SWOOSH: Efficient Lattice-Based Non-Interactive Key Exchange

Phillip Gajland[1,2], Bor de Kock[3], Miguel Quaresma[1], Giulio Malavolta[4,1], and Peter Schwabe[1,5]

[1]Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy
[2]Ruhr University Bochum
[3]NTNU – Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway
[4]Bocconi University
[5]Radboud University
phillip.gajland@{mpi-sp.org,rub.de}, bor.dekock@ntnu.no,
{miguel.quaresma,giulio.malavolta}@mpi-sp.org, peter@cryptojedi.org

Abstract

The advent of quantum computers has sparked significant interest in post-quantum cryptographic schemes, as a replacement for currently used cryptographic primitives. In this context, lattice-based cryptography has emerged as the leading paradigm to build post-quantum cryptography. However, all existing viable replacements of the classical Diffie-Hellman key exchange require additional rounds of interactions, thus failing to achieve all the benefits of this protocol. Although earlier work has shown that lattice-based Non-Interactive Key Exchange (NIKE) is theoretically possible, it has been considered too inefficient for real-life applications. In this work, we challenge this folklore belief and provide the first evidence against it. We construct an efficient lattice-based NIKE whose security is based on the standard module learning with errors (M-LWE) problem in the quantum random oracle model. Our scheme is obtained in two steps: (i) A passively-secure construction that achieves a strong notion of correctness, coupled with (ii) a generic compiler that turns any such scheme into an actively-secure one. To substantiate our efficiency claim, we provide an optimised implementation of our passively-secure construction in Rust and Jasmin. Our implementation demonstrates the scheme's applicability to real-world scenarios, yielding public keys of approximately 220 KBs. Moreover, the computation of shared keys takes fewer than 12 million cycles on an Intel Skylake CPU, offering a post-quantum security level exceeding 120 bits.

1 Introduction

A key exchange is a fundamental cryptographic primitive that allows two users to agree on a common secret key over an insecure channel, such as the Internet. When the protocol involves a single, asynchronous message from each party, it is known as a *Non-Interactive Key Exchange* (NIKE). The seminal work of Diffie and Hellman [32] introduced the well-known NIKE scheme that marked the birth of public-key cryptography; each party sends a single group element g^x (or g^y, respectively) and the shared key can be derived by computing $(g^y)^x = (g^x)^y$. From a theoretical stand-point NIKE implies the existence of public key encryption (PKE), key encapsulation mechanism (KEM), and even authenticated key-exchange (AKE) when combining the results of [22] with [40]. Moreover, in practice, the Diffie-Hellman key exchange lies at the heart of widely-used protocols such as Transport Layer Security (TLS) [69], the Signal protocol [58, 59], or the Noise protocol framework [64]. The looming threat of quantum computers, combined with the discovery of efficient quantum algorithms for factoring integers and computing discrete logarithms [73], has necessitated the exploration of alternative solutions based on new mathematical structures, departing from protocols based on the Diffie-Hellman key exchange. In particular, lattice-based cryptography [68] has emerged as the leading paradigm for constructing *post-quantum* cryptographic schemes. Notably, three out of four algorithms selected for standardisation by NIST are lattice-based [53, 67, 71]. While efficient lattice-based key exchange protocols exist [5, 20, 71], they are all qualitatively different from the standard Diffie-Hellman-style key exchange, in the sense that they require *additional rounds of interaction*. For many applications, where interaction is already built-in, these protocols are perfectly fine substitutes for Diffie-Hellman (which is not post-quantum secure). However, in many scenarios of interest, the non-interactive nature of NIKE protocols is crucial (we discuss concrete examples in further detail in [43]). Unfortunately, despite almost two decades of research on the subject, an efficient lattice-based NIKE remains elusive. Perhaps more worryingly, a recent work [46] has shown theoretical barriers on the efficiency of lattice-based NIKE, calling into question whether it is even possible to build an efficient scheme at all. Thus, the current state of affairs, leaves open the following question:

**Is lattice-based *non-interactive*
key exchange feasible in practice?**

In our work we seek to answer this question in the affirmative, and show that lattice-based NIKE can be made efficient enough to be used in practice, whilst maintaining post-quantum security.

1.1 Our Contributions

In this work, we demonstrate the real-world feasibility of lattice-based *non-interactive key exchange*. We propose a new scheme, that we call "SWOOSH", based on the hardness of the M-LWE problem. We show a proof of its security, both in the passive and active setting, and provide parameter sets for the former with over 120-bits of security against quantum adversaries (using the best known attacks that incorporate recent advances in lattice cryptanalysis). Our contributions can be summarised as follows.

1. We propose a new construction of NIKE based on the hardness of the M-LWE problem. Our construction is based on the standard template [33, 52], but with a new tweak that allows us to prove a strong notion of correctness (which, in turn, is necessary to achieve active security) in the quantum random oracle model (QROM). Somewhat interestingly, our use of the random oracle appears to be different from the Fiat-Shamir [39] and the Fujisaki-Okamoto [41, 42] transformations, and may thus be of independent interest.

2. We propose a compiler that allows for the generic transformation of a passively secure NIKE into an actively secure scheme using non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs, that satisfy a strong soundness property (simulation-sound online-extractability). While this approach is folklore, we provide, to the best of our knowledge, the first explicit treatment of this technique in the literature. Furthermore, the exact notion of passive security needed for the proof to go through, turns out to be surprisingly subtle to identify.

3. We provide a highly optimised implementation [1] of Passive-SWOOSH, written in Rust and Jasmin [6, 7]. With carefully selected parameters, our scheme achieves more that 120 bits of security against *quantum* adversaries. Notably, our benchmarks reveal smaller public keys compared to the smallest parameter set of Classic McEliece [1], an interactive KEM selected for round 4 of the NIST-PQC competition. Furthermore, we demonstrate that Passive-SWOOSH outperforms CSIDH [28], the only currently known (and realistic) post-quantum NIKE by orders of magnitude in terms of speed. Together with existing NIZK proof libraries [54, 55], our work establishes the first

competitive construction of a lattice-based NIKE for practical use.

1.2 Related work

Post-quantum NIKE. While interactive KEMs appear to be much more efficient in a post-quantum world than NIKEs, there have been notable efforts towards constructing post-quantum NIKE schemes as well. Boneh and Zhandry [18] showed a construction using indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) to construct a multiparty NIKE from pseudorandom generators. However, the practicality of this approach is hindered by the performance limitations of iO, rendering it mainly of theoretical interest. Much more practical was supersingular-isogeny Diffie-Hellman (SIDH) [30, 48]. However, in 2016, this construction was shown to be susceptible to active attacks [44]. This could be solved by employing the Fujisaki-Okamoto transform [41] in the NIST PQC candidate SIKE [47], but this came at the expense of turning the NIKE into an interactive KEM. Another approach to restoring the active security of SIKE was presented in [9]. This approach preserved the non-interactive nature of SIDH, but required many parallel protocol executions and thus massively increased computation time and message sizes. In 2022, all of these approaches based on SIDH were made obsolete by the numerous attacks against SIDH [27, 56, 70].

In 2018, Castryck, Lange, Martindale, Panny, and Renes proposed CSIDH, a different approach for constructing an isogeny-based NIKE [28]. CSIDH is not affected by the attacks on SIDH, and is arguably the most plausible candidate for practical post-quantum NIKE thus far, although the post-quantum security of concrete parameters is subject of debate [15, 19, 63]. Multiple works have considered the efficient and secure implementation of CSIDH, currently the fastest approach is a variant called CTIDH [10]. We provide a performance comparison of our proposal to CTIDH in Section 6.2. Notably, the work of [16] introduced a compiler for achieving passive to active security. However, the compiler assumes a base scheme with perfect correctness and thus it does not apply to lattice-based NIKE.

Lattice-based NIKE. The idea of lattice-based NIKE using the approach employed in Passive-SWOOSH is not new; in [52] Lyubashevsky calls it *"folklore (since at least 2010)"*. An attempt at selecting parameters was made in [31]. However, the proposed scheme did not formally consider passive security, nor active security. Moreover, the selected parameters resulted in a correctness error that would not even allow the transformation into an actively secure scheme through the use of NIZK proofs, a crucial aspect we achieve in SWOOSH. In fact, prior to our work, lattice-based NIKE was widely considered impractical and this was even substantiated by theoretical evidence. The work of [46]

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[1]See https://github.com/MQuaresma/pswoosh.

discovered information-theoretic barriers in constructing lattice-based NIKE with non-interactive reconciliations. In particular, they showed that any natural candidate of lattice-based NIKE with polynomial modulus-to-noise ratio would necessarily incur an inverse-polynomial correctness error. However, we stress that our work does not contradict the theorem of [46]. As the authors of [46] observe, non-interactive reconciliation is possible, if we consider (M-)LWE instances with *super-polynomial* modulus-to-noise ratio. This is indeed the regime of parameters that we adopt in our work.

2 Technical Outline

We give a self-contained overview of our approach for constructing a fast lattice-based NIKE. The following is somewhat informal and glosses over many important details, as it is only intended for an intuitive understanding of our approach. The reader is referred to the respective technical sections for precise statements.

