

# POST MORTEM FACILITATION

**Theory and Practice** 








@nphoff

@wcgallego

@miriamlauter

# Some important folks











#### **Etsy By The Numbers**


1.6M active sellers

**AS OF MARCH 31, 2016** 

25M active buyers \$2.39B annual GMS

35+M items for sale





https://github.com/ etsy/morgue

### What happened?


Calendar


- 15:24 @jdoe types bad command "git push -f", hits Ctrl-C, thinks that it did not propagate (but it You can use markdown did)
- 15:?? @rob and @pat both tell @dschauenberg that there is a problem
- 15:43 push queue is put on HOLD status
- 15:44 "do not push" email goes out to techall
- 15:46 @jdoe joins #push to work out the issue
- 15:49 @klee pushes all but one commit to master
   he was missing the most recent merge commit; @dschauenberg advocated that @klee do this push
- 15:52 @dschauenberg suggests that we use deploy03 git repo to recover
- 16:09 @schauenberg finishes backing up deploy03 git repo and does "git push -f", recovering the lost commits 16:19 we push princess again at commit b9d6f3615f8ce02b3437977d9e46aea737ef078b and everything is peachy

Edit

#### Images

Enter image URL






# A Story



## "It's just too crazy to try to explain..."





## What was the cause

- Human error?
- Mechanical failure?
- The environment?
- Design of the system?
- · Procedures used?




# Complex systems

## Complexity

- Robust
- · Unpredictable
- Produce large events

Bottom up emergent phenomena

## Surprise!



04-01 19:12:46: (#etsy) cathi adi: anything related to your icon work?

04-01 19:13:02: (#etsy) adi might be... i didn't make any changes to [the homepage] though

04-01 19:14:57: (#push) marty oh my god

04-01 19:14:59: (#push) marty i saw that on [our qa server]


04-01 19:15:01: (#push) marty and i thought it was an april fools joke

Clothing & Accessories Jewelry Craft Supplies & Tools Weddings Entertainment Home & Living Kids & Baby Vintage

## Whoever you are, find whatever you're into

What are you shopping for?

Search





#### Get something you love

Our marketplace is a world of vintage and handmade goods



#### Find your new favorite shop

More than a million independent sellers from everywhere are right here



#### Buy safely and securely

Etsy handles and protects every transaction, so shop with confidence


### Shop by category



Home & Living



Jewelry



Clothing



Craft Supplies & Tools



Weddings



Toys & Games

#### Browse our latest collections



EDITORS' PICKS



EDITORS' PICKS

## Accident Models

WHY DO ACCIDENTS HAPPEN?

# "HUMAN ERROR"

# Amazon blames human error for Xmas Eve outage; Netflix vows better resiliency

Derrick Harris Dec 31, 2012 - 3:58 PM PDT

14 Comments

# Human error causes NASDAQ outage

31 October 2013 By Penny Jones



















# Germany train crash: Human error to blame, says prosecutor





### **Bad Apples**

The system is basically safe.
Unreliable humans cause failure.
Get rid of bad apples.



March 6, 1987 The Herald leaves the Belgian port of Zeebrugge 193 passengers and crew died. bound for Dover. MS Herald of Free Enterprise



## Four years earlier...

October, 29 1983: The *Pride* of Free Enterprise makes it from Calais to Dover with both bow and stern doors open, successfully.

## Two years after that...

"There is no indication on the bridge as to whether the most important watertight doors are closed or not."

"Thanks for the suggestion."

## The year before the Herald disaster

Two different captains ask for door closure indicator lights.

They are told: "Please submit a request via application."

They do so.

"Do they need an indicator to tell them whether the deck storekeeper is awake and sober? My goodness!!"

"Nice but don't we already pay someone?!"

"Assume the guy who shuts the doors tells the bridge if there is a problem."

## Other factors

- Herald designed for berths at Calais/Dover
- · Zeebrugge run added later
- High tide (need to fill the ballasts)
- Transfer time at Zeebrugge under tighter constraints






Fig. 2. The complex pattern of the Zeebrugge accident.




Dr. Steven Shorrock
European Safety Culture Programme
EUROCONTROL

"Someone did (or did not do) something that they were not (or were) supposed to do according to someone."




### James Reason's Swiss Cheese Model



Safety


# Getting work done




A top rope anchor on bolts




Safety is an <u>EMERGENT PROPERTY</u> that arises when components and processes interact with each other and their environment.



## Reason's Swiss Cheese Model



# Cause is not something you find. Cause is something you construct.



## Thank you!

#### References

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- · http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/31/magazine/the-wreck-of-amtrak-188.html?\_r=0
- · The Field Guide To Understanding 'Human Error', Sidney Dekker
- · Rasmussen, Jens. "Risk management in a dynamic society: a modelling problem." Safety science 27.2 (1997): 183-213.
- · 'Life After Human Error' Steven Shorrock, Velocity 2014 <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=STU3Or6ZU60">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=STU3Or6ZU60</a>
- · 'Revisiting the Swiss Cheese Model of Accidents', J. Reason, E. Hollnagel, J. Paries Eurocontrol Oct 2006
- · https://humanisticsystems.com/2014/09/30/safety-ii-and-just-culture-where-now/
- · Rosness, Ragnar, et al. "Organisational Accidents and Resilient Organisations: Five Perspectives Revision." (2004).

