## Lowering the USB Fuzzing Barrier by Transparent Two-Way Emulation

Rijnard van Tonder Herman Engelbrecht



Stellenbosch University

### **Motivation**

- High-impact security bugs reside in the USB attack surface
- Challenging to explore due to
  - limited pure software solutions
  - hardware acquisition
  - inflexible hardware for security testing
  - knowledge requirement of USB
- ➤ Can we do better?



# **Existing Solutions**

#### Software:

- Qemu emulation (MWR Labs, '11)
- ➤ Frisbee Lite (Davis, '12)

#### Hardware:

 USB Analyzer, Frisbee and GraphicUSB (Davis, '11)



 BeagleBone and USBProxy (Spill '14) Arduino (Ose, '11, Davis, '11)



 Facedancer (Goodspeed, Bratus, '12), umap (Davis, '13)







Fast	1
Read and Write ability	✓
Man-in-the-middle	1
Knowledge requirement	~
Cost	X
Flexible	X



Fast	X		
Read and Write ability			
Man-in-the-middle	×		
Knowledge requirement	X		
Cost	1		
Flexible	1		

## Contributions

- ➤ The TTWE USB fuzzing framework that
  - Is flexible,
  - Is cost-effective, and
  - Lowers the knowledge requirement
- Initial results and analysis of bug-hunting with TTWE
- > New possibilities for USB fuzzing and attacks

## **USB Protocol Primer**

- Consists of requests and descriptors exchanged between host and peripheral
- USB defines device classes for peripherals
- Endpoints designate data *direction* and *address*
- Control transfers and Non-control transfers
- Packets
  - Token
  - o Data
  - Handshake

#### TTWE

- Tap into the communication between host and peripheral
- Modify communication
- The Facedancer can emulate host or peripheral devices



 $\succ$  Emulate both simultaneously

# Design



## **Hardware Implementation**



**16-bit Microcontroller** 

## **Software Implementation**

#### Emulation drivers

- Host and Peripheral mode
- Communicate via named pipes



Two challenges:

- ➤ Endpoint Hijacking
- Handshake emulation

## **Endpoint Hijacking**

Problem: hardcoded endpoint descriptors







# Design



### **Transparent Emulation Results**

- ➤ Mass storage device
  - Enumeration
  - SCSI data
  - Mount, read, and write ability

DIR	EP	DATA (Base 10)
OUT	[0]	[128, 6, 0, 1, 0, 0, 64, 0]
IN	[0]	[18, 1, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0, 64, 143, 5, 135, 99, 2, 1, 1, 2, 3, 1]
OUT	[0]	[0, 5, 25, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]
OUT	[0]	[128, 6, 0, 1, 0, 0, 18, 0]
IN	[0]	[18, 1, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0, 64, 143, 5, 135, 99, 2, 1, 1, 2, 3, 1]
OUT	[0]	[128, 6, 0, 6, 0, 0, 10, 0]
IN	[0]	[10, 6, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0, 64, 1, 0]
OUT	[0]	[128, 6, 0, 2, 0, 0, 9, 0]
IN	[0]	[9, 2, 32, 0, 1, 1, 0, 128, 100]
OUT	[0]	[128, 6, 0, 2, 0, 0, 32, 0]
IN	[0]	[9, 2, 32, 0, 1, 1, 0, 128, 100, 9, 4, 0, 0, 2, 8, 6, 80, 0, 7,
		5, <b>1</b> , 2, 64, 0, 0, 7, 5, <b>130</b> , 2, 64, 0, 0]
OUT	[0]	[128, 6, 0, 3, 0, 0, 255, 0]
IN	[0]	[4, 3, 9, 4]
OUT	[0]	[128, 6, 2, 3, 9, 4, 255, 0]
IN	[0]	[26, 3, 77, 0, 97, 0, 115, 0, 115, 0, 32, 0, 83, 0, 116, 0, 111,
		0, 114, 0, 97, 0, 103, 0, 101, 0]
OUT	[0]	[128, 6, 1, 3, 9, 4, 255, 0]
IN	[0]	[16, 3, 71, 0, 101, 0, 110, 0, 101, 0, 114, 0, 105, 0, 99, 0]
OUT	[0]	[128, 6, 3, 3, 9, 4, 255, 0]
IN	[0]	[18, 3, 49, 0, 57, 0, 54, 0, 50, 0, 51, 0, 55, 0, 51, 0, 54, 0]
OUT	[0]	[0, 9, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]
OUT	[0]	[161, 254, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0]
IN	[0]	[0]
OUT	[1]	[85, 83, 66, 67, 1, 0, 0, 0, 36, 0, 0, 0, 128, 0, 6, 18, 0, 0, 0,
		36, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]
IN	[3]	[0, 128, 4, 2, 31, 0, 0, 0, 71, 101, 110, 101, 114, 105, 99, 32,
		70, 108, 97, 115, 104, 32, 68, 105, 115, 107, 32, 32, 32, 32, 32,
		32, 56, 46, 48, 55]
IN	[3]	[85, 83, 66, 83, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]
OUT	[1]	[85, 83, 66, 67, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
		0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]
IN	[3]	[85, 83, 66, 83, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1]
OUT	[1]	[85, 83, 66, 67, 3, 0, 0, 0, 18, 0, 0, 0, 128, 0, 6, 3, 0, 0, 0,
		18, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]

## **Fuzzing Results**

- ➤ "Dumb" fuzzing setup
- Printer Driver bug
  - Memory corruption
- Application DoS on print
  - Waits for ACK
- ➢ WiFi dongle
  - Invalid response to clear\_feature
- Mass storage driver bug in printer
  - Malformed SCSI response



#### Limitations

- > Slow
- Device timeouts
- > Number of endpoints

## Conclusion

- Flexible and inexpensive way to explore the USB attack surface
- Record and replay when fuzzing

Further avenues:

- ➤ TOCTTOU RIT attack (Mulliner, '12)
- Devices-as-seed-files

## Questions





#### @rvtond



https://github.com/rvantonder/ttwe-proto



rvantonder@ml.sun.ac.za