $\kappa \leftarrow \mathsf{KeyRec}(y_1, \ldots, y_{t+1})$
- $\mathbf{E} \leftarrow \mathsf{GenE}(\kappa)$

For each instance $x$, they publish the corresponding marks list. Each of these lists is a shuffled version of the original $\mathbf{M}$.

- `Publish:` $\mathbf{E}_{(:,2,:)}$

Finally, a tally is computed from any $\mathbf{E}_{(:,2,k)}$ and $\mathbf{E}_{(:,3,k)}$ pair of columns, and the list of totaled values for each candidate, denoted $\tau$, is published. This can be considered an *asserted tally*, as the purpose of E2E verification is to prove that this tally is correct.

#### 3.5.6 Generate the Linkage List

To ensure that the Eperio table is consistent with what actually appears on the printed ballots in the election, verifiers have the ability to keep an issued ballot for purposes of auditing its printing. If a ballot was chosen to be print audited and the first position contained candidate Bob, then a row corresponding to this markable region will exist in $\mathbf{E}$ at an unknown row. The row will be different for each instance. If the ballot is printed correctly, each corresponding row in each instance should contain Bob in the third column. The print auditor would like assurance of this fact.

However since commitments to only entire columns $\mathbf{E}_{(:,1,k)}$ and $\mathbf{E}_{(:,3,k)}$ exist, this fact cannot be directly revealed without revealing both columns for a given instance. Doing this would reveal which candidate was selected for every receipt and cannot be pursued. Instead, the election trustees will indirectly establish this fact. The trustees assert the row number, $a$, in each instance corresponding to every audited markable region. Which markable regions are audited is contained in the marks list, $\mathbf{M}$, with -1 recorded for that entry. The list of asserted row numbers is called the linkage list, $\mathbf{L}$, and it is made public.

- for $i = 1$ to $u$ and $k = 1$ to $x$:
  - if $\mathbf{M}_i =$ -1:
    - `Find:` $a$ s.t. $\mathbf{E}_{(a,1,k)} = \mathbf{U}_i$
    - $\mathbf{L}_{(i,k)} \leftarrow a$

#### 3.5.7 Audit Challenge and Response

After the tally has been posted, the trustees prove to an independent auditor that the tally was calculated correctly. They do this through a cut-and-choose protocol. First the trustees regenerate the election secret and the Eperio table.

- $\kappa \leftarrow \mathsf{KeyRec}(y_1, \ldots, y_{t+1})$
- $\mathbf{E} \leftarrow \mathsf{GenE}(\kappa)$

Next, they invoke the public coin toss function to generate one flip for each of the $x$ instances.

- for $k = 1$ to $x$:
  - $z \leftarrow \mathsf{PublicCoin}()$
  - $\mathbf{Z}_k \leftarrow z$
  - `Publish:` $\mathbf{R}_{(z+1,k)}$
  - `Publish:` $\mathbf{E}_{(:,2z+1,k)}$

Each flip is recorded in $\mathbf{Z}_k$. Depending on the flip, they either reveal the first two or last two columns in each instance. Recall that $\mathbf{E}_{(:,2,:)}$ was published previously. This is illustrated in Figure 2.

### 3.6 Verification

We now show the steps that the verifiers take to check that the published data corresponds to a tally that is correct. Recall there are three sets of audits (and corresponding verifiers). The first set, $\mathcal{V}_1$, are the voters




Figure 2: **Auditing Eperio table instances**. Two example instances of the Eperio table during auditing. Each instance alleges to contain the same information, but in an independently shuffled order. **Left:** `E(:,3,1)` was challenged (then revealed), allowing verifiers to tally the election. **Right:** `E(:,1,2)` was challenged (then revealed) allowing voters to check their receipts. The grey bars symbolize cryptographic commitments that will remain unopened to protect ballot secrecy.

who check their receipts (or provide a copy to someone they delegate to check on their behalf). If the receipt corresponds to ballot number $b$ and contains $s$ positions that are either marked (1) or unmarked (0), the auditor should check that the status of each position $i$ on the receipt matches the status recorded at $\mathbf{M}_j$, where $j = s(b-1)+i$.

