Reusable Enclaves for Confidential Serverless Computing

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Authors: 

Shixuan Zhao, The Ohio State University; Pinshen Xu, Southern University of Science and Technology; Guoxing Chen, Shanghai Jiao Tong University; Mengya Zhang, The Ohio State University; Yinqian Zhang, Southern University of Science and Technology; Zhiqiang Lin, The Ohio State University

Abstract: 

The recent development of Trusted Execution Environment has brought unprecedented opportunities for confidential computing within cloud-based systems. Among various popular cloud business models, serverless computing has gained dominance since its emergence, leading to a high demand for confidential serverless computing services based on trusted enclaves. However, the issue of cold start overhead significantly hinders its performance, as new enclaves need to be created to ensure a clean and verifiable execution environment. In this paper, we propose a novel approach for constructing reusable enclaves that enable rapid enclave reset and robust security with three key enabling techniques: enclave snapshot and rewinding, nested attestation, and multi-layer intra-enclave compartmentalisation. We have built a prototype system for confidential serverless computing, integrating OpenWhisk and a WebAssembly runtime, which significantly reduces the cold start overhead in an end-to-end serverless setting while imposing a reasonable performance impact on standard execution.

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