



Cryptographic Analysis of Delta Chat

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Abstract

We analyse the cryptographic protocols underlying Delta Chat, a decentralised messaging application which uses e-mail infrastructure for message delivery. It provides end-to-end encryption by implementing the Autocrypt standard and the SecureJoin protocols, both making use of the OpenPGP standard. Delta Chat’s adoption by categories of high-risk users such as journalists and activists, but also more generally users in regions affected by Internet censorship, makes it a target for powerful adversaries. Yet, the security of its protocols has not been studied to date. We describe five new attacks on Delta Chat in its own threat model, exploiting cross-protocol interactions between its implementation of SecureJoin and Autocrypt, as well as bugs in rPGP, its OpenPGP library. The findings have been disclosed to the Delta Chat team, who implemented fixes.

1 Introduction

Delta Chat¹ is an open-source decentralised messaging application based on e-mail infrastructure. It can be seen as a custom-built e-mail client: users log into Delta Chat with their existing e-mail accounts, and messages in Delta Chat are specially formatted e-mails. It does not have a central server, since users can choose different e-mail providers or even host their own e-mail servers. It provides end-to-end encryption by implementing the Autocrypt standard [53] and the SecureJoin protocols [23], both based on a subset of the OpenPGP standard [34]. It functions in two modes, with different security: *verified chats* guarantee end-to-end encryption, while *unverified chats* are not intended to be secure against active network attackers, i.e. they are vulnerable to machine-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, and may not even be encrypted.

While Delta Chat does not explicitly advertise itself as suitable for high-risk users, these users likely make up a noticeable part of Delta Chat’s user base. For example, Delta Chat’s website lists feedback from people in regions with

strict Internet governance [22]. Delta Chat works with activist groupings and researchers to improve the usability and security of the application for high-risk users, and has produced several need-finding reports by engaging with journalists and activists in Ukraine [32, 33] and elsewhere [31].

Delta Chat has been supported or recommended by several organisations in the human rights context. Among other funding sources, Delta Chat has received support from the U.S. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor to make Delta Chat “more resilient and secure in places often affected by internet censorship and shutdowns” [20]. Front Line Defenders, a human rights organisation, recommended Delta Chat for secure communication during COVID-19 [27]; eQualitie, a digital security organisation, recommends Delta Chat to Ukrainian users in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war [49].

Despite being perceived as secure and engaging with high-risk users, the security of Delta Chat is still largely unclear, especially for its cryptographic components and protocol implementations. Further, while its position as both an instant messenger and an e-mail client ensures easier adoption, it also brings more complexity to its protocols, thereby enlarging its attack surface. The Autocrypt and SecureJoin protocols have received considerable input from academia [45], but have never been formally analysed. This is especially concerning since these protocols use OpenPGP in non-standard ways, and the Delta Chat team has made substantial changes to the SecureJoin protocols. Further, the OpenPGP library used by Delta Chat, rPGP, has received relatively little attention compared to other OpenPGP libraries.

Recent works have uncovered serious security flaws in several messaging applications deploying custom cryptographic protocols such as Bridgefy [3, 6], Matrix [4] and Threema [47]. In the last two, flaws were found after the application in question was “vetted” via security audits, showing that audits alone cannot establish a protocol as secure and trustworthy. Indeed, Delta Chat too has undergone two audits that covered its use of cryptography [51, 52]; as we will see, this was not sufficient to prevent attacks.

¹<https://delta.chat/>

1.1 Contributions

We have analysed the core cryptographic protocols used by Delta Chat, discovering five new attacks:

1. **Gossip key injection.** An attacker can send an e-mail to the target such that the target will replace the public key of a given contact of the target with an attacker-controlled key and mark it as verified.
2. **Group member removal.** An attacker can remove arbitrary members from a verified group as if they were removed by other members by adding a carefully constructed plaintext e-mail header to a normal group message.
3. **Synchronisation forgery.** An attacker capable of spoofing self-addressed e-mails for the target can trivially forge synchronisation messages. This allows the attacker to verify themselves to the target or change chat statuses.
4. **InsecureJoin observer.** An attacker can exploit the fact that clients observe self-sent SecureJoin protocol messages from other devices to trick the target into marking an attacker-controlled key as verified.
5. **Autocrypt Setup forgery.** An attacker can forge an Autocrypt Setup Message, which is used to transfer a user's secret key between different e-mail clients. This enables the attacker to make the target use a key known by the attacker.