The second set of verifiers, $\mathcal{V}_2$, should check the linkage list against their print audited ballots. Let $a = \mathbf{L}_{(i,k)}$ for an $i$ on their ballot and an instance $k$. Depending on the random coin for instance $k$, $\mathcal{V}_2$ should check that $\mathbf{E}_{(a,1,k)}$ matches the associated markable region on the ballot or $\mathbf{E}_{(a,3,k)}$ matches the associated candidate. They should do this for all $i$ on their print audited ballot and each $k$ in the election.

These two audits establish that the reported marks correspond to what appeared on voter's completed ballots and that what appears on the ballot corresponds to what is in the pre-committed Eperio table. The final step is to ensure that the asserted tally, $\tau$, corresponds to the marks. Recall that for each of the $x$ instances, a random coin was flipped to reveal value $z \in_r \{0,1\}$. The third set of verifiers, $\mathcal{V}_3$, should do the following.

- for $k = 1$ to $x$:
  - $z \leftarrow \mathbf{Z}_k$
  - `Check` $\mathsf{Reveal}(\mathbf{C}_{(z+1,k)}, \mathbf{R}_{(z+1,k)}, \mathbf{E}_{(:,2z+1,k)})$
  - If $z = 0$:
    - `Check` $\{\mathbf{E}_{(:,1,k)}, \mathbf{E}_{(:,2,k)}\} \cong \{\mathbf{U}_i, \mathbf{M}_i\}$
  - If $z = 1$:
    - `Check` $\{\mathbf{E}_{(:,2,k)}, \mathbf{E}_{(:,3,k)}\} \cong \tau$

Here $\cong$ means that the two pairs of tables are isomorphic—*i.e.,* they are a permuted representation of the same information.

# 4 Security

In this section, we summarize the main results of our security proof, which can be found in the full technical report version of this paper (see Section 11 for link). Given a transcript of the entire protocol, the asserted tally can be either accepted or rejected. If the asserted tally is correct, the decision will always be to accept (completeness). If the asserted tally is not correct, the decision will be to reject with a high probability (soundness). Finally, the outputs do not provide any information that can be used by a computationally bounded adversary to determine any non-negligible information about which candidate was voted for by any voter (computational secrecy).

Let $\mathcal{P}$ be an unbounded prover (the election authority) and $\mathcal{V}$ be a PPT-bounded verifier. Either entity may employ a malicious strategy and we denote this with a prime $(\mathcal{P}', \mathcal{V}')$. Recall that $\tau$ represents the asserted tally and let $\rho$ be the asserted receipts.

**Soundness** The soundness of Eperio relies on two assumptions:

1. The function $\mathsf{Commit}(m, r)$ is perfectly binding. That is, for any $m_1$ such that $\mathsf{Commit}(m_1, r_1) = c_1$, there does not exist any $r_2$ and $m_2 \neq m_1$ such that $\mathsf{Reveal}(c_1, r_2, m_2) = 1$.
2. The function $\mathsf{PublicCoin}()$ is perfectly unpredictable before invocation.

Let $b'_r$ be the number of modified ballot receipts, and $0 \leq p_1 \leq 1$ represent the fraction of voters who conduct a receipt check. Let $b'_p$ be the number of misprinted ballots, and $0 \leq p_2 \leq 1$ be the fraction of ballots that are print audited. Recall there are $x$ instances are in $\mathbf{E}_{(:,:,k)}$, for $1 \leq k \leq x$. Given the above assumptions hold, it is proven (in the technical report) that the probability of $\mathcal{V}$ rejecting a malformed transcript from $\mathcal{P}'$ is:

$$\mathbf{Pr}[\texttt{REJECT}_{\mathcal{P}',\mathcal{V}}] = \min[(1-(1-p_1)^{b'_r}), (1-(1-p_2)^{b'_p})(1-\frac{1}{2^x})].$$

**Computational Secrecy** The secrecy of Eperio relies on the following assumptions:

1. The maximum number of colluding trustees is $t$.
2. At least one trustee submits to $\mathsf{DKG}$ an $f_i$ drawn with uniform randomness from $\mathbb{Z}_l^t$.

