USENIX Association

Proceedings of the 5th Annual Linux Showcase & Conference

Oakland, California, USA
November 5–10, 2001

Capturing Network Traffic with a MAGNeT

Jeffrey R. Hay, Wu-chun Feng, Mark K. Gardner
{jrhay, feng, mkg}@lanl.gov

Computer & Computational Sciences Division
Los Alamos National Laboratory
Los Alamos, NM 87545

Abstract

Current monitoring tools capture network traffic as it appears on the network but are incapable of capturing traffic as it progresses through a running protocol stack. Thus, the current generation of tools cannot record true application-traffic demands and cannot capture protocol-state information at run-time in order to help fine-tune network performance. They also lend no insight into the modulating behavior of protocols (e.g., TCP) that have been shown to impact network performance.

In this paper, we introduce MAGNeT — Monitor for Application-Generated Network Traffic. MAGNeT consists of both Linux kernel modifications and user-application programs. In addition to describing the implementation of MAGNeT, we evaluate its performance and its potential use in applications such as network security, protocol tuning and troubleshooting, and traffic characterization.

I. Introduction

The networking community routinely uses traffic libraries such as `tcplib` [1], network traces such as those found at the Internet Traffic Archive [2] or the Internet Traffic Data Repository [3], or mathematical models of network behavior such as those discussed in [4] to test the performance of network-protocol enhancements and other network designs.

However, such libraries, traces, and models are based on measurements made either by host-based tools such as `tcpdump` [5] and CoralReef [6] or by global network-mapping tools such as NLANR's Network Analysis Infrastructure [7]. These tools are only capable of capturing traffic an application sends on the network *after* the traffic has passed through the operating system's protocol stack (e.g., TCP/IP). Feng et al. [8] suggest that application traffic experiences significant modulation by the protocol stack before it is placed on the network. This implies that current tools can only capture traffic which has already been modulated by the protocol stack; the pre-modulation traffic patterns are unknown.

In order to determine pre-modulation application traffic patterns, as well as determine the modulation experienced by traffic as it progresses through the protocol stack, we offer the Monitor for Application-Generated Network Traffic (MAGNeT). MAGNeT captures traffic (1) generated by applications, (2) passing through each layer (e.g., TCP to IP) of the Linux protocol stack, and (3) entering and leaving the network. Thus, MAGNeT differs from existing tools in that it monitors traffic not only as it enters and leaves the network, but also at the application level and throughout the entire protocol stack. We are aware of two tools which attempt similar measurements: TCP kernel monitor from Pittsburgh Supercomputing Center (PSC) [9] and *tcpmon* from ETH Zurich [10].

MAGNeT differs from the TCP kernel monitor in several ways. First, MAGNeT can be used anywhere in the protocol stack and with any protocol (with very minor alterations to the protocol's code); PSC's kernel monitor is a TCP-specific solution. Second, MAGNeT monitors a superset of the data that the TCP kernel monitor does and operates under Linux 2.4.x, whereas the TCP kernel monitor only works in NetBSD.

Bolliger and Gross describe a method of extracting network bandwidth information per TCP connection under BSD in [10]. While their monitor (*tcpmon*) appears to have a similar architecture to MAGNeT, it only records the specific information needed to compute estimated bandwidth for TCP connections because it was written primarily to advance their research in other related areas. In fact, Bolliger and Gross use results obtained from their tool to argue that network application performance could be improved with the establishment of a tool such as MAGNeT.

II. Software Architecture

MAGNeT consists of both Linux kernel modifications and user application programs. In order to accurately mark events occurring throughout the protocol stack, MAGNeT must exist within the kernel; that is, there must be hooks in the protocol stack code to allow MAGNeT



Fig. 1. Overview of MAGNeT Operation

to record events at certain points. Running in the kernel also has the advantage of being able to acquire application traffic patterns with unmodified applications (e.g., there is no need to re-compile or re-link against a special instrumented network library). However, in order to provide the maximum amount of flexibility in data acquisition and processing, the ability to start and end traffic monitoring should be controlled by the user. Therefore, when MAGNeT collects data in the kernel, the data is placed in a special memory region to be read and used by a separate user-application program.

The dataflow in a system running MAGNeT is shown in Figure 1. Unmodified applications run as normal on the host system, periodically making use of the network communication routines in the kernel (such as the `send()` and `recv()` system calls). These kernel routines, in turn, make use of TCP, IP, or other network protocols to transfer data on the network. Under MAGNeT, each time a network-stack event (e.g., `send()`, entering TCP, entering IP, etc.) occurs in the kernel, the function `magnet_add()` is also called by the kernel. This procedure saves relevant data to a circular buffer in kernel space, which is then saved to disk by an user-level application program (`magnet-read` is provided with the MAGNeT distribution for this purpose but could easily be replaced by a more sophisticated application).

