When neither the exact number nor kind markets can be known ahead of time, methods for comparing and evaluating the benefits of different market configurations [7] will need to be developed. Using such comparisons, we can hope to identify general rules or incentives that promote commerce environments having increased efficiency, profits, surplus or any number of other criteria. We are currently performing small experiments to compare the efficiency and surplus for different market configurations given different buyer and seller value distributions.
In the next sections, we consider the mechanics of two particular market selection processes. The mechanics of the market selection process will have an impact on what kinds of markets can be started as well as the kind of rules and incentives which can be used. In particular, who makes the decisions about what auctions to create, is it the agents (where agents can be humans or software) or the Auction Manager? We argue that in some circumstances it may be more reasonable to have agents decide while in others the Auction Manager, and both should be supported. We also discuss the kinds of information and incentive requirements needed for each situation.