3. All outputs are computed with a blackbox.
4. Any polynomial-sized output from $\mathsf{PRNG}(\kappa)$ provides no non-negligible advantage to a PPT-bounded adversary in guessing either $\kappa$, the next bit in the output, or any unobserved previous bit.
5. The function $\mathsf{Commit}(m, r)$ is semantically secure and computationally hiding. That is, given either $c_1 = \mathsf{Commit}(m_1, r_1)$ or $c_2 = \mathsf{Commit}(m_2, r_2)$ for any chosen $m_1$ and $m_2$, a PPT-bounded adversary should have no non-negligible advantage in guessing which message was committed to.

Let $\epsilon_{A4}$ and $\epsilon_{A5}$ be the advantage specificied in assumptions 4 and 5. Given all of the assumptions hold, we prove (in the technical report) that the advantage of $\mathcal{P}'$ recovering non-negligible information about any voter's selection given the full transcript as opposed to just the final tally is:

$$|\mathbf{Pr}[\mathsf{RecoverSel}(\mathtt{View}_{\mathcal{V}'}(\rho, \tau, \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{L}, \mathbf{E}_{(:,2,:)}, \mathbf{R}_z) = 1] - \mathbf{Pr}[\mathsf{RecoverSel}(\mathtt{View}_{\mathcal{V}'}(\tau)) = 1]| \leq \epsilon_{A4} + \epsilon_{A5}.$$

**Additional Claims** In addition to the above proofs, we also show that Eperio is complete and can be modified to have everlasting privacy (*i.e.,* $\mathcal{V}$ is unbounded and $\mathcal{P}$ is PPT-bounded).

## 5 Practical Primitives

In this section, we revisit a few of the cryptographic primitives needed in Eperio. In particular, we are interested in options that allow for useful deployment options.

**Blackbox Computation** The Eperio protocol requires the generation of the Eperio table to be done using a blackbox computation. While in theory, the task performed by the blackbox could be made into a multiparty computation (where only privacy is required as correctness is provided by Eperio), we instead propose the use of a semi-trusted computer. It is semi-trusted in the sense of only providing *private* evaluation of functions; the *correctness* can be determined through the audit. That said, mechanisms are provided to encourage correct evaluation. To this end, we assume disclosed source code for the functions to be evaluated is provided in advance and some attestation mechanism is available to ensure it is the same code running on the computer.

All tasks performed by the trustees can be accomplished by regenerating the Eperio table, and the regeneration of this table can be accomplished through a threshold of secret shares from the trustees. Therefore the computer should not have any persistent memory and its internal state should be purged after the outputs have been published. While this assumption may seem strong, in each of the recent occasions where end-to-end verifiable voting systems were used in real-life binding elections, semi-trusted computers were deployed: *e.g.,* Punchscan at the University of Ottawa [24], Helios at Université Catholique de Louvain (for key generation from the description in their paper) [2], and Scantegrity at Takoma Park, MD [16].

**Cryptographic Commitment** We are interested in using symmetric-key file encryption as a commitment function for its speed, simplicity and widespread availability of software implementations. For Eperio, this means putting the columns of the Eperio table into individuals files, encrypting them under a randomly chosen key, and posting the encryption as a commitment. To open the commitment, the encryption key is revealed and the file can be decrypted. While our implementation of Eperio can be easily modified to work with any standard commitment function, we use this approach to simplify the experience for voters who want to verify the proof for themselves. File encryption utilities are readily available, easy to use, and the commitment has message recovery.

Let $\mathcal{E}$ be a pseudorandom permutation (PRP): $\{0,1\}^k \times \{0,1\}^m \rightarrow \{0,1\}^m$. Let $M$ be a message of $L$ $m$-bit blocks and let $IV$ be a random $m$-bit initialization vector. Define $E$ to be the cipher block chaining (CBC) mode of encryption that encrypts $M = m_1, \ldots, m_L$ under $k$-bit key $K$ and $m$-bit $IV$. $E$ is defined as: $c_0 = IV$ and $c_i = \mathcal{E}(K, c_{i-1} \oplus m_i)$. Assume $M$ is exactly $L \cdot m$ bits long and $k = m$. Let $D$ be its inverse decryption function applied to $C = c_0, \ldots, c_L$ under $K$: $M = D(K, C)$.