The Basic Blueprint. Before delving into the specifics of our approach, it is useful to recall the folklore construction of lattice-based key exchange between Alice and Bob. Let $\boldsymbol{A}$ be a random public $N \times N$ matrix over some ring $\mathcal{R}_q$ and χ a noise distribution. The protocol proceeds as follows; Alice samples $\vec{\boldsymbol{s}}_1$ and $\vec{\boldsymbol{e}}_1$ from χ^N, and computes her public key as $\vec{\boldsymbol{s}}_1^\top \boldsymbol{A} + \vec{\boldsymbol{e}}_1^\top$. Bob samples an independent $\vec{\boldsymbol{s}}_2$ and $\vec{\boldsymbol{e}}_2$ from χ^N, and computes his public key as $\boldsymbol{A}\vec{\boldsymbol{s}}_2 + \vec{\boldsymbol{e}}_2$. After asynchronously obtaining each other's public keys, Alice and Bob can compute an approximate shared key as

$$\vec{\boldsymbol{s}}_1^\top \left(\boldsymbol{A}\vec{\boldsymbol{s}}_2 + \vec{\boldsymbol{e}}_2 \right) \approx \left(\vec{\boldsymbol{s}}_1^\top \boldsymbol{A} + \vec{\boldsymbol{e}}_1^\top \right) \vec{\boldsymbol{s}}_2.$$

A simple calculation shows that the shared keys computed by both parties are identical with the exception of the error terms $\vec{\boldsymbol{s}}_1^\top \vec{\boldsymbol{e}}_2$ and $\vec{\boldsymbol{e}}_1^\top \vec{\boldsymbol{s}}_2$ for Alice and Bob, respectively. To correct these errors, known schemes in the literature run interactive *reconciliation* protocols, which can be realised quite efficiently. However, if we insist on a NIKE protocol, no further interaction is allowed, and Alice and Bob must correct the errors locally. That is, we need to devise a *non-interactive* reconciliation function Rec such that

$$\texttt{Rec}\left(\vec{\boldsymbol{s}}_1^\top \left(\boldsymbol{A}\vec{\boldsymbol{s}}_2 + \vec{\boldsymbol{e}}_2 \right) \right) = \texttt{Rec}\left(\left(\vec{\boldsymbol{s}}_1^\top \boldsymbol{A} + \vec{\boldsymbol{e}}_1^\top \right) \vec{\boldsymbol{s}}_2 \right).$$

Note that, thus far, we have assumed that both Alice and Bob compute their keys according to the specification of the protocol, i.e., we implicitly only considered passive attacks. However, for the security of the final scheme, it will be necessary to handle parties that may behave arbitrarily. In what follows, we show how we tackle these two challenges separately, in a way that preserves the efficiency and security of the scheme.

Challenge I: Non-Interactive Reconciliation. A natural approach for correcting the errors introduced by the noise terms, is to derive the key by *rounding* the coefficients of the resulting ring element. In fact this is the approach that we adopt in this work, however there are still new ideas required to simultaneously achieve all of the following objectives: (i) security from the hardness of the standard module learning with errors (M-LWE) problem, (ii) reducing the correctness error to negligible, and (iii) maintaining the concrete efficiency of the construction. Here, we stress that a negligible correctness error is not just a matter of convenience, but that a non-negligible correctness error translates to an attack against the scheme: Loosely speaking, this is because the attacker can observe whenever the key agreement fails, therefore learning some information about the secret key of the honest party. Let us now focus on making the rounding approach work for non-interactive reconciliation. A simple calculation shows that the error terms cause a correctness error, only when the term $\vec{\boldsymbol{s}}_1^\top \boldsymbol{A}\vec{\boldsymbol{s}}_2$ falls into a *danger interval*

$$S^* = \left[\frac{q}{4} \pm \beta^2 dN \right] \cup \left[\frac{3q}{4} \pm \beta^2 dN \right],$$

where β is a bound on the norm of the noise distribution and d is the degree of $\mathcal{R}_q$. It is tempting to conclude that, if q is sufficiently large, then this event only happens with negligible probability. However, this analysis is imprecise as it does not take into account *adaptive* attacks, where the adversary chooses their secret key intentionally to make this event more likely. To prevent this, and obtain a provably secure scheme, we add a *random shift* $\boldsymbol{r}$ to the term $\vec{\boldsymbol{s}}_1^\top \boldsymbol{A}\vec{\boldsymbol{s}}_2$ to ensure that their sum $\vec{\boldsymbol{s}}_1^\top \boldsymbol{A}\vec{\boldsymbol{s}}_2 + \boldsymbol{r}$ is indeed uniformly distributed in $\mathcal{R}_q$. Note that such $\boldsymbol{r}$ does not need to be kept private, although it is important that it is sampled independently of the keys. Our idea is to sample $\boldsymbol{r}$ as the output of a hash function (modelled as a random oracle) on input the two public keys. This allows us to achieve two goals simultaneously:

- Both parties can recompute the shift $\boldsymbol{r}$ without the need of further interaction.

- We can show that $\vec{\boldsymbol{s}}_1^\top \boldsymbol{A}\vec{\boldsymbol{s}}_2 + \boldsymbol{r}$ is indeed uniformly sampled, even if the adversary has quantum access to the random oracle.

In summary, we are able to build a non-interactive reconciliation mechanism so that the scheme is provably secure (in the passive settings) against the standard M-LWE assumption, in the QROM. In fact, we are also able to show a strong notion of correctness, namely that the adversary cannot cause a reconciliation error, *even if it is allowed to choose both secret keys*. This strong notion of correctness will be useful when lifting the scheme to the active setting.

Challenge II: From Passive to Active Security. The above discussion concerns keys that are guaranteed to be well-formed (passive security). However, in real-world scenarios we have to deal with attackers that can behave arbitrarily. In the stronger notion of *active security* [25, 40] the adversary is given access to various oracles that allow them to register honest keys, register corrupt keys (ones to which they do not know the corresponding secret key), or reveal the shared key between an honest key and a corrupted one. Ultimately the adversary wins if he can distinguish between a random key and a shared key, that was derived from two honestly generated key pairs.

In order to prove the active security of our scheme we present a *compiler* that generically lifts our scheme to the active setting using non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs. Here it is crucial that our scheme satisfies the aforementioned strong notion of correctness, since the only thing that the NIZK guarantees is that the keys are in the support of the honest distributions, but otherwise they may be chosen arbitrarily. For technical reasons, we require a NIZK that satisfies the strong property of simulation-sound online-extractability. We refer the reader to Section 5 for more details.

Putting Everything Together. Overall, we obtain a passively secure construction in the QROM assuming the hardness of the Module-LWE (M-LWE) problem (for the active settings, we additionally require a NIZK proof). Compared to Ring-LWE (R-LWE), M-LWE gives us greater flexibility over the choice of parameters, when implementing our scheme. However, this introduces an additional complication: Unlike the case for R-LWE, where single polynomials are considered and their multiplication is commutative, in the case of M-LWE we work with matrices where the matrix multiplication is not generally commutative. For the general case of two parties without predefined roles in a protocol, there is no way to know ahead of time whether to left multiply or right multiply. This means that each public key is effectively duplicated by adding a left multiplied key and right multiplied key. However, we argue that in many cases, when parties have predefined roles in a protocol, such as a server or client, this issue can be resolved (the server could "go right" and the client "left" or vice versa). We defer a more detailed discussion of this to Section 5.3.

Our parameters are selected as to provide more than 120 bits of post-quantum security, taking into account recent advances in lattice cryptanalysis. We work over the ring $\mathcal{R}_q := \mathbb{Z}_q[X]/(X^d + 1)$ with $d = 256$. Along with our public matrix $\boldsymbol{A} \in \mathcal{R}_q^{N \times N}$, where $N = 32$, this gives us a lattice dimension of 8192. In order to reduce the correctness error to reasonable levels, q had to be sufficiently large. We choose $q = 2^{214} - 255$, a prime that is simultaneously NTT-friendly and close to a power-of-two making for more efficient field arithmetic. Furthermore, we use ternary noise sampled from

a centred binomial distribution, for the sake of efficiency.

Finally, we provide an open-source implementation of Passive-SWOOSH in Rust and Jasmin, which employs numerous optimisations rendering competitive benchmarks. Due to the modular fashion of our implementation we note that it can easily be tailored to use different parameters or be incorporated with suitable NIZKs. We defer a more detailed discussion to Section 6.

3 Preliminaries

In this section we introduce our notation and review some quantum preliminaries along with the relevant lattice-based hardness assumptions.

3.1 Notation

We define some standard notation used throughout the paper.

Sets, Vectors, Polynomials and Norms. For integers a, b, where $a < b$, $[a, b]$ denotes the set $\{a, a+1, \ldots, b\}$. For any positive $\beta \in \mathbb{Z}$, we define the set $[\beta] := \{-\beta, \ldots, -1, 0, 1 \ldots, \beta\}$, and let $x \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{S}$ denote the uniform sampling of x from the set $\mathcal{S}$. Let $\mathbb{Z}_q$ denote the ring of integers modulo a prime q. We define $\mathcal{R} := \mathbb{Z}[X]/(X^d + 1)$ to be the ring of integer polynomials modulo $X^d + 1$, for d a power of 2, and $\mathcal{R}_q := \mathbb{Z}_q[X]/(X^d + 1)$ the ring of integer polynomials modulo $X^d + 1$ where each coefficient is reduced modulo q. Bold upper case letters $\boldsymbol{A}$ and bold lower case letters with arrows $\vec{\boldsymbol{a}}$ denote matrices and column vectors over $\mathcal{R}_q$, respectively; for row vectors we use the transpose $\vec{\boldsymbol{b}}^{\top}$. For a polynomial $\boldsymbol{f} \in \mathcal{R}_q$, let $\vec{f} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^d$ denote the coefficient vector of $\boldsymbol{f}$, and $f_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ the ith coefficient. However, we denote the constant coefficient by $\tilde{f} := f_0 \in \mathbb{Z}_q$. For an element $f_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q$, we write $|f_i|$ to mean $|f_i \bmod q|$. Let the ℓ_∞ norm for $\boldsymbol{f} = \sum_{i=0}^{d-1} f_i X^i \in \mathcal{R}_q$ and $\vec{\boldsymbol{f}} = (\boldsymbol{f}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{f}_k) \in \mathcal{R}_q^k$ be defined as

$$\|\boldsymbol{f}\|_\infty := \max_{0 \leq i \leq d-1} |f_i| \quad \text{and} \quad \left\|\vec{\boldsymbol{f}}\right\|_\infty := \max_{1 \leq i \leq k} \|\boldsymbol{f}_i\|_\infty,$$

respectively.

