

# ICS Testbed Tetris: Practical Building Blocks Towards a Cyber Security Resource

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https://www.lancaster.ac.uk/security-lancaster/




## Introduction

- What are Industrial Control Systems (ICS)
- Our work to date/Related work
- Design considerations
- Experiment lifecycle
- High-Level Model
- Model breakdown
- Practical implementation
- Living resource
- TIDE-H and future work



# What are Industrial Control Systems (ICS)





## Related Work

- Our work
  - Over 6 years of ICS testbed development
  - Collaborative engagement
  - 5 Existing publications in this space
- Related work
  - Surveys
  - Theoretical concepts
  - Practical implementation

Green, B., Lee, A., Antrobus, R., Roedig, U., Hutchison, D. and Rashid, A., 2017. Pains, gains and PLCs: ten lessons from building an industrial control systems testbed for security research. In 10th {USENIX} Workshop on Cyber Security Experimentation and Test ({CSET} 17).

Green, B., Frey, S.A.F., Rashid, A. and Hutchison, D., 2016. Testbed diversity as a fundamental principle for effective ICS security research. Serecin.

Gardiner, J., Craggs, B., Green, B. and Rashid, A., 2019, November. Oops I did it again: further adventures in the land of ICS security testbeds. In *Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Cyber-Physical Systems Security & Privacy* (pp. 75-86)

Ani, U.D., Watson, J.M., Green, B., Craggs, B. and Nurse, J., 2019. Design Considerations for Building Credible Security Testbeds: A Systematic Study of Industrial Control System Use Cases. arXiv preprint arXiv:1911.01471.

Green, B., Paske, B., Hutchison, D. and Prince, D., 2014. Design and construction of an industrial control system testbed. In PG Net-The 15th Annual PostGraduate Symposium




# **Design Considerations**

Characteristic	TBO	TBA	TBE
Fidelity		✓	
Modularity	✓	✓	
Diversity		✓	
Interoperability		✓	
Monitoring and Logging	<b>√</b>	✓	
Openness	✓	✓	
Scalability/Extensibility		✓	
Flexibility/Adaptability	<b>√</b>	✓	
Repeatability/Reproducibility	<b>√</b>	✓	✓
Measurability&Measurement Accuracy		✓	✓
Cost-effectiveness	<b>√</b>	✓	✓
Isolation/Safe Execution	<b>√</b>	✓	
Usability	<b>√</b>	✓	
Complexity		✓	



# Cyber Security Experiment Lifecycle

# Design ☐ Instantiation ☐ Execution ☐ Analysis











# High-Level Model





## Model Breakdown





# Baseline Implementation Guide









https://www.gunt.de/en/products/process-engineering/water-treatment/multistage-water-treatment/water-treatment-plant-1/083.58100/ce581/glct-1:pa-148:ca-255:pr-57

https://www.fischertechnik.de/en/products/teaching/training-models/554868-edu-training-factory-industry-4-0-24v-education


https://factoryio.com/features

http://snap7.sourceforge.net/



# **Living Resource**

- Online resource
  - www.ics-testbed.co.uk
  - Transcends static nature of paper
  - Community contribution
  - tide-ssg@lancaster.ac.uk



covered by this layer. For example, management access to a hypervisor can be used to deploy virtual machines within the Experimental Layer as



# Security Lancaster's TIDE-H & Future Work

LANC TIDE-H: Lancaster's "Threat Intelligence Data

Exchange Hub"

TIDE-H

#### **Academia**

Threats Dataset
Repository for
Academic
Collaborations
(iDID, h-UNIQUE,
ICS, OS,
Network,
Social...)

### <u>Industry</u>

Anonymized
Sharing of
Attacks &
Threat
Patterns
(Banks, CIP...)

#### **Government**

Repositoryfor
Threat rofiles,
Health DBs...
(Police,
GCHQ+ Intl.,
NHS...)

## <u>Virtual Labs</u>

Incubator Env.
Tools/Testbeds
/IPR/Best
Practices...

Synergy: Data Sciences Institute, Secure Digitalization (SecureD @UEZ),
Lancaster Technology Accelerator, Manchester/Lancashire CyberFoundry,
Health Innovation Campus, Eden, EC CONCORDIA...



# Thank You for Watching!