Inferring Phishing Intention via Webpage Appearance and Dynamics: A Deep Vision Based Approach

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Presenter: Yun Lin

National University of Singapore

(Research Assistant Professor)

Shanghai Jiao Tong University

(incoming Associate Professor)

Phishing Attack



Phishing site

Phishing Attack



Phishing site

login credential, bank account, …

Phishing Attack

transfer money

deliver misinformation

start new attacks (e.g., deploying trojan)



Phishing site

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
cna
Top Stories
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Asia
Commentary
Sustainability
CNA Insider
Lifestyle
Watch
Listen
+ All Sect
Singapore
At least S$8.5 million lost in December to phishing scams involving OCBC Bank


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CNA Insider
Lifestyle
Watch
Listen
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Singapore
Police warn of banking-related phishing scams; S$114,000 lost since May


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Top Stories
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Discover
Singapore
Asia
Commentary
Sustainability
CNA Insider
Lifestyle
Watch
Listen
+ All Sections
Singapore
At least S$12,500 lost this month to Netflix phishing scams
At least five victims have fallen prey to the phishing scams since the beginning of July, said the police.

HOME MAIL NEWS FINANCE SPORTS ENTERTAINMENT LIFE SEARCH SHOPPING YAHOO PLUS MORE...

yahoo!finance Search for news, symbols or companies

Phishing Attacks Rose 61% in 2022, New Study Finds

July 26, 2022 at 7:02 PM



Cat-and-mouse Game

abc.com

Google Safe Browsing

Blacklist

Cat-and-mouse Game



Cat-and-mouse Game



Cat-and-mouse Game

Full Automation



~~abc.com~~ ~~efg.com~~ … xyz.com

Update every week

Google Safe Browsing

Blacklist

abc.com
efg.com
…

Cat-and-mouse Game

~~abc.com~~ ~~efg.com~~ … xyz.com

Evolving HTML code



PhishIntention Solution

brand intention

abc.com

credential-taking intention

look



PI (PhishIntention)

PhishIntention Solution

look

credential-taking intention



PI (PhishIntention)

PhishIntention Solution



Reference-based Phishing Detection

brand reference

Domain	Representation
facebook.com	
paypal.com	
...	...

Reference-based Phishing Detection



Representation as Screenshot (VisualPhishNet, CCS 2020)

PayPal Screenshot



Reference

AT&T Screenshot



Benign Webpage

PayPal Screenshot



Phishing Webpage

false positive (similar screenshot)

Representation as Screenshot (VisualPhishNet, CCS 2020)

PayPal Screenshot



AT&T Screenshot



PayPal Screenshot



Reference

Benign Webpage

Phishing Webpage

false negative (dissimilar screenshot)

Representation as Logo (Phishpedia, USENIX Security 2021)



false positive



Benign Webpage

The screenshot and logo can only convey partial webpage intention.

PhishIntention Solution

- ***Comprehensive Intention***
- ***Static and Dynamic Webpage Analysis***


Webpage Representation Extraction
Brand Recognition
Credential-taking Intention Recognition
Credential-taking Intention Confirmation





Step 1: Extract the Abstract Webpage Layout (AWL)





As an object detection task:



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

Step 2: Detecting Brand Intention



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



Step 3 : Credential-taking Intention Classification (whether this page takes credential?)





Step 4 : CRP (Credential-requiring Page) transition location (Whether any link/button on this webpage can link to a CRP?)



As an object detection task:





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Webpage Representation Extraction

Brand Recognition

Credential-taking Intention Recognition

Credential-taking Intention Confirmation




Webpage Representation Extraction
Brand Recognition
Credential-taking Intention Recognition
Credential-taking Intention Confirmation
CRP transition potential
AWL Extraction
Link
Webpage Screenshot
Detected Non-CRP Layout
Detected CRP Layout


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
CRP transition potential
AWL Extraction
Link
Webpage Screenshot
Detected Non-CRP Layout
Detected CRP Layout

Experiments

- RQ1: Phishing Detection Experiment
- RQ2: CRP Location Experiment
- RQ3: Evaluating Model-wise Performance
- RQ4: Robustness Against Adversaries
- RQ5: Phishing Discovery Experiment

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Precision and recall in a collected phishing webpage dataset

Experiments

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What is the performance to find a CRP from a non-CRP?

Experiments

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- RQ2: CRP Location Experiment
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What is the performance of each component?



Experiments

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- RQ3: Evaluating Model-wise Performance
- RQ4: Robustness Against Adversaries
- RQ5: Phishing Discovery Experiment

How robust is the each of our deep learning model?



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What is the performance of PI to detect zero-day phishing webpages in the wild?

Experiments

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What is the performance of PI to detect zero-day phishing webpages in the wild?

Phishing Discovery Experiment

- Detect phishing in the wild with a Crawling system



Phishing Discovery Experiment

- Two months starting from April 2021
- PhishIntention reports **1,942** real phishing webpages, **1,368** are zero-day phishing



Phishing Discovery Experiment

- Distribution of brands of discovered phishing webpages
  - Top five brands are Microsoft (751), Facebook (146), HSBC Bank (110), Amazon (89), and Instagram (58).



Qualitative Analysis (False Positive)



Qualitative Analysis (False Negative)



https://github.com/lindsey98/PhishIntention

Takeaways

- PhishIntention: a visual reference-based phishing detection solution
  - with both brand and credential-taking intentions.
  - with interaction for confirming more credential intentions.
  - with a tool to effectively detect zero-day phishing webpages.







PI (PhishIntention)