Two methods for exploiting speculative control flow hijacks

Touted as the buffer overflows of the age, Spectre and Meltdown have created significant interest around microarchitectural vulnerabilities and have been instrumental for the discovery of new classes of attacks. Yet, to-date, real-world exploits are rare since they often either require gadgets that are difficult to locate, or they require the ability of the attacker to inject code. In this work, we uncover two new classes of gadgets with very few restrictions on their structure, making them suitable for real-world exploitation. We demonstrate -- through PoCs -- their suitability to leak one bit and one byte respectively per successful attack, achieving high success rates and low noise on the constructed side-channel. We test our attack PoC on various kernels with default mitigations enabled, showing how they are insufficient to protect against them. We also show that hardening the configuration of mitigations successfully prevents exploitation, making a case for their wider adoption.