



## How WEIRD is Usable Privacy and Security Research?

Ayako A. Hasegawa and Daisuke Inoue, *NICT*; Mitsuaki Akiyama, *NTT*

<https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity24/presentation/hasegawa>

This paper is included in the Proceedings of the  
33rd USENIX Security Symposium.

August 14-16, 2024 • Philadelphia, PA, USA

978-1-939133-44-1

Open access to the Proceedings of the  
33rd USENIX Security Symposium  
is sponsored by USENIX.

# How WEIRD is Usable Privacy and Security Research?

Ayako A. Hasegawa  
*NICT*

Daisuke Inoue  
*NICT*

Mitsuaki Akiyama  
*NTT*

## Abstract

In human factor fields such as human-computer interaction (HCI) and psychology, researchers have been concerned that participants mostly come from WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic) countries. This WEIRD skew may hinder understanding of diverse populations and their cultural differences. The usable privacy and security (UPS) field has inherited many research methodologies from research on human factor fields. We conducted a literature review to understand the extent to which participant samples in UPS papers were from WEIRD countries and the characteristics of the methodologies and research topics in each user study recruiting Western or non-Western participants. We found that the skew toward WEIRD countries in UPS is greater than that in HCI. Geographic and linguistic barriers in the study methods and recruitment methods may cause researchers to conduct user studies locally. In addition, many papers did not report participant demographics, which could hinder the replication of the reported studies, leading to low reproducibility. To improve geographic diversity, we provide the suggestions including facilitate replication studies, address geographic and linguistic issues of study/recruitment methods, and facilitate research on the topics for non-WEIRD populations.

## 1 Introduction

Usable privacy and security (UPS) research focuses on the perspective of those who use technology (i.e., humans), which has not been addressed in conventional security research. It contributes to solving security and privacy issues that arise in the gap between social requirements and technical feasibility, i.e., *social-technical gap* [4]. The UPS field has accumulated approximately a quarter of a century of research history. UPS papers have been published in various conferences and journals both inside and outside the field of security and privacy, and the number of published UPS papers is increasing every year. In 1996, Zurko and Simon introduced the

concept of UPS, which was called *user-centered security* in their paper. Two pioneering UPS papers were subsequently published in 1999. Adams and Sasse advocated that human factors should be considered in the design of security mechanisms [6]. Further, Whitten and Tygar pointed out a lack of good user interface design for security and applied several usability testing approaches with signing and encrypting an email message [98].

The research methodologies, i.e., recruiting participants and conducting a user study, for UPS are often interdisciplinary. Many of these methodologies are drawn from human-computer interaction (HCI), psychology, and behavioral sciences. In these research fields, the majority of participants have been reported to be Western, which has caused the issue that many of the findings accumulated over several years may not generalize to other countries and cultures. Henrich et al. indicated that U.S. participants were common outliers on many psychological measures and this fact made these participants “WEIRD” (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic) [42]. Linxen et al. [59] published a paper in 2021 entitled “How WEIRD is CHI?” in which they conducted a literature review and quantitatively confirmed the WEIRD skew of participant samples at CHI, one of the top conferences in HCI. Because the residents of WEIRD countries are a minority of the world population, this fact is suggested to significantly impact the generalizability of HCI research. Although the WEIRD framework, which includes indicators based on national statistics or characteristics, has the limitation of assessing participant sampling (e.g., in the Global South individually wealthy people may be more accessible), it has been successful in providing a broad picture of the geographic diversity of the participants.

In UPS, some studies have also identified critical gaps concerning security and privacy between WEIRD and non-WEIRD societies/populations that stem from environmental aspects (e.g., IT resource usage, documentation, and laws/regulations) and personal aspects (e.g., (mis)conception, preference, and susceptibility) [7, 10, 18, 43, 53, 57, 58, 80]. We further assume that demographic skew may also influ-

ence *attack feasibility*. Researchers in UPS sometimes leverage user studies to demonstrate the feasibility of attacks, which is a unique approach to UPS. These observations suggest that threat assessment, design implications, interventions, and support technologies proposed based on the findings of conventional WEIRD-skewed studies may not be sufficiently beneficial to or actionable in diverse non-WEIRD societies/populations and may instead hinder facilitating security and privacy in such societies/populations. Even with the harms of the WEIRD skew to UPS research, the degree of geographic breadth and factors that impede geographic diversity have not been sufficiently investigated in UPS. Moreover, the methodologies used and topics addressed are still either unrevealed or overlooked from the WEIRD perspective. In this study, we conduct a systematic literature review in UPS to answer the following research questions (RQs).

**RQ1:** *To what extent are participant samples in UPS papers from WEIRD countries? How has this changed over time?*

**RQ2:** *What are the differences in the characteristics of the methodologies and research topics in each user study recruiting Western or non-Western participants?*

We reviewed 715 UPS papers, which recruited participants, from representative security and HCI conferences over a recent five-year period (2017–2021). We used the WEIRD framework for assessing the geographic diversity of participant samples on the basis of extracted participant information and analyzed the author affiliations, methodologies, and research topics. We found that a large majority of participant samples in UPS papers were skewed toward WEIRD countries and particularly involved Western participant samples (78.89%). This skew is higher than that in the results of Linxen et al.’s study, which reviewed CHI papers (73.13%). Linxen et al. reported that the percentage of non-Western participant samples in CHI papers largely increased (from 16.31% to 30.24%, 1.85x) in the past five years, whereas our results revealed that the percentage in UPS papers decreased (25.00% to 20.77%, 0.93x). Authors tend to recruit convenient participants from the countries of their affiliations, e.g., students of the local university who are easily accessible for university researchers. Because most authors are affiliated with institutions in Western countries, the participant samples are more likely to be skewed toward Westerners. Moreover, we identified that a non-negligible number of papers did not report participant demographics. This tendency was more pronounced in non-HCI and non-UPS-focused conferences. Such papers with low reproducibility may hinder replication studies. We confirmed that there is a large Western skew in every research topic. In particular, attack-feasibility studies are skewed heavily toward Western and suffered from demographic issues: the feasibility of the attacks can be affected by participant demographics due to relying on targets’ English proficiency.

We provide the following recommendations for making

UPS research less WEIRD. First, a replication study should be facilitated in UPS because most UPS papers have examined only WEIRD countries and not considered/discussed whether geographic diversity affects the results. Second, geographic issues of study and recruiting methods should be addressed. Third, researchers should also be diversified (e.g., non-Western researchers) to overcome linguistic barriers and communicate precisely and deeply with and understand non-WEIRD populations. Finally, we discuss UPS research topics to be addressed in the future.

## 2 Background and Related Work

### 2.1 Original Study: How WEIRD is CHI?

Linxen et al. published a paper titled “How WEIRD is CHI?” in 2021 (hereafter referred to as the Linxen study) [59]. The Linxen study was motivated by the issues raised in psychology: (1) most findings in psychology were based on U.S. undergraduate students [12] and (2) findings drawn from U.S. participants were frequently outliers when compared with those from other countries [42]. Then, Linxen et al. investigated the geographic diversity of participants recruited in 2,768 papers published between 2016–2020 at CHI, which is the most prestigious academic conference in the HCI field. They showed that the participant samples of the CHI papers were highly skewed toward WEIRD countries, e.g., 73.13% of the participant samples were from Western countries. However, encouragingly, they also showed that the percentage of non-Western participant samples had been increasing in recent years.

### 2.2 Harms of WEIRD skew to UPS Research

Some UPS studies have focused on non-WEIRD societies/populations and identified critical gaps concerning security and privacy between WEIRD and non-WEIRD societies/populations that stem from environmental and individual aspects. These results suggest actual and potential harms to UPS research; design implications, interventions, and support technologies that are proposed on the basis of the findings of conventional WEIRD-skewed studies may not be sufficiently beneficial to or actionable in non-WEIRD societies/populations.

**Environmental aspects.** Gaps have been reported between WEIRD and non-WEIRD societies/populations regarding environmental aspects, e.g., IT resource usage, documentation, and laws/regulations. The first one is the gap in IT resource usage. Whereas people in WEIRD societies usually own devices individually, cultural contexts such as economic constraints, social values, and social power relations drive shared device practices in non-WEIRD societies, which create new challenges to ensuring individual privacy [7]. In particular, several studies have reported that women who live in the

Global South, where gender inequality is greater than in Western countries, are likely to be vulnerable to privacy abuse, harassment, and fraud when they use IT resources [10, 80]. The second one is the gap in documentation. Security and privacy documents (e.g., advice, guidelines, and training materials) notably influence individuals' security and privacy practices [77, 101]. The U.S., for instance, has issued numerous critical security and privacy documents, e.g., NIST SP-800 series [67], which are referenced by other countries. However, these documents are much less widely available in non-English-speaking countries than in English-speaking countries due to lower English proficiency levels and the additional cost of translation [41, 53]. The third one is the gap in laws/regulations. Data privacy laws and regulations play a vital role in protecting individual privacy rights and promoting responsible data practices among service providers. Many studies have investigated whether services comply with laws and regulations, e.g., EU GDPR, and the usability of the law-compliant interfaces for user privacy [68, 91]. However, in addition to Europe and the U.S., many countries in regions such as Asia, South America, and Africa have already enacted numerous data privacy laws independently [24, 48], suggesting the anticipated divergence in the treatment of user privacy in services across different countries. Moreover, the countries where data privacy laws have not been established have usually been overlooked by the abovementioned study approaches based on existing privacy laws and regulations.

**Individual aspects.** Gaps have also been reported regarding individual aspects, e.g., (mis)conceptions, preference, and susceptibility. It is important to note that individuals and their surrounding environment are not mutually independent entities, as individuals are influenced by their environment [56, 85]. The first one is the gap in (mis)conceptions. Many studies have identified that misconceptions of security and privacy technologies lead to insecure behavior and increase users' risk of being harmed [3, 84]. However, Herbert et al. identified that one of the most important factors influencing user misconceptions is the country of residence, with greater differences between Western and non-Western countries [43]. This result suggests further investigation of the reasons for these differences and how to debunk misconceptions tailored to each country. The second one is the gap in preferences. Many studies have identified users' privacy preferences on willingness to share their data with companies and disclose their data on social media and have proposed techniques to recommend privacy settings on the basis of users' privacy preferences [54, 86, 97]. Some studies have reported that such privacy preferences vary among countries [20, 57, 58]. For example, Li et al. showed that when users were informed that third-party companies were accountable for data collection, users from collectivistic countries (e.g., China) were less likely to share their data, whereas users from individualistic countries (e.g., U.S) were more likely to share their data [58]. The third one is the gap in susceptibility. Many studies have

identified attackers' phishing techniques and users' coping strategies and proposed interventions [33, 92, 95]. However, Butavicius et al. demonstrated that users from individualistic cultures were significantly less likely to be susceptible to phishing emails [18], suggesting that users in collectivistic countries may be more exposed to phishing threats. Moreover, Hasegawa et al. unveiled that non-native English speakers used different coping strategies for suspicious emails in English from suspicious emails in their native language [41].