**Theorem 1:** As defined, $E$ is indistinguishable under a chosen plaintext attack (CPA). [6]

**Conjecture 2:** As defined, $D$ behaves like a pseudorandom function with respect to collisions when $C$ is held constant (note the difference from standard assumptions on $M$ and $C$ with a fixed $K$). That is, $M \leftarrow D_C(K)$ has random collisions for a fixed $C$ and a variable $K$.

**Theorem 3:** Define a *commitment with message recovery* function as $(c, \mathrm{IV}) \leftarrow \mathsf{Commit}(M, K) = E(K, \mathrm{IV}, M \| f(M))$, where $E$ is, as defined, CBC mode with a pseudorandom permutation, and $f(M) =$

$M \| M$ is a redundancy function.[4] Define $M' \leftarrow \mathsf{Reveal}(C, K) = D(K, C)$. $M'$ is only accepted when $M'$ has the correct form $M \| f(M)$ for some $M$. We show that such a commitment is computationally hiding under Theorem 1 and statistically binding under Conjecture 2.

We omit a proof of Theorem 3 here but it is included in the full version of the paper. Because the commitment has message recovery, its Reveal function differs slightly from the commitment used earlier. We have demonstrated a very specific statistically hiding commitment function that can be constructed from a block cipher, assuming conjecture 1 holds. We model this ideal functionality in the real-world with AES-128-CBC in the next section.

**Public Coin Toss** Voting systems often require the use of a public coin for the purposes of fairly implementing the cut-and-choose aspect of the audits. In the case of conventional voting, it is used to select precincts for manual recounts. Cordero *et al.* suggest a protocol using dice [21]. Clark *et al.* note that dice outcomes are only observable by those in the room, and suggest a protocol for auditing E2E ballots using stock market prices [18], which has recently been given a more formal analysis [19]. This was suggested earlier by Waters *et al.* outside of the voting context [42]. A further alternative is to use the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [26], which is secure in the random oracle model. However, a requirement for Fiat-Shamir is that the challenge space is large. In our case, the number of challenge bits is the same as the number of proof instances—for 10 or 20 instances, Fiat-Shamir is not secure. Thus, we use the stock market protocol. The output from a statistically-sound PRNG is seeded with a random extraction of a pre-selected portfolio of closing stock prices. Evaluation of challenges occurs at least a full business day after the audit data has been committed to [19].

## 6 Implementation

**Election Generation Tool** The hardware/OS platform design of the election generation software tool follows directly from previous systems [2, 16, 24] whereby a diskless, stand-alone computer is booted from a Linux live-CD. The Eperio election generation software is then loaded via a USB-key after being certified by external experts. Election data is generated and written back on to the USB sticks, at which point the computer is shut down

[4] We thank and acknowledge Ronald L. Rivest for suggesting this redundancy function for creating a binding commitment from a block cipher. Any errors in the analysis are our own.




Figure 3: Election generation wizard. Trustees are guided through the complete process of selecting election parameters and setting up strong passwords prior to generating ballots and cryptographic audit data.

(it and the live-CD are then optionally placed beyond use). The election generation software itself is separated in to graphical user-interface, and cryptographic/back-end components. The primary cryptographic operations (i.e., file-encryption based commitments) were realized using function calls to OpenSSL. We implemented the election generation tool in Python using the GTK+ GUI library, which is a standard to most GNOME Linux live-CD distributions. The graphical layout consists of a multi-panel "wizard" work flow (shown in figure 3) to incrementally guide election trustees through parameter selection and password input. Unlike the Punchscan/Scantegrity software implementation, which requires some initial system configuration, the Eperio trustee interface software is intended to be self-contained and runnable directly following a live-CD boot.

**Bulletin Board** The implementation of secure public, append-only bulletin boards is an open area of research. In its simplest form, the bulletin board consists of signed election audit data available on a public FTP server administered by the election authority, and which is closely monitored and archived/mirrored by any interested party. Mirroring of audit data can be an important peer-service provided between verifiers since the election authority may maliciously attempt to modify commitment data throughout the course of the election. It also ensures long-term archiving of the audit data, which may otherwise might be removed following the election.

