Get more
Help Promote graphics!
Mirror: Enabling Proofs of Data Replication and Retrievability in the Cloud
LISA: Where systems engineering and operations professionals share real-world knowledge about designing, building, and maintaining the critical systems of our interconnected world.
The LISA conference has long served as the annual vendor-neutral meeting place for the wider system administration community. The LISA14 program recognized the overlap and differences between traditional and modern IT operations and engineering, and developed a highly-curated program around 5 key topics: Systems Engineering, Security, Culture, DevOps, and Monitoring/Metrics. The program included 22 half- and full-day training sessions; 10 workshops; and a conference program consisting of 50 invited talks, panels, refereed paper presentations, and mini-tutorials.
Frederik Armknecht, University of Mannheim; Ludovic Barman, Jens-Matthias Bohli, and Ghassan O. Karame, NEC Laboratories Europe
Proofs of Retrievability (POR) and Data Possession (PDP) are cryptographic protocols that enable a cloud provider to prove that data is correctly stored in the cloud. PDP have been recently extended to enable users to check in a single protocol that additional file replicas are stored as well. To conduct multi-replica PDP, users are however required to process, construct, and upload their data replicas by themselves. This incurs additional bandwidth overhead on both the service provider and the user and also poses new security risks for the provider. Namely, since uploaded files are typically encrypted, the provider cannot recognize if the uploaded content are indeed replicas. This limits the business models available to the provider, since e.g., reduced costs for storing replicas can be abused by users who upload different files—while claiming that they are replicas.
In this paper, we address this problem and propose a novel solution for proving data replication and retrievability in the cloud, Mirror, which allows to shift the burden of constructing replicas to the cloud provider itself—thus conforming with the current cloud model. We show that Mirror is secure against malicious users and a rational cloud provider. Finally, we implement a prototype based on Mirror, and evaluate its performance in a realistic cloud setting. Our evaluation results show that our proposal incurs tolerable overhead on the users and the cloud provider.
Open Access Media
USENIX is committed to Open Access to the research presented at our events. Papers and proceedings are freely available to everyone once the event begins. Any video, audio, and/or slides that are posted after the event are also free and open to everyone. Support USENIX and our commitment to Open Access.
author = {Frederik Armknecht and Ludovic Barman and Jens-Matthias Bohli and Ghassan O. Karame},
title = {Mirror: Enabling Proofs of Data Replication and Retrievability in the Cloud},
booktitle = {25th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 16)},
year = {2016},
isbn = {978-1-931971-32-4},
address = {Austin, TX},
pages = {1051--1068},
url = {https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity16/technical-sessions/presentation/armknecht},
publisher = {USENIX Association},
month = aug
}
connect with us