Motivated by these observations, we focus on the WEIRD perspective in UPS. Ensuring security and privacy is not limited to WEIRD societies alone but rather a shared global challenge. To strive to equitably provide security and privacy globally, it is imperative to broaden the focus of UPS to include non-WEIRD societies; specifically, understanding the similarities and differences between WEIRD and non-WEIRD societies/populations is crucial for addressing this challenge.

## 2.3 Literature Reviews in UPS Research

Many researchers have conducted literature reviews in terms of "research topics" of UPS papers. Garfinkel and Lipford [35] summarized the research topics of the whole UPS field. Other reviews focused on the research topics of specific subfields of UPS, such as privacy- and security-related decision-making [5], social cybersecurity [99], phishing interventions [33], at-risk users [94], sexual abuse [69], cross-cultural privacy issues in social media [90], and developer-centered security [87].

On the other hand, few researchers have conducted literature reviews in terms of the "methodology" of UPS papers. Distler et al. conducted a literature review to understand which methods researchers use and how researchers represent risks to participants [30]. Kaur et al. reviewed and compared the methods of UPS papers on experts and non-experts (end users) [52]. In addition to revealing current research practices, these authors identified methodological and ethical challenges in UPS papers, such as no definition of ethically-acceptable deceptions, lack of using theories for result interpretation, and lack of participant diversity.

Table 1 compares our study with the closely related literature reviews. Our study is a *quasi*-replication of the Linxen study [59], which focused on the WEIRD perspective on user study participants in the HCI field; we focus on the UPS field. Our study differs from the two closely related papers on UPS methodologies [30, 52] in the following points<sup>1</sup>:

- We collected papers from more diverse conferences to gain a comprehensive understanding of UPS papers.
- We review more recent papers (2017–2021).

<sup>1</sup>Note that this comparison is based on the simplified points and does not cover all the objectives of the papers.

Table 1: Comparison of our study with prior review literature on user studies.

Paper	Field	Population	Geographic Diversity	Research Topic	Conference	Period	# Papers*
Linxen et al. [59]	HCI	Any	Analyzed from WEIRD perspective	Not analyzed	CHI	2016–2020	2,768
Distler et al. [30]	UPS	Any	Not analyzed	Analyzed	S&P, SEC, CCS, SOUPS, CHI	2014–2018	284
Kaur et al. [52]	UPS	Experts	Analyzed from W perspective	Analyzed	Tier-1/2 in security [38], SOUPS, CHI	2008–2018	48 (+48)**
Our study	UPS	Any	Analyzed from WEIRD perspective	Analyzed	S&P, SEC, CCS, NDSS, PETS, CHI, CSCW, SOUPS, USEC, EuroUSEC	2017–2021	715

\*The number of fully-reviewed papers. \*\*They reviewed 48 papers on experts plus 48 papers on non-experts for comparison.

- We analyze not only the degree to which the participants’ countries were Western but also the degrees to which they were Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic.
- We unveil the degrees of Western-skew in research topics, conferences, and author affiliations.
- We discuss the possible influence of participants’ demographics on the results of UPS research and recommend future UPS research topics.

Note that, recently, Mathew et al. reported work-in-progress results of author diversity in security and privacy papers, partly including UPS [61]. Our study focuses on not only author diversity but also participant diversity.

### 3 Methodology

#### 3.1 Review Process

We followed the review process of recent representative review papers in the UPS field [30, 69].

**Criteria.** Since we are interested in geographic diversity of participants recruited in UPS papers, we decided to review papers that meet three criteria: full-length papers (i) that addressed issues of human factors and computer security/privacy as the main research objectives, (ii) that recruited voluntary participants, and (iii) that reported the total number of participants. We removed the following papers because they did not meet criterion–(ii):

- The papers that analyzed online public data, such as online services design and social media posts.
- The papers that analyzed behavioral logs of employees (e.g., response to simulated phishing) or that of actual service users (e.g., response to warnings displayed on browser).
- The papers in which the authors conducted ethnographic observations.

**Phase–1: Conference selection.** We decided to review all conferences that were selected in either or both of the two recent representative papers that comprehensively reviewed UPS papers [30, 94]: S&P, USENIX Security (SEC), CCS, NDSS, and PETS (top and second tier conferences in security and privacy), CHI and CSCW (top-tier conferences in HCI), and SOUPS, EuroUSEC, and USEC (a conference and workshops that focus on UPS). The total number of full-length

papers of the above 10 conferences between 2017–2021 was 7,587, as shown in Table 2.

**Phase–2: Screening for potentially relevant papers.** The dataset of Phase–1 included numerous non-UPS security papers (e.g., cryptography theory) and non-UPS HCI papers. To exclude the papers that did not meet the criteria, we filtered papers with the following search queries: (*security OR privacy*) AND (*recruit\* OR participant\* OR respondent\**). Since we were especially interested in the UPS papers that recruited participants, we used the terms *recruit*, *participant*, and *respondent* instead of the terms relevant to all UPS papers such as *user* or *usability*. Whereas a prior study [30] conducted a similar search for titles or abstracts, we conducted it for full texts to prevent inappropriately excessive exclusion. We explain the detailed procedure in the extended version of this paper [40]. Our search query resulted in 3,226 potentially relevant papers.

**Phase–3: Identifying relevant papers.** The first author reviewed the titles, abstracts, and body text of the 3,226 papers and removed papers that did not meet our criteria. Every time the first author found a paper where it was unclear whether it met the criteria, the authors discussed and resolved the issue. The last author independently double-coded 323 randomly selected papers (10%). The inter-rater reliability was Cohen’s kappa  $k = .86$ , which is considered to be an excellent level of agreement [32]. After this manual screening, we finally identified 715 relevant papers<sup>2</sup>. Table 3 lists the numbers of identified UPS papers in each publication year. The number of UPS papers noticeably increased in 2020–2021, which Distler et al. and Kaur et al. do not cover [30, 52].

**Phase–4: Detailed review.** The first author reviewed each paper in detail and extracted information about the publication, participant, author, and method/topic listed in Table 4. Note that we did not extract information of pilot studies. The coding items were based on the Linxen study [59], and some of them were newly added in this work for UPS papers. The newly added items are described below.

- **Participant type** is whether the participants are experts or non-experts (end users) [52].
- **Study method** and **recruitment method** consist of the classification listed in Table 5. We created this classification with reference to the existing classification [30, 52].

<sup>2</sup>The full list of papers is available in the extended version of this paper [40].

Table 2: The number of UPS papers in each phase of our review process.

Paper	S&P	SEC	CCS	NDSS	PETS	CHI	CSCW	SOUPS	EuroUSEC	USEC	Total
# Papers published for 5 years (Phase-1)	426	701	751	403	313	3,471	1,268	143	57	54	7,587
# Potentially relevant papers (Phase-2)	139	191	233	108	137	1,379	797	137	54	51	3,226
# Relevant papers (Phase-3)	45	81	48	28	53	177	63	125	48	47	715

Table 3: The number of papers for detailed review by publication year.

	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Total
# Papers	117	128	119	150	201	715

Table 4: Extracted information for each paper.

Category	Item
Publication	Title, conference, publication year
Participant	Number*, residence country*, education*, income*, participant type (experts/non-experts)*
Author	Affiliation, affiliation country
Method and Topic	Study method*, recruitment method*, research topic, design evaluation (y/n)*, attack feasibility evaluation (y/n)*

Asterisk marks mean the information that we extracted per user study rather than per paper. A single paper can conduct multiple user studies.

Table 5: Research methods and topics.

Item	Classification
Study method	Survey, interview, lab study, online field experiment, trial deployment, other
Recruitment method	Institution, crowdsourcing, social media, city, mailing list/personal contacts, conference/event, webpanel, source code repository, other, not mentioned
Research topic	Overall, access control and privacy preference, authentication, vulnerability/malware/incident response, privacy abuse, social engineering, privacy-enhancing technologies, other

- **Research topics** is the classification (seven distinct topics and “other”) listed in Table 5. We improved an existing classification [30] by focusing on technology (details are described in the extended version of this paper [40]).
- **Design evaluation** is whether the authors experimented with technology or service design. For example, papers that compared multiple interfaces or framing with a between-group or within-group approach, or papers that clearly stated that usability evaluations have been performed are coded “yes.”
- **Attack feasibility evaluation** is unique to UPS: whether the authors conducted a user study for only demonstrating the feasibility of their proposed attack and did not ask participants about their perceptions of security and privacy issues.

We extracted information per user study rather than per paper if a single paper recruited participants separately for multiple user studies with different study methods (e.g., a survey and

interview) or with different purposes (e.g., one survey to identify user concerns and another to evaluate the proposed UI), as shown in Table 4.

Some papers were ambiguous in their description of the recruitment process and participant information. In addition, it is potentially difficult to classify research topics of each paper. To reduce coders’ subjectivity, the first and last authors discussed many times to develop a codebook and resolve the discrepancies in their interpretations. The last author independently double-coded 72 randomly selected papers (10%). The Cohen’s kappa of our review was  $k = .85-.97$ , which is considered to be an excellent level of agreement [32].

### 3.2 Analysis

We followed the analysis framework of the WEIRD acronym used in the Linxen study [59]. We used the same year’s national statistics as the Linxen study to directly compare the results of the Linxen study (i.e., the HCI field) with our results (i.e., the UPS field)<sup>3</sup>.

**Participant sample.** The number of participant samples refers to the number of countries from which there were participants who were recruited for a user study. A single paper can report multiple participant samples, i.e., a single paper can recruit participants from multiple countries.

**WEIRD.** The WEIRD acronym (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic) is the set of indicators for measuring the diversity of participants’ countries. Just because a country is non-Western does not necessarily mean it is non-EIRD, i.e., there are certain non-W and EIRD countries such as Israel, Japan, and South Korea.

- **Western.** We classified participants’ countries described in each paper into Western or non-Western using Huntington’s classification [47]. This classification is based on civilizations in the post-Cold War era, and Western is centered in Europe and North America. Note that while we adopt this classification for our comparison, it has been criticized in the political science community [22, 34] and does not always agree with the general perception of Western.
  - Western (examples): U.S., Canada, UK, Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland, Sweden, and Australia.
  - Non-Western (examples): India, China, Japan, South Korea, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Mexico, Brazil, and South Africa.

<sup>3</sup>The statistical data was provided from the authors of the Linxen study.

