

Lowering the USB Fuzzing Barrier by Transparent Two-Way Emulation

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Motivation

- High-impact security bugs reside in the USB attack surface
- Challenging to explore due to
 - limited pure software solutions
 - hardware acquisition
 - inflexible hardware for security testing
 - knowledge requirement of USB
- Can we do better?



Existing Solutions

Software:

- Qemu emulation (MWR Labs, '11)
- Frisbee Lite (Davis, '12)

Hardware:

- USB Analyzer, Frisbee and GraphicUSB (Davis, '11)




- BeagleBone and USBProxy (Spill '14)

- Arduino (Ose, '11, Davis, '11)




- Facedancer (Goodspeed, Bratus, '12), umap (Davis, '13)





Fast	✓
Read and Write ability	✓
Man-in-the-middle	✓
Knowledge requirement	✓
Cost	✗
Flexible	✗



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Contributions

- The TTWE USB fuzzing framework that
 - Is flexible,
 - Is cost-effective, and
 - Lowers the knowledge requirement
- Initial results and analysis of bug-hunting with TTWE
- New possibilities for USB fuzzing and attacks

USB Protocol Primer

- Consists of *requests* and *descriptors* exchanged between *host* and *peripheral*
- USB defines device classes for peripherals
- Endpoints designate data *direction* and *address*
- Control transfers and Non-control transfers
- Packets
 - Token
 - Data
 - Handshake


TTWE

- Tap into the communication between host and peripheral
- Modify communication
- The Facedancer can emulate host or peripheral devices




- Emulate both simultaneously

Design



Hardware Implementation



Software Implementation

- Emulation drivers
 - Host and Peripheral mode
 - Communicate via named pipes



Two challenges:

- Endpoint Hijacking
- Handshake emulation

Endpoint Hijacking

- Problem: hardcoded endpoint descriptors

EP1: IN

EP2: OUT




EP3: IN

EP1: OUT




Design



Fuzzing Results

- “Dumb” fuzzing setup
- Printer Driver bug
 - Memory corruption
- Application DoS on print
 - Waits for ACK
- WiFi dongle
 - Invalid response to clear_feature
- Mass storage driver bug in printer
 - Malformed SCSI response



Limitations

- Slow
- Device timeouts
- Number of endpoints

Conclusion

- Flexible and inexpensive way to explore the USB attack surface
- Record and replay when fuzzing

Further avenues:

- TOCTTOU RIT attack (Mulliner, '12)
- Devices-as-seed-files

Questions

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<https://github.com/rvantonder/ttwe-proto>



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