



MAZE: Towards Automated Heap Feng Shui

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0x01 Motivation


AEG is important

- The number of vulnerabilities is growing explosively.
- Software vendors need to quickly evaluate the severity of security vulnerabilities and allocate appropriate resources to fix critical ones.
- Defenders could learn from synthetic exploits to generate IDS (Intrusion Detection System) rules and block potential attacks.



Automated Heap Feng Shui is demanded


- Lots of vulnerabilities, e.g., heap overflow and UAF, could only be exploited in specific heap layouts via techniques like heap feng shui.
- Heap overflow: An exploitable object should be placed at a position which is next to the overflowed object.
- UAF: A content controllable object should be placed at the freed object's position.
- Complex exploit techniques require complicated heap layout, e.g., unsafe unlink attack requires two chunks to be allocated before and after the overflowed chunk.



Problem Scope

Maze


Expected Memory
Layout Generation



Vulnerability analysis
—> ASAN, Valgrind(Memcheck)

Expected Memory Layout
—>Heuristic, e.g. in this example,
a controllable object (e.g. switch-
>name) should take the freed
exceptional object's position

Memory Layout
Manipulation



Heap Layout Primitives Analysis

Heap Layout Primitives Assembly

Full Chain Exploit
Composition

Exploit primitive composition
—> Automated multi-hop
exploit generation

Security mechanisms bypass
—> bypass ASLR, NX, CFG

0x02 Introduction


Example: A UAF vulnerability

```
1 void main(void){
2   while(1){ switch(c){           //function dispatcher
3     case 1: Create_Router();    //primitive 1
4     case 2: Create_Switch();    //primitive 2
5     case 3: Delete_Switch();   //primitive 3
6     case 4: Edit_name(); }     //
7 Router Create_Router(){...
8   Router *router = malloc(0x160);
9   router->protocol = malloc(0x160);
10  router->r_table = malloc(0x160); ...}
11 Switch Create_Switch(){...
12   Switch *switch = malloc(0x160);
13   switch->name = malloc(0x160);
14   glist[count++] = switch; ...}
15 void Delete_Switch(int index){...
16   if (glist[index]!=Null) {...
17     free(glist[index]);
18     free(glist[index]->name); }.. ...}
19 void Edit_name(int index){...
20   Switch *s = glist[index];
21   read(0, s->name, 0x60) ...}
```

- Program: An interactive program that selects the corresponding function based on user input
- UAF: Delete_Switch() function does not clear the pointer to this object after deleting an object
- Expected layout: a controllable object (i.e. switch->name) should take the freed object's position (i.e. switch), to hijack the sensitive pointer s->name, yielding arbitrary memory writes.
- Layout primitive noise: There is at least one noise (de)allocation in one primitive.

Primitives Analysis in Example

```
7 Router Create_Router(){...
8     Router *router    = malloc(0x160);
9     router->protocol  = malloc(0x160);
10    router->r_table    = malloc(0x160); ...}
11 Switch Create_Switch(){...
12     Switch *switch    = malloc(0x160);
13     switch->name       = malloc(0x160);
14     glist[count++]    = switch;      ...}
15 void Delete_Switch(int index){...
16     if (glist[index]!=Null) {...
17         free(glist[index]);
18         free(glist[index]->name); }.. ...}
19 void Edit_name(int index){...
20     Switch *s = glist[index];
21     read(0, s->name, 0x60) ...}
```



• Primitives Extraction

- Reentrant code snippets: exist in function dispatchers that are enclosed in loops.
- Maze utilizes the code structure characteristic to recognize candidate heap layout primitives, via static analysis.
- **Example: Create_Router, Create_Switch, Delete_Switch**

• Primitives Dependency Analysis

- Some reentrant code snippets may depend on other snippets.
- Maze analyzes the pre-condition and post-condition of each snippet to recognize such dependencies and merge them into one primitive
- **Example: Delete_Switch \leftarrow Create_Switch**

• Primitives Semantics Analysis

- It's necessary to understand the semantics of each primitive, especially the size of (de)allocated objects
- Taint analysis and symbolic execution.
- **Example: Create_Router: 3 malloc, size=0x160; Create_Switch: 2 malloc. Size = 0x160; Delete_Switch: 2 free, target from Create_Switch**

Challenge – How to assemble primitives ?

- Random Search? (SHRIKE) Genetic Algorithm ? (Gollum)
 - ▶ Path space explosion
 - ▶ Unnecessary time consumption
 - ▶ Low success rate
- Why? *Noise*: unwanted (de)allocations in heap primitives.


