All Your Tokens are Belong to Us: Demystifying Address Verification Vulnerabilities in Solidity Smart Contracts

Authors: 

Tianle Sun, Huazhong University of Science and Technology; Ningyu He, Peking University; Jiang Xiao, Huazhong University of Science and Technology; Yinliang Yue, Zhongguancun Laboratory; Xiapu Luo, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University; Haoyu Wang, Huazhong University of Science and Technology

Abstract: 

In Ethereum, the practice of verifying the validity of the passed addresses is a common practice, which is a crucial step to ensure the secure execution of smart contracts. Vulnerabilities in the process of address verification can lead to great security issues, and anecdotal evidence has been reported by our community. However, this type of vulnerability has not been well studied. To fill the void, in this paper, we aim to characterize and detect this kind of emerging vulnerability. We design and implement AVVERIFIER, a lightweight taint analyzer based on static EVM opcode simulation. Its three-phase detector can progressively rule out false positives and false negatives based on the intrinsic characteristics. Upon a well-established and unbiased benchmark, AVVERIFIER can improve efficiency 2 to 5 times than the SOTA while maintaining a 94.3% precision and 100% recall. After a large-scale evaluation of over 5 million Ethereum smart contracts, we have identified 812 vulnerable smart contracts that were undisclosed by our community before this work, and 348 open source smart contracts were further verified, whose largest total value locked is over $11.2 billion. We further deploy AVVERIFIER as a real-time detector on Ethereum and Binance Smart Chain, and the results suggest that AVVERIFIER can raise timely warnings once contracts are deployed.

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BibTeX
@inproceedings {299645,
author = {Tianle Sun and Ningyu He and Jiang Xiao and Yinliang Yue and Xiapu Luo and Haoyu Wang},
title = {All Your Tokens are Belong to Us: Demystifying Address Verification Vulnerabilities in Solidity Smart Contracts},
booktitle = {33rd USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 24)},
year = {2024},
isbn = {978-1-939133-44-1},
address = {Philadelphia, PA},
pages = {3567--3584},
url = {https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity24/presentation/sun-tianle},
publisher = {USENIX Association},
month = aug
}