Attrition Defenses for a Peer-to-Peer Digital Preservation System

Abstract: 

In peer-to-peer systems, attrition attacks include both traditional, network-level denial of service attacks as well as application-level attacks in which malign peers conspire to waste loyal peers' resources. We describe several defenses for the LOCKSS peer-to-peer digital preservation system that help ensure that application-level attrition attacks even from powerful adversaries are less effective than simple network-level attacks, and that network-level attacks must be intense, widespread, and prolonged to impair the system.

BibTeX
@inproceedings {269427,
author = {T.J. Giuli and Petros Maniatis and Mary Bake and David S. H. Rosenthal},
title = {Attrition Defenses for a {Peer-to-Peer} Digital Preservation System},
booktitle = {2005 USENIX Annual Technical Conference (USENIX ATC 05)},
year = {2005},
address = {Anaheim, CA},
url = {https://www.usenix.org/conference/2005-usenix-annual-technical-conference/attrition-defenses-peer-peer-digital-preservation},
publisher = {USENIX Association},
month = apr
}