Probabilities, Algorithms and Games. The support of a discrete random variable X is defined as $\sup(X) := \{x \in \mathbb{R} : \Pr[X = x] > 0\}$. Algorithms are denoted by upper case letters in sans-serif font, such as A and B. Unless otherwise stated all algorithms are probabilistic and $(x_1, \ldots) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{A}(y_1, \ldots)$ is used to denote that A returns $(x_1, \ldots)$ when run on input $(y_1, \ldots)$. When A has oracle access to B during its execution, this is denoted by A^B. For a probabilistic algorithm A, the notation $x \in \mathsf{A}(y)$ denotes that x is a possible output of A on input y. We use code-based security games [12], where $\Pr[\mathsf{G} \Rightarrow 1]$ denotes the probability that the final output of game G is 1. The notation $[\![B]\!]$, where B is a Boolean statement, refers

to a bit that is 1 if the statement is true and 0 otherwise. The following lemma demonstrates the high probability of a randomly selected matrix being invertible. Due to space constraints, the proof is deferred to the full version [43].

Lemma 1 (Invertibility of Random Matrices). *For* $\mathcal{R}_q = \mathbb{Z}_q[X]/(X^d + 1)$ *with* $d = 256$ *and* $q = 2^{214} - 255$, *if* $\boldsymbol{A}$ *is a random matrix sampled from* $\mathcal{R}_q^{N \times N}$, *then the probability of* $\boldsymbol{A}$ *being invertible, denoted by* $\Pr[\boldsymbol{A} \in \mathsf{GL}_N(\mathcal{R}_q)]$, *satisfies*

$$\Pr[\boldsymbol{A} \in \mathsf{GL}_N(\mathcal{R}_q) \mid \boldsymbol{A} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R}_q^{N \times N}] \geq \left(1 - \frac{128}{q^2}\right)^N.$$

3.2 Quantum Preliminaries

We review some quantum preliminaries as stated in [36]. Additional preliminaries are deferred to the full version [43].

Quantum Random Oracle Model. In the random oracle model [11], all parties have access to a uniformly sampled random function H. Since quantum adversaries can evaluate hash functions in superposition, we model quantum adversaries to have quantum access to random oracles [17]. Specifically, we assume that all algorithms have access to the unitary implementing the mapping: $|x\rangle |y\rangle \mapsto |x\rangle |y \oplus \mathsf{H}(x)\rangle$ where H is a uniformly sampled random function.

Query Depth and Query Parallelism. As in the work of [8] we consider the query depth D of an adversary making a total of Q_H random oracle queries. This is important in practice because for highly parallel adversaries we have $D \ll Q_\mathsf{H}$. By setting $D := Q_\mathsf{H}$ we obtain the bounds for sequential adversaries. We will use the following technical lemma from [8].

Lemma 2 (Search in unstructured functions [8, Lem. 2]). *Let* H *be a random function drawn from a distribution such that* $\Pr[\mathsf{H}(x) = 1] \leq \lambda$ *for all x. Let* A *be an adversary with query depth D, making at most* Q_H *many queries to* H. *Then*

$$\Pr\left[\mathsf{H}(x) = 1 : b \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{A}^\mathsf{H}\right] \leq 4 \cdot (D+2) \cdot (Q_\mathsf{H}+1) \cdot \lambda.$$

3.3 Hardness Assumption

The security of our scheme relies on Module-Learning With Errors (M-LWE), a well-known computational lattice problem [50, 68].

Definition 1 (M-LWE$_{q,n,m,\chi}$)**.** The decisional *Module-Learning With Errors* problem (in its Hermite normal form) with parameters $n, m > 0$ and an error distribution χ over $\mathcal{R}_q$ is defined via the game $\mathbf{M\text{-}LWE}_{q,n,m,\chi}^b$ depicted in Figure 1. Here, $\mathbf{M\text{-}LWE}_{q,n,m,\chi}^b$ is parameterised by a bit b. We define A's advantage in $\mathbf{M\text{-}LWE}_{q,n,m,\chi}^b$ as

$$\mathsf{Adv}_{q,n,m,\chi}^{\mathbf{M\text{-}LWE}}(\mathsf{A}) := \left| \begin{array}{l} \Pr[\mathbf{M\text{-}LWE}_{q,n,m,\chi}^{0,\mathsf{A}} \Rightarrow 1] \\ - \Pr[\mathbf{M\text{-}LWE}_{q,n,m,\chi}^{1,\mathsf{A}} \Rightarrow 1] \end{array} \right|,$$

and say that $\mathbf{M\text{-}LWE}_{q,n,m,\chi}$ is ε-hard for all adversaries A satisfying $\mathsf{Adv}_{q,n,m,\chi}^{\mathbf{M\text{-}LWE}}(\mathsf{A}) \leq \varepsilon$.

Game M-LWE$_{q,n,m,\chi}^b$	**Oracle** RoR(b) /Once
01 $b' \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{A}^{\text{RoR}(b)}$	03 $\boldsymbol{A} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R}_q^{n \times m}$
02 **return** $[\![b = b']\!]$	04 **if** $b = 0$:
	05 $\vec{s} \xleftarrow{\$} \chi^m$
	06 $\vec{e} \xleftarrow{\$} \chi^n$
	07 **return** $(\boldsymbol{A}, \boldsymbol{A}\vec{s} + \vec{e})$
	08 **elseif** $b = 1$:
	09 $\vec{u} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R}_q^n$
	10 **return** $(\boldsymbol{A}, \vec{u})$

Figure 1: Game defining $\mathbf{M\text{-}LWE}_{q,n,m,\chi}^b$ with adversary A.

Theoretic treatments of LWE-based schemes typically consider the modulus to be polynomial in n and χ to be the discrete Gaussian on $D_{\mathbb{Z},\alpha \cdot q}$ over $\mathbb{Z}$ with mean 0 and standard deviation $\sigma = \alpha \cdot q / \sqrt{2\pi}$ for some $\alpha < 1$. For these choices the work of [23, 68] showed that if $\alpha q > 2\sqrt{n}$ then worst-case GapSVP-$\tilde{O}(n/\alpha)$ reduces to average-case LWE. As such, many early implementations sampled from a discrete Gaussian distribution, which turns out to be either fairly inefficient [21] or vulnerable to timing attacks [24, 38, 65]. Furthermore, the performance of the best known attacks against LWE-based encryption schemes does not depend on the exact distribution of noise, but rather on the standard deviation (and potentially the entropy). This motivates the use of noise distributions that we can easily, efficiently, and securely sample from. One example is the centred binomial distribution used by CRYSTALS-Kyber [71] and in [5].

4 Definitions

In this section we present a formal definition of a non-interactive key exchange along with its security notions. A precise definition of non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs can be found in the full version [43].

4.1 Non-Interactive Key Exchange

Following the work of [25, 40], we formally define a non-interactive key exchange (NIKE). Through the use of IDs, the security model proposed in [25] abstracts away all considerations concerning certification and public key infrastructure.

Definition 2 (Non-Interactive Key Exchange)**.** A non-interactive key exchange NIKE is defined as a tuple NIKE := (Stp, Gen, SdK) of the following PPT algorithms. Furthermore, we define an identity space $\mathcal{IDS}$ and a shared key space $\mathcal{SKS}$.

$par \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{Stp}(1^\lambda)$**:** Given the security parameter 1^λ (encoded in unary), the probabilistic setup algorithm returns a set of system parameters *par*.

$(sk, pk) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{Gen}(\mathtt{ID})$**:** Given an identity $\mathtt{ID} \in \mathcal{IDS}$, the probabilistic key generation algorithm Gen returns a secret/public key pair (sk, pk).

$k \leftarrow \mathsf{SdK}(\mathtt{ID}_1, pk_1, \mathtt{ID}_2, sk_2)$**:** Given an identity $\mathtt{ID}_1 \in \mathcal{IDS}$ and its corresponding public key pk_1 along with another identity $\mathtt{ID}_2 \in \mathcal{IDS}$ and its corresponding secret key sk_2, the deterministic shared key establishment algorithm SdK returns a shared key $k \in \mathcal{SKS}$, or a failure symbol $\perp$. We assume that SdK always returns $\perp$ if $\mathtt{ID}_1 = \mathtt{ID}_2$.

Correctness. Informally, *honest correctness* states that shared keys derived by two honest parties should be the same with overwhelming probability. Although our subsequent definition of correctness implies honest correctness, we state both definitions here for completeness.