A. MAGNeT in Kernel Space

The new kernel source file `net/magnet/magnet.c` contains the core functionality of MAGNeT. The function `magnet_add()`, defined in `magnet.c`, adds a data point to a circular buffer that is pinned in physical memory. This function is designed to be very lightweight so that it can be called at several points in the protocol stack without inducing a significant amount of overhead in the protocol processing. (see Section III-E for an analysis.) Other code in `magnet.c` sets up the circular buffer and the necessary hooks for the user-application program to read data from the buffer. In addition, a new item is added to the file space at `/proc/net/magnet`. This file may be read by any user to determine the current state and parameters of the MAGNeT kernel code.

```
struct magnet_data {
  void *sockid;
  unsigned long long timestamp;
  unsigned int event;
  int size;
  union magnet_ext_data data;
}; /* struct magnet data */
```

Fig. 2. The MAGNeT Instrumentation Record

A.1 Instrumentation Record

The C header file `include/linux/magnet.h` contains the global definitions for the MAGNeT system. At the heart of the system is the instrumentation record structure shown in Figure 2.

The instrumentation record is the data structure that `magnet_add()` adds to the kernel buffer at each instrumentation point. `sockid` is a unique identifier for each connection stream,[1] giving MAGNeT the ability of separating data traces into individual streams while protecting user privacy. The `timestamp` field contains a CPU cycle count which serves as both a high-fidelity time measurement for MAGNeT traces, and a synchronization flag between the user and kernel MAGNeT processes (See Section II-B.1). Valid values for the `event` field (e.g., `MAGNET_IP_SEND`) are given by an `enum` declaration at the beginning of `magnet.h` and indicate what type of the event is being recorded. `size` is the number of bytes transferred during a specific event.[2] The `data` field (a optional field selected at kernel compilation time) is a union of various structures in which information specific to particular protocols can be stored. This field provides a mechanism for MAGNeT to record protocol-state information along with event transitions.

A.2 Instrumented Events

MAGNeT is designed to be extensible with respect to the specific events that are monitored. The current distribution instruments the general socket-handling code, the TCP layer, and the IP layer. Other protocols can be easily instrumented by adding new MAGNeT `event` codes to the `enum` definition in `magnet.h` and placing calls to `magnet_add()` at appropriate places in the protocol stack. Thus, the mechanisms provided by MAGNeT (that is, capturing application-level traces as well as intercepting protocol stack events) are available to all existing and future Linux networking protocols.

Our current MAGNeT distribution records events

```
struct magnet_tcp {
  /* data from "struct tcp_opt" in
     include/net/sock.h */

  unsigned short  source;
  /* TCP source port */
  unsigned short  dest;
  /* TCP destination port */

  unsigned long snd_wnd;
  /* Expected receiver window */

  unsigned long srtt;
  /* smothed round trip time << 3 */
  unsigned long rto;
  /* retransmit timeout */

  unsigned long packets_out;
  /* Packets which are "in flight" */
  unsigned long retrans_out;
  /* Retransmitted packets out */

  unsigned long snd_ssthresh;
  /* Slow start size threshold */
  unsigned long snd_cwnd;
  /* Sending congestion window */

  unsigned long rcv_wnd;
  /* Current receiver window */
  unsigned long write_seq;
  /* Tail+1 of data in send buffer */
  unsigned long copied_seq;
  /* Head of yet unread data */

  /* TCP flags*/
  unsigned short  fin:1,syn:1,rst:1,
      psh:1,ack:1,urg:1,ece:1,cwr:1;
}; /* struct magnet_tcp */

struct magnet_ip {
  unsigned char  version;
  unsigned char  tos;
  unsigned short id;
  unsigned short frag_off;
  unsigned char  ttl;
  unsigned char  protocol;
}; /* struct magnet_ip */
```

Fig. 3. MAGNeT Extended Data for TCP and IP

when the socket-handling code receives data from an application, when the TCP layer receives data from the socket-handling code, when the IP layer receives data from TCP, and, finally, when IP hands the data off to the network device driver. MAGNeT records a similar set of events for the receive pathway.