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- · http://www.slideshare.net/jallspaw/alert-designcac-talk2013
- https://github.com/etsy/morgue
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Normal\_Accidents
- · https://gigaom.com/2012/12/31/amazon-blames-human-error-for-xmas-eve-outage-netflix-vows-better-resiliency/
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- · Rasmussen, Jens. "Risk management in a dynamic society: a modelling problem." Safety science 27.2 (1997): 183-213.
- · http://safety-doc.com/safety-blogs/blog/pull-the-domino-and-build.html

### Related Reading/Learning

- Todd Conklin's Pre-Accident Investigations podcast (<a href="http://prescriptions.org/">http://prescriptions.org/</a>)
- http://www.safetydifferently.com/
- Steven Shorrock's blog (<a href="http://humanisticbydesign.blogspot.com/">http://humanisticbydesign.blogspot.com/</a>)
- · Don Norman's The Design of Everyday Things









## Ops Engineer @ Etsy















#### Richard I. Cook @ri\_cook



**Following** 

Without biases we'd not survived sabertooth days. Biases WORK! For every cog fixation there R 10^4 good results.



"You will undoubtedly fall into biases.

This is natural.

You're not trying to stop them, just call them out in a non-shameful way"

- Morgan Evans




# What kind of biases are we running into?



## Counterfactual

- "If only they had..."
- · "They failed to..."
- · "They should have..."
- · "They could have..."








#### The Colorful History of the Internet and increasingly Problematic Future

quanter of the ties have prished the development of the power stated that among enjoys today . Distinguisting properties personal, makest mentione, to south montulions actules and children. No emple factor printinged the World Wide Web that today connects on many plantal networks Committee aking events in territoric (the involvanical parts composing the computer networks and withware (the programming language running the network and doing the necessary computations, orearmy have taken place and those developments have had buyer as tal and proposed impacts on an ely

The 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s. In the Law 1940s and 1950s, when computers were made with transferances taken and energiant on than a suggestion out one set up too, those was undered a himse to from high the expertences could be for they could exected and explinite there were other problems will there early companies The vacuum titles could leak. Do moral that emilled observers in the vacuum tubes burned our and all of those bules required tour of power to sun. Alajor improvements came in community headware technology with the development of translature, invented by John Bandero and Walter Brattom in 1917 and 1948 at Bell telephone Laboratories and the development of integrated circuits, invented by lack Killey at Joseph Instruments and Roberts Novce at Fairchild Camera in 1988 and 1989, Integrated circuits resolved a number of vacuum tube technology's problems and did much to further the the development of smaller computers with greater power. With this improved technology, instead of making transistors one by one, several transistors could be made at the same time and on the same piece of semiconductor. In addition to transistors, other electric components such as resistors, capacitors, and diodes could be made using the same process and materials (Haviland, 2005).

It is important to note that since the 1960s, the number of transistors per unit area has been doubling every one and a half years—thus increasing computing power. This amazing progress

Curse of Knowledge



So how do we know when our biases are negatively impactful?



#### Takeaways



- Replace bias heavy language. Typically, there's a question hidden underneath
- Failing during failures is ok!
- Blame awareness exists outside the vacuum of a Post Mortem


# Post Mortem Facilitation

**The Practical Bits** 

## Overview

- 1. Learning Culture
- 2. Debriefing

## Learning Culture






### Local Rationality

"People do things that make sense to them given their goals, understanding of the situation and focus of attention at that time."






#### Retributive Justice


- Looks to the past
- Determines blame
- · Tries to prevent a "bad apple" from re-offending
- Feels good
- Easy

#### Restorative Justice

- Looks to the future
- People involved give their account
- Focus on organizational safety



## EMPATHY



# Debriefing

#### Talk to the people involved

- · Let them know you're on their side
- Set their expectations
- Get a sense for their expectations

#### Gather Data

- · Graphs, Metrics
- · IRC Logs, emails
- · Commits, Pull Requests

#### During the Debriefing

- Set the stage
- Ask people about their story
- Tell their story back to them
- Identify critical junctures
- Progressively re-build how the world looked to people inside the situation at each juncture.

### BIASES

# ASK BETTER QUESTIONS



### http://bit.ly/DebriefingPrompts

# CUES

#### Cues

- · What were you seeing?
- · What were you focusing on?
- · What were you expecting to happen?

### INTERPRETATION

 If you had to describe the situation to a colleague at that point, what would you have said?

### HISTORY

#### History

- Did this approach work for you before?
- Did this situation fit a standard scenario?
- Were you trained to deal with this situation?
- Were there any rules that applied clearly here?
- Did you rely on other sources of knowledge to tell you what to do?

# GOALS

#### Goals

- Were there any conflicts or trade-offs to be made that you were aware of at the time?
- What were the goals you were reaching for?
- Too what extent did you feel time pressure at this point?
- What was most important to accomplish at this point in the incident?

### ACTION

#### Action

- How did you judge you could influence the course of events?
- Did you discuss or mentally imagine a number of options or did you know straight away what to do?

### COMMUNICATIONS

#### Communications

- What communications mediums did you prefer? (IRC, Vidyo, phone, email, in person, etc.)
- Did you use any communication channels together?

# 

#### Help

- Did you ask for help?
- What was the signal that brought you to ask for help?
- Were you able to get in touch with the people you wanted to talk with?
- How did you know to trust the guidance that you got?

### Our Goal is to Learn

#### Remediation

- Action items not always necessary
- Soak time

### Thanks!

### Homework

(Due during the next session)

Think of a time when your skills were particularly challenged, or when your experience really made a difference in the way something turned out.

It should be something that you can share.

# Questions?