Allocator	Noise	% Overall Solved	% Natural Solved	% Reversed Solved
avrlibc-r2537	0	100	100	99
dlmalloc-2.8.6	0	99	100	98
tcmalloc-2.6.1	0	72	75	69
avrlibc-r2537	1	51	50	52
dlmalloc-2.8.6	1	46	60	31
tcmalloc-2.6.1	1	52	58	47
avrlibc-r2537	4	41	44	38
dlmalloc-2.8.6	4	33	49	17
tcmalloc-2.6.1	4	37	51	24

The success rate drops dramatically when the number of noises grows!

Dig & Fill—A novel algorithm regardless of *Noise*

- **Redefine Problem**

- One-object constraint layout: placing one object O into one target address P .
- Multi-objects constraint layout: placing multi objects into multi target addresses.




- **Dig**

- At the time of allocating the target object O , the target address P is taken by object O' .
- We need to dig memory holes before allocating O' , by adding primitives that could free objects of proper sizes, to accommodate O' .

- **Fill**

- At the time of allocating the target object O , the target address P could be empty, but O still falls into other holes.
- We need to fill (multiple) holes before allocating O , by adding primitives that could allocate objects.



Counteract *Noise* using *Diophantine Equations*

- Linear Diophantine Equation Setup

$$\begin{cases} \Delta d_1 x_1 + \Delta d_2 x_2 + \Delta d_3 x_3 + \dots + \Delta d_n x_n + d = 0 \\ x_1, x_2, x_3 \dots x_n \geq 0 \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

➔ Measurement Unit — — Standard fill (or dig) operation

- 1) Contains only one allocation (or deallocation) and 2) the size equals to the size of O (or P)

➔ **d**: Target Distance (PoC) Measurement

- Add standard fill (or dig) operations into the program execution trace of PoC, until the target object O is placed into the target address P.
- If d standard dig operations are required, Target Distance is +d. If d standard fill operations are required, Target Distance is -d.

➔ **Δd**: Delta Distance (Layout Primitives) Measurement

- Target Distance before and after inserting a primitive are d1 and d2, then the Delta Distance (Δd) of this primitive is d2-d1.