Without the optionally-compiled `data` field, MAGNeT records only the timestamp and associated data size for each transition between network-stack layers. With the `data` field compiled in, MAGNeT records more extensive data about the instantaneous state of the protocol being monitored. This data typically contains all protocol-header information as well as run-time, protocol-state variables, which are not usually available outside of experimental situations. As an example of the kind of information stored within the `data` field, Figure 3 shows the union members for TCP and IP events.

A.3 Event Loss

Because the kernel portion of MAGNeT saves events to a fixed-sized buffer, there is a possibility that events may occur when the buffer is full. In this case, MAGNeT is unable to save the event. MAGNeT keeps track of the number of unrecorded events and reports this information as soon as possible. (See Section II-B.1 for details.)

Our experience to date indicates that unrecorded instrumentation records rarely occur during the monitoring of actual users. MAGNeT provides the capability of tuning its operation, trading between resource utilization and performance. As discussed in [11], with appropriately tuned values MAGNeT is able to record events with less than a 1% loss when a sender saturates a 100Mbps network for a sustained time. Since the majority of users do not approach continuous network-saturation levels, MAGNeT efficiently records virtually all application-generated network traffic.

B. MAGNeT in User Space

The MAGNeT user interface is designed to be modular; that is, as long as the MAGNeT API is followed, any application can be a MAGNeT user-level application. Thus, this section first discusses the basic elements required of a MAGNeT user-level application and then describes the user applications that are supplied with the current MAGNeT software distribution.

B.1 User/Kernel Interface and Synchronization

The MAGNeT additions to the kernel export the circular buffer to user-space applications via Linux kernel/user shared memory. That is, a device file[3] serves as an user-level handle to the kernel's shared-memory region. Opening this file causes Linux to create a mapping



Fig. 4. MAGNeT Kernel Operation



Fig. 5. MAGNeT User Operation

between the kernel-memory region and the user-address space. With this mapping in place, no additional kernel code is executed; the application program simply reads the shared memory and writes it to disk.

Because the kernel and user processes share the same area of physical memory, they must have a means of synchronization. This is accomplished by using the `timestamp` field of the instrumentation record as a synchronization flag between the MAGNeT user and kernel processes, as shown in Figures 4 and 5.

Before writing to a slot in the circular buffer, the MAGNeT kernel code checks the value of the `timestamp` field for that slot. A non-zero value indicates that the slot has not yet been copied to user space and that the kernel buffer is full. In this case, the kernel code increments a count of the number of instrumentation records that could not be saved due to the buffer being full. Otherwise, the kernel code writes a new instrumentation record and advances its pointer to the next slot in the circular buffer.

The user application accesses the same circular buffer via kernel/user shared memory and maintains a pointer to its current slot in the buffer. When the `timestamp` field at this slot becomes non-zero, the application reads the entire record, saves it to disk, and sets the `timestamp` field back to zero to signal the kernel that the slot is once again available. It then advances its pointer to the next slot in the circular buffer.

If the kernel has a non-zero count of unsaved events and buffer space becomes available (i.e., the `timestamp` field of the kernel's currently active slot is set to zero by the user application), the kernel writes a special instrumentation record with an event type of `MAGNET_LOST` and with the `size` field set to the number of instrumentation records that were not recorded. Thus, during post-processing of the data, the fact that events were lost is detected at the appropriate chronological place in the data stream and in time.

B.2 MAGNeT System Information

In order to accurately gauge the amount of time spent in protocol-stack layers, MAGNeT requires very high-fidelity timing. To this end, MAGNeT `timestamp` values are recorded in units of processor-clock cycles by the kernel's `get_cycles()` function. In addition, the first record stored by MAGNeT in the circular buffer is a record of type `MAGNET_SYSINFO`, whose `size` field contains the processor-clock speed estimated by the kernel. This information allows for easy conversion of MAGNeT timestamp values to wall-clock time.

The `MAGNET_SYSINFO` event record also provides endian-awareness. Since this field is guaranteed to be the first record in the circular buffer every time the MAGNeT device file is opened, it will be the first record that the user-application reads. The value of the `event` field of this record lets data processing software determine if the records were saved on a big- or little-endian machine (e.g., if the records are saved to a file for later processing on a different machine). Specifically, `MAGNET_SYSINFO` is defined in `magnet.h` to have a value of 0x01234567. If the first record read by the data processor has an `event` field of this value, no endian translation is necessary. On the other hand, if the first record's `event` field contains a different value (e.g., a value of 0x67452301), the file was saved on a machine with a different endian orientation than the processing machine, so endian translation is necessary.