- **Educated.** We comprehensively explored participants' education levels by analyzing two indicators: (a) the mean years of schooling per country [73] and (b) specific educational levels of each participant if the information was provided in a paper.
- **Industrialized.** We used GDP (gross domestic product) per country, which is regarded as the most representative indicator for assessing the development and progress of a national economy [55]. To adjust for differences in purchasing power among countries, we used GDP based on PPP (purchasing power parity) [36].
- **Rich.** We comprehensively explored participants' wealth by analyzing two indicators: (a) the country's GNI (gross national income) based on PPP [37] and (b) specific income levels of each participant if the information was provided in a paper.
- **Democratic.** We used the political rights rating, which indicates countries' degrees of democracy and covers electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and functioning of government [46].

**Normalization by country population.** To address which countries are over- or under-represented in UPS papers relative to population, we normalized the number of participant samples and participants by the country's population [66]. Specifically, we calculated the normalized ratio of participant samples ( $\psi_s$ ) and that of participants ( $\psi_p$ ) as follows:

$$\psi = \frac{n_{\text{samples or } n_{\text{participants}}}(\text{country}) \cdot \text{population}(\text{world})}{n_{\text{samples or } n_{\text{participants}}}(\text{total}) \cdot \text{population}(\text{country})}$$

The values of  $\psi_s$  and  $\psi_p$  are at least 0. A value of  $\psi_s < 1$  or  $\psi_p < 1$  indicates the country is under-represented, while a value of  $\psi_s > 1$  or  $\psi_p > 1$  indicates that the country is over-represented corresponding to the country's population as a percentage of the world's population. For example,  $\psi_s = 2$  indicates that the country was over-studied twice as much relative to its population size.

**Correlation analysis.** To understand to what extent participant samples tend to be from EIRD countries, we calculated the Kendall's tau rank correlations between  $\psi_s$  and each indicator of EIRD (e.g., mean schooling years and GDP). For instance, if there is a significantly positive correlation between  $\psi_s$  and the mean schooling years, we conclude that participant samples of UPS papers come from generally educated countries.

**Author diversity.** We identified the country of each author's affiliation on the basis of their affiliated institution listed first. Each paper was classified either as Western-affiliated authors only, both Western-affiliated and non-Western affiliated authors, or non-Western affiliated authors only.

**Differences among conferences and research topics.** To reveal the characteristics of conferences, we compared the

Table 6: The number of participant samples and participants.

Countries	$n_{\text{samples}}$		$n_{\text{participants}}$	
	Ours	[59]	Ours	[59] <sup>4</sup>
Western	624	1,102	183,828	174,041
non-Western	167	405	38,208	75,068
Reported as "other"	–	–	4,836	n/a
% Western	78.89%	73.13%	82.79%	69.87%

percentage of papers that were published only by Western-affiliated authors, papers that recruited only Western participant samples and papers that reported the participants' countries across conferences. Similarly, we compared those percentages across research topics, participant type, design evaluation (y/n), and attack feasibility evaluation (y/n).

## 4 Results

### 4.1 Western

Of our dataset, 51.89% (371/715) papers explicitly reported the participants' countries. In 15.94% (114/715) of papers, although the authors did not mention the participants' countries, we were able to infer them from the authors' affiliations (e.g., if authors mentioned that participants were recruited locally and all the authors were at institutions in the same country). For the remaining 32.17% (230/715) of papers, we were not able to confidently identify the participants' countries because the authors provided no or unclear descriptions. For example, there were papers (i) that described only that participants were recruited locally or a user study was conducted in person, but not all the authors were in the same country; (ii) that described only that participants were recruited through social media, crowdsourcing, or personal contacts (i.e., recruitment methods that may include people outside of the authors' country, especially for online studies); and (iii) that described only that participants were recruited at a security conference held in a specific country (some attendees may be from outside of the country). We provide a flowchart for coding in participants' countries in Appendix A.

Table 6 shows the number of participant samples and participants among 485 papers for which we were able to identify or infer the participants' countries. In terms of the number of participant samples, a large majority of UPS papers involved Western participant samples (78.89%, 624/791). This is higher than the results in the Linxen study [59] that reviewed studies in the HCI field (73.13%). In terms of the number of participants, 226,872 were involved in UPS user studies. Except for 4,836 participants who were reported as "and other" and whose details were not available, 82.79% (183,828/222,036) of participants were from Western countries. Although our analysis methods are the same as those

<sup>4</sup>This value was not mentioned in the Linxen study, but we compiled it using the artifact data published by the authors.




Figure 1: Temporal changes in participant samples.




Figure 2: Distribution of normalized participant samples.

in the Linxen study [59], please note that this is a conservative estimate, given that we only included papers for which we were able to identify or infer participants’ countries. If researchers recruited non-Westerners, they would probably have reported it because it is an uncommon practice. Thus, we are concerned that the true percentage of the Western participant samples is much higher.

Figure 1 shows the temporal changes in the percentages of Western, non-Western, and U.S. participant samples over the five-year period. Whereas the Linxen study reported that the percentage of non-Western participant samples in CHI papers largely increased (16.31% to 30.24%, 1.85x) between 2016–2020, our results unveiled that the percentage in UPS papers between 2017–2021 slightly decreased (25.00% to 20.77%, 0.83x).

Table 7 shows the top five countries by the number of participant samples, normalized ratio of participant samples by country population, and the number of participants, which enabled us to grasp over- and under-represented countries. Participant samples of UPS papers heavily skewed toward four Western countries: U.S. has been the most frequently studied, followed by Germany, United Kingdom, and Canada.

<sup>5</sup>The number of Japanese participant samples was small ( $N=6$ ), but one user study recruited a very large number of participants ( $N=20,645$ ).

Although these top four countries are the same as those for the CHI papers (the Linxen study), their shares are higher in the UPS papers (63.84%) than in the CHI papers (55.61%). Considering the U.S. population as a percentage of the world population, U.S. participant samples in the UPS field are over-represented by 9.79 times. Figure 2 shows the worldwide distribution of a normalized ratio of participant samples. Participants in the UPS papers between 2017 and 2021 were from only 79 countries, and many countries are completely missing from this map, especially African ones. South America, the Middle East, and Asia also have many countries that are missing or under-represented.

In the following two subsections, indicators of E, I, R, and D are analyzed independently. The percentage of participant samples that are from fully WEIRD (i.e., using AND as the logical operator) countries is presented in the extended version of this paper [40].

## 4.2 Educated

Table 8 indicates the correlation between countries’ normalized ratio of participant samples and countries’ mean years of schooling (see Analysis of Education-(a) in Section 3.2). We found a positive correlation ( $r = .57, p < .001$ ), i.e., most participant samples of UPS papers come from countries with generally highly educated populations.

Next, we analyzed the participants’ education levels on the basis of the detailed descriptions in each paper (see Analysis of Education-(b) in Section 3.2). In our dataset, only 34.69% (248/715) of papers explicitly reported their participants’ education levels. Although 14.13% (101/715) of papers did not report their participants’ education levels, we were able to infer the educational levels of participants because the authors mentioned that they recruited university students. In the remaining 51.19% (366/715) of papers, we were not able to find descriptions of their participants’ education levels. Among the participants recruited in the 248 papers in which the authors explicitly reported their participants’ education levels, 71.38% (79,539/111,436) of participants had a college-level or higher education, 20.89% (23,282/111,436) had a secondary or lower education, and the remaining 7.73% (8,615/111,436) were reported as “other” or “prefer not to answer.” The participants of UPS papers (71.38% of the participants were college-educated) are as highly educated as the participants in CHI papers (69.93% of the participants were college-educated). We believe that the skew toward highly educated participants is related to the recruiting methods (described in Section 4.4): (1) many papers recruited participants within the authors’ institutions including universities, (2) many papers recruited participants through crowdsourcing such as MTurk (e.g., MTurk workers tend to be more educated than the general U.S. population [75]), and (3) there is a certain percentage (14.96%) of papers that recruited experts (who are generally highly educated).



Table 7: Top five countries by the number of participant samples (left), the normalized ratio of participant samples (middle), and the number of participants (right).

Top countries by $n_{samples}$				Top countries by $\psi_s$				Top countries by $n_{participants}$			
Country	$n_{samples}$	%	$\psi_s$	Country	$n_{samples}$	%	$\psi_s$	Country	$n_{participants}$	%	$\psi_p$
U.S.	329	41.59	9.79	Andorra	1	0.13	127.98	U.S.	142,908	62.99	14.83
Germany	76	9.61	8.94	Cyprus	2	0.25	16.33	Japan <sup>5</sup>	21,979	9.69	5.97
UK	67	8.47	9.73	Luxembourg	1	0.13	15.77	Germany	21,857	9.63	8.96
Canada	33	4.17	8.61	Austria	9	1.14	9.85	UK	9,297	4.10	4.71
India	26	3.29	0.19	U.S.	329	41.59	9.79	China	4,994	2.20	0.12

Table 8: Correlations of the normalized ratio of participant samples  $\psi_s$  with each indicator of Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic.

Indicators	$r$	$r$ [59]
Educated (mean schooling year)	.57***	.46***
Industrialized (GDP)	.49***	.50***
Rich (GNI)	.52***	.50***
Democratic (political rights)	.44***	.50***

Significance levels: \* $p < .05$ , \*\* $p < .01$ , \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

### 4.3 Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic

Table 8 shows the results of the correlations between countries' normalized ratios of participant samples and countries' GDP and GNI (see Analysis of Rich-(a) in Section 3.2). We found positive correlations for both GDP ( $r = .49$ ,  $p < .001$ ) and GNI ( $r = .52$ ,  $p < .001$ ), i.e., most participant samples of UPS papers come from industrialized and rich countries.

Next, we analyzed the participants' income on the basis of the detailed descriptions in each paper (see Analysis of Rich-(b) in Section 3.2). However, only 5.59% (40/715) reported the income levels of their participants. As in the Linxen study, we are also not able to directly establish whether the wealth of participants is representative of the general population.

Finally, as shown in Table 8, we found a positive correlation between countries' normalized ratio of participant samples and countries' political rights ( $r = .44$ ,  $p < .001$ ), i.e., most participant samples of UPS papers come from countries with a high degree of freedom in terms of political rights.

### 4.4 Author Diversity and Methodology

Of our dataset, 86.57% (619/715) of the papers consisted exclusively of authors affiliated with institutions in Western countries, which is slightly even more Western-skewed than the Linxen study (83.08%<sup>6</sup>). 9.93% (71/715) of the papers consisted of both Western-affiliated and non-Western affiliated authors, and the remaining 3.50% (25/715) of the papers consisted of only non-Western affiliated authors. The percentage of papers that included authors affiliated with institutions in non-Western countries remained roughly the same: from

<sup>6</sup>This value was not mentioned in the Linxen study, but we compiled it using the artifact data published by the authors.

14.53% (17/117) in 2017 to 13.43% (27/201) in 2021.

