# Telepathwords: preventing weak passwords by reading users' minds

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Microsoft Research

# Authentication ecosystem

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System administrators



Users



# Defending users

- System administrators set password policies
  - Constraints on passwords



#### Character requirements

- Common component of policies
  - Length
  - Uppercase, digit, symbol

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Can't prevent weak passwords:

# Character requirements

Default policies often use only character requirements

- In Microsoft Active Directory (3class8)
  - 3 of the following: uppercase, lowercase, digit, symbol
  - 8 character minimum

These requirements don't improve security, and they make passwords harder to type

#### Goal

- Focus on weakest passwords
  - Threat model: online attack of an organization
  - Policies should make the weakest passwords harder to guess

#### Contributions

Show that character requirements don't prevent weak passwords


- Introduce Telepathwords
  - Detects weak passwords while providing real-time feedback

- Show that real-time feedback coupled with prevention of common patterns works well
  - Significantly better security than character requirements
  - Not significantly different in usability (after creation)

#### Real-time predictions

X indicates that the character below it	will try to guess each character of your password before you type it was one we guessed, and does little to improve your password. was hard to guess, and is more likely to improve your password.
Choose a password:	Show Password
Re-enter your password:	
Continue	


Explanations show why password is guessable



Prediction display can be turned off

```
✓✓XX✓XXXX (2 more ✓ marks required)
```

Feedback bar scores password by predictions



 Can enforce a policy by requiring a minimum number of unpredicted characters

#### Related work

- Character requirements haven't changed much in 35 years since Morris and Thompson
  - Proposed 6-character minimum [1979]
  - Very little security improvement [Bonneau 2012]

#### Related work

- Password meters
  - Meters are typically based on character requirements
     [Ur et al. 2012]
  - No consistency across meters [de Carnevalet and Mannan 2013]



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- Password meters
  - Meters are typically based on character requirements
     [Ur et al. 2012]
  - No consistency across meters [de Carnevalet and Mannan 2013]
- zxcvbn entropy estimator [Wheeler 2012]

Password meters don't explain their scores

 Multiple, weighted "predictors" produce nextcharacter guesses and likelihood scores

Search query n-grams

Choose a password:

Showmethe

Showmethe

Showmethe


Showmethe

Showmethe


Cas in showmethecurry

Was in showmetheway

Password sets




Common substitutions (s -> \$, a -> @, etc.)




Keyboard patterns

Choose a password:



Keyboard patterns



Keyboard patterns

Choose a password:

Zaqwsxcde

Rrfvbgt

Best guesses for the next key you'll type

RRFVBGT

3-v

Repeating patterns

Choose a password:

abababab

Arepeating ab (ab)

Best guesses for the next key you'll type

AAB

Yang (4 more √ marks required)


Arepeating ab (ab)

AB

Yas in babababy

Interleaving strings

Choose a password:



Can cover many behaviors and easily add

Many possible ways to implement, ours is just one example

#### **Evaluation**

 December 2013 - deployed as a public website https://telepathwords.research.microsoft.com

- Feburary 2014 Mechanical Turk study
  - CMU branded, using Javascript API

#### **Policies**


• 6 policy conditions (2 Telepathwords)

All conditions included some visual feedback

#### Condition: basic8

#### Requirements

Minimum 8 characters



#### Condition: 3class8

- Minimum 8 characters
- Must contain at least 3 of the following: lowercase, uppercase, digit, symbol

d for your email account.	
Your password needs 8 more characters	s and must include lowercase letters, uppercase letters, digits, symbol  Show Password



#### Condition: 3class8-d

- Minimum 8 characters
- Must contain at least 3 of the following: lowercase, uppercase, digit, symbol
- Letters in password must not be in a dictionary

for your email accou			
our password needs 8 n	ore c <mark>haracters ar</mark>	nd must include lowercase letters, uppercase letters, digits, sy  Show Password	/mbo



#### Condition: 3class12

- Minimum 12 characters
- Must contain at least 3 of the following: lowercase, uppercase, digit, symbol

ord	or your email account.
Y	our password needs 12 more characters and must include lowercase letters, uppercase letters, digits, symbols.  Show Password



#### Conditions: telepath, telepath-v

- Minimum 6 unpredicted characters
- "Show Password" checked by default in telepath-v

Please create a new password for your email account	nt.
X indicates that the character below it was one we	ess each character of your password before you type it. guessed, and does little to improve your password. guess, and is more likely to improve your password.
Choose a password:	Show Password
Re-enter your password:  Continue	

#### **Conditions**

Character requirements

Character requirements

3class8-d
telepath telepath-v

Character requirements

3class8-d
telepath policies

#### **Evaluation**

- N = 2,844 (started) / 2,560 (finished)
- Median age = 27 (limited to 18+)
- 60% male, 44% with Bachelor's or above
- Required 95% acceptance rate and U.S. location

## Study design

Hypothetical email scenario for password creation

#### Steps:

- Create a password under a randomly assigned condition
- 2. Take a survey
- 3. Recall password
- 4. Return in two days

#### Policy metrics


#### Security

- Weir+ guessability
  - Refinement of [Weir et al. 2009]
  - Minimum number of guesses needed for single password, 2.5%, 5%, and 10%
- zxcvbn entropy estimate
  - Min-entropy; 2.5<sup>th</sup>, 5<sup>th</sup>, 10<sup>th</sup> percentiles
- Probability metrics were not viable

#### Policy metrics


#### Usability


- Creation difficulty
- Did participants find it insightful?
- Recall difficulty





# Security results 10.0% Percent covered basic8 1.0% 0.1% 20


zxcvbn entropy scores





























#### Usability: Recall after 2—5 days



#### Usability: Creation time




# Usability: Creation sentiment



#### Usability

#### Feedback Gave Insight



#### Conclusions

- "Dictionary" policies with real-time feedback can help users avoid weak passwords
  - Usability cost on creation
  - Telepathwords' feedback gave insight into password strength

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  - Usability cost on creation
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 Character-class requirements had little to no effect on security using our metrics




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


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
#### Returned after 2-5 days



# Usability: Stored password



# Usability: Recall after 2—5 days



# Usability: Toggled Show Password