Definition 3 (Honest Correctness)**.** A non-interactive key exchange $\mathsf{NIKE} := (\mathsf{Stp}, \mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{SdK})$ has *honest correctness error* δ (or is said to be δ-*correct*), if for all $par \in \mathsf{Stp}(1^\lambda)$ and $\mathtt{ID}_1, \mathtt{ID}_2 \in \mathcal{IDS}$ it holds that,

$$\Pr\left[\mathsf{SdK}(\mathtt{ID}_1, pk_1, \mathtt{ID}_2, sk_2) \neq \mathsf{SdK}(\mathtt{ID}_2, pk_2, \mathtt{ID}_1, sk_1) \;\middle|\; \begin{array}{c} (sk_1, pk_1) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{Gen}(\mathtt{ID}_1) \\ (sk_2, pk_2) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{Gen}(\mathtt{ID}_2) \end{array}\right] \leq \delta(\lambda),$$

where the probability is taken over the random choices of Stp and Gen.

In this work we define a stronger notion, *semi-malicious correctness* that captures the property that two maliciously chosen key pairs (that are in the support of the key generation algorithm) will not cause the key exchange to fail. Since this property clearly implies honest correctness, throughout the rest of this work we only focus on semi-malicious correctness. We formalise *semi-malicious correctness* for NIKE relative to a random oracle H via the game $\mathbf{SM\text{-}COR}_{\mathsf{NIKE}}$ depicted in Figure 2 and define the advantage of an adversary A in $\mathbf{SM\text{-}COR}_{\mathsf{NIKE}}$ as

$$\mathsf{Adv}_{\mathsf{NIKE}, par}^{\mathbf{SM\text{-}COR}}(\mathsf{A}) := \Pr[\mathbf{SM\text{-}COR}_{\mathsf{NIKE}}^{\mathsf{A}} \Rightarrow 1].$$

Definition 4 (Semi-malicious Correctness)**.** Let $\mathsf{NIKE} := (\mathsf{Stp}, \mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{SdK})$ be a non-interactive key exchange. In the quantum random oracle model, we say that NIKE is $\delta(Q_\mathsf{H})$-$\mathbf{SM\text{-}COR}$ if for all $\mathtt{ID}_1, \mathtt{ID}_2 \in \mathcal{IDS}$ and for all (possibly unbounded) adversaries A of depth at most D, making at most Q_H queries (possibly in superposition) to the random oracle H, we have $\mathsf{Adv}_{\mathsf{NIKE}, par}^{\mathbf{SM\text{-}COR}}(\mathsf{A}) \leq \delta(Q_\mathsf{H}, D)$. [2]

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[2]Note that in the standard model our correctness definition can be considered a special case where the number of random oracle queries is zero and hence $\delta(Q_\mathsf{H}, D)$ is a constant.

> **Game SM-COR**$_{\mathsf{NIKE}}$
> 01 $par \leftarrow \mathsf{Stp}(1^\lambda)$
> 02 $\left.\begin{array}{l}\mathsf{supp}(\mathsf{Gen}(\mathtt{ID}_1)) \ni (sk_1, pk_1) \\ \mathsf{supp}(\mathsf{Gen}(\mathtt{ID}_2)) \ni (sk_2, pk_2)\end{array}\right\} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{A}^{|\mathsf{H}\rangle}(par)$
> 03 **return** $[\![\mathsf{SdK}(\mathtt{ID}_1, pk_1, \mathtt{ID}_2, sk_2) \neq \mathsf{SdK}(\mathtt{ID}_2, pk_2, \mathtt{ID}_1, sk_1)]\!]$

Figure 2: Correctness game $\mathbf{SM\text{-}COR}_{\mathsf{NIKE}}$ for a non-interactive key exchange NIKE defined relative to a random oracle H with adversary A.

Passive Security. Following the conventions of [40], we formalise the notion of key indistinguishability with *passive security*, or honest key registration (HKR), for a non-interactive key exchange NIKE, with respect to system parameters $par \in \mathsf{Stp}(1^\lambda)$ via the game $\mathbf{HKR\text{-}CKS\text{-}l}_{\mathsf{NIKE}, par}$ depicted in [43]. In $\mathbf{HKR\text{-}CKS\text{-}l}_{\mathsf{NIKE}, par}$, the adversary A may make two queries to the $\mathtt{RegHonUsr}$ oracle, where A provides and identity and the public and secret keys are derived honestly. A may then make one query to the $\mathtt{TestQue}$ oracle, where A has to distinguish the shared key from a random key. We define the advantage of adversary A in $\mathbf{HKR\text{-}CKS\text{-}l}_{\mathsf{NIKE}, par}$ as $\mathsf{Adv}_{\mathsf{NIKE}, par}^{\mathbf{HKR\text{-}CKS\text{-}l}}(\mathsf{A}) := \left|\Pr\left[\mathbf{HKR\text{-}CKS\text{-}l}_{\mathsf{NIKE}, par}^{\mathsf{A}} \Rightarrow 1\right] - \frac{1}{2}\right|$.

Definition 5 (Passive Security)**.** Let $\mathsf{NIKE} := (\mathsf{Stp}, \mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{SdK})$ be a non-interactive key exchange. We say that NIKE is $(\varepsilon, Q_\mathsf{H})$-$\mathbf{HKR\text{-}CKS\text{-}l}$ relative to $par \in \mathsf{Stp}(1^\lambda)$ if for all PPT adversaries A, making at most Q_H queries (possibly in superposition) to the random oracle H, two queries to the $\mathtt{RegHonUsr}$ oracle and one query to the $\mathtt{TestQue}$ oracle, we have $\mathsf{Adv}_{\mathsf{NIKE}, par}^{\mathbf{HKR\text{-}CKS\text{-}l}}(\mathsf{A}) \leq \varepsilon(Q_\mathsf{H})$.

Active Security. We formalise the notion of key indistinguishability with *active security* for a non-interactive key exchange NIKE, with respect to system parameters $par \in \mathsf{Stp}(1^\lambda)$ via the game $\mathbf{CKS}_{\mathsf{NIKE}, par}$ depicted in [43]. Observe that this $\mathbf{CKS}$ (sometimes called DKR-CKS, short for "Dishonest Key Registration") notion was first defined in [25] and is polynomially equivalent to $\mathbf{CKS\text{-}l}$ (where the adversary is only allowed to make two $\mathtt{RegHonUsr}$ queries and one $\mathtt{TestQue}$ query) and *m-CKS-heavy* in the work of [40]. Unsurprisingly our definition of active security implies the former notion of passive security. The game starts by selecting a bit b uniformly at random after which the adversary A is given access to four oracles. A's queries may be made adaptively and are arbitrary in number. The $\mathtt{RegHonUsr}$ and $\mathtt{RegCorUsr}$ oracles let A register honest and corrupted user public keys, respectively. A may make multiple queries to $\mathtt{RegCorUsr}$, in which case only the most recent $(corrupt, \mathtt{ID}, \perp, pk)$ entry is kept. The $\mathtt{RevCorQue}$ oracle provides A with a shared key between a pair of registered identities, subject only to the restriction that at least one of the two identities was registered as honest. Depending on the bit b, the $\mathtt{TestQue}$ oracle returns either a

random key or a shared key between two identities registered as honest. Finally, the adversary outputs a guess bit b' and wins the game if and only if $b = b'$. We define the advantage of adversary A in $\mathbf{CKS}_{\mathsf{NIKE},par}$ as $\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathbf{CKS}}_{\mathsf{NIKE},par}(\mathsf{A}) := \left| \Pr\left[\mathbf{CKS}^{\mathsf{A}}_{\mathsf{NIKE},par} \Rightarrow 1 \right] - \frac{1}{2} \right|$.

Definition 6 (Active Security [25])**.** Let $\mathsf{NIKE} := (\mathsf{Stp}, \mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{SdK})$ be a non-interactive key exchange. We say that NIKE is $(\epsilon, Q_{\mathsf{H}}, Q_{\mathtt{RHU}}, Q_{\mathtt{RCU}}, Q_{\mathtt{RCQ}}, Q_{\mathtt{TQ}})$-$\mathbf{CKS}$ secure relative to $par \in \mathsf{Stp}(1^\lambda)$ if for all PPT adversaries A making at most; Q_{H} queries (possibly in superposition) to the random oracle H, $Q_{\mathtt{RHU}}$ queries to $\mathtt{RegHonUsr}$, $Q_{\mathtt{RCU}}$ queries to $\mathtt{RegCorUsr}$, $Q_{\mathtt{RCQ}}$ queries to $\mathtt{RevCorQue}$, and $Q_{\mathtt{TQ}}$ queries to $\mathtt{TestQue}$, we have $\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathbf{CKS}}_{\mathsf{NIKE},par}(\mathsf{A}) \leq \epsilon$.

Single- and Multi-User Security. The following Theorem from [40] shows that **CKS-l** and **CKS** are polynomially equivalent and will become useful for our proofs in Section 5.2. The other direction of the Theorem is trivial.

Theorem 3 (CKS-light $\Rightarrow$ CKS [40, Thm. 1])**.** For any adversary A against NIKE in the *CKS* model, there exists an adversary B that breaks NIKE in the *CKS-light* model such that

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathbf{CKS}}_{\mathsf{NIKE},par}(\mathsf{A}) \leq \frac{Q^2_{\mathtt{RHU}} \cdot Q_{\mathtt{TQ}}}{2} \cdot \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathbf{CKS\text{-}l}}_{\mathsf{NIKE},par}(\mathsf{B}),$$

Furthermore, the following observation will also be useful for our proofs in Section 5.2. Note that a variant of the $\mathbf{CKS}_{\mathsf{NIKE},par}$ game in which the adversary A is only given access to the $\mathtt{RegHonUsr}$ and $\mathtt{TestQue}$ oracles (as well as the random oracle H) can be thought of as a multi-user version of the $\mathbf{HKR\text{-}CKS\text{-}l}_{\mathsf{NIKE},par}$ game. Naturally we call this game $\mathbf{HKR\text{-}CKS}_{\mathsf{NIKE},par}$, as in the work of [40], and define the advantage of adversary A analogous to the previous definitions. As noted in [40], Theorem 3 carries over to the HKR setting.