Table 9 shows the relationships of authors' affiliation countries, participants' countries, study methods, and recruitment methods. In 80.84% (464/574) of user studies, the authors recruited participants from only the countries of their affiliations. The possible reasons that participants samples are skewed towards Western countries as we presented in Section 4.1 include: (1) the countries of authors' affiliations in UPS papers are skewed toward Western ones and (2) authors tend to recruit participants in the countries of their affiliations.

In most user studies, surveys, interviews, or lab studies are conducted. As shown in Table 9, when authors recruited participants from other countries, they were more likely to conduct surveys than lab studies or interviews. Lab studies and interviews require researchers to communicate immediately/interactively with participants, and thus linguistic barriers are a serious problem. Moreover, geographic barriers also affect the choice of study method. While lab studies and interviews essentially require participants to physically come to a specific location, surveys are conducted online in most cases. Note that interviews can also be conducted online now thanks to video conferencing services.

For recruiting participants in the authors' country, authors tend to recruit within their institutions (which is a university in most user studies). We found crowdsourcing platforms are commonly used for recruiting participants both inside and outside of authors' countries. However, registered workers of commonly used crowdsourcing platforms such as Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and Prolific are skewed toward Westerners. Specifically, MTurk workers are mostly from the U.S., followed by India, whereas Prolific workers are primarily from the UK, followed by the U.S. and other Europe countries [70, 72]. Thus, such popular platforms contribute little to the recruitment of non-Westerners. Specifically, the Indian participant sample was the fifth largest in our dataset thanks to India's high numbers of MTurkers and English speakers as shown in Table 7, but non-Western countries except India are less likely to be studied by Western authors. We were interested in how Western-affiliated authors were reaching non-Western participants (excluding Indians, who are easily accessible via MTurk). In such user studies, the authors advertised their user study on social media, or one of the authors, who belonged to a Western affiliation but had a

Table 9: Author affiliations and study/recruitment method.

Authors	Participants	Study Method		Recruitment Method	
		Survey	Int/Lab	Top1	Top2
Western only	Only authors' countries (72.65%)	35.73%	55.88%	Institution (32.85%)	CS (27.58%)
	Other countries: Western only (7.84%)	57.78%	37.78%	CS (40.00%)	Social media (28.89%)
	Other countries: non-Western included (7.49%)	60.47%	32.56%	Social media (32.56%)	CS (30.23%)
non-Western included	Only authors' countries: Western only (2.79%)	62.50%	31.25%	CS (62.50%)	Institution (12.50%)
	Only authors' countries: non-Western included (5.40%)	25.81%	58.06%	Institution (51.61%)	ML/PC (22.58%)
	Other countries: Western only (1.22%)	85.71%	14.29%	CS (85.71%)	Institution (14.29%)
	Other countries: non-Western included (2.61%)	33.33%	53.33%	City (26.67%), ML/PC (26.67%)	

We show the percentages of user studies rather than that of papers because multiple user studies (e.g., interview and survey) can be conducted in a single paper. We focused on the user studies in which we were able to identify or infer the participants' countries. Figures represent the percentages of user studies within the sections separated by solid lines. "Int/Lab": interview or lab study. "CS": crowdsourcing. "ML/PC": mailing list or personal contacts.

Table 10: Characteristics of conferences.

Conference	% Country Reported	% Attack Feasibility	% W-only Authors	% W-only Samples
S&P field	56.08 (36.86)	18.82	81.96	85.31
HCI field	75.83 (61.25)	0.42	89.58	84.62
UPS-focused	72.73 (59.09)	0.45	88.64	86.25

"S&P field": S&P, SEC, CCS, NDSS, and PETS. "HCI field": CHI and CSCW. "UPS-focused": SOUPS, EuroUSEC, and USEC. "Country Reported" column: the percentage of the papers in which we were able to identify or infer the participants' countries (the figures in parentheses indicate the papers in which we were able to identify them).

non-Western background, was in charge of recruitment in the city or through the author's social network [7, 8].

#### 4.5 Differences among Conferences

Table 10 shows the characteristics of authors and participant samples by conferences. Both authors' affiliations and participants were skewed toward Westerners at every conference. The percentages of the papers in which the authors explicitly reported their participants' countries are lower in S&P, SEC, CCS, NDSS, and PETS than in HCI conferences (CHI and CSCW) and UPS-focused conferences (SOUPS, EuroUSEC, and USEC). Those five conferences (S&P, SEC, CCS, NDSS, and PETS) have relatively higher percentages of the papers in which the authors recruited participants only for demonstrating the feasibility of their proposed attack.

#### 4.6 Research Topics and Methodology

Table 11 shows the percentages of user studies that recruited only Western samples by participant type and study objectives. In terms of participant type (i.e., non-experts or experts), we found that the percentages of user studies that recruited only Western samples are higher among the user studies that focused on non-experts than among the user studies that focused on experts. This result was influenced by the fact that (1) more than 40% (40.48%) of user studies that focused on experts recruited "developers," and (2) for recruiting developers, Western-affiliated authors succeeded in accessing non-Western developers by using Freelancer.com (on which

Table 11: Differences among participant type and study objectives.

	% Studies	% Country Reported	% W-only Samples
Participants – Non-experts	85.04	70.67 (53.07)	85.38
Participants – Experts	14.96	53.97 (38.10)	77.94
Design evaluation – Yes	39.55	68.47 (41.44)	83.78
Design evaluation – No	60.45	67.98 (56.97)	84.97
Attack feasibility – Yes	7.01	44.07 (15.25)	92.31
Attack feasibility – No	92.99	69.99 (53.51)	84.12

We show the percentages of user studies rather than those of papers because authors can conduct multiple user studies in a single paper (e.g., researchers recruit non-experts for the first study and experts for the second study).

Table 12: Differences among research topics.

Topic	% Papers	% Country Reported	% W-only Samples
Access control and privacy preference	31.47	75.11 (63.56)	90.53
Authentication	17.34	65.32 (33.06)	82.72
Vulnerability, malware, and incident response	13.43	56.25 (41.67)	77.78
Overall	11.33	77.78 (67.90)	85.71
Privacy-enhancing technologies	9.79	60.00 (45.71)	85.71
Social engineering	6.29	75.56 (64.44)	79.41
Privacy abuse	5.45	76.92 (66.67)	80.00
Other	4.90	34.29 (14.29)	91.67

We show the percentages of papers rather than those of user studies because research topics in a single paper can be classified into one code, even if the paper conducted multiple user studies.

many non-Western developers are registered) and developer contacts published on source code repositories (e.g., GitHub), and app stores (e.g., Google's Play Store). However, if the user studies that recruited developers are excluded, the participants of the remaining user studies (e.g., user studies that recruited system/network administrators and security experts) skewed heavily towards Western participant samples (88.57%).

When comparing the user studies that conducted design evaluation (e.g., evaluated usability of the proposed prototype or effectiveness of the proposed nudges for security) with the user studies that did not conduct design evaluation, we found no difference in the degree of skewness toward Western

participant samples.

The user studies conducted only for demonstrating the feasibility of the proposed attack account for 7.01% (59/842). Regarding such user studies, we found that (1) authors were less likely to report participants' countries explicitly (15.25%), and (2) authors were likely to recruit only Western samples (92.31%). The heavy Western skew of participant samples among attack-feasibility studies can be explained by the following fact: MTurk and lab studies, which are prone to demographic skew (e.g., the workers in MTurk are mostly from the U.S., and university researchers in Western countries are likely to recruit students at their universities for a lab study), were often used for demonstrating the feasibility of attacks. We further analyzed the studies of attack feasibility (56 papers including 59 user studies) and confirmed that attack feasibility can be influenced by participant demographics in the majority of studies (54.24%, 32/59). Two types of attack made up the majority: (i) targeting automatic speech recognition (15.25%, 9/59) and (ii) typing/keystroke inference (13.56%, 8/59). Because most such studies implicitly leveraged English audio or input in English, the attack feasibility may vary depending on the language used by the participants. For example, participants with low English proficiency may have difficulty recognizing malicious English audio. Additionally, for example, the keyboard layout and character input/conversion method used in each linguistic area can affect the feasibility of typing/keystroke inference. Therefore, authors who demonstrate attack feasibility should also properly report participants' demographic information such as their country of residence and language proficiency.

Table 12 shows the percentages of papers that recruited only Western participant samples by research topics. In UPS, "access control and privacy preference" was most frequently studied, followed by "authentication," "vulnerability, malware, and incident response," and "overall." The Western skew is pervasive in every topic. The degree of Western skew is relatively higher in "access control and privacy preference" and "other." On the other hand, in three research topics, the degree of Western skew is relatively lower: (i) for "vulnerability, malware, and incident response," researchers often recruited developers, and as mentioned above, researchers succeeded in accessing non-Western developers; (ii) regarding "social engineering", several researchers realized the importance of investigating the phishing susceptibility of non-Westerners (e.g., emerging market citizens [74] and non-native English speakers [41]); and (iii) regarding "privacy abuse," researchers often focus on privacy issues of minorities and demographic groups facing difficulties, one of which is non-Westerners (e.g., women in non-Western countries facing gender gaps [79]).

## 5 Discussion

Our literature-review results demonstrated that UPS has fewer non-Western participant samples than HCI and that the percentage of non-WEIRD participant samples has been slightly decreasing. This implies that more significant efforts should be made in UPS to address this geographic diversity issue. On the basis of our findings, we provide recommendations for further exploring UPS research with geographically diversified populations.

### 5.1 Summary of Main Findings

The main findings of our review and analysis as follows:

- Only 51.89% of UPS papers explicitly reported the participants' countries. In non-HCI and non-UPS-focused conferences, authors were less likely to report them. In papers from which we were able to identify or infer them, 78.89% of the participant samples were Western. The Western skew increased between 2017 and 2021. (RQ1, Sections 4.1 and 4.5)
- The participant samples tended to come from countries that were considered educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic on the basis of national statistics. The percentages of papers explicitly reporting their participants' education and/or income levels were not high. (RQ1, Sections 4.2 and 4.3)
- Most of the UPS papers (86.57%) exclusively comprised authors affiliated with institutions in Western countries. The authors tended to recruit participants from the countries of their affiliations. When authors recruited participants from other countries, they were more likely to conduct surveys than lab studies or interviews due to linguistic and geographic barriers. (RQ2, Section 4.4)
- Authors with a non-Western background, social media, and some recruitment methods for developers (e.g., source code repositories and app stores) contribute to the recruitment of non-Westerners. On the other hand, studies on experts excluding developers and studies for demonstrating attack feasibility were skewed heavily toward Western participant samples. (RQ2, Sections 4.4 and 4.6)

### 5.2 Replications for Non-WEIRD Populations

A replication study can be used to examine the generalizability of the findings of an existing study to a new population or to evaluate the robustness of the findings of an existing study when a new study design is used. Although several existing UPS papers have already shown that regional and cultural differences affect the results [43, 58, 81], we found that most UPS papers have examined only WEIRD countries

and not considered/discussed whether geographic diversity affects the results. Therefore, researchers should explore different insights from geographically diversified populations while pursuing generalizable results. Recognizing population differences is a promising path for addressing the issues faced by marginalized populations.