**Verification Script** As a primary objective of Eperio, the verification script was designed to be compact and execute swiftly. A Python script externally calls OpenSSL to decrypt relevant commitment files and then performs the audits on them. We implemented proofs of

the *Marked-as-Intended* and *Counted-as-Collected* properties in a compact fifty (50) lines of Python code, and have placed it online along with sample election audit data. As will be discussed in the following section, this represents the smallest implementation of a verification interface relative to other major released implementations by an order of magnitude. We tested this implementation on Ubuntu 7.10 (Python 2.5) and 9.10 (Python 2.6) as well as on Mac OSX Leopard and found that it could be executed without additional installation or configuration. Verifiers using Windows would be required to install Python and OpenSSL, or as an alternative, they could be directed to burn and boot Linux live CD. With the verification scripts on a USB key the entire audit can be completed without actually installing or configuring software on a verifier's machine.

**Verification using Spreadsheets** An interesting alternative to writing a custom codebase is to use a spreadsheet that can import a CSV file as a worksheet. We believe that spreadsheets can help broaden the appeal of E2E verification, given many citizens who are not accustomed to reading/writing/running code *do* use spreadsheets. Spreadsheets have grown to become one of the most familiar computer applications, capturing a diverse cross-section of users in government, enterprise, and consumer sectors. They are also widely available: OpenOffice.org, a freely-downloadable open-source office productivity suite (which includes the Calc spreadsheet application), reports over a hundred million downloads.[5]

We have developed a set of simple manual verification steps using TrueCrypt and OpenOffice Calc. As an overview of this implementation, the user manually copies and pastes the revealed encryption keys into the TrueCrypt volume password dialog to mount the encrypted volume. The unencrypted CSV file can now be loaded directly in to the spreadsheet program as a worksheet. The verifier can then complete the audit using only simple spreadsheet operations (`COPY`, `PASTE`, `SORT`, etc). A full set of instructions is contained in the full technical report. As an alternative to manual verification, most spreadsheet applications integrate power macro/scripting languages that could automate the audit checks.

**Spreadsheets as an all-in-one election audit tool?** Although many spreadsheets support basic file-encryption, cases of improper implementation (as in [43]) have led to a general distrust of spreadsheets as an encryption service. We observed that OpenOffice's file encryption leaks partial information about a file's contents by storing an unencrypted/unsalted hash of the first 1024 bytes of the compressed spreadsheet[6], making it unsuitable as an implementation of the commitment scheme proposed in section 5. Indeed it is not clear whether any of the major contemporary spreadsheet applications would be suitable for implementing file-encryption based commitments. Nevertheless, the prospect of an "all-in-one" election verification tool already installed on most voters computers is an intriguing one.

## 7 Performance Comparison

Let us examine the technical requirements of election audits by comparing Eperio to several other major implementations. For space reasons we restrict our comparison to recent systems that have been deployed in binding elections, specifically Punchscan, Prêt à Voter, Helios and Scantegrity II. As outlined in section 3, Eperio uses a cut-and-choose protocol to verify the correctness of the ballot data structure. Through the use of the *linkage-list* construct for print auditing, and the symmetric-key commitment scheme outlined in section 5, the protocol allows for the commitment of entire columns, causing the number of required symmetric-key block operations to grow with the number of voters/candidates divided by the block size. The compactness of the verification process follows from it: verification involves running a file-decryption utility, followed by a sort and comparison of columns with the asserted outcome.