B.3 /proc/net/magnet

The /proc/net/magnet file allows user applications to determine the state of MAGNeT's kernel process. The existence of this file serves as proof that the MAGNeT code is active in the kernel. This file contains information such as the major and minor numbers for the MAGNeT shared-memory device file, the size of the circular buffer, and other information that may be useful to user-level applications.

B.4 MAGNeT User Implementation

As provided in our current distribution of MAGNeT, the user interface consists of three programs, magnet-read, mkmagnet, and magnet-parse, along with a couple of scripts to automate traffic collection.

magnet-read is the primary means of obtaining MAGNeT traffic traces; its function is to read the data from the kernel's circular buffer. Our first version of magnet-read copied records out of the shared memory and wrote them to a file on disk. We found, however, that this approach was unable to keep up with the demands of a simple test application that tries to saturate a 100-Mbps Ethernet network. Instead, the current version of magnet-read uses the memory-mapped I/O features in the Linux kernel. Once an empty "binary trace file" exists, magnet-read maps this file into its memory space and then saves data to disk by simply performing a memory copy between the kernel/user shared memory and the memory region mapped to the binary trace file. This approach reduces overhead significantly and allows MAGNeT to record data on even high-speed networks with little chance of record loss. The mkmagnet application creates and initializes the binary trace file prior to it being mapped into memory by magnet-read. Finally, magnet-parse reads data collected by magnet-read and dumps a tab-delimited ASCII table of the collected data for further processing, performing endian translation as necessary.

The MAGNeT distribution also includes two shell scripts that allow network administrators to create an automated application-monitoring environment. magnet.cron, the overall MAGNeT management script, ensures that the MAGNeT device file exists and that a binary trace file has been created by mkmagnet. Additionally, if invoked while magnet-read is running, magnet.cron terminates the current MAGNeT data collection session and calls magnet.copy to transfer the data to a remote archive.[4] Before exiting, magnet.cron starts magnet-read as a background process to save network events to disk. Thus, the management script may be added as a crontab event (e.g., run everyday at midnight) to collect data on a diverse set of machines without requiring special action by the users of the network.

III. MAGNeT Performance

In this section, we determine the effect of running MAGNeT through a variety of tests. We compare overall attainable bandwidth on a system running MAGNeT to that of a system running tcpdump as well as a system running no monitoring software. We also look at CPU utilization under these conditions and at the effect of MAGNeT on real-time traffic streams such as multimedia traffic. We conclude the section with a brief discussion of how the different design decisions made in MAGNeT and other monitors result in the observed performance differences.

A. Experimental Environment

We use a common environment for all the tests discussed in this section. This environment consists of two identical, dual 400-MHz Pentium IIs connected to each other via an Extreme Networks Summit 7i Gigabit Ethernet switch. Each machine contains 128MB of RAM, ATA-33 IDE hard drives, and both 100-Mbps (NetGear) and 1000Mbps (Alteon) Ethernet cards. All non-essential Linux services are disabled on the test machines, and no extraneous traffic is allowed on the network. MAGNeT is set to record a minimal set of information per event (i.e., the data field is not compiled into the MAGNeT build).

B. Network Throughput

As an indication of how much MAGNeT affects network applications, we measure the maximum data rate between a sender and receiver. We also measure the overhead of running tcpdump as a point of comparison.

In total, we run six different configurations, each on 100-Mbps and Gigabit Ethernet networks. The first configuration, our baseline, runs between two machines with stock Linux 2.4.3 kernels. The second configuration (i.e., MAGNeTized) uses the same machines but with the MAGNeT patches installed on both sender and receiver. Although present in the kernel, MAGNeT instrumentation records are not saved to disk. The third configuration is the same as the second except magnet-read runs on the receiver to drain the kernel-event buffer. The fourth configuration is also the same as the second except magnet-read runs on the sender. For the fifth and sixth configurations, we run tcpdump on either the sender or the receiver, with a stock Linux 2.4.3 kernel (i.e., no MAGNeT code installed). For each trial, we run netperf [12] on the sender to transmit data as fast as possible.[5]

Table I shows the results of our bandwidth experiments. Along with the mean, the width of the 95% confidence interval is given. As shown in this table, MAGNeT never reduces the achievable network bandwidth by more than 4.5%. By comparison, while tcpdump has roughly