Replication studies are recognized to be important and are recommended by conferences dedicated to UPS, for example, SOUPS emphasizes their importance in the Call for Paper (CFP) [2], and USEC and EuroUSEC include them in their CFP topics. Seven replication papers are in our dataset [13, 16, 17, 19, 26, 82, 93]<sup>7</sup>. However, the current replication studies did not sufficiently focus on non-WEIRD populations; some papers conducted a cross-cultural replication, but only in Western countries. Replication with an awareness of geographic diversity including non-WEIRD populations should be actively pursued and clearly recommended in the CFP.

The program committee (PC) needs to understand regional, cultural, and institutional differences arising from the geographic diversity to properly evaluate the value of research on non-WEIRD participants and replication studies for non-WEIRD participants. For this purpose, Western PC members alone may be insufficient to cover a broad knowledge base. In other words, more diversity of PC members is required. We additionally analyzed the PC diversity in UPS and found that the PC members also largely skewed towards researchers affiliated with institutions in Western countries: PC members were mostly Western-affiliated researchers (89.44%, 127/142) at UPS-focused conferences (SOUPS, USEC, and EuroUSEC) and research tracks (“Privacy and Security” subcommittee in CHI, “Security Usability and Measurement” track in CCS) in 2021. Soneji et al. shed light on the challenges of the review process by conducting interviews with PC members at the top-tier security conferences [83]. Although they mentioned the issue of PC members’ expertise, they did not discuss the impact of the lack of geographic diversity of PC members. This implies that the Western skew of PC members is not currently well recognized as a major problem in top-tier security conferences. UPS-related conferences should be open for PC nominations and select PC members in accordance with geographic diversity. In addition, a complementary approach to enrich PC diversity is actively reaching out to research groups that study non-Western (non-WEIRD) populations and have expertise in cross-cultural/regional research. As a first step, such research groups need not necessarily have a background in non-WEIRD countries as long as they have expertise in cross-cultural/regional research and sufficient cultural knowledge.

<sup>7</sup>In our dataset, we identified papers with “Replication:” in the title as replication papers. SOUPS recommends this title naming rule.

### 5.3 Reproducibility and Participant Protection

Papers with low reproducibility may hinder replication studies. Through our review, we identified many papers with reproducibility problems, i.e., lacking basic demographic information of participants of a user study. For example, the percentage of papers for which we were able to identify the participants’ countries was not sufficiently high (Section 4.1), nor was the percentage of papers that described the participant’s education or income level (Sections 4.2 and 4.3). Moreover, most attack-feasibility studies did not report participant demographics, which is vital because many attacks used English audio or input, highlighting the impact of language proficiency (Section 4.6). Our recommendation that researchers appropriately report participant demographics can be helpful for researchers who conduct replication studies to analyze generalizability and population differences. Note that all participant demographics reported do not necessarily have to be linked to the study results one by one because such brute-force linking entails conducting numerous statistical tests to achieve the desired  $p$ -value and creates misleading interpretations (called  $p$ -hacking).

How and where participant demographic information was described were fragmented in many papers, so researchers (readers of these papers) may spend a lot of time searching for the relevant descriptions. Moreover, many papers provided some information but not clear and insufficient descriptions (please see frequent examples in Section 4.1). A straightforward approach for researchers to recognize the reporting of participant demographics is using a checklist or uniform format. For example, NeurIPS, one of the top AI conferences, has introduced a checklist for reproducibility of AI research [1]. In addition, Distler et al. suggested a self-check format for UPS researchers to provide a clear understanding of risk representation of user studies [30]. However, for recognizing and reporting participant demographics, such an approach needs a more careful discussion in the research community because it may (i) simplify sensitive issues in recognizing participant demographics or (ii) create a threat to the safety of at-risk populations. In the first case, researchers require careful consideration when recognizing certain demographics, e.g., asking transgender people about their recognized gender or asking people living in areas that cannot be clearly defined because of conflict zones or territorial disputes about their countries of residence. To avoid these issues, researchers should provide sufficient options for a broad range of individual expressions of identity. In the second case, researchers require measures to protect the physical/digital safety of at-risk populations (e.g., political activists and survivors of intimate partner abuse/violence). Bellini et al. summarized the practices of protecting at-risk populations’ privacy and physical/digital safety against reidentification before, during, or after the research; representative practices include omitting details of research procedures and demographic information [15, 62]. Therefore,

the UPS community also needs to understand the reasons for not clarifying information associated with participants' identities when participants belong to at-risk populations.

## 5.4 Geographic Barriers

The skew toward Western participant samples in the UPS papers is related to the facts that the majority of authors are affiliated with institutions in Western countries and that authors tend to recruit participants from the countries of their affiliations as mentioned in Section 4.4. Geographic barriers may cause researchers to find the most *convenient sample* (e.g., students of the local university who are easy for university researchers to recruit). Online methods can be used as a promising approach to overcome geographic barriers. Our results demonstrated that crowdsourcing is the common method to recruit participants outside of authors' countries. However, note that there is also a skew in the participant pool in popular crowdsourcing platforms. Although crowdsourcing platforms such as MTurk, Prolific, and Clickworker are often used to recruit participants as end users, these platforms basically had Western workers, and researchers cannot reach people living in outside of the West, e.g., Asian countries as well as the Global South. Thus, to overcome the aforementioned geographic barriers of participant recruitment, researchers should consider using local (regional) crowdsourcing platforms used in the country of the target population. On the other hand, online methods have a major weakness: only people with Internet access and some familiarity with information technology can participate. This is a more serious problem in the Global South. As a complementary solution, we recommend improving the researcher diversity and collaboration with local researchers, as mentioned in Section 5.5.

Recruiting experts through crowdsourcing is generally more difficult than recruiting non-experts (end users). This is because most workers registered for crowdsourcing are non-experts. Even in this situation, software developers are often recruited online, e.g., Freelancer.com (a crowdsourcing platform for freelance developers), contact lists on source code repositories (e.g., GitHub), and app stores (e.g., Google's Play Store) as mentioned in Section 4.6. Unfortunately, however, the current methods of recruiting software developers have been reported to have several contractual and methodological issues. Danilova et al., whose study was published in 2021, admitted that Freelancer.com rejected their academic tasks of a user study for software developers [28]. This means a mismatch between researchers' "academic" objective and the platform's "business" objective. Furthermore, while some researchers started recruiting software developers by harvesting developers' emails from source code repositories, app stores, and social media, Tahaei et al. pointed out that there is no support for doing large-scale recruitment by harvesting those platforms (at least on GitHub, this harvesting is against the terms of service and privacy policy) [88]. In addition,

Danilova et al. and Tahaei et al. pointed out the problem that online recruitment often includes software developers who do not have sufficient development skills to participate in the user study, and they evaluated screening methods to verify whether participants have sufficient development skills [25, 27, 88].

The majority of studies that recruited experts through online methods (e.g., crowdsourcing, source code repositories, app stores, and social media) focused on software developers. However, experts studied in UPS are more diverse and are not limited to software developers, but include system/network administrators, SOC analysts, security experts, and so on. Since such expert populations are hard to find in the current participant pool of crowdsourcing platforms, recruitment methods tend to rely on personal contacts. Although there is currently no groundbreaking method for recruiting experts other than software developers, a platform is desired that can be used without geographical or linguistic barriers and designed with incentives to attract professionals.

## 5.5 Linguistic Barriers

Whereas the online research mentioned in the previous section can (partially) resolve geographic barriers to recruiting, there are also linguistic barriers to studying non-WERID populations. We suggest approaches to reduce the linguistic barriers in UPS research include (1) enriching the geographic diversity of authors and (2) empowering non-Western researchers.

Although English is used as a national language in many countries, non-native English speakers account for the majority of the world's population, and there are many countries where English proficiency is not sufficiently high [31]. Linguistic barriers resulting from the use of different languages in various countries significantly impact the localization of research within a single linguistic community (Section 4.4). Linguistic barriers become apparent following two cases: when (1) participants and researchers and (2) documents and researchers have different native languages. For the first case of participants and researchers, especially in user studies that require immediate communication, the researchers have difficulty correctly communicating the intention of the study to the participants and to understanding the intended meanings of their responses. In fact, the results in Section 4.4 suggested that authors were more likely to conduct surveys than lab studies or interviews when they recruited participants from other countries. Dell et al. evaluated the difference in participants' response bias due to demand characteristics between a local interviewer and a foreign researcher with a translator [29]. Their results demonstrated that the bias towards the artifact of the foreign researcher was greater than that of the local interviewer. Therefore, the difficulty in conducting interviews with people speaking other languages can be a serious problem in human factor research including UPS. For the second case of documents and researchers, although understanding online public advice, policies (e.g., privacy

policies), and user posts on social media<sup>8</sup> is important work in the UPS field, such documents written in foreign languages are difficult for researchers to correctly analyze. Redmiles et al. suggested the key challenge in prioritizing security and privacy advice through their large-scale analysis of the advice on the Web [76], while the obtained results were inherently constrained to English-language advice owing to the advice collected from MTurkers, mainly consisting of workers from English-speaking countries, including the U.S. In their analysis of online phishing advice, Althobaiti et al. explicitly stated the linguistic limitation; they restricted their investigation to webpages from limited countries to avoid heavy reliance on automated translation [11]. When English-speaking researchers conduct a study in a non-English-speaking country, they should preferably work with a researcher who is a native speaker of the language of that country. From the viewpoint of studies in non-English speaking countries, especially in the Global South, researchers may incur additional costs to translate the participants' responses or documents into the publication language (i.e., English). To reduce these linguistic barriers, the UPS research community should facilitate cross-national authorship and consider linguistic support, including cost sharing.

The diversification of conference locations is expected to not only facilitate collaboration among researchers by increasing the number of diverse conference attendees [63] but also foster and strengthen local (e.g., non-Western) researchers by stimulating local research communities and technology transfers. In UPS, however, most conferences have been held in limited locations. S&P, NDSS, and SOUPS have never been held outside the U.S., USENIX Security has been held mostly in the U.S. and once in Canada, and CCS has been held almost exclusively in the U.S. and Europe (it was held in South Korea only in 2021).

