Grace Jia, Yale University; Rachit Agarwal, Cornell University; Anurag Khandelwal, Yale University
This paper explores the problem of preventing length leakage in oblivious data access mechanisms with passive persistent adversaries. We show that designing mechanisms that prevent both length leakage and access pattern leakage requires navigating a three-way tradeoff between storage footprint, bandwidth footprint, and the information leaked to the adversary. We establish powerful lower bounds on achievable storage and bandwidth footprints for a variety of leakage profiles, and present constructions that perfectly or near-perfectly match the lower bounds.
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author = {Grace Jia and Rachit Agarwal and Anurag Khandelwal},
title = {Length Leakage in Oblivious Data Access Mechanisms},
booktitle = {33rd USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 24)},
year = {2024},
isbn = {978-1-939133-44-1},
address = {Philadelphia, PA},
pages = {6417--6434},
url = {https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity24/presentation/jia-grace},
publisher = {USENIX Association},
month = aug
}