

NoisyKey: Tolerating Keyloggers via Keystrokes Hiding

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Keyloggers

- ▶ Provoke critical damage (steal user data).
- ▶ Pervasive (included in malware, worms, etc).
- ▶ Standard countermeasures: **detection** and **prevention**.

If only it was possible. . .

- ▶ Prevention may **not** be feasible (system dependent).
- ▶ Detection, instead, **works** on top of an existing system.
- ▶ Detection does not **aid** removal.



Provocative brainwashing

- ▶ Detection is not what we want.
- ▶ Prevention is not feasible.
- ▶ Assume the keylogger is just there.
- ▶ Assume we have to live with it.


Living with a Keylogger

- ▶ Purportedly having a keylogger stealing keystrokes?
- ▶ How is that tolerating?



How-to Tolerate (1/3)


- ▶ The keylogger intercepts all the user keystrokes.
- ▶ Below an example of some keystroke activity.





How-to Tolerate (2/3)


- ▶ The idea is to generate (and exfiltrate) bogus keystrokes.
- ▶ The keylogger sees two intermixed keystroke activities.





How-to Tolerate (3/3)

- ▶ Result: “haystack” where the real keystrokes are safe-guarded.
- ▶ No information disclosed! (if done properly)





Scientific Challenges

- ▶ What is **noise**? How the noise shall be modeled?
- ▶ User activity is not predictable. Several attacks possible.

Technical Challenges

- ▶ How shall the noise be generated and exfiltrated?
- ▶ In a compatible, robust, and efficient manner?



Measurements defining keystroke dynamics

- ▶ Flight time: time between keystrokes.
- ▶ Dwell time: time a key pressed.
- ▶ **EXTRA** Scancode: the symbol which the key corresponds to.


Our approach: NoisyKey

- ▶ We force the system to expose pre-set keystroke dynamics.
- ▶ Bogus keystrokes are adaptively generated.
- ▶ Example (flight time):
 - ▶ If no user input \Rightarrow noise generations goes full throttle.
 - ▶ Lots of user input \Rightarrow less bogus keystrokes.



Exfiltrating real keystrokes


- ▶ Keyloggers sniff the event channel used to delivery keystrokes.
- ▶ We exfiltrate the keystrokes outside the event channel.





A sliding-window approach exfiltrates the real keystrokes

- ▶ The **smaller** the sliding window, the **lower** the latency.
- ▶ The **bigger** the sliding window, the **lower** the CPU usage.





Full paper menu (check it out!)

- ▶ Correctness and performance evaluation.
- ▶ A novel privacy model for keystroke dynamics.
- ▶ Comprehensive evaluation against 51 test subjects.