## 5.6 Research Justice Considerations

Research justice is a concept and method that articulates and ensures fairness, equity, and ethical considerations in research, particularly in community-based collaborations, including non-WEIRD populations. It addresses power imbalances, promotes inclusivity, and respects marginalized populations' or individuals' rights and interests. Haelewaters et al. criticized "helicopter research," where Global North (i.e., richer globalized countries such as Western countries) researchers make roundtrips to the Global South to conduct their research with little to no involvement of local collaborators, highlighting it as a prime example of harming research justice [39]. Haelewaters et al. proposed rules for avoiding helicopter research for better, collaborative, and non-colonial science between the Global North and the Global South. The rules mainly include equal and synergistic collaborations with local re-

<sup>8</sup>The papers that analyzed only online public data without a user study were out of the scope of our literature review.

searchers/collaborators/communities, being ethical and fair about publications and authorship, recognizing differences in work culture, and using local infrastructure. These rules are also related to our suggestions: improving researcher diversity and collaboration with local researchers (Sections 5.4 and 5.5), fostering and strengthening local researchers by stimulating local research communities and technology transfers (Section 5.5), increasing the diversity among PC members with knowledge of non-WEIRD societies/populations (Section 5.2), and using local crowdsourcing platforms (Section 5.4). When facilitating research on non-WEIRD societies/populations, the UPS community needs to embrace Haelewaters et al.'s rules as the principles of research.

## 5.7 Future Research

In Section 2.2, we presented how WEIRD skew would harm UPS research. Here, we discuss the promising areas of future research in USP, highlighting the undisclosed facts and unsolved challenges based on our literature reviews.

**WEIRD perspective.** Our results demonstrated that the participant samples were skewed toward Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (EIRD) countries as well as Western. With respect to "Western," we found Western skew in UPS papers on any topic. Among these papers, participant samples that investigated experts (excluding developers) were particularly skewed toward Westerners. While the papers that focused on developers investigated non-Western participant samples to some extent as mentioned in Section 4.6, experts are more diverse, including system/network administrators, SOC analysts, and CSIRT engineers. In software development, organizational structures varied across countries and generated different organizational constraints [51]. This fact implies that organizational and cultural issues are a promising direction to study various types of experts in non-Western countries. With respect to "Educated," studying only educated countries is not sufficient because Global South countries face several challenges in the development of cybersecurity education. Cybersecurity education in the Global South is generally elementary [21], and individual participants' education level was found to be a significant factor influencing participants' security and privacy behaviors in general [71, 96, 102]. Researchers should clarify what kind of security and privacy education and advice people in the Global South are receiving and make efforts to narrow the digital divide regarding security and privacy education between the Global South and Global North. With respect to "Industrialized" and "Rich," some studies have already focused on the security and privacy concerns of people in the Global South, where people have limited IT resources, e.g., concerns regarding device sharing, and developed support technology for them [9, 14, 78]. Researchers should investigate whether support technology is actionable in other countries and regions with lower levels of industrialization and wealth. With respect to "Democratic,"

some studies indicated that people in countries with little political freedom perceive their privacy differently than people in other countries [100]. This democratic difference may affect the study result of the topic of “access control and privacy preferences”: participant samples of this topic were particularly skewed toward Westerners as mentioned in Section 4.6. When conducting a user study with potential participants in politically repressive regimes, researchers should consider and overcome difficulties in recruiting methods and study methods, as well as the ethical issue of potentially putting participants at risk due to their criticism of the government. The research practices for protecting such at-risk participants are introduced in Section 5.3.

**Design evaluation.** Although some cross-cultural comparisons of user perceptions, concerns, and practices have been conducted in the UPS field, those of design evaluation have been insufficiently investigated. In the HCI and psychology fields, user preferences on interface design and framing are known to vary across countries [50, 60, 65]; therefore, more differences across countries in the usability of security/privacy interfaces and the effectiveness of framing, such as text and icons on the notification that encourage users to adopt a security technology, should be identified to design interfaces tailored to each country’s users.

**More diverse non-WEIRD societies/populations.** Broadening geographic diversity is a vital factor in fostering UPS growth; nevertheless, there is a pitfall in the measure of the percentage of non-Western participant samples. If more papers studied India and China, which have already been studied to some extent (the fifth and sixth highest number of participant samples, respectively), the percentage of non-Western participant samples would increase; however, there are still many non-Western countries in Africa, South America, and Asia that have not been studied in the last five years (please see Section 4.1). The UPS research community should strive to understand more diverse countries.

## 5.8 Limitations

**Measurement errors.** While some measurement errors are inevitable in manual analysis, we have tried to make our literature-review procedure as clear as possible to ensure coding precision. Our dataset will be available to researchers upon request to improve reproducibility and facilitate replications of our study.

**Conference coverage.** Our dataset (ten conferences,  $N=715$ ) is much larger than the recent representative literature-review papers in UPS (five conferences,  $N=284$  in [30]). Our dataset covers top-tier and competitive conferences in which UPS papers are presented and that highly influence many researchers and societies globally. Understanding the WEIRD skew of such conferences would be a reasonable first step. Note that papers concerning non-WEIRD countries are also presented at region-focused conferences (e.g., AfriCHI), which are not

included in our dataset.

**Exclusion of papers that analyzed online public data.** We focused on the UPS papers in which the authors recruited participants for user studies, and we did not focus on the UPS papers in which the authors analyzed online public data. We are concerned that such UPS papers are also skewed towards Western societies, i.e., researchers investigated design and policies implemented on Western online services and online content posted by Western users.

**Limitation of WEIRD framework.** Most indicators of the WEIRD framework<sup>9</sup> assume representative population demographics in each country. However, in general, individuals within the same country are diverse. For example, even if the participants are from poor countries, they may be personally wealthy. Moreover, online methods can easily recruit people with Internet access and some familiarity with information technology, as mentioned in Section 5.4. In addition, low-income people in Western countries remain valuable for the UPS community. However, we were unable to quantify the papers on such people because few papers reported their participants’ income levels.

**Other indicators of the diversity dimensions.** The five indicators of WEIRD are just a subset of the diversity dimensions that are considered in human factor research [44]. UPS researchers should consider various kinds of diversities beyond WEIRD. For example, Hofstede’s cultural dimensions framework includes promising indicators. We additionally analyzed our dataset in terms of that framework (please see Appendix B). Future research is needed to comprehensively capture the diversities that influence UPS research.

## 6 Conclusion

The goal of this study was to understand the geographic diversity of recruited participants in usable privacy and security (UPS) and the characteristics of the methodologies and research topics. Throughout our comprehensive literature review of 715 UPS papers, we unveiled that UPS papers are highly skewed towards Western participant samples (78.89%). Unfortunately, this skew is higher than that in human-computer interaction (HCI; 73.13%). Moreover, the percentage of non-Western participant samples in UPS papers between 2017–2021 decreased (25.00% to 20.77%, 0.83x). This implies that more significant efforts should be made in UPS to address this geographic diversity issue. We provided the recommendations for making UPS research less WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic): facilitating replications, addressing geographic and linguistic issues of study and recruiting methods, and setting future research topics. We hope that our findings and recommendations encourage the growing UPS community to further diversify and become more inclusive.

<sup>9</sup>Indicators of E and I use both national averages and individual figures.

## Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Sebastian Linxen, the author of the original study (the Linxen study) [59], for the advice on our replication efforts. We also thank the anonymous reviewers and shepherd for their insightful and invaluable feedback.

## References

- [1] NeurIPS 2021. Paper checklist guidelines. <https://neurips.cc/Conferences/2021/PaperInformation/PaperChecklist>, (accessed August 2, 2022).
- [2] SOUPS 2022. Call for papers. <https://www.usenix.org/conference/soups2022/call-for-papers>, (accessed August 2, 2022).
- [3] Ruba Abu-Salma, M. Angela Sasse, Joseph Bonneau, Anastasia Danilova, Alena Naiakshina, and Matthew Smith. Obstacles to the adoption of secure communication tools. In *Proceedings of the 38th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy*, 2017.
- [4] Mark S. Ackerman. The intellectual challenge of CSCW: The gap between social requirements and technical feasibility. *Hum.-Comput. Interact.*, 15(2):179–203, 2000.
- [5] Alessandro Acquisti, Idris Adjerid, Rebecca Balebako, Laura Brandimarte, Lorrie Faith Cranor, Saranga Komanduri, Pedro Giovanni Leon, Norman Sadeh, Florian Schaub, Manya Sleeper, Yang Wang, and Shomir Wilson. Nudges for privacy and security: Understanding and assisting users’ choices online. *ACM Computing Surveys*, 50(3):1–41, 2017.
- [6] Anne Adams and Martina Angela Sasse. Users are not the enemy. *Commun. ACM*, 42(12):40–46, 1999.
- [7] Syed Ishtiaque Ahmed, Md Romael Haque, Jay Chen, and Nicola Dell. Digital privacy challenges with shared mobile phone use in Bangladesh. *Human-Computer Interaction*, 1(CSCW):1–20, 2017.
- [8] Syed Ishtiaque Ahmed, Md Romael Haque, Shion Guha, Md Rashidujjaman Rifat, and Nicola Dell. Privacy, security, and surveillance in the Global South: A study of biometric mobile SIM registration in Bangladesh. In *Proceedings of the 2017 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems*, 2017.
- [9] Syed Ishtiaque Ahmed, Md Romael Haque, Irtaza Haider, Jay Chen, and Nicola Dell. “Everyone has some personal stuff”: Designing to support digital privacy with shared mobile phone use in Bangladesh. In *Proceedings of the 2019 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems*, 2019.
- [10] Elham Al Qahtani, Yousra Javed, Heather Lipford, and Mohamed Shehab. Do women in conservative societies (not) follow smartphone security advice? A case study of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. In *Proceedings of the 5th European Workshop on Usable Security*, 2020.
- [11] Kholoud Althobaiti, Ghaidaa Rummani, and Kami Vaniea. A review of human-and computer-facing URL phishing features. In *Proceedings of the 4th European Workshop on Usable Security*, 2019.
- [12] Jeffrey J. Arnett. The neglected 95%: Why American psychology needs to become less American. *American Psychologist*, 63(7):602–614, 2008.
- [13] Khadija Baig, Elisa Kazan, Kalpana Hundlani, Sana Maqsood, and Sonia Chiasson. Replication: Effects of media on the mental models of technical users. In *Proceedings of the 17th Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security*, 2021.
- [14] Khaled Baqer, Ross Anderson, Jeunese Adrienne Payne, Lorna Mutegei, and Joseph Sevilla. Digitally: Piloting offline payments for phones. In *Proceedings of the 13th Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security*, 2017.
- [15] Rosanna Bellini, Emily Tseng, Noel Warford, Tara Matthews Alaa Daffalla, Sunny Consolvo, Jill Palzkill Woelfer, Patrick Gage Kelley, Michelle L. Mazurek, Dana Cuomo, Nicola Dell, and Thomas Ristenpart. SoK: Safer digital-safety research involving at-risk users. *arXiv: 2309.00735*, 2023.
- [16] Karoline Busse, Julia Schäfer, and Matthew Smith. Replication: No one can hack my mind revisiting a study on expert and non-expert security practices and advice. In *Proceedings of the 15th Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security*, 2019.
- [17] Karoline Busse, Dominik Wermke, Sabrina Amft, Sascha Fahl, Emanuel von Zezschwitz, and Matthew Smith. Replication: Do we snooze if we can’t lose? Modelling risk with incentives in habituation user studies. In *Proceedings of the 2019 Workshop on Usable Security*, 2019.
- [18] Marcus A. Butavicius, Kathryn Parsons, Malcolm R. Pattinson, Agata McCormac, Dragana Calic, and Meredith Lillie. Understanding susceptibility to phishing emails: Assessing the impact of individual differences and culture. In *Proceedings of the 11th International Symposium on Human Aspects of Information Security & Assurance*, 2017.
- [19] Casey Canfield, Alex Davis, Baruch Fischhoff, Alain Forget, Sarah Pearman, and Jeremy Thomas. Replication: Challenges in using data logs to validate phishing detection ability metrics. In *Proceedings of the 13th Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security*, 2017.
- [20] Weicheng Cao, Chunqiu Xia, Sai Teja Peddinti, David Lie, Nina Taft, and Lisa M Austin. A large scale study of user behavior, expectations and engagement with Android permissions. In *Proceedings of the 30th USENIX Security Symposium*, 2021.
- [21] Frankie E. Catota, M. Granger Morgan, and Douglas C. Sicker. Cybersecurity education in a developing nation: The ecuadorian environment. *Journal of Cybersecurity*, 5(1), 2019.
- [22] Giacomo Chiozza. Is there a clash of civilizations? Evidence from patterns of international conflict involvement, 1946-97. *Journal of Peace Research*, 39(6):711–734, 2002.
- [23] Sophie Cockcroft and Saphira Rekker. The relationship between culture and information privacy policy. *Electronic Markets*, 26(1):55–72, 2016.
- [24] comferte AG. 17 countries with GDPR-like data privacy laws. <https://insights.comferte.com/countries-with-gdpr-like-data-privacy-laws>, (accessed June 2, 2023).
- [25] Anastasia Danilova, Stefan Horstmann, Matthew Smith, and Alena Naiakshina. Testing time limits in screener questions for online surveys with programmers. In *Proceedings of the 44th International Conference on Software Engineering*, 2022.
- [26] Anastasia Danilova, Alena Naiakshina, Johanna Deuter, and Matthew Smith. Replication: On the ecological validity of online security developer studies: Exploring deception in a password-storage study with freelancers. In *Proceedings of the 16th Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security*, 2020.
- [27] Anastasia Danilova, Alena Naiakshina, Stefan Horstmann, and Matthew Smith. Do you really code? Designing and evaluating screening questions for online surveys with programmers. In *Proceedings of the 43rd International Conference on Software Engineering*, 2021.
- [28] Anastasia Danilova, Alena Naiakshina, Anna Rasgauski, and Matthew Smith. Code reviewing as methodology for online security studies with developers - A case study with freelancers on password storage. In *Proceedings of the 17th Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security*, 2021.
- [29] Nicola Dell, Vidya Vaidyanathan, Indrani Medhi, Edward Cutrell, and William Thies. “Yours is better!”: Participant response bias in HCI. In *Proceedings of the 2012 SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems*, 2012.