Overall, our analysis demonstrates that Delta Chat users were vulnerable to: a MITM attacker reading and modifying their messages even in verified chats, being impersonated to other Delta Chat users (or vice versa), their chat statuses and setup being modified, being deceived to use an attacker-controlled OpenPGP key and consequently losing most security guarantees, and denial-of-service attacks.

1.2 Related Work

No prior works to date provide an in-depth security analysis of Delta Chat or its specialised protocols. ClaimChain [41], a part of the CounterMITM [46] specification which served as the basis for SecureJoin, is a solution for privacy-preserving key distribution for Autocrypt, but it was never implemented in Delta Chat. A recent work [28] proposed to extend the OpenPGP library used by Delta Chat with post-quantum primitives, but did not include a security analysis.

OpenPGP itself has a long history in the literature as evidenced by EFAIL [48], attacks on signatures [44] and ElGamal implementations [26], format oracle attacks [39] and key overwriting attacks [17]. It has also been criticised for its lack of usability [50, 56] and wider standardisation and deployment issues [35]. Yet, efforts are underway for updating the cryptographic building blocks of OpenPGP [57].

Delta Chat has undergone four independent security audits [20], and is planning a fifth audit in 2024 [37]. Two of the audits covered the cryptographic components of Delta Chat, including one in 2019 on its OpenPGP and RSA libraries [51], and another in 2020 on its core Rust libraries [52], both conducted by Include Security.

Our work fits within the larger area of cryptographic study of secure messaging protocols. A number of works show attacks on messaging apps [3, 4, 6, 7, 47], while other works provide security proofs, largely focusing on Signal-based protocols [9, 15, 24], though attacks may still be possible [25]. From a wider perspective, analysis of TLS 1.2 has provided both security proofs [40, 43] and practical attacks [1, 8, 13].

In Signal, verification of user keys is more invisible than in Delta Chat, relegated to an optional feature of verifying “safety numbers”. Recent works have focused on both its usability aspects [54] and enhancing its security guarantees [29, 30]. For group communication, Messaging Layer Security (MLS) [14] could provide an alternative, provably secure design [10, 11, 18]; however, implementing it in a decentralised fashion remains an open problem [12].

Notably, Delta Chat's need-finding reports [31–33] uncovered many of the information security practices of higher-risk users that were later replicated in a different context [2].

1.3 Methodology

We conducted a security analysis on the cryptography used in Delta Chat, covering Delta Chat's cryptographic components as well as Delta Chat's implementation of the Autocrypt and SecureJoin protocols. We manually analysed Delta Chat's core Rust implementation² as well as the relevant parts of rPGP,³ Delta Chat's OpenPGP library: we analysed version 1.132.0 of the Delta Chat core library,⁴ released on 6 December 2023, and version 0.10.2 of the rPGP library,⁵ released on 24 July 2023. We studied the specifications of OpenPGP [34], Autocrypt [53], and SecureJoin [23] and compared them with their implementations in Delta Chat and rPGP.

We implemented our attacks using the Python bindings for the Delta Chat core library.⁶ We instantiated eavesdroppers and network attackers as malicious SMTP proxies, and we used a local testing e-mail server for attack simulation. We verified our proof-of-concept attacks on Delta Chat core versions 1.132.0 and 1.133.2⁷ and Delta Chat Desktop 1.42.2.

Since Delta Chat and its dependencies are open-source, we did not perform any reverse engineering for our analysis. Our analysis and tests did not involve any real Delta Chat users or target the Delta Chat infrastructure.