Primitive Assembly in Example

```

7 Router Create_Router(){...
8     Router *router    = malloc(0x160);
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12     Switch *switch    = malloc(0x160);
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15 void Delete_Switch(int index){...
16     if (glist[index]!=Null) {...
17         free(glist[index]);
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19 void Edit_name(int index){...
20     Switch *s = glist[index];
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
- The Target Distance (d) of POC is +1. (one standard dig operation is needed so that switch->name can be placed at the target position.
- The Δd of Create_Switch, Create_Router and Delete_Switch (combining with its dependant Create_Switch) are +2, +3 and -2
- A Linear Diophantine Equation can be build:

$$\begin{cases} 2x_1 + 3x_2 - 2x_3 + 1 = 0 \\ x_1, x_2, x_3 \geq 0 \end{cases}$$



$$x_1 = 0, x_2 = 1, x_3 = 2$$

- One Create_Router and two Delete_Switch primitives are needed.



Overview of Maze




Figure 2: Overview of Maze

- **Heap Layout Primitives Analysis**

- Taking the program and POC as inputs, Maze will extract primitives in them. (Heap layout primitives (e.g., Create_Switch) are the building blocks for heap layout manipulation.)

- **Heap Layout Primitives Assembly**

- The inputs of this part are heap primitives, POC info, path constraints and expected layout.
- Maze will utilize heap primitives to manipulate POC's layout (inferred from the POC info) to the expected layout and generate an exploit using a constraint solver.

0x03 Evaluation

CTF benchmark

Table 1: CTF programs successfully processed by MAZE.

Name	CTF	Vul Type	Final State
sword	PicoCTF '18	UAF	EIP hijack
hacknote	Pwnable.tw	UAF	EIP hijack
fheap	HCTF '16	UAF	EIP hijack
main	RHme3 CTF '17	UAF	Memory write
cat	ASIS Qual '18	Double free	Memory write
asvdb	ASIS Final '18	Double free	Memory leak
note3	ZCTF '16	Heap bof	Unlink attack
stkof	HITCON '14	Heap bof	Unlink attack
Secure-Key-Manager	SECCON '17	Heap bof	Unlink attack
RNote2	RCTF '17	Heap bof	Unlink attack
babyheap	RCTF '18	Off-by-one	Unlink attack
secret-of-my-heart	Pwnable.tw	Off-by-one	Unlink attack
Mem0	ASIS Final '18	Off-by-one	Unlink attack
quotes_list	FireShell '19	Off-by-one	Unlink attack
freenote	OCTF '15	Double free	Unlink attack
databank	Bsides Delhi	UAF	fastbin attack

- MAZE can hijack control flow for 5.
- Leak arbitrary memory address information for 1.
- MAZE outputs exploitable layout without generating exploits for 10, extra techniques (e.g., unlink attack) are required.

Table 3: Heap layout primitives results on CTF programs.

Program	Paths	Symbolized Paths	Independent Primitives	Dependent Primitives	Time(s)
sword	118	11	5	5	500
hacknote	8	5	3	1	71
fheap	55	5	4	1	370
main	182	8	4	4	398
cat	44	10	4	5	1064
asvdb	7440	10	6	3	1156
note3	198	6	4	2	942
stkof	30	11	1	3	267
babyheap	18	6	3	2	163
secret...	12	4	2	2	186
Mem0	183	11	8	3	1099
Secure...	1332	55	5	3	445
quotes...	98	5	2	3	149
freenote	1068	7	3	4	1643
RNote2	62	6	3	3	359
databank	100	11	9	2	192

- Path simplification: 15 programs' paths are reduced to about 10 symbolized paths, the average rate of is 98.4%.
- Dependency Analysis: Column 5 shows the number of primitives that depend on others and can be analyzed by MAZE.

Real world Program Benchmark

Table 5: Evaluation results of different solutions on PHP.

Solution	Solve time(s)	Succ	POC analysis time(s)
Maze	100% in 68s	100%	922s
Shrike	25% in 300s, 60% in 3000+s	60%	Not Supported
Gollum	75% in 300s, 85% in 2500+s	85%	Not Supported

- Efficiency: MAZE is much faster than Shrike and Gollum. MAZE: 100% in 68s. Shrikes: 25% in 300s. Gollum: 75% in 300s
- Effectiveness: MAZE can solve all the benchmarks. Shrike can only solve 60% of them, and Gollum solved 85%.
- Maze doesn't need a template to guide the heap layout manipulation process.

Table 6: Evaluation results on Python and Perl.

Target	Vulnerabilities	Average time(s)
Python	CVE-2007-4965, 2014-1912, Issue24105, 24095, 24094	100% in 118s
Perl	Issue132544, 130703, 130321, 129024, 129012	100% in 141s

- Compared with others, Maze broadly extends the application scope. (supports both Python and Perl)
- Maze can generate expected heap layouts for all of them, and is much faster.

Synthetic Benchmarks

- Influence of heap layout noise




Figure 6: Influences of different number of noises.

- The success rate keeps between 98% and 100%, showing that the number of noises does not influence the success rate of Dig & Fill.
- The time cost increases along with the number of noises, since noises will make the heap layout more complicated and cost more time to solve them.




Figure 7: Influences of different number of primitives.

- The number of primitives increases, the success rate also increases. This proves that the diversity of primitives influences the success rate. (still $\geq 87.7\%$)
- The time spent by MAZE to solve the problem does not grow along with the number of primitives.

Synthetic Benchmarks

- Multi-object Position Constraint

Table 8: Results of multi-object layout constraint evaluation.

Target	Object count	Time (s)	Success rate	Nature	Reversed
PT	2	73.1	98.0%	72.1%	27.9%
PT	3	95.2	97.0%	55.1%	44.9%
PT	4	145.6	96.4%	52.2%	47.8%
PT	5	238.8	95.6%	50.4%	49.6%

- Setup: a) noise is 3 ; b) 3 allocation primitive and 4 deallocation primitive; c) 100 random heap layouts for each constraint
- While the number of objects increases (from 2 to 5), the success rate decreased (still > 95%) and the time interval increased: With more object layout constraints, MAZE has to generate more Diophantine Equations to solve.
- The order of allocation relative to memory corruption direction doesn't influenced the success rate: For 5 object constraints, the Nature ratio is even 50%, but the success rate can still be 95.6%. (Nature means an earlier allocation takes the lower memory address but a later allocation takes the higher address)

0x04 Take-away

Conclusion

- MAZE can transform POC samples' heap layouts into expected layouts and automatically generate working exploits when possible.
- MAZE extends heap layout primitives to reentrant code snippets in event loop driven applications, and could efficiently recognize and analyze them.
- MAZE adopts a novel Dig & Fill algorithm to assemble primitives to generate expected layout, by deterministically solving a Linear Diophantine Equation.
- Maze is very efficient and effective and can even support multi-object constraints and many heap allocators.

Other Challenges of AEG^[1]

- Exploit Specification problem (A, H)
- Input generation problems (B, C, D, E)
- Exploit Primitive composition problem (F)
- Environment determination (I, J, K)
- State space representation (G)
- ...

Maze (problem I:Heap likelihood inference)

[1] J.Vanegue, "The automated exploitation grand challenge," in *presented at H2HC Conference*, 2013.

Thank you!

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