TABLE I
NETWORK THROUGHPUT REDUCTION

Configuration	Fast Ethernet (100Mbps)		Gigabit Ethernet (1000Mbps)	
	Throughput	% Reduction	Throughput	% Reduction
Linux 2.4.3	94.1 ± 0.0	-	459.5 ± 1.6	-
MAGNeTized	94.1 ± 0.1	0.01	452.5 ± 1.8	1.53
`magnet-read/rcv`	90.8 ± 0.8	3.56	444.3 ± 1.7	3.30
`magnet-read/snd`	90.7 ± 0.9	3.67	440.2 ± 2.1	4.19
`tcpdump/rcv`	89.4 ± 1.5	5.04	290.7 ± 15.6	36.74
`tcpdump/snd`	89.4 ± 0.8	5.42	343.2 ± 18.7	25.30

the same impact on performance for Fast Ethernet, it suffers dramatically as network speeds increase to Gigabit Ethernet. Thus, we conclude that MAGNeT is better able to adapt to tomorrow's networking infrastructure than the current version of `tcpdump`.

It is worth noting that these comparisons are not entirely fair. As discussed in Section III-F, MAGNeT and `tcpdump` are designed to record different (but similar) sets of information. However, since no tool exists which captures the same information as MAGNeT, we use `tcpdump` as the closest commonly-available tool.

By default (and as used in our experiments), `tcpdump` stores the first 68 bytes of every packet. During these tests, the MAGNeT per-event record size is 24 bytes. However, since MAGNeT instruments the entire network stack, it records the packet's transitions between the application, TCP, and IP layers, as well as transmission onto the network. Thus, although MAGNeT stores approximately 1/3 less data than `tcpdump` *per event*, MAGNeT records up to *four* events per packet whereas `tcpdump` only records one event per packet. Hence, the total data saved by MAGNeT per packet is up to 96 bytes per packet or 41% more than `tcpdump`.

C. CPU Utilization

Under Linux, `netperf` estimates CPU load by creating a low-priority process which increments a counter. This process, being the lowest priority task in the system, should only execute when the CPU has nothing else to execute, so the counter is only incremented when the CPU would otherwise be idle. Thus, a low counter value implies a high CPU utilization, and a high counter value implies low CPU utilization. Using this feature with the above set of tests, we estimate the additional CPU load incurred by both MAGNeT and `tcpdump`. The increase in CPU load, averaged over the sender and receiver during the above tests, is shown in Figure 6.

As can be seen, MAGNeT uses proportionally less CPU than `tcpdump`, which is expected given the results



Fig. 6. Average Percent Increase in CPU Utilization

of our bandwidth tests. Also apparent is a decrease in CPU utilization when moving from 100-Mbps to 1000-Mbps. This drop is a result of the fact that our Gigabit Ethernet cards perform interrupt coalescing by default. That is, they wait for several packets to arrive from the network before interrupting the CPU. Thus, the cost of servicing the network device interrupt is amortized over several packets. This reduces the total amount of work performed by the CPU, as shown in Figure 6. Had interrupt coalescing been disabled, the average CPU utilization for both MAGNeT and `tcpdump` would have increased.

D. Streaming MAGNeT

In order to determine what visible effect the operation of MAGNeT has on streaming media we set up a web server on one of our test machines to stream an 8-minute, 51-second MPEG clip of *Crocodile Dundee*. We then viewed the clip with MAGNeT running only on the server, with MAGNeT executing only on the client, and with MAGNeT not installed at all.

Our results are summarized in Figure 7. Note that



Fig. 7. Streaming MAGNeT Effects

most streaming MPEG clients buffer data to maintain a constant framerate. This fact implies that frames-per-second is a misleading measure of streaming network performance. Therefore, the metric we have chosen is the total wall-clock time taken for the entire clip to be sent to the client.

As can be seen, MAGNeT has minimal effect on MPEG streaming. Over 100 trials, the average time to stream the movie clip without MAGNeT is 46.02 seconds, with a 95% confidence interval of ± 0.07 seconds. To transfer the movie clip with MAGNeT running on the server took an average 46.07 seconds, and with MAGNeT on the client, 46.05 seconds. (Both of the MAGNeT cases have a 95% confidence interval of ± 0.06 seconds.) As a point of comparison, `tcpdump` increases the streaming time to approximately 52 seconds.

E. Network Perturbation

Adding CPU cycle-counting code in `magnet_add()` allows us to determine the amount of time taken to save events to the buffer. In a similar manner (by instrumenting the relevant areas of `magnet-read`), we can determine the average time taken to events from the buffer to disk. The sum of these values is the amount of time taken by MAGNeT to record events.