Both Punchscan [38] and Scantegrity [16] rely on a similar cut-and-choose protocol to audit their respective data structures, but utilize a particular commitment and print-audit scheme that requires each table element to be committed to separately resulting in a much larger dataset and number of symmetric-key operations. Unlike Eperio and Scantegrity however, Punchscan encodes ballot information in a way that is mostly invariant to the number of candidates, resulting in some savings in terms of data/number of overall block operations, although it requires additional ballot commitments as a result of its particular ballot style. Punchscan was first deployed during University of Ottawa Graduate Students Association's (GSAÉD) annual general election in 2007 [24]. This election dataset (denoted `GSAED07` in table 2) and verification source code (written in C#) are available online.[7] Scantegrity was deployed during the 2009 Takoma Park municipal election (supra. note 2). This election dataset (denoted `TAKOMA09` in table 2) and verification source code (Python and JAVA) are also available online

[5] `http://stats.openoffice.org`

[6] Open Document Format for Office Applications (OpenDocument) v1.2

[7] `http://punchscan.org/gsaed/`

| System | Mod Exp. | Mod Mult. | Symm. key ops | Data (B) | LOC (approx) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Eperio | – | – | $3iv(\log(2v)+2)/16$ | $6iv(\log(2v)+2)+16i$ | 50 |
| Scantegrity | – | – | $7.5civ$ | $168civ$ | 1000 |
| Punchscan | – | – | $7.5iv+9v$ | $168iv+224v$ | 2000 |
| Prêt-á-voter | $1.5itv$ | – | $itv$ | $288itv+192v$ | 1000 |
| Helios v2. | $9cv+ct$ | $9cv$ | $2.5cv$ | $2064cv$ | 1500 |

Table 1: Technical requirements for election verification: comparison of Eperio with other implementations for cryptographic audits involving $v$ voters, $c$ candidates, $t$ trustees and $i$ proof instances.

(supra. note 3). We used the Python implementation to produce timing results in table 2.

Prêt à Voter [17], also an E2E mechanism for optical-scan elections, uses randomized-partial checking of the correct behaviour of nodes in a decryption mixnet [30]. Each election trustee separately maintains two mix nodes in this network, and auditing the mixnet involves verifying the public-key decryption of half of the ciphertexts emanating from a given mix node. The number of public-key operations a verifier must perform therefore is the number of trustees times the number of voters. Auditing ballot printing also involves decryptions proportional to the number of trustees. Prêt à Voter differs from Eperio, Punchscan and Scantegrity in that it does not precommit to cryptographic ballot forms—they can be generated (and audited) on-demand. This allows only voted ballots to have to be decrypted by the mixnet, but the print audit still requires more ballot forms be printed than actually voted upon. Prêt à Voter was deployed in 2007 for the University of Surrey Students' Union (USSU) Sabbatical Elections. The audit dataset (USSU07) is not currently available online. The verification interface was written in JAVA.[8]

Helios v2. [2] is an E2E mechanism for remote voting that uses homomorphic tallying (i.e., tallying under encryption) to protect voter privacy. To ensure the tally is correct, a zero-knowledge proof of correctness accompanies the encryption of each candidate on each ballot in the election. Likewise, a proof of decryption accompanies the final tally. The primary computational requirement of Helios election verification comes from auditing the inputs—each ballot requires 4 modular exponentiations per candidate. The Helios verification interface was written in Python.[9] Helios v2. was deployed in 2009 in an election at Universite Catholique de Louvain. The the election dataset (UCL09) is not currently available online. Timing analysis of a reference election of the original implementation, Helios v1., is presented in [1] and is denoted in table 2 as HELv1REF.

**Audit dataset size** For an election involving $v$ voters, $c$ candidates, $t$ trustees and $i$ proof instances, Table 1 expresses each system in terms of the number of modular exponentiations, modular multiplications, and symmetric-key block operations required during the verification process, along with the size of the audit dataset (bytes) and contributed software lines of code (LOC) of the respective implementation. In the case of paper-ballot systems, we include an additional 0.5v ballots for the print audit. In the case of systems with pre-committed ballots, an additional 0.5v ballots are included to account for spoilage. Although the execution and data complexities of the systems are all linear in the election parameters, Eperio's performance advantage stems from its smaller constant factor.

**Timing** Basic timing analysis of election verification on available data is presented in Table 2. Our test platform was a 1.8GHz dual-core HP laptop running Ubuntu Linux 9.10. Eperio timings were performed on data *simulating* equivalently sized elections.

Comparing execution times of the Eperio verification script relative to three other systems (Punchscan, Scantegrity, Helios) on three election datasets shows Eperio significantly faster in time-to-verify. As a concrete example, using the Punchscan verification tool to audit the 2007 Punchscan election in [24], it took us 75 seconds to complete, while an equivalently sized election run with Eperio took us 9 seconds.

