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This research was supported in part by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency under contract F119628-93-C-0193, IBM, U.S. Department of Energy under Contract No. W-7405-ENG-36, the US Postal Service, and Visa International. Howard Gobioff was supported in part by a National Science Foundation Graduate Fellowship. Sean Smith performed this research at Los Alamos National Laboratory. The views and conclusions in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official policies or endorsements of the US Government, its agencies, or any of the research sponsors.

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...protocol

Tamper resistance is more difficult than it appears at first. Anderson and Kuhn[2] have show how to break a purportedly secure device. Kocher[9] has shown how to use timing attacks to discover RSA keys. And Boneh, DeMillo, and Lipton[4] have shown that a smart card performing the same encryption twice is vulnerable if an opponent can induce processor failures through a hostile environment (radiation, temperature extremes, etc.).

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...designs

Please note there are some examples of smart cards that provide these I/O operations - such as the VISA/Toshiba Super Smart Card.

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