Our tests indicate `magnet_add()` uses 556 cycles per 1500-byte packet while `magnet-read` uses 425 cycles. So, on our 400-MHz machines, MAGNeT takes $(556 \text{ cycles} + 425 \text{ cycles})/(400 \text{ Mcycles/second}) = 2.4$ μsec to record each packet. On a 100-Mbps Ethernet, a minimal TCP packet (that is, a packet of 40 bytes) will take at least $(40 \text{ bytes} \times 8 \text{ bits/byte})/100 \text{ Megabits/second} = 3.2$ μsec to transfer. This comparison suggests MAGNeT-induced disturbances into TCP traffic streams should be quite small. [6]

F. Design of `tcpdump` vs. MAGNeT

While `tcpdump` and MAGNeT are similar in that they are both monitors of network traffic, they are also very different in that they monitor different aspects of the traffic and are based on different design philosophies.

`tcpdump`, like `magnet-read`, is an user-interface application relying on functionality contained in a lower layer. In the case of `tcpdump`, the lower layer is called `libpcap` and has been used successfully with other applications, such as CoralReef. The critical difference is that while MAGNeT operates largely within the Linux kernel, `libpcap` is implemented as a library working in user space under a variety of operating systems.

The exact method used by `libpcap` to intercept network packets varies depending on the features available in the root operating system, but it always involves a system call or similar facility that causes a switch into kernel mode and a copy of memory from the kernel to the user-level library. This call-and-copy is repeated for every packet traveling across the interface being monitored. At high network speeds (and thus high packet-transfer rates), the overhead of copying each individual packet between kernel and user space becomes a significant burden. MAGNeT benefits from having code embedded in the kernel to aggregate multiple network packets into a single space which then is copied in bulk, thus amortizing the cost of the copy over multiple packets. This approach incurs less overhead but is not as portable as `libpcap`'s method.

Finally, we note again that the kind of data collected by `tcpdump` and MAGNeT is not exactly the same. As used in the experiments in this paper,[7] MAGNeT collects only packet generation time and data size. `tcpdump`, on the other hand, collects packet time information along with a sampling of the actual data contained in the packet. MAGNeT ignores this data mostly out of privacy concerns.

IV. Applications of MAGNeT

MAGNeT provides network implementors with the ability to discover true application-traffic demands while maintaining application transparency. This ability has many practical applications, some of which we discuss in this section.

A. Network Security

A standard method of detecting network intrusion is to have an automated system continually watching network traffic patterns and flagging anomalous behavior for a human operator to investigate. This approach requires all traffic on the network to flow through a centralized monitoring station, which not only introduces a single point of failure to the network but also provides a potential bottleneck that may reduce achieved network

bandwidth significantly (while, at the same time, increasing network latency).

MAGNeT provides an alternative solution. We have shown that MAGNeT, unlike `tcpdump`, runs almost transparently for most applications, even on high-speed networks. Thus, MAGNeT may be deployed on every computer in an installation. If this is the case, there is no need for all traffic to flow through a central monitoring machine. Instead, each machine may collect its own traffic patterns and then periodically have `magnet.cron` send its collected data to a central processor. This processor is then able to analyze campus-wide network activity with a finer granularity than currently available.[8] Unlike current solutions, if for some reason the central processor goes down, the rest of the computers on the network continue to operate without difficulty. Thus, the problems of a single network-traffic sink are eliminated.

B. Protocol Tuning and Troubleshooting

With the optional `data` filed compiled in, MAGNeT has the ability to return snapshots of complete protocol state (information previously only available in simulation environments) during execution of real applications on real-world networks. This kind of data is a powerful tool for aiding the debugging and fine-tuning of network-protocol implementations such as TCP.

C. Traffic Pattern Analysis

MAGNeT is a useful tool for investigating differences between traffic generated by an application and that same traffic but after modulation by the protocol stack, i.e., when the traffic hits the network. An example of this kind of modulation is shown in Figure 8. This figure is the MAGNeT trace of using FTP to send a Linux 2.2.18 bzipped tar file from our facilities in Los Alamos, NM to a location in Dallas, TX. As can be seen by examining the graph, the FTP application attempts to send 10KB segments of data every 1/5 of a second. However, the Linux protocol stack (TCP and IP in the case of FTP) modulates this traffic pattern into approximately 1500 byte packets at considerably shorter intervals.

