

Programmable In-Network Security for Context-aware BYOD Policies

Qiao Kang, Lei Xue*, Adam Morrison, Yuxin Tang, Ang Chen, Xiapu Luo*

Rice University **The Hong Kong Polytechnic University*




BYOD: Bring Your Own ~~Device~~ Risks




- BYOD devices: **Less well managed** and easier to be compromised
- Need to **access control** for BYOD clients

“Context-aware” policies for BYOD




- Making **precise** security decisions by **dynamically** adapting to security contexts
- **How to enforce these policies?**

State of the art: SDN-based defense



- **Client modules** collect client-side information
- BYOD policies are managed and enforced in an **SDN “app”**

Limitations of the SDN-based defense




- **Low defense agility:** Context updates need to traverse the software controller
- Vulnerable to **control plane DoS attacks** [AvantGuard - CCS'13]
- Root cause: Lower processing speed of the SDN controller software

Research question

Can we address the limitations of SDN-based BYOD defense?



Opportunity: Programmable data planes



- Switch features:
 - Programmable parser: Customized protocols
 - Stateful processing
 - Arithmetic operations
 - General-purpose control plane
- High performance : <1us delay for Tbps traffic
- Can we transform these **hardware features** to **security benefits** for BYOD? 7

P4: Language for data plane programming

Customized headers

```
header myTunnel_t {
    bit<16> proto_id;
    bit<16> dst_id;
}

struct headers {
    ethernet_t  ethernet;
    myTunnel_t  myTunnel;
    ipv4_t      ipv4;
}
```

Match/action processing


```
table ipv4_lpm {
    key = {
        hdr.ipv4.dstAddr: lpm;
    }
    actions = {
        ipv4_forward;
        drop;
        NoAction;
    }
    size = 1024;
    default_action = NoAction();
}
```

Stateful registers

```
// count the number of bytes seen since the last probe
register<bit<32>>(MAX_PORTS) byte_cnt_reg;
// remember the time of the last probe
register<time_t>(MAX_PORTS) last_time_reg;
```

- Reconfigures switch pipeline for header manipulation
- Has the potential to enforce BYOD policies **at linespeed**
- Downside: P4 is low-level, non-trivial to develop and maintain

Poise: Programmable In-network Security



- **Language:** An expressive language for defining BYOD policies
- **Compiler:** Generates device configurations and switch programs
- **P4 data plane design:** A dynamic and efficient security primitive

Outline

- ✓ • Motivation
- Poise Design
 - ➔ • The Poise language
 - Compiling Poise policies
 - Data plane design
- Evaluation
- Conclusion

The Poise language

Primitive Actions

$A ::= \text{drop} \mid \text{fwd}(\text{port}) \mid \text{flood} \mid \text{log}$

Expressions

$E ::= v \mid e_1 + e_2 \mid e_1 - e_2 \mid e_1 * e_2 \mid M$

Constant Lists

$L ::= \text{nil} \mid v, L$

Predicates

$P ::= \text{match}(e_1 \circ e_2) \mid \text{match}(h \circ e) \mid$
 $\text{match}(h \text{ in } l) \mid P \& P \mid (P \mid P) \mid !P$


Monitors

$M ::= \text{count}(P)$

Policies

$C ::= A \mid \text{if } P \text{ then } C \text{ else } C \mid (C \mid C)$

Block access if *SSL*
version $\leq 6.5.2$



Predicate

if match (*sslver* ≤ 6.5)
then drop

Primitive Action

Policy

- An expressive language for writing context-aware policies
 - Predicates on customized client contexts
 - Support pre-defined primitive actions

Compiling Poise policies

```
if match (sslver <= 6.5)
then drop
```

```
header ctx_t {
    sslver: 16
}
```

```
table decision_tab
{
    key = {ctx.sslver: exact}


    entries = {
        <= 6.5.0: dec = DROP
        > 6.5.0: dec = ALLOW
    }
}
```

- Contexts (sslver) are compiled to customized header fields
- Security actions (if-else) are compiled to match/action table entries
- Advanced features: Policy composition, resource optimizations, etc

Outline


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An efficient in-network primitive



- **Problem:** How to spread context information from client to switch?
 - Strawman solution: Tag every packet with context -- high overhead!
- **Idea:** Periodic **context packets** per flow: Headers + context, no data
 - **Dynamic:** Decisions are based on the latest context
 - **Efficient:** Data packets unmodified (no embedded contexts)
 - **Adjustable accuracy:** Tunable context packet period

Key data structure: A per-flow table



- A match/action table to maintain the latest per-flow decision
- Technical challenges:
 - New flow insertion delay (~1ms)
 - Controlling the size of the table
 - Handling DoS attacks (e.g., many new flows) **See more details in our paper!**

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
Evaluation setup

- Prototype implementation
 - Compiler: Bison + Flex
 - Android client module: a kernel module on Linux 3.18.31
 - ~6000 LoC
- Evaluation setup
 - Tofino Wedge 100BF switch 32 X 100 Gbps = 3.2 Tbps

What we have evaluated


- **Correctness:** Can Poise enforce BYOD policies correctly?
 - **Overhead:** How much delay or throughput degradation can Poise incur?
 - **Scalability:** How complex/large policies can Poise support?
 - ✓ • **Poise vs. SDN:** Is Poise resilient to control plane saturation attacks?
-
- SDN-based solution: PBS – NDSS'16
 - Floodlight v1.2 + Open vSwitch v2.9.2
 - Methodology:
 - DoS attacker: Launch **frequent context changes**
 - Measure how **normal user traffic** are affected

Poise vs. SDN: First packet delay



- SDN: Takes **~1 second** for the first packet to arrive under heavy attacks
- Poise: Remains at a **constant** level

Poise vs. SDN: New flow installation



- SDN: **Fails** to install new flows under heavy attacks
- Poise: Almost always installs **100%** new flows
- Poise is highly resilient to DoS attacks from malicious clients

Conclusion

- Motivation
 - SDN-based BYOD defense has limitations
- Poise: Programmable In-Network Security
 - An expressive policy language
 - Compiler for generating P4 programs
 - An efficient in-network security primitive
- Poise transforms the hardware features to security benefits

Thank you for listening!

Contact: qiaokang@rice.edu – Looking for 2021 summer internship
<https://github.com/qiaokang92/poise>