

# Effective Malware: The Importance of Stealth



Henry Stern
Senior Security Researcher
Cisco IronPort Systems LLC

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### **The Conflict of Stealth and Interest**

# **Boring is Beautiful**

- Be malicious.
- Be boring.
- Be succesful.

### What is Interest?

- Malware needs to do something.
- Doing something causes interest.

Noisy.

Destructive.

High tech.

Sufficient interest provokes action.

### What is Stealth?

- Evading interest.
- Malware is more effective when not countered.
- Countering malware costs resources.
- Malware is tolerated if it is not interesting.

### The State of Practice

- We tolerate certain levels of malfeasance.
- Attackers are not always observant of this. e.g. Conficker vs. Gh0stNet
- Maybe they should be!

## **The Bestiary**

- Imbot
- ASProx
- Conficker
- Storm (Waledac)
- Reactor Mailer 3 (Srizbi)
- GhostNet

### **IMbot**

- Malware: Imbot.AC, Bifrose.E.
- Infection vector: Instant Messenger.
- Size: 50k sustained.

15k new bots per campaign.

Roughly same cleaned up.

- Exploits trust between IM friends.
- Social pressure to clean infections.

"Hey, you have a virus and it's spamming me."

Large amount of effort required to sustain bot pool.

#### **ASProx**

- Behaviour: Mass SQL injection.
   Javascript payload.
- Generic MSSQL function infects all fields in table.
- Large number of compromised websites for first layer of javascript redirection.
- Small number of hosts for actual exploit code.
- Too many sites infected to clean up.
- Involves enough third parties that clean-up is effectively impossible.

# Storm (Waledac)

- Purpose: Spam, DDOS.
- Infection vector: Social engineering, now Conficker.
- Infamous for its social engineering campaigns, peer-topeer rendezvous protocol, fast flux service network.
- Spam activity was low and slow.
- Attracted too much attention, was never especially effective at spamming.
- Poorly-implemented, high tech features resulted in total subversion.

### Conficker

- Behaviour: Scanning worm.
- Purpose: Vehicle for secondary infections.
- Infection vector: MS08-067 buffer overflow.
- Size: Millions.
- Technical sophistication attracted significant researcher, media attention.
- Enormous development investment from malware authors.

### **Reactor Mailer 3**

- Malware: Srizbi.
- Size: 260k+ bots.
- Responsible for more spam than all other botnets combined.
- Infection vector: Browser exploits, social engineering.
- Purpose-built spam tool. No other functionality.
- Full-kernel rootkit, minimal user disruption.
- Trivial for security vendors to block symptoms.
- Survived 18 months without major harassment.

### **GhostNet**

- Malware: gh0st RAT.
- Infection vector: Targeted social engineering.
  - Specific, known groups and individuals.
  - High degree of human intervention by attacker.
- Dates back as far as 2002.
- Accusations of foreign government involvement.

# A Taxonomy of Interest

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# The Taxonomy

- I am infected.
- My friend is attacking me.
- Somebody around me is infected.
- Somebody is attacking me.
- Something nearby is shiny.

### I am Infected

- Do I notice anything?
- Does it adversely affect me?
- Is it important enough for me to act?

### My friend is attacking me.

- Is it something I see?
- Does it harm me or my other friends?
- Is it worthwhile for me to act?

#### Somebody around me is infected.

- Is it affecting my usage of a shared resource?
- Will it go away on its own?
- Will my actions be effective?

### Somebody is attacking me.

- How much damage is being done?
- Can I do anything about it?
- Will it happen again?

### Something nearby is shiny.

- Is it kewl?
- Is it newsworthy?
- Is it understood?

# **Implications**

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## **Common Failings**

- Malware is too exciting.
- Indiscriminate attacks.
- Excessive population sizes and activity.
- Whiz-bang features.

# Why Not Boring?

- Tip-toe around users, avoid their friends.
- Low-volume, focused attacks.
- Don't be shiny.
- Clean up afterwards.

# **Are They Already Boring?**

- Sophos estimated 11m unique samples in mid-2008.
- Collins estimates that 10% of flows are definitive mysteries.
- What's in the long tail?



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