5 Construction

We present our NIKE construction in two steps by introducing a scheme that only satisfies passive security followed by a generic transformation that turns it into a scheme with active security.

5.1 Passive Setting

In this section we present our construction of a non-interactive key exchange with semi malicious correctness that satisfies key indistinguishability for honestly registered public keys (passive security) in the random oracle model. The scheme is depicted in Figure 3. The Gen algorithm generates two independent left and right secret keys sk_L and sk_R along with their respective public keys pk_L and pk_R. Subsequently, the

SdK algorithm computes the shared key using $\mathtt{ID}_1$'s pk_L and $\mathtt{ID}_2$'s sk_R when $\mathtt{ID}_1 \leq \mathtt{ID}_2$ and vice versa. By Lemma 1 a random matrix over $\mathcal{R}_q$ will be invertible with overwhelming probability.

Correctness. In order to achieve better bounds in our proof of security, we show that our scheme satisfies both honest correctness as well as the stronger notion of semi-malicious correctness of Definition 3 and Definition 4, respectively. Although Theorem 5 implies Lemma 4, we will use the latter and state its proof in [43] for sake of completeness.

Lemma 4 (Honest Correctness)**.** For all (possibly unbounded) adversaries A the non-interactive key exchange $\mathsf{NIKE} := (\mathsf{Stp}, \mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{SdK})$ construction depicted in Figure 3 has *honest correctness error*

$$\delta \leq \frac{4\beta^2 d^2 N}{q}$$

as per Definition 3.

We show that the scheme satisfies semi-malicious correctness in the quantum random oracle model.

Theorem 5 (SM-COR of NIKE)**.** For all (possibly unbounded) adversaries A of depth D making at most Q_{H} queries (possibly in superposition) to the random oracle H, the non-interactive key exchange $\mathsf{NIKE} := (\mathsf{Stp}, \mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{SdK})$ construction depicted in Figure 3 has *semi-malicious correctness error*

$$\delta(Q_{\mathsf{H}}, D) \leq 16 \cdot (D+2) \cdot (Q_{\mathsf{H}} + 1) \cdot \frac{\beta^2 d^2 N}{q}$$

as per Definition 4, where β is a bound on the maximum absolute value of the support of χ.

Proof. We are going to prove that the adversary cannot cause an error in the key derivation, i.e., a mismatch between the derived keys, even if he is allowed to choose both secret keys from the support of the key generation algorithm. This trivially implies semi-malicious correctness. Let (sk_1, pk_1) and (sk_2, pk_2) be the pairs returned by the adversary. Without loss of generality we can consider $sk_1 = sk_L$ and $pk_2 = pk_R$, i.e. only "one side" of the key. A key mismatch occurs whenever

$$\mathtt{Rec}\left(pk_L^\top sk_R + \boldsymbol{r} \right) \neq \mathtt{Rec}\left(sk_L^\top pk_R + \boldsymbol{r} \right)$$

$$\mathtt{Rec}\left(\left(\vec{\boldsymbol{s}}_L^\top \boldsymbol{A} + \vec{\boldsymbol{e}}_L^\top \right) \vec{\boldsymbol{s}}_R + \boldsymbol{r} \right) \neq \mathtt{Rec}\left(\vec{\boldsymbol{s}}_L^\top \left(\boldsymbol{A}\vec{\boldsymbol{s}}_R + \vec{\boldsymbol{e}}_R \right) + \boldsymbol{r} \right)$$

$$\mathtt{Rec}\big(\underbrace{\vec{\boldsymbol{s}}_L^\top \boldsymbol{A}\vec{\boldsymbol{s}}_R + \boldsymbol{r}}_{\boldsymbol{k}^\star \in \mathcal{R}_q} + \vec{\boldsymbol{e}}_L^\top \vec{\boldsymbol{s}}_R \big) \neq \mathtt{Rec}\big(\underbrace{\vec{\boldsymbol{s}}_L^\top \boldsymbol{A}\vec{\boldsymbol{s}}_R + \boldsymbol{r}}_{\boldsymbol{k}^\star \in \mathcal{R}_q} + \vec{\boldsymbol{s}}_L^\top \vec{\boldsymbol{e}}_R \big),$$

where $\boldsymbol{r}$ is the output of the random oracle on both public keys and $\vec{\boldsymbol{e}}_L$ and $\vec{\boldsymbol{e}}_R$ are sampled from the noise distribution χ^N. By

Stp(1^λ) | SdK(ID₁, pk₁, ID₂, sk₂) | Rec(**k**)

Figure 3: Construction of passively secure non-interactive key exchange $\mathsf{NIKE} := (\mathsf{Stp}, \mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{SdK})$ with functions $\mathsf{Rec} : \mathcal{R}_q \to \{0,1\}^d$, $\mathsf{Rnd} : \mathbb{Z}_q \to \{0,1\}$ and $\mathsf{Cbd} : \emptyset \to \mathcal{R}_q^N$, and random oracle $\mathsf{H} : I\mathcal{DS} \times \left(\mathcal{R}_q^{1 \times N} \times \mathcal{R}_q^N\right) \times I\mathcal{DS} \times \left(\mathcal{R}_q^{1 \times N} \times \mathcal{R}_q^N\right) \to \mathcal{R}_q$. Here $\mathsf{GL}_N(\mathcal{R}_q)$ denotes the set of invertible $N \times N$ matrices over $\mathcal{R}_q$.

definition of the Rec function, this means that the term $\vec{\boldsymbol{e}}_L^\top \vec{\boldsymbol{s}}_R$ (or, equivalently, the term $\vec{\boldsymbol{s}}_L^\top \vec{\boldsymbol{e}}_R$) is causing a rounding error on one out of the d coefficients of $\boldsymbol{k}^\star$. We now bound the size of the largest coefficient of $\vec{\boldsymbol{e}}_L^\top \vec{\boldsymbol{s}}_R$ as

$$\left\| \vec{\boldsymbol{e}}_L^\top \vec{\boldsymbol{s}}_R \right\|_\infty = \left\| \sum_{i=1}^N \boldsymbol{e}_{L,i} \boldsymbol{s}_{R,i} \right\|_\infty \leq \sum_{i=1}^N \| \boldsymbol{e}_{L,i} \boldsymbol{s}_{R,i} \|_\infty \leq \beta^2 dN,$$

where the first inequality follows from the triangle inequality. The norm of $\vec{\boldsymbol{s}}_L^\top \vec{\boldsymbol{e}}_R$ can be bounded similarly. It follows that, in order for a key derivation error to occur, then at least one coefficient of $\boldsymbol{k}^\star$ must be in the following interval

$$S^\star = \left[\frac{q}{4} \pm \beta^2 dN \right] \cup \left[\frac{3q}{4} \pm \beta^2 dN \right].$$

If $\boldsymbol{k}^\star$ followed a uniform distribution, this would then happen with probability at most $\frac{d \cdot |S^\star|}{|\mathbb{Z}_q|} = \frac{4\beta^2 dN}{q}$. Next we define a function F that, on input two public keys and two identities samples a uniform $\boldsymbol{r}$, it returns 1 if a key mismatch occurs, i.e.,

$$\mathsf{Rec}\left(pk_L^\top sk_R + \boldsymbol{r}\right) \neq \mathsf{Rec}\left(sk_L^\top pk_R + \boldsymbol{r}\right)$$

and 0 otherwise. The function checks this by (inefficiently) recovering the secret keys and comparing the results of the Rec functions (see equation above). Due to the high probability of invertibility for $\boldsymbol{A}$, as stated in Lemma 1, the secret key is uniquely determined by the public key. Hence, this (inefficient) function is well defined on all inputs. Furthermore, note that the element

$$\boldsymbol{k}^\star = sk_L^\top \boldsymbol{A} sk_R + \boldsymbol{r}$$

is uniformly distributed in $\mathcal{R}_q$, since $\boldsymbol{r} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R}_q$. It follows that for any given input x:

$$\Pr[F(x) = 1] \leq \frac{4\beta^2 d^2 N}{q}.$$

Finally, observe that by definition a key mismatch happens if and only if the function F output 1 and consequently the adversary is able to find such accepting input. By Lemma 2, this happens with probability at most $16 \cdot (D+2) \cdot (Q_\mathsf{H} + 1) \cdot \beta^2 d^2 N / q$ for an adversary of depth D, making at most Q_H quantum queries to the random oracle. ∎

On the Need for Random Oracles. An astute reader may wonder whether the usage of the random oracle is needed at all to prove the above notion of correctness, since there does not appear to be an immediate attack even if we omit the random oracle completely from the scheme. It is plausible to conjecture that semi-malicious correctness holds even without the random oracle. Informally, semi-malicious correctness boils down to showing that, for a given public key $pk \in \mathcal{R}_q^N$, it is hard to find an $\boldsymbol{s} \in \mathcal{R}_q^N$ such that no coefficient of the product $\boldsymbol{s}^\top pk$ lies in the interval $S^\star$. Thus, the bound in these settings would require one to estimate the hardness of this version of the (inhomogenous) 1-dimensional short integer solution (SIS) problem. By relying on the random oracle heuristic, we are able to bypass this problem and obtain a construction in the QROM that is: (i) unconditionally correct in *any ring* and (ii) whose security is based on the well-established M-LWE problem. We leave the precise study of the hardness of this 1-dimensional variant of the SIS problem as ground for future work.

