Breaking Trust Shades of Crisis Across an Insecure Software Supply Chain

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Atlantic Council

Methods & Definitions

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139 incidents collected since October 2019 from publicly available information

Software Supply Chain Attack (SSCA): Occurs when attackers access and edit software somewhere in the complex software development supply chain to compromise a target down the chain by inserting their own malicious code.

Software Supply Chain Vulnerability (SSCV): Any software vulnerability that could be employed in a supply chain attack if exploited.

<u>Code Location/Owner</u>: Vendor or OSS repository associated with the codebase.

Downstream Target: The end-target of the attack.


<u>Affected Codebase</u>: Categories describing the codebase, product, or service modified by attackers or subject to disclosure

A Decade of Attacks and Disclosures in the Software Supply Chain

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
For more information, visit: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/breaking-trust

Takeaways


- Attacks have been popular and will continue to rise in prominence over time.
- Attacks that utilize software supply chain vulnerabilities are impactful.
- Used to great effect by states

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Attack Disclosure



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
Trends

- At least 30 attacks from state actors • especially China & Russia
- Attacks undermined signing certificates ۲ & abused public key cryptography
- Attacks targeted widely popular • open-source projects
- 25% of the total incidents targeted ٠ app stores & developer tools
- 26% of incidents targeted ۲ software updates

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
50 45 10 35 30 25 20 15 10 0 2010 2012 2011 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Typosquatting Hijacked Updates ■ Proprietary Application Store ■ Third-Party Application Store Open-Source Dependency Worm Component Hardware Component Direct Download ■ Supply Chain Service Provider ■ Unknown, N/A, or Other Phishing Development Software


Figure 10: Distribution Vector by Year




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




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Recommendations

Improve the Baseline

Better Protect Open Source Counter Systemic Threats

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Thank You

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For more on this project visit: <u>https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/breaking-trust/</u>

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16. Internationalize the software bill of materials (**SBOM**) effort *(NTIA, State)*

(Selected) Recommendations

Improve the Baseline 1. Develop a Lifecycle Security Overlay to help implement 800-53 for software supply chains (*NIST, Industry*)

2. Offer public reference implementations of the Overlay (*Industry, cloud service providers*)

5. Recognize software is part of 5G (State, NSC)

Better Protect Open Source

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
Counter Systemic Threats

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
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




The infection starts with a malicious development kit (SDK) named RXDrioder, masquerading as an ad kit developers could use to help overlay ads in their applications.




The infection spreads – via the malicious SDK used by specific app developers – to 206 <u>Android applications</u> during the implementation phase of development. The malicious code remains hidden during this phase.



Each compromised app goes through iterative testing by its developer. The malicious code in RXDrioder's codebase - remains undetected.


ATTACK VECTORS MALWARE




The compromised app passes through iterative testing and is ready for deployment. The finished product moves from the individual app developers to teams at app stores such as Google Play or 9Apps for review.

ATTACK VECTORS

MALWARE





Once the app passes inspection by the app store teams, it is launched for download by the public. SimBad registers with a C2 server on install and takes steps to obfuscate its presence. Most of the apps targeted by SimBad were games and were downloaded by a total of <u>150 million people</u> before it was identified and mitigated.