²<https://github.com/deltachat/deltachat-core-rust>

³<https://github.com/rpgp/rpgp>

⁴<https://github.com/deltachat/deltachat-core-rust/releases/tag/v1.132.0>

⁵<https://crates.io/crates/pgp/0.10.2>

⁶<https://pypi.org/project/deltachat/>

⁷The latest core version available to us at the time.

1.4 Responsible Disclosure

We disclosed our findings to the Delta Chat development team on 2 February 2024, suggesting a 90-day disclosure period. They acknowledged receipt and agreed to a coordinated disclosure on 7 February 2024. The team implemented fixes for all of the main attacks as well as for a number of additional issues identified during our analysis. Some of the fixes were implemented in rPGP. The fixes were released to end users as part of Delta Chat application versions 1.44 on 12-16 March 2024, with a public disclosure describing the issues on 25 March 2024 in order to allow time for users to update [21].

1.5 Overview of the Paper

We describe Delta Chat’s threat model in Section 2 and its architecture in Section 3. We describe our attacks in Section 4 and discuss the implications of our findings in Section 5. For extended background and other details we may refer the reader to the full version of the paper.⁸

2 Threat Model

Delta Chat provides different levels of security for different types of chats. *Verified chats* provide guaranteed end-to-end encryption with the SecureJoin protocols, protecting against network attackers that can actively modify messages, such as malicious e-mail servers. *Unverified chats* are opportunistically end-to-end encrypted via Autocrypt, protected only against passive eavesdropping attackers. Hence, for unverified chats, MITM attacks are outside of the threat model [37]; it is also possible to use them to send unencrypted messages.

Delta Chat does not offer advanced properties such as forward secrecy and post-compromise security, and verified chats do not aim to protect against insider attacks. Our threat model follows Delta Chat’s security claims and assumptions, thus only capturing a subset of the attackers typically considered for other end-to-end encrypted messaging applications.

Capabilities. We consider attackers with one or more of the following capabilities, ordered roughly by their strength. Note that different capabilities may overlap with each other.

Sending e-mails. The attacker knows the target’s e-mail address and is able to send e-mails to the target without being flagged by the spam detector or blocked by the target. In Delta Chat, it is possible to receive e-mails from non-contacts, in which case the e-mails appear as “message requests” [20].

Knowledge of public keys. The attacker knows the target’s public key. This capability is trivial for eavesdropping attackers since they can observe the Autocrypt headers attached to all of the target’s outgoing e-mails. The attacker may also learn the target’s public key by tricking the target into sending

an e-mail to an attacker-controlled e-mail address, or through the Autocrypt key gossip mechanism (Section 3.1.3).

Eavesdropping. The attacker is able to observe messages on the network, including the target’s incoming and outgoing e-mails; this is assumed in the Autocrypt standard [53].

E-mail spoofing. The attacker is able to create and send e-mails to the target with the From header arbitrarily chosen by the attacker, e.g. through an insecure SMTP server [42]. A special case is spoofing an e-mail as if it were sent from the target to themselves, where both the From and To headers represent the target’s e-mail address.

Control of network messages. The attacker can read, create, modify, and delete messages. The SecureJoin protocols [23, Section 1.1] as well as Delta Chat [20] consider such a network attacker in their threat model.

Limiting assumptions. Attackers targeting unverified chats are assumed to not spoof e-mails or modify network messages.

We assume that users can share their QR invite codes via a secure out-of-band channel that cannot be observed or modified by the attacker [23, Section 1.1].

All verified contacts of the target are honest, and no infiltrators colluding with the attacker are present in the verified groups where the target is a member [23, Section 2.2.3]. This assumption does not exclude the attacker from communicating with the target through unverified chats, or establishing themselves as by exploiting vulnerabilities in Delta Chat.