Passive Security. Assuming the hardness of M-LWE, Definition 1, we show that the scheme satisfies *passive security*, Definition 5, in the QROM.

Theorem 6 (Passive Security). For any PPT adversary A against NIKE := $(\mathsf{Stp}, \mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{SdK})$, depicted in Figure 5, making an arbitrary number of queries (possibly in superposition) to H, there exists PPT adversaries B_1, B_2 such that

$$\mathsf{Adv}_{\mathsf{NIKE},par}^{\mathbf{HKR\text{-}CKS\text{-}l}}(A) \leq \mathsf{Adv}_{q,N,N,\chi}^{\mathbf{M\text{-}LWE}}(B_1) + \mathsf{Adv}_{q,N,N+1,\chi}^{\mathbf{M\text{-}LWE}}(B_2) + \frac{4\beta d}{q}.$$

Proof of Theorem 6. Let A be an adversary against NIKE in the **HKR-CKS-l** game. Consider the sequence of games in Figure 4 that takes into account both independent left and right halves of the keys.

Games G_0, G_1, G_2, G_3

```
01  b ←$ {0,1}
02  (sk₁,pk₁) ←$ Gen(ID₁)
03  pk₁ = (pk₁_L, pk₁_R) ←$ R_q^{1×N} × pk₁_R          / G₁
04  (sk₂,pk₂) ←$ Gen(ID₂)
05  pk₂ = (pk₂_L, pk₂_R) ←$ pk₂_L × R_q^N               / G₃
06  if ID₁ ≤ ID₂ :
07      r := H(ID₁,pk₁,ID₂,pk₂) ∈ R_q
08      parse pk₁ → (pk_L,⊥) =: u⃗_L^⊤ ∈ R_q^{1×N}
09      parse sk₂ → (⊥,sk_R) =: s⃗_R ∈ R_q^N
10      k' := u⃗_L^⊤ s⃗_R + r ∈ R_q
11  else :
12      r := H(ID₂,pk₂,ID₁,pk₁) ∈ R_q
13      parse pk₁ → (⊥,pk_R) =: u⃗_R ∈ R_q^N
14      parse sk₂ → (sk_L,⊥) =: s⃗_R^⊤ ∈ R_q^{1×N}
15      k' := s⃗_R^⊤ u⃗_R + r ∈ R_q
16  k₀ := Rec(k') ∈ {0,1}^d                             / G₀
17  e ←$ χ                                              / G₂
18  k₀ := Rec(k'+e) ∈ {0,1}^d                           / G₂
19  u ←$ R_q                                            / G₃
20  k₀ := Rec(u) ∈ {0,1}^d                              / G₃
21  k₁ ←$ SKS
22  b' ← A^{|H⟩}(pk₁,pk₂,k_b)
23  return ⟦b = b'⟧
```

Figure 4: Games G_0, G_1, G_2, G_3 for the proof of **HKR-CKS-l** of NIKE in Figure 3.

Game G_0 This is the original **HKR-CKS-l**$_{\mathsf{NIKE},par}$ game so by definition $\Pr\left[\mathsf{G}_0^A \Rightarrow 1\right] = \Pr\left[\mathbf{HKR\text{-}CKS\text{-}l}_{\mathsf{NIKE},par}^A \Rightarrow 1\right]$.

Game G_1 Without loss of generality we consider the half of pk_1 that is actually used in the key derivation, say pk_{1_L}. In this game pk_{1_L} is replaced with a uniform key on Line 03. It follows immediately from Definition 1 that

$$\left|\Pr\left[\mathsf{G}_0^A \Rightarrow 1\right] - \Pr\left[\mathsf{G}_1^A \Rightarrow 1\right]\right| \leq \mathsf{Adv}_{q,N,N,\chi}^{\mathbf{M\text{-}LWE}}(B_1).$$

Game G_2 In this hybrid we modify the way we compute the shared key. Consider k' as computed in the SdK algorithm, we define the shared key as $\mathsf{Rec}(k'+e)$ where $e \xleftarrow{\$} \chi$ is a freshly sampled ring element from the noise distribution. Note that the adversary can only detect a change in this hybrid if

$$\mathsf{Rec}(k'+e) \neq \mathsf{Rec}(k').$$

Since k' is uniformly distributed in $\mathcal{R}_q$, the probability that any coefficient is rounded to a different term is at most $4\beta d/q$, which is also an upper bound on the distinguishing advantage of the adversary. Thus we get

$$\left|\Pr\left[\mathsf{G}_1^A \Rightarrow 1\right] - \Pr\left[\mathsf{G}_2^A \Rightarrow 1\right]\right| \leq \frac{4\beta d}{q}.$$

Game G_3 In this game the half of pk_2 that is used in the key derivation, pk_{2_R}, is replaced with a uniform key on Line 05. Furthermore $k'+e$ is replaced with a uniform ring element u on Line 20. By an invocation of the module-LWE assumption we have that

$$\left|\Pr\left[\mathsf{G}_2^A \Rightarrow 1\right] - \Pr\left[\mathsf{G}_3^A \Rightarrow 1\right]\right| \leq \mathsf{Adv}_{q,N,N+1,\chi}^{\mathbf{M\text{-}LWE}}(B_2).$$

Observe that k_0 and k_1 are identically distributed and the adversary can only guess b'. Hence, $\Pr\left[\mathsf{G}_3^A \Rightarrow 1\right] = \frac{1}{2}$. Collecting all probabilities yields the bound stated in Theorem 6.

∎

Reconciliation Function. The reconciliation function Rec depicted in Figure 3 maps a ring element $k \in \mathcal{R}_q$ to a bit string of length d. In the final step of the proof of Theorem 6 the input to Rec is a uniformly sampled ring element $u \in \mathcal{R}_q$. Each element in $\mathbb{Z}_q$ is rounded to a bit with almost equal probability. More specifically for all $u_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q$, $\Pr[\mathsf{Rnd}(u_i) = 0] = \frac{q-1}{2q}$ and $\Pr[\mathsf{Rnd}(u_i) = 1] = 1 - \frac{q-1}{2q}$, which are negligibly close to $1/2$, for an appropriate choice of q. Although the reconciliation function maps the key to a smaller domain, trying to guess $k := \mathsf{Rec}(u)$, even when given both public keys, would, in expectation, require guessing half of all possible keys, which amounts to 2^{d-1}. This becomes practically infeasible for large values of d. For more details on our specific choice of q and d, we refer to Section 5.4.

5.2 Active Setting

Here we show how a non-interactive key exchange with passive security can be generically transformed to one with active security. The transformation, depicted in Figure 5, requires a simulation-sound NIZK with a straight line extractor. Due to space constraints, the proof is deferred to [43].

$\mathsf{Stp}(1^\lambda)$	$\mathsf{Gen}(\mathtt{ID})$	$\mathsf{SdK}(\mathtt{ID}_1, pk_1, \mathtt{ID}_2, sk_2)$
01 $par \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{Stp}'(1^\lambda)$	03 $(sk'_{\mathtt{ID}}, pk'_{\mathtt{ID}}) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{Gen}'(\mathtt{ID})$	08 **parse** $pk_1 \to (pk'_1, \pi)$
02 **return** par	04 $\pi \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{ZK.Prv}(pk'_{\mathtt{ID}}, sk'_{\mathtt{ID}})$	09 **if** $\mathsf{ZK.Ver}(pk'_1, \pi) = 0 : $ **return** $\perp$
	05 $sk_{\mathtt{ID}} := sk'_{\mathtt{ID}}$	10 $k' := \mathsf{SdK}'(\mathtt{ID}_1, pk'_1, \mathtt{ID}_2, sk_2)$
	06 $pk_{\mathtt{ID}} := (pk'_{\mathtt{ID}}, \pi)$	11 **return** k'
	07 **return** $(sk_{\mathtt{ID}}, pk_{\mathtt{ID}})$	

Figure 5: Compiler for transforming a passively secure non-interactive key exchange $\mathsf{NIKE}' := (\mathsf{Stp}', \mathsf{Gen}', \mathsf{SdK}')$ with semi-malicious correctness into an actively secure non-interactive key exchange $\mathsf{NIKE} := (\mathsf{Stp}, \mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{SdK})$.