- [30] Verena Distler, Matthias Fassl, Hana Habib, Katharina Krombholz, Gabriele Lenzini, Carine Lallemand, Lorrie Faith Cranor, and Vincent Koenig. A systematic literature review of empirical methods and risk representation in usable privacy and security research. *ACM Transactions on Computer-Human Interaction*, 28(6):1–50, 2021.
- [31] EF Education First. EF english proficiency index. <https://www.ef.com/wwen/epi/>, (accessed August 12, 2022).
- [32] Joseph L. Fleiss, Bruce Levin, and Myunghee Cho Paik. The measurement of interrater agreement. *Statistical methods for rates and proportions*, 2(212-236):22–23, 1981.
- [33] Anjuli Franz, Verena Zimmermann, Gregor Albrecht, Katrin Hartwig, Christian Reuter, Alexander Benlian, and Joachim Vogt. SoK: Still plenty of phish in the sea – A taxonomy of user-oriented phishing interventions and avenues for future research. In *Proceedings of the 17th Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security*, 2021.
- [34] George Fujii, Andrew Szarejko, and Diane Labrosse. The clash of civilizations in the IR classroom. <https://networks.h-net.org/node/28443/discussions/5273269/h-diploissf-teaching-roundtable-11-6-clash-civilizations-ir>, (accessed November 27, 2022).
- [35] Simson Garfinkel and Heather Richter Lipford. Usable security: History, themes, and challenges. *Synthesis Lectures on Information Security, Privacy, and Trust*, 5(2):1–124, 2014.
- [36] The World Bank Group. GDP per capita, PPP (current international \$) (2020). <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD>.
- [37] The World Bank Group. GNI per capita, PPP (current international \$) (2020). <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.AP.PP.CD>.
- [38] Guofei Gu. Computer security conference ranking and statistic. [https://people.engr.tamu.edu/guofei/sec\\_conf\\_stat.htm](https://people.engr.tamu.edu/guofei/sec_conf_stat.htm), (accessed August 18, 2022).
- [39] Danny Haelewaters, Tina A. Hofmann, and Adriana L. Romero-Olivares. Ten simple rules for Global North researchers to stop perpetuating helicopter research in the Global South. *PLoS Computational Biology*, 17(8), 2021.
- [40] Ayako A. Hasegawa, Daisuke Inoue, and Mitsuaki Akiyama. How weird is usable privacy and security research? (extended version). *arXiv: 2305.05004*, 2023.
- [41] Ayako A. Hasegawa, Naomi Yamashita, Mitsuaki Akiyama, and Tatsuya Mori. Why they ignore English emails: The challenges of non-Native speakers in identifying phishing emails. In *Proceedings of the 17th Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security*, 2021.
- [42] Joseph Henrich, Steven J. Heine, and Ara Norenzayan. The weirdest people in the world? *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 33(2-3):61–83, 2010.
- [43] Franziska Herbert, Steffen Becker, Leonie Schaewitz, Jonas Hielscher, Marvin Kowalewski, Angela Sasse, Yasemin Acar, and Markus Dürmuth. A world full of privacy and security (mis)conceptions? Findings of a representative survey in 12 countries. In *Proceedings of the 2023 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems*, 2023.
- [44] Julia Himmelsbach, Stephanie Schwarz, Cornelia Gerdenitsch, Beatrix Wais-Zechmann, Jan Bobeth, and Manfred Tscheligi. Do we care about diversity in human computer interaction: A comprehensive content analysis on diversity dimensions in research. In *Proceedings of the 2019 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems*, 2019.
- [45] Geert Hofstede. Dimensionalizing cultures: The Hofstede model in context. *Online readings in psychology and culture*, 2(1):2307–0919, 2011.
- [46] Freedom House. Freedom in the world (2020). <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world>.
- [47] Samuel P. Huntington. *The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order*. Simon & Schuster, 2011.
- [48] Enzuzo Inc. Data privacy laws in 2023: The rules & regulations you need to know. <https://www.enzuzo.com/blog/data-privacy-laws>, (accessed June 2, 2023).
- [49] Hofstede Insights. Country comparison tool. <https://www.hofstede-insights.com/>, (accessed August 2, 2022).
- [50] Jainaba Jagne and Serengul Smith. Cross-cultural interface design strategy. *Universal Access in the Information Society*, 5:299–305, 2006.
- [51] Fumihiko Kanei, Ayako Akiyama Hasegawa, Eitaro Shioji, and Mitsuaki Akiyama. A cross-role and bi-national analysis on security efforts and constraints of software development projects. In *Proceedings of the 37th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference*, 2021.
- [52] Mannat Kaur, Michel van Eeten, Marijn Janssen, Kevin Borgolte, and Tobias Fiebig. Human factors in security research: Lessons learned from 2008-2018. *arXiv:2103.13287*, 2021.
- [53] Nir Kshetri. Cybercrime and cybersecurity in Africa. *Journal of Global Information Technology Management*, 22(2):77–81, 2019.
- [54] Pedro Giovanni Leon, Blase Ur, Yang Wang, Manya Sleeper, Rebecca Balebako, Richard Shay, Lujo Bauer, Mihai Christodorescu, and Lorrie Faith Cranor. What matters to users? Factors that affect users’ willingness to share information with online advertisers. In *Proceedings of the 9th symposium on usable privacy and security*, 2013.
- [55] Philipp Lepenies. *The power of a single number: A political history of GDP*. Columbia University Press, 2016.
- [56] Ling Li, Wu He, Li Xu, Ivan Ash, Mohd Anwar, and Xiaohong Yuan. Investigating the impact of cybersecurity policy awareness on employees’ cybersecurity behavior. *International Journal of Information Management*, 45:13–24, 2019.
- [57] Yao Li, Reza Ghaiumy Anaraky, and Bart Knijnenburg. How not to measure social network privacy: A cross-country investigation. *Human-Computer Interaction*, 5(CSCW):1–32, 2021.
- [58] Yao Li, Alfred Kobsa, Bart P. Knijnenburg, and M-H Carolyn Nguyen. Cross-cultural privacy prediction. In *Proceedings of the 17th Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium, PETS’17*, 2017.
- [59] Sebastian Linxen, Christian Sturm, Florian Brühlmann, Vincent Cassau, Klaus Opwis, and Katharina Reinecke. How WEIRD is CHI? In *Proceedings of the 2021 CHI conference on human factors in computing systems*, 2021.
- [60] Aaron Marcus and Emilie West Gould. Crosscurrents: Cultural dimensions and global web user-interface design. *Interactions*, 7(4):32–46, 2000.
- [61] Raima Mathew, Mutmaina Adebayo, and Camille Cobb. A meta-analysis on the diversity of security and privacy research. In *Proceedings of the 7th Workshop on Inclusive Privacy and Security*, 2022.
- [62] Jessica McClearn, Rikke Bjerg Jensen, and Reem Talhouk. Othered, silenced and scapegoated: Understanding the situated security of marginalised populations in lebanon. In *Proceedings of the 32nd USENIX Security Symposium*, 2023.
- [63] Helena Mentis, Cliff Lampe, Regina Bernhaupt, Anirudha Joshi, Susan Fussell, Susan Dray, Dan Olsen, Aaron Quigley, Julie R. Williamson, Eunice Sari, Loren Terveen, Allison Druin, and Philippe Palanque. The new SIGCHI EC’s values and strategic initiatives. *Interactions*, 26(1):84–85, 2018.
- [64] Sandra J Milberg, Sandra J Burke, H Jeff Smith, and Ernest A Kallman. Values, personal information privacy, and regulatory approaches. *Communications of the ACM*, 38(12):65–74, 1995.