It may be assumed that since the maximum data size on an Ethernet network is 1500 bytes, the protocol stack is simply modulating the data to this size to obtain valid Ethernet traffic. However, if the traffic stream *as it was delivered to the network* is sent through another TCP stack (this is exactly the case when using a `tcpdump`-derived traffic trace as input to a network simulation), we again see modulation. Every successive run of network-delivered traffic through TCP further modulates the traffic, as shown in Table II. The table reflects the average data size of output TCP packets and the average time in seconds between output TCP packets, using the data stream from the previous TCP output as input. Likewise,



Fig. 8. MAGNeT FTP Trace

Figure 9 shows the effect of successive TCP stacks on achieved bandwidth across the same WAN pathway used for the original FTP transfer.

TABLE II
EFFECT OF MULTIPLE TCP STACKS

Trial	Data Size	Interpacket Spacing (sec)
Application	3284	0.124
1st TCP stack	1016	0.045
2nd TCP stack	919	0.037
3rd TCP stack	761	0.079
4th TCP stack	723	0.122

As shown in Table II, successive TCPs reduce the data size of each packet in an exponential fashion. In addition, the first TCP stack (that is, the TCP stack used by the application) radically reduces the inter-packet spacing, while each successive TCP stack (e.g., the TCP stacks of a network simulation) slowly increases the inter-packet delay. The ultimate effect is to drastically reduce the achieved bandwidth during actual transfers, as reflected in Figure 9. After just three TCP stacks, the achievable bandwidth has been reduced by 76%.

D. Application-Generated Trace Library

Currently existing models of network traffic have been developed using network traffic traces gathered via traditional network monitoring systems. These models are then used to develop new network protocols and networking enhancements.

However, the kind of results typified by Figure 8 indicate that network traffic demands of applications are not accurately reflected by traffic on the network wire (since the traffic pattern has already been modified by the current network protocol). Hence, while current network



Fig. 9. Effect of Multiple TCP Stacks

models may accurately reflect current network-*wire* traffic, they are not useful in optimizing application communications.

We have seen (in Section IV-C) that recursively passing traffic through TCP stacks results in decreased network performance. Yet the current tools available to network researchers (such as `tcpdump`) only allow traffic collection after that traffic has passed through at least one TCP stack. Thus, the results of simulations using this traffic data are corrupt; the input data has already been modulated. This is a critical observation for the development of next-generation, high-speed network protocols.

Traffic traces generated by MAGNeT provide a realistic picture of the protocol-independent traffic demands generated by applications running on today's networks. Thus, MAGNeT provides network researchers and developers with a better understanding of applications' actual communication needs.

V. Future Work

MAGNeT currently exists as a prototype implementation, and as such, its user interface is not highly refined. We plan to improve the interface by allowing the user to set various MAGNeT parameters (i.e., the kinds of events to be recorded, the size of the kernel buffer, etc.) at run-time rather than at kernel compile-time. This is possible by making the current `/proc` file writable and would greatly increase the usability and flexibility of MAGNeT.

Another potential area of improvement in MAGNeT is the mechanism used to store saved data from the kernel buffer to disk. As it is currently implemented, the mechanism works but requires a user well-versed in how to operate MAGNeT (or a script which takes care of the details for the user). A better approach may be to utilize kernel threads to perform all steps of the instrumentation. With this methodology, the need for the special device file, the file created by `mkmagnet`, and the kernel/user shared memory would be eliminated. In addition, kernel threads may lower MAGNeT's current low event loss rate by reducing the need for a context switch to save data. However, the execution of kernel threads can break an application's usage-pattern transparency which MAGNeT currently is able to achieve. Additionally, kernel threads may remove the ability of easily integrating MAGNeT data-collection facilities into new user applications. The use of kernel threads may be explored for future versions of MAGNeT, along with other options for improving this interface, such as the Turbo Packet scheme used by Alexey Kuznetsov to increase `tcpdump`'s performance under Linux.

Timing with the CPU cycle counter can be problematic on contemporary CPUs which are able to change their clock rate in response to power-management policies. If the kernel can detect such changes, MAGNeT can easily hook into the clock-rate change detection code and output a new `MAGNET_SYSINFO` event with the new timing information. This would keep timing relatively consistent across CPU clock-rate changes. However, there is currently no way for production Linux kernels to detect CPU clock rate changes at run-time. [9]

VI. Conclusion

We have developed a new kind of monitor for the Linux networking community. Our Monitor for Application-Generated Network Traffic (MAGNeT) collects run-time data about the network protocol stack as well as application traffic demands before modulation by any protocol stack. In addition, MAGNeT collects this data while maintaining user and application transparency. Thus, MAGNeT may be used in live systems to obtain real-world, application-traffic traces and protocol-state information in production environments.