Theorem 7 (HKR-CKS-l and SM-COR of $\mathsf{NIKE}' \overset{\mathrm{QROM}}{\underset{\mathrm{ZKPoK}}{\Rightarrow}}$ CKS of NIKE). Let $\mathsf{H} : \{0,1\}^* \to \mathcal{R}_q$ be a random oracle and $\mathsf{NIKE}' := (\mathsf{Stp}', \mathsf{Gen}', \mathsf{SdK}')$ a passively secure non-interactive key exchange with semi-malicious correctness defined relative to $par' \in \mathsf{Stp}'(1^\lambda)$. Further, let $\mathsf{ZKPoK} := (\mathsf{ZK.Prv}, \mathsf{ZK.Ver})$ be a simulation-sound online extractable zero-knowledge proof of knowledge for the NP relation $R = (pk_{\mathtt{ID}}, sk_{\mathtt{ID}})$. Then, for any **CKS** adversary A against $\mathsf{NIKE} := (\mathsf{Stp}, \mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{SdK})$, depicted in Figure 5, there exist PPT adversaries $\mathsf{B}_1, \mathsf{B}_2, \mathsf{B}_3, \mathsf{C}$ such that

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathbf{CKS}}_{\mathsf{NIKE}, par}(\mathsf{A}) \leq \frac{Q^2_{\mathrm{RHU}} \cdot Q_{\mathrm{TQ}}}{2} \cdot \varepsilon$$

and

$$\varepsilon := Q_{\mathrm{RCU}} \cdot \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathbf{SSND}}_{\mathsf{ZKPoK}}(\mathsf{B}_1) + 2 \cdot \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathbf{SM\text{-}COR}}_{\mathsf{NIKE}', par'}(\mathsf{B}_2)$$
$$+ 2 \cdot \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathbf{ZK}}_{\mathsf{ZKPoK}}(\mathsf{B}_3) + \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathbf{HKR\text{-}CKS\text{-}l}}_{\mathsf{NIKE}', par'}(\mathsf{C}),$$

where Q_{RHU}, Q_{RCU}, Q_{RCQ}, and Q_{TQ} denote the number of queries made by A to $\mathtt{RegHonUsr}$, $\mathtt{RegCorUsr}$, $\mathtt{RevCorQue}$, and $\mathtt{TestQue}$, respectively.

5.3 Practical considerations

Halving the Key Size. Observe that the "left" and "right" components pk_L and pk_R of the public key of the NIKE as specified in Figure 3 are necessary because we work in the non-commutative M-LWE setting. Note that all theorems, lemmas and proofs consider both the left and right components of keys. An easy way to halve the size of the public key would be to set $N = 1$, i.e., to work in the R-LWE setting; this also eliminates the need for the case distinction in SdK. We argue that for essentially all relevant applications of a NIKE, we can halve the public-key size even *without* moving to the R-LWE setting. All that is required is that protocol participants (and their associated NIKE keys) have different *roles*, typically called initiator and responder or client and server, and that these roles are clear from protocol context. This is certainly the case for the application examples sketched in [43]: The OPTLS handshake, like the TLS handshake, clearly distinguishes the roles of client and server, so does the handshake in (post-quantum) WireGuard. Also in X3DH the critical static-semistatic key exchange has

clear roles that can be used to distinguish between the "left" and "right" participant instead of transmitting both components of the key and using comparison of IDs. Note that this setting of a NIKE using keys with different roles is very similar to the ℓ_A and ℓ_B keys of SIDH [48, Sec. 3.2], when it was still considered as a replacement for DH, i.e., before it was shown to not be actively secure in [44] and completely broken in [26]. Based on these considerations, we stick to the M-LWE setting for the construction of SWOOSH; in our performance evaluation in Section 6 we report the size of only one public-key component.

Security of the NIZK. We highlight that our proof of active security, Theorem 7, requires the strong property of simulation-sound online-extractability. Although constructions satisfying such a strong notion exist [75], they tend to be less efficient than alternatives satisfying weaker notions of security. For instance, a proof of knowledge of an M-LWE secret satisfying simulation soundness, but without *online*-extractability, using state-of-the-art techniques [54] and appropriate parameters is around 89 KB in size. Since the [54] framework is relatively new, there are currently no implementations available to determine the exact running time of the prover and verifier. However, previous versions of lattice-based zero-knowledge proofs [55], which serve as the basis for [54], have shown implementations with prover and verifier running times on the order of milliseconds when proving similar relations. We remark that using NIZKs with slightly weaker security, in favour of a more efficient scheme, is a well-established heuristic and was already used in many works prior to ours, including [29, 34, 35, 45, 51, 57, 74]. However, this limitation is inherent in our approach, and investigating security under an alternative notion remains an interesting (and challenging) question. Tangentially, we also mention that for some applications, the performance of the NIZK does not affect the efficiency of the shared-key computation, since it can be verified once and for all for a given public key: In any scenario where the public keys are distributed by a PKI, the NIZK proof can be simply verified by the PKI upon the registration of the key, and then immediately discarded. The users would then trust the PKI to have verified the NIZK on their behalf. Note that this does not introduce any extra trust assumption, since the PKI is

already trusted to provide the correct public key. In these scenarios, the efficiency of the NIZK only marginally impacts the overall system performance, and thus justifies ignoring the costs of the NIZK for shared-key computation.

5.4 Parameter selection

Selecting parameters for the scheme influences several aspects, most notably the correctness error and the hardness of M-LWE. In order to evaluate the security of our scheme we use the *Lattice-Estimator* tool [2, 4, 66], to estimate the memory and CPU operations required to perform various lattice attacks, including dual attacks, uSVP, the Coded-BKW attack, and solving using Gröbner bases with the Arora-GB attack. The estimator has been used to estimate the concrete security for all LWE and NTRU based candidates of the NIST competition [3], and is regularly updated to include the latest developments in lattice cryptanalysis [3]. However, we also take into account practical considerations for the implementation when selecting our parameters, such as the use of ternary secrets and noise sampled from a centred binomial distribution. For our scheme with parameters $n = 8192, q = 2^{214} - 255$ and $\mathcal{X}$ a ternary distribution, we estimate the hardness of the M-LWE problem underlying SWOOSH at 120 bits [4]. The other way to attack SWOOSH is, for an active attacker, to try to produce failures. We consider a quantum attacker with a bounded query depth of $D = 2^{64}$ (i.e., what NIST considers to be "the approximate number of gates that current classical computing architectures can perform serially in a decade" [62, Sec. 4.A]) and a bound on the number of queries of 2^{120} (i.e., matching the hardness of the underlying lattice problem). Applying Theorem 5 yields a success probability (correctness error), after this amount of computation,

$$16 \cdot \left(2^{64} + 2\right) \cdot \left(2^{120} + 1\right) \cdot \frac{256^2 \cdot 32}{2^{214}} < \frac{1}{2^4} = \delta(Q_{\mathsf{H}}),$$

i.e., considerably smaller than 1/2. Note that this analysis is conservative as it ignores the circuit depth for the Grover oracle that an attacker would need to implement.

6 Implementation & Performance Evaluation

In order to demonstrate the efficiency of SWOOSH in terms of performance, we implement the core part of the scheme, Passive-SWOOSH, present benchmarks of this implementation, and compare to other KEMs and (pre- and post-quantum) NIKEs. We caution the reader that all implementation details and numbers we present in this

Parameter	Description	Value
β	upper bound on $\|\vec{s}\|_\infty = \|\vec{e}\|_\infty$	1
q	prime modulus	$2^{214} - 255$
d	dim of $\mathcal{R}_q := \mathbb{Z}_q[X]/(X^d + 1)$	256
l	# factors $X^d + 1$ splits into $\mod q$	128
N	height of the $\boldsymbol{A}$ matrix	32
n	lattice dimension	8192
χ	secret / noise distribution	$p(-1) = 25\%$ $p(0) = 50\%$ $p(1) = 25\%$

Table 1: Parameter selection for non-interactive key exchange NIKE.

section are for Passive-SWOOSH only. To obtain a full picture of the performance of SWOOSH, the implementation will need to be augmented with a future implementation of the NIZK proof from [54]. As outlined in Section 5.3, the performance impact of adding the NIZK proof in terms of both size and computational effort depends on the concrete application scenario and may be negligible if key-generation performance is not critical and if NIZK proof verification can be outsourced to the PKI.

6.1 Implementation

As a NIKE, SWOOSH is composed of two major functions, the key generation procedure and the shared-key computation, the performance of which dictates the efficiency of SWOOSH.

In the case of the key generation, the matrix $\boldsymbol{A}$ is fixed and assumed to be in the NTT domain, so performance is dictated by the sampling of the secret and error vectors, as well as the computation of the public key which involves two NTT transformations, and a matrix multiplication followed by a polynomial addition. On Intel Skylake the cumulative execution time of the forward NTT accounts for $\sim 10\%$ of total key-generation time. This calculation is based on a single transformation taking 217430 cycles, with a total of 64 transformations executed (32 for each secret and error vector). In contrast, the inverse NTT and noise-generation processes require 262992 and 89776 cycles, respectively. As for the shared-key computation, its performance is mainly dictated by the random offset computation, which requires the use of cSHAKE [49] and the polynomial base multiplication required to calculate $\boldsymbol{k}'$ (see Figure 3). Similar to other schemes, the shared-key derivation also performs rounding of the shared key, however its execution time is negligible. At a high level, the architecture of our implementation is divided into two distinct parts: low-level field arithmetic over $\mathbb{F}_q$ that is implemented using the Jasmin language [6, 7], and polynomial arithmetic in $\mathcal{R}_q$ as well as the scheme itself, both of which are implemented in Rust.

The structure largely mimics the abstract specification in Figure 3. The main difference is that, like other

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[3]An up-to-date list of implemented works can be found https://lattice-estimator.readthedocs.io/en/latest/references.html.

[4]These numbers can be reproduced with the estimator — the version used in this work is at commit 96875622c6b0e6f98a91ddeecaaa17b66dbc5a87.