The timing result for the Scantegrity audit on the TAKOMA09 dataset includes several audits relating to the Scantegrity II ballot and voting method of the specific election that we did not replicate, suggesting that a more precise timing analysis would produce a smaller margin.

**Code size: is less really more?** Table 1 lists the approximate code size of published verification software showing Eperio having a significantly smaller code base than related systems. As a performance metric however, software lines of code (LOC) is limited. There is debate as to how code lines should be counted, as well as which components to even include. It also does not take into account whether more efficient implementations could be created. Setting these questions aside, are small code bases important for E2E audit software?

While ultimately smaller code bases are not a proof

[8] http://www.pretavoter.com

[9] http://www.heliosvoting.org/

| Election | Scantegrity | Punchscan | Helios | Eperio |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| TAKOMA09 | 1127s | – | – | 162s |
| GSAED07 | – | 75s | – | 9s |
| HELv1REF | – | – | 14400s | 1s |

Table 2: Time to verify election audit dataset. Eperio times are for simulated datasets of equivalently sized election.

of relative simplicity or ease of implementation, we believe it is a signal of simplicity as well as a gesture for engaging a wider audience.

## 8 Related Work

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, many protocols for cryptographic voting were proposed, the majority based on either mix networks, originating with Chaum [14], or additive homomorphic encryption, originating with Benaloh and Tuinstra [9]. The first generation of mixnet protocols appeared before techniques for provably correct mixing were known, including a well-studied protocol by Fujioka *et. al* [27], while second generation protocols, originating with Sako and Killian [40], use a correctness proof.

Recently, implementation issues are given more consideration. VoteHere [36] and Votegrity [15] are early electronic systems where voters do not need to perform traditional cryptography, while VoteBox [41] allows voters to obtain an encrypted ballot from an untrusted machine using a cut-and-choose protocol due to Beneloh [8]. Prêt à Voter [17], Punchscan [38], Scratch & Vote [3], ThreeBallot [39], and Scantegrity [16] are examples of systems that use paper ballots, require no cryptography for vote capture, and offer a privacy preserving receipt to each voter. Civitas [20] is an internet system based on a protocol by Juels *et al.* [31] for high coercion elections, while Helios is designed for low coercion internet elections [1].

The cryptographic proofs in these systems use a variety of approaches, including zero-knowledge proofs, cut-and-choose protocols, and randomized partial checking [30]. Eperio is perhaps closest to Scantegrity, which also breaks election data into markable regions and uses a blackbox computation. However Eperio uses a more compact data structure, no pointers, and commits to data at a lower level of granularity than Scantegrity.

## 9 Future Work

This paper presented an E2E protocol in with single-party privacy assurance. Future work will be aimed at providing similar ease of verification but with multi-party construction of the Eperio table. We also focused on an E2E ballot style with randomized candidate ordering. Integration of Eperio with code-based ballots, specifically those with the subtle non-repudiation properties of the Scantegrity II ballot are of interest. Also, this paper considered *plurality* elections, however voting methods, such as *single transferable vote* (STV) and *instant run-off voting* (IRV) provide unique privacy challenges not addressed by the basic Eperio data table. Finally, and in many ways most pertinent, a formal usability study of election verification relative to other systems would be provide valuable feedback regarding the direction of this work.

## 10 Conclusion

The contemporary verification process for electronic voting is deficient. Independent security reviews are generally rare, time-constrained affairs subject to non-disclosure. While we advocate greater transparency for existing election technology, we also contend that end-to-end verification offers a distinct advantage: verification becomes a task of checking election *data* not software and equipment. This may appear to simply shift the problem: the prevailing methods for verifying E2E election data is with software. However it is not a simple shift. In nearly all E2E systems, the verification code is smaller than the hundreds of thousands of lines of code in a modern DRE.

With Eperio, the software is *much* smaller—four orders of magnitude smaller—and verification can even be performed manually without any custom software. By making verification more accessible to voters, we contend that Eperio is an important democracy enhancing technology.

## 11 Website

The technical report, source code and test data are available from: `http://www.eperio.org`

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