

Lamassu: Storage-Efficient Host-Side Encryption

Peter Shah, Won So Advanced Technology Group 9 July, 2015

Agenda


- 1) Overview
- 2) Security
- 3) Solution Architecture
- 4) Experimental Results
- 5) Conclusion



Architectural Goals

1) Enable external / untrusted storage


Public Clouds, etc.





Architectural Goals


- 1) Enable external / untrusted storage
 - Public Clouds, etc.
- 2) Provide data security
 - Restrict trust domain





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
Public Clouds, etc.

2) Provide data security

Restrict trust domain

3) Preserve storage deduplication

- Use convergent encryption
- Focus on block-oriented deduplication





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Public Clouds, etc.

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
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3) Preserve storage deduplication

- Use convergent encryption
- Focus on block-oriented deduplication

4) Work with existing applications

- Transparent addition
- No changes to app or storage systems
- Self-contained*





Security

Encryption Model

Convergent Encryption (CE)


Equality-Preserving Encryption

 For any given plain text, convergent encryption will always produce the same cipher text.



Message-Locked Encryption (MLE)

- For any given plain text, convergent encryption will always produce the same cipher text.
- Most common form: Key derived from data




Message-locked encryption path



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


Message-locked decryption path



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


Message-locked decryption path



Key Storage

- For any given plain text, convergent encryption will always produce the same cipher text.
- Most common form: Key derived from data



Key Storage

 For any given plain text, convergent encryption will always produce the same cipher text

Most common form: Key derived from data

Secret
Key

Hash
Block
Key

Non-convergent


Data
Block
Block
Block
Block
Block
Block
Block



Metadata Storage


Key Storage Architecture

- Treat per-block hash-keys as file metadata
 - Potentially hundreds, or thousands per file






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- Store keys inside each file
 - Preserve transparency
 - Allow external storage to copy, rename, etc.






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 - Keep keys from polluting duplicate blocks
 - Keep added data from breaking block alignment






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
File Structure

Logical File Layout




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File Structure

Logical File Layout



- Data and metadata must be in sync
 - Depends on underlying storage to prevent partial writes



Crash Detection and Recovery

- Data and metadata must be in sync
 - Depends on underlying storage to prevent partial writes

Starting State


Starting State

Block N

Block N




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


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
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
Stale keys are cleaned up during subsequent metadata updates



Results

Storage Efficiency & Performance

Prototype Implementation





Comparison with other Systems

Benchmarking Strategy

1) PlainFS

FUSE-based (pass-through)



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
3) LamassuFS

- FUSE-based
- Provides AES encryption
- Provides convergent encryption




Deduplication Results

Comparison of Deduplication Ratios




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
Singe File I/O Throughput

Comparison with other FUSE systems using remote NFS storage



Single File I/O Throughput

Comparison with other FUSE systems using local DRAM storage



Conclusions

Recap and Observations

- Strong security on shared storage
 - Uses standard encryption techniques
- Preserves storage-based deduplication
- Transparent to both application and storage
 - Easy to deploy
- Flexible user-mode architecture
 - Can integrate with other host-side technologies



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Questions?

Special Thanks
James Kelley





Thank You