Scheme (variant)	Security	Assumption	Non-interactive	Post-quantum	Size (bytes)		Cycles	
					ct	pk	Gen	Encaps + Decaps **or** SdK
CRYSTALS-Kyber (`Kyber-768` [71])	IND-CCA2	M-LWE	✗	✓	1088	1184	200 302	539 108 (251 384 + 287 724)
Classic McEliece (`mceliece348864` [1])	IND-CCA2	Binary Goppa Codes	✗	✓	96	261120	46 715 060	143 178 (31 000 + 112 178)
ECDH (`X25519` [13])	HKR-CKS* [5]	CDH	✓	✗	—	32	28 187	87 942
CTIDH (`CTIDH-1024` [10])	HKR-CKS* [6]	CSIDH	✓	✓	—	128	469 520 000	511 190 000
This work (Passive-SWOOSH)	HKR-CKS	M-LWE	✓	✓	—	221184	146 920 890	10 612 666

Table 2: Comparison of select post-quantum KEMs and NIKEs.

lattice-based schemes [5, 71], we encode and transmit public keys in NTT domain. This massively reduces the number of cycles required for shared-key computation. In addition, as discussed in Section 5.3, we assume that the role of each party is well defined and thus only compute one half of the key. Finally, we implement the noise sampling in a slightly different way than one might expect; we will discuss this later in this section.

Zooming in on the low-level field arithmetic, the operations on integers modulo $2^{214} - 255$ require multiple-precision integers since native 64-bit registers are not large enough to store a single field element. This arithmetic is implemented through libjbn [7], a Jasmin library that exposes (modular) big-integer arithmetic.

Polynomial Arithmetic. On top of this layer, operations in polynomial rings are implemented using Rust, in addition to other functions such as reconciliation, matrix and noise generation. Similar to other lattice-based schemes, one of the more critical (and easier) operations to optimise (from a performance perspective) is polynomial multiplication. The naive algorithm for multiplying two polynomials in $\mathcal{R}_q$, sometimes called Schoolbook multiplication, involves multiplying all pairs of coefficients, calculating their sum and reducing modulo $X^d + 1$. However, the complexity of this approach is quadratic in the number of coefficients and thus quite costly. The *Number Theoretic Transform* (NTT) provides a more efficient approach for polynomial multiplication with quasi-logarithmic time complexity $O(d \log(d))$ instead of $O(d^2)$. For a detailed discussion on the NTT refer to [72]. As is the case for other implementations [5, 71], we use an in-place NTT which requires bit-reversal operations in the forward and inverse transforms but uses less memory. Another optimisation is to make the NTT a part of our scheme, which means that the matrix $\boldsymbol{A}$ is sampled in the NTT domain, and the secret and public keys are stored in the NTT domain. This results in the NTT only being used three times, once for the shared-key derivation and twice in the key generation to transform the secret and error vectors, which are sampled in the normal domain, to the NTT domain before computing the public key. A common trick to speed-up the NTT transformation when using Montgomery reduction [60], as is the case for libjbn, is

to use pre-computed constants in Montgomery form $\zeta \cdot R \pmod{q}$.

Noise Sampling and Matrix Generation. Both the matrix generation and noise-sampling procedures use a seed, either set as a system parameter for $\boldsymbol{A}$ or as a secret input to a PRG in the case of $\vec{s}$ and $\vec{e}$, to produce a stream bytes from which the distributions are sampled. In the case of matrix generation this is achieved via rejection sampling on the stream of bytes produced by an extendable output function (XOF). The noise-sampling procedure, used for generating the secret key and the error vector, samples these vectors from a centred binomial distribution using the output of a PRF with a random seed. As with other schemes where multiplication is optimised using the NTT, the choice of (symmetric) primitive that underlies these functions tends to be a deciding factor for the performance. We chose cSHAKE [49] based on Keccak [37] as the underlying primitive for the XOF and AES256-CTR for the PRF used in noise sampling. Similar to the NewHope scheme [5], for efficiency reasons the secret and error vectors are sampled from a centred binomial distribution rather than a discrete Gaussian distribution. Using ternary noise means that each coefficient can be generated from only 2 bits and thus, the generation of a polynomial in $\mathcal{R}_q$ only requires $(32 \cdot 256 \cdot 2)/8 = 2048$ (pseudo-random) bytes. Intuitively, our CBD definition in Figure 3 when a and b are sourced from a PRG, maps 00_b and 11_b to $0 \mod q$ with 50% probability, 10_b to $1 \mod q$ and 01_b to $-1 \mod q$ with 25% probability each. Our implementation differs from the specification by applying signed reduction modulo 3 to each two bit block and converting it to a congruent value in $\mathbb{F}_q$, as opposed to using big-integer field arithmetic to map bits a and b to an element in $\mathbb{F}_q$. Although this approach produces a different mapping (11_b to $-1 \mod q$, 00_b and 10_b to $0 \mod q$ and 01_b to $1 \mod q$), the distribution of the outputs is identical. Due to the size of our field elements, this approach results in a considerable speed up in the noise sampling. The random offset used in our scheme is generated by performing rejection sampling on the output of cSHAKE-256 [49].

6.2 Performance and Security Evaluation

In this section we evaluate the performance of our scheme and compare it to other NIKEs and KEMs. Additionally, we present a comparison of key sizes and the properties of each

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[5]See Section 6.2.

[6]See Section 6.2.

[7]See https://github.com/formosa-crypto/libjbn.

scheme such as post-quantum security, and whether they are non-interactive, and the security notions they satisfy.

Security Models. To set a common ground for comparison, we note that the SdK algorithm in a NIKE can be viewed as simultaneously running both Encaps and Decaps of a KEM. KEMs should satisfy the standard security notions of IND-CCA security, with schemes such as CRYSTALS-Kyber [71] satisfying indistinguishability under *adaptive* chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2 security). On the other hand, we implemented the passively-secure version of our NIKE. We argue that this comparison is still meaningful because, in the context of a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), NIZK verification can be performed once and for all by the PKI. Therefore, the runtime of our scheme is primarily influenced by the operations of the passively-secure NIKE. We also note that the *"unhashed"* version of ECDH (X25519 [13]), for which we report benchmarks, is insecure in the (DKR-)CKS model. In an unhashed NIKE where shared keys aren't linked to specific identities, an adversary, A, can carry out a two-step attack: (i) A registers the public key g^a belonging to an honest party, Alice, as if it were their own key (RegCorUsr(ID = A, $pk = g^a$)). (ii) Next, A requests the shared key between themselves and another honest party, say Bob, who possesses a public key g^b (RevCorQue(ID = Bob, ID = A) $\rightarrow g^{ab}$). This immediately gives the shared key g^{ab} between Alice and Bob. Due to the homomorphic properties of (EC)DH, this attack remains effective (requiring only a minor modification) even if A is prohibited from registering keys of existing users. On the other hand, a hashed version of (EC)DH can be shown to be DKR-CKS secure in the ROM under the *Strong Computational Diffie-Hellman* assumption. Although there is no proof of CTIDH (CTIDH-1024 [10]) in the CKS model, the unhashed variant (excluding identities) of CTIDH faces similar security issues for the same reason. Recent work [36] proved that achieving actively secure NIKE from CSIDH inherently depends on *"very strong variants of the Group Action Strong CDH"* problem. Nevertheless, it is important to note that Passive-SWOOSH is indeed strictly weaker than unhashed DH, as a key-recovery attack becomes possible if the adversary is allowed to register corrupted keys. Furthermore, from a practical point of view, enhancing the security of ECDH and CTIDH does not come with a significant increase in costs, as the computation time for hashing is still minimal, compared to the dominating modular-arithmetic cycle counts.

Benchmarks. The benchmark results for Passive-SWOOSH were obtained on an Intel Core i7-6500U (Skylake) running on a single core with Hyper-threading and TurboBoost disabled. The Rust compiler version used for the benchmarks was 1.62.1[8] and the Jasmin compiler version was 2022.09.0.

We report the median cycle counts of 10000 runs. In Table 2 we list the results and compare to the cycle counts of Kyber-768 (on the same hardware), mceliece348864 as reported in [14], CTIDH-1024 as reported in [10, Sec. 8], and of lib25519 [61], on Intel Skylake CPUs. As expected, the pre-quantum X25519 [13] scheme is orders of magnitude faster than Passive-SWOOSH for key generation. However, in many applications of NIKEs, keys are re-used many times and what is more critical is the performance of shared-key computation. Here the gap to pre-quantum X25519 is considerably smaller and Passive-SWOOSH outperforms the only real post-quantum competitor CTIDH by a factor of 48. Compared to post-quantum KEMs, such as Kyber-768 and mceliece348864, the performance gap increases to several orders of magnitude, similarly to X25519. However, these schemes require further rounds of interaction, which not only presents additional overhead, but also means they cannot be used as drop-in replacements for a NIKE. Additionally, as shown in Table 2, CTIDH, Kyber, and X25519 have a public key size several orders of magnitude smaller than Passive-SWOOSH. In this aspect, only Classic McEliece has a public key size comparable to that of Passive-SWOOSH, even when taking into account the expected size of the proof of knowledge (see Section 5.3).

7 Conclusions

In this work, we constructed a NIKE based on the M-LWE problem, with a proof in the QROM. Our scheme is based on the standard blueprint, but with an additional twist to guarantee provable security for arbitrary rings. Our optimised implementation shows that our scheme offers reasonable computational performance and key sizes that should be acceptable for most applications. We view our work as the first evidence *contradicting* the folklore belief that lattice-based NIKE is too inefficient to be used in practice. As future work, we plan to explore applications of our scheme to more complex protocols and to formally verify the correctness of (parts of) our implementation.

8 Acknowledgements

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[8]The following build configuration options/values were used: opt-level=3 and target-cpu="native".

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