The resulting data may be used, among other things, for debugging existing protocol implementations, understanding possible performance degradation seen under various network architectures, designing new networking protocols that specifically take advantage of true application-traffic patterns, and developing more realistic models of network traffic. The data-collection capabilities of MAGNeT also have potential use in fields such as network security which rely on a detailed understanding of the traffic existing in an institutional network.

The combination of capabilities offered by MAGNeT make it a valuable tool to network designers, implementors, researchers, and administrators. We intend for MAGNeT development to continue and lead to further advances in high-performance networking.

Availability

MAGNeT patches for Linux 2.4 kernels (known to work on i386 and PowerPC code branches), the user-application program `magnet-read`, and supporting

material including additional published and unpublished documents relating to MAGNeT, are available from **`http://www.lanl.gov/radiant`** under the GNU Public License (GPL).

Disclaimer

This work was supported by the U.S. Dept. of Energy's Laboratory-Directed Research & Development Program and the Los Alamos Computer Science Institute through Los Alamos National Laboratory contract W-7405-ENG-36. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of DOE, Los Alamos National Laboratory, or the Los Alamos Computer Science Institute. This paper is Los Alamos Unclassified Report (LA-UR) 01-5065.

Notes

[1]The `sockid` field is, in fact, the run-time value of the pointer to the kernel's status information for the specific connection.

[2]A negative value in the `size` field reflects the error code returned by the function causing the event.

[3]The major and minor numbers for this device are system specific and can be discovered by inspecting `/proc/net/magnet`.

[4]Since `magnet.copy` is called while `magnet-read` is not running, any traffic produced by the data archiving will not be captured by MAGNeT. This behavior can easily be changed by re-ordering the commands in `magnet.cron`.

[5]The command used was "`netperf -P 0 -c {local CPU index} -C {remote CPU index} -H {hostname}`"

[6]Of course, with 1000-Mbps networks, the time taken to send a minimal TCP packet is reduced by an order of magnitude. In this case, MAGNeT takes significantly longer to record a packet than the transmission time. However, it is likely that Gigabit networks will be used with much faster machines than our test machines, thus reducing this discrepancy.

[7]By utilizing the `data` field of the instrumentation record, MAGNeT captures much more detail (but still not actual packet data).

[8]Since MAGNeT never collects actual data (only traffic patterns), the privacy of each individual machine is maintained.

[9]Dynamic CPU clock changing is also an issue with many aspects of the Linux kernel. For instance, short delay loops in the kernel rely on x number of loops taking y amount of time to compute. This relation is also affected by CPU clock-rate changes.

References

[1] P. Danzig and S. Jamin, "tcplib: A Library of TCP Internetwork Traffic Characteristics," `http://irl.eecs.umich.edu/jamin/papers/tcplib/tcplibtr.ps.Z`, 1991.

[2] "The Internet Traffic Archive," `http://ita.ee.lbl.gov/html/traces.html`.

[3] A. Kato, J. Murai, and S. Katsuno, "An Internet Traffic Data Repository: The Architecture and the Design Policy," in *INET'99 Proceedings*.

[4] V. Paxson and S. Floyd, "Wide-Area Traffic: The Failure of Poisson Modeling," *IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking*, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 226–244, June 1995.

[5] "`tcpdump`," `http://www.tcpdump.org`.

[6] CAIDA, "CoralReef Software Suite," `http://www.caida.org/tools/measurement/coralreef`.

[7] A.J. McGregor, H-W Braun, and J.A. Brown, "The NLANR Network Analysis Infrastructure," *IEEE Communications*, May 2000.

[8] W. Feng and P. Tinnakornsrisuphap, "The Failure of TCP in High-Performance Computational Grids," in *Proc. of SC 2000: High-Performance Networking and Computing Conf.*, November 2000.

[9] J. Semke, "PSC TCP Kernel Monitor," Tech. Rep. CMU-PSC-TR-2000-0001, PSC/CMU, May 2000.

[10] J. Bolliger and R. Gross, "Bandwidth Monitoring for Network-Aware Applications," *Proc. of the 10th Annual Int'l Symposium on High Performance Distributed Computing*, August 2001.

[11] W. Feng, J. R. Hay, and M. K. Gardner, "MAGNeT: Monitor for Application-Generated Network Traffic," *To appear in Proc. of the 10th Annual Int'l Computer Communication and Networking Conf.*, October 2001.

[12] "Netperf," `http://www.netperf.org`.