- [65] Yeseul Nam, Haeyoung Gideon Park, and Young-Hoon Kim. Do you favor positive information or dislike negative information? Cultural variations in the derivation of the framing effect. *Current Psychology*, 2021.
- [66] United Nations. World population prospects 2019 (2020 estimation). <https://population.un.org/wpp/DataQuery/>.
- [67] NIST. NIST SP-800 series. <https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/sp800>, (accessed June 2, 2023).
- [68] Midas Nouwens, Ilaria Liccardi, Michael Veale, David Karger, and Lalana Kagal. Dark patterns after the GDPR: Scraping consent pop-ups and demonstrating their influence. In *Proceedings of the 2020 CHI conference on human factors in computing systems*, 2020.
- [69] Borke Obada-Obieh, Yue Huang, Lucrezia Spagnolo, and Konstantin Beznosov. SoK: The dual nature of technology in sexual abuse. In *Proceedings of the 43rd IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy*, 2022.
- [70] Jonas Oppenlaender, Kristy Milland, Aku Visuri, Panos Ipeirotis, and Simo Hosio. Creativity on paid crowdsourcing platforms. In *Proceedings of the 2020 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems*, 2020.
- [71] Kathryn Parsons, Agata McCormac, Malcolm Pattinson, Marcus Butavicius, and Cate Jerram. Phishing for the truth: A scenario-based experiment of users' behavioural response to emails. In *Proceedings of the 2013 IFIP international information security conference*, 2013.
- [72] Eyal Peer, Laura Brandimarte, Sonam Samat, and Alessandro Acquisti. Beyond the Turk: Alternative platforms for crowdsourcing behavioral research. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 70:153–163, 2017.
- [73] United Nations Development Programme. Human development report 2019. <https://hdr.undp.org/content/human-development-report-2019>, (accessed August 2, 2022).
- [74] Lubna Razaq, Tallal Ahmad, Samia Ibtasam, Umer Ramzan, and Shrirang Mare. “We even borrowed money from our neighbor”: Understanding mobile-based frauds through victims' experiences. *Human-Computer Interaction*, 5(CSCW):1–30, 2021.
- [75] Elissa M. Redmiles, Sean Kross, and Michelle L Mazurek. How well do my results generalize? Comparing security and privacy survey results from MTurk, web, and telephone samples. In *Proceedings of the 40th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy*, 2019.
- [76] Elissa M. Redmiles, Noel Warford, Amritha Jayanti, Aravind Koneru, Sean Kross, Miraida Morales, Rock Stevens, and Michelle L Mazurek. A comprehensive quality evaluation of security and privacy advice on the web. In *Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium*, 2020.
- [77] Benjamin Reinheimer, Lukas Aldag, Peter Mayer, Mattia Mossano, Reyhan Duezguen, Bettina Lofthouse, Tatiana Von Landesberger, and Melanie Volkamer. An investigation of phishing awareness and education over time: When and how to best remind users. In *Proceedings of the 16th Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security*, 2020.
- [78] Simon Robinson, Jennifer Pearson, Thomas Reitmaier, Shashank Ahire, and Matt Jones. Make yourself at phone: Reimagining mobile interaction architectures with emergent users. In *Proceedings of the 2018 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems*, 2018.
- [79] Nithya Sambasivan, Amna Batool, Nova Ahmed, Tara Matthews, Kurt Thomas, Laura Sanely Gaytán-Lugo, David Nemer, Elie Bursztein, Elizabeth Churchill, and Sunny Consolvo. “They don't leave us alone anywhere we go”: Gender and digital abuse in South Asia. In *Proceedings of the 2019 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems*, 2019.
- [80] Nithya Sambasivan, Garen Checkley, Amna Batool, Nova Ahmed, David Nemer, Laura Sanely Gaytán-Lugo, Tara Matthews, Sunny Consolvo, and Elizabeth F. Churchill. “Privacy is not for me, it's for those rich women”: Performative privacy practices on mobile phones by women in South Asia. In *Proceedings of the 14th Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security*, 2018.
- [81] Yukiko Sawaya, Mahmood Sharif, Nicolas Christin, Ayumu Kubota, Akihiro Nakarai, and Akira Yamada. Self-confidence trumps knowledge: A cross-cultural study of security behavior. In *Proceedings of the 2017 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems*, 2017.
- [82] Maxim Schessler, Eva Gerlitz, Maximilian Häring, and Matthew Smith. Replication: Measuring user perceptions in smartphone security and privacy in Germany. In *Proceedings of the 6th European Workshop on Usable Security*, 2021.
- [83] Ananta Soneji, Faris Bugra Kokulu, Carlos Rubio-Medrano, Tiffany Bao, Ruoyu Wang, Yan Shoshitaishvili, and Adam Doupé. “Flawed, but like democracy we don't have a better system”: The experts' insights on the peer review process of evaluating security papers. In *Proceedings of the 43rd IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy*, 2022.
- [84] Peter Story, Daniel Smullen, Yaxing Yao, Alessandro Acquisti, Lorie Faith Cranor, Norman Sadeh, and Florian Schaub. Awareness, adoption, and misconceptions of web privacy tools. 2021.
- [85] Detmar Straub, Karen Loch, Roberto Evaristo, Elena Karahanna, and Mark Srite. Toward a theory-based measurement of culture. *Journal of Global Information Management*, 10(1):13–23, 2002.
- [86] Monika Taddicken. The ‘privacy paradox’ in the social web: The impact of privacy concerns, individual characteristics, and the perceived social relevance on different forms of self-disclosure. *Journal of computer-mediated communication*, 19(2):248–273, 2014.
- [87] Mohammad Tahaei and Kami Vaniea. A survey on developer-centred security. In *Proceedings of the 4th European Workshop on Usable Security*, 2019.
- [88] Mohammad Tahaei and Kami Vaniea. Recruiting participants with programming skills: A comparison of four crowdsourcing platforms and a CS student mailing list. In *Proceedings of the 2022 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems*, 2022.
- [89] Sabine Trepte, Leonard Reinecke, Nicole B. Ellison, Oliver Quiring, Mike Z. Yao, and Marc Ziegele. A cross-cultural perspective on the privacy calculus. *Social Media + Society*, 3(1), 2017.
- [90] Blase Ur and Yang Wang. A cross-cultural framework for protecting user privacy in online social media. In *Proceedings of the 22nd International Conference on World Wide Web*, 2013.
- [91] Christine Utz, Martin Degeling, Sascha Fahl, Florian Schaub, and Thorsten Holz. (Un)informed consent: Studying GDPR consent notices in the field. In *Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC conference on computer and communications security*, 2019.
- [92] Amber Van Der Heijden and Luca Allodi. Cognitive triaging of phishing attacks. In *Proceedings of the 28th USENIX Security Symposium*, 2019.
- [93] Melanie Volkamer, Andreas Gutmann, Karen Renaud, Paul Gerber, and Peter Mayer. Replication study: A cross-country field observation study of real world PIN usage at ATMs and in various electronic payment scenarios. In *Proceedings of the 14th Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security*, 2018.
- [94] Noel Warford, Tara Matthews, Kaitlyn Yang, Omer Akgul, Sunny Consolvo, Patrick Gage Kelley, Nathan Malkin, Michelle L Mazurek, Manya Sleeper, and Kurt Thomas. SoK: A framework for unifying at-risk user research. In *Proceedings of the 43rd IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy*, 2022.
- [95] Rick Wash, Norbert Nthala, and Emilee Rader. Knowledge and capabilities that non-expert users bring to phishing detection. In *Proceedings of the 17th Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security*, 2021.

- [96] Rick Wash and Emilee Rader. Too much knowledge? Security beliefs and protective behaviors among United States internet users. In *Proceedings of the 11th Symposium On Usable Privacy and Security*, 2015.
- [97] Jason Watson, Heather Richter Lipford, and Andrew Besmer. Mapping user preference to privacy default settings. *ACM Transactions on Computer-Human Interaction*, 22(6):1–20, 2015.
- [98] Alma Whitten and J. D. Tygar. Why Johnny can’t encrypt: A usability evaluation of PGP 5.0. In *Proceedings of the 8th USENIX Security Symposium*, 1999.
- [99] Yuxi Wu, W. Keith Edwards, and Sauvik Das. SoK: Social cybersecuritiy. In *Proceedings of the 43rd IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy*, 2022.
- [100] Volker Wulf, Dave Randall, Konstantin Aal, and Markus Rohde. The personal is the political: Internet filtering and counter appropriation in the Islamic Republic of Iran. *Computer Supported Cooperative Work*, 31(2):373–409, 2022.
- [101] Jeff Yan, Alan Blackwell, Ross Anderson, and Alasdair Grant. Password memorability and security: Empirical results. *IEEE Security & privacy*, 2(5):25–31, 2004.
- [102] Yixin Zou, Kevin Roundy, Acar Tamersoy, Saurabh Shintre, Johann Roturier, and Florian Schaub. Examining the adoption and abandonment of security, privacy, and identity theft protection practices. In *Proceedings of the 2020 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems*, 2020.

## Appendix

### A Coding of Participants’ Countries

Figure 3 presents a flowchart of for identifying the participants’ countries. The participant sample in each user study was divided into “Identified,” “Inferred,” or “Not identified.”

### B Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions

We performed the additional analysis using Hofstede’s cultural dimensions framework [45, 49]. This framework is used for understanding cultural differences and consists of six cultural dimensions, as shown in Table 13. Although the framework cannot explain all cultural differences, we believe that these dimensions are relevant to UPS research. For example, countries with higher power distance exhibited significantly higher levels of government involvement in regulating information privacy [23, 64]. As for information disclosure on social media, Trepte et al. [89] focused on the conflicting findings of the prior studies: (1) people from individualistic cultures are more likely to avoid privacy risks, and (2) people from collectivist cultures are more likely to avoid them. Their result supported the latter findings. As for phishing, Butavicius et al. demonstrated that users from individualistic cultures were significantly less likely to be susceptible to phishing emails [18].

We collected six dimension scores per country [49] and calculated the correlations between countries’  $\psi_{samples}$  and each indicator of a cultural dimension. We found that  $\psi_{samples}$




Figure 3: Flowchart to identify or infer participants’ countries.

has a negative correlation ( $r = -.44, p < .001$ ) with power distance and a positive correlation ( $r = .43, p < .001$ ) with individualism. That is, most participant samples in UPS papers come from individualistic cultures that have equal distributions of power. Considering the findings of prior studies and our analysis, we highlighted that most UPS papers may have investigated people primarily from countries whose residents are more likely to disclose their information on social media and are less likely to be phished.

Table 13: Correlations of  $\psi_S$  with cultural dimensions.

Indicators	$r$
Power distance	-.44***
Individualism (vs. collectivism)	.43***
Masculinity (vs. femininity)	-.09
Uncertainty avoidance	-.08
Long-term orientation (vs. short-term)	.13
Indulgence (vs. restraint)	.09