Goals. The Autocrypt standard does not specify the attacker’s goals, but it can be inferred that Autocrypt intends to protect the content of encrypted messages. The SecureJoin protocols specify the attacker’s goals as “i) read the content of messages, and to ii) impersonate peer devices” [23, Section 1.1]. Finally, Delta Chat states that messages in verified chats “can not be read or altered by compromised e-mail servers or Internet providers” [20]. Thus, the attacker’s goal is to break the confidentiality or integrity of encrypted messages, break authenticity by forging messages in verified chats, and break verification guarantees in Delta Chat. The latter includes the attacker getting themselves or some honest peer to be verified by the target under a key controlled by the attacker, and changing the setup of verified chats.⁹

We do not consider removing, duplicating, or reordering messages as among the goals of the attacker, even though they are trivial for network attackers and can become real threats.

3 Delta Chat

In this section, we introduce Autocrypt (Section 3.1) as well as the SecureJoin protocols (Section 3.2), which together form

⁹Having the target verify a key controlled by the attacker allows the attacker to perform a “Bob in the middle” attack [23, Section 2.2.3] to the target as a malicious insider and break all previous security properties. Changing the verified chat setup qualifies as breaking integrity or authenticity.

⁸Available at <https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/918>.

the cryptographic core of Delta Chat. Delta Chat relies on a subset of the OpenPGP standard for end-to-end encryption that Delta Chat claims to be secure [20], implemented in the rPGP library. We summarise the relevant parts of OpenPGP in Appendix A of the full version of the paper.

User’s perspective. Upon installation, Delta Chat prompts the user to log into their e-mail account or import an existing Delta Chat account from another device. The user can add a contact by scanning a QR code of another user, inputting an e-mail address or being part of the same group chat. When the user sends an encrypted message, it is shown with a small padlock. If the encryption material for a contact is considered *verified*, chats with that contact are shown with a green checkmark. Verification needs little effort from the user: a contact is verified when added using their invite code or from a verified chat, and a chat is verified if all members are verified.

Public keys. Delta Chat associates each contact or *peer* with several OpenPGP keys. In the context of Autocrypt, these will be referred to as the peer’s *Autocrypt (public) key* and the peer’s *gossip key*. In the context of SecureJoin, we will also define *verified keys*. The functions of these keys will be explained in later subsections.

AEAP. Automatic E-mail Address Porting (AEAP) [36] allows a user to switch to a new e-mail in Delta Chat and optionally set up forwarding from their old e-mail. When the user sends a message to an existing verified contact from the new address, the contact automatically changes the address for the user with minimal interruption to their chats.

3.1 Autocrypt

Autocrypt [53] is a set of guidelines for e-mail clients to provide low-effort end-to-end e-mail encryption to users by automating key management. The current version, Autocrypt Level 1 (release 1.1.0), provides opportunistic encryption with OpenPGP. It is based on the trust on first use (TOFU) principle and does not support key verification, only aiming to defend against passive data collection attacks. In Autocrypt, an “encrypted” e-mail is always signed and encrypted.

Autocrypt e-mail clients attach their public keys in the Autocrypt e-mail header. They may also include Autocrypt-Gossip MIME headers in e-mail messages to distribute the public keys of their peers. Autocrypt e-mail clients maintain states for communication peers in a table based on the Autocrypt-related headers in incoming e-mails, and use this to check whether encryption is possible or recommended for a particular e-mail message.

Delta Chat implements all functionalities in the Autocrypt standard. Other e-mail clients have, if any, only limited support for Autocrypt headers. Where relevant, we describe Delta Chat’s additions to the standard Autocrypt features.

3.1.1 OpenPGP Keys

We cover a subset of OpenPGP keys that have the same structure as the OpenPGP transferable public key in the Autocrypt standard, which we call Autocrypt-compliant. An Autocrypt-compliant OpenPGP key consists of five parts: (i) a primary key for signing, (ii) a User ID, (iii) a self-signature that certifies the User ID and the primary key, (iv) an encryption subkey, and (v) a signature that binds the subkey using the primary key [53, Section 3.1.1]. While Delta Chat only generates Autocrypt-compliant OpenPGP keys, it actually supports the usage of most valid OpenPGP keys.

The OpenPGP key fingerprint is a 20-byte SHA-1 digest derived from the the public part of the primary key. Other parts of the OpenPGP key do not contribute to the fingerprint.

3.1.2 Autocrypt Header

The Autocrypt header is an e-mail header that contains the sender’s address `addr` and public key data `keydata`, as well as an optional `prefer-encrypt` attribute that indicates the agreement to perform encryption with peers having the same preference. Autocrypt e-mail clients should include these headers in every message for peers that also use Autocrypt. For this reason, Autocrypt traffic is easily recognisable.

The `keydata` attribute represents an OpenPGP transferable public key (Section 3.1.1). The default signing and public-key encryption algorithms in Autocrypt are Ed25519 and ECDH over Curve25519 respectively, and RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 should also be supported. Delta Chat additionally supports NIST P-256 and P-384 curves. See [53, Section 7.2] for an example e-mail with an Autocrypt header.

In Autocrypt, the party receiving a message with an Autocrypt header should check whether the `addr` attribute matches the `From` header in the e-mail, rejecting the header but keeping the message if not. Then, it should place the peer’s public key in the peer state table (Section 3.1.4) unless there is already an entry for the peer’s Autocrypt public key, and the *effective date* (sending time of the message, capped to now) of the message is less recent than that of the existing entry.

3.1.3 Autocrypt Key Gossip

Autocrypt specifies the key gossip mechanism to allow users to send encrypted replies to a group of recipients without having to communicate with each of them in advance. Autocrypt e-mail clients may include Autocrypt-gossip headers in the outbound message, one for each of the intended recipients (excluding Bcc). They must be placed in the root MIME part of the encrypted message payload. Each Autocrypt-gossip header contains the address and the public key of a recipient. The public key is taken from the peer state table (Section 3.1.4), and for this purpose, Autocrypt prefers the peer’s public key (updated with the Autocrypt header) over the gossip key in the peer state table. In Delta

Chat, the `Autocrypt-gossip` header has the same format as the `Autocrypt` header.

Gossip keys in the peer state table are updated in a similar way to `Autocrypt` keys. Namely, the receiver checks if the address in an `Autocrypt-gossip` header matches some address in the e-mail’s `To`, `Cc`, or `Reply-To` header, ignoring the header if not, and updates the peer’s gossip key in the peer state table accordingly unless the peer’s current gossip key in the table has a more recent *effective date*.

3.1.4 Peer State Table

`Autocrypt` e-mail clients maintain a state for each peer in a *peer state table*. A peer state records the encryption information of the peer, such as keys and the encryption preference, as well as metadata that can be used by the client to decide on whether to update the state. The client updates the peer states automatically based on the incoming e-mails, relieving the user from OpenPGP key management. When sending a message, the e-mail client uses the peer state table to check whether encryption is possible or preferred, and the client automatically selects the appropriate keys for encryption based on the recipients’ states in the peer state table.

Figure 1: Simplified overview of a peer state in Delta Chat.




Figure 1 gives an overview of a peer state in Delta Chat, which is augmented with fields for verified keys for the `SecureJoin` protocols (Section 3.2). Unlike `Autocrypt` keys, a network attacker should not be able to change verified keys in the peer state table to attacker-controlled keys by modifying network messages. Verified chats in Delta Chat, implemented as verified groups (Section 3.2.3), use exclusively verified keys for chat messages.

Delta Chat also adds a secondary verified key column to the peer state table. This seems to be in place to enable a faster recovery from key changes.¹⁰ When marking a gossip key as verified, if there is already a verified key for the peer and the gossip key is different from the verified key, then Delta Chat sets the peer’s secondary verified key to be the gossip key. When receiving an encrypted message from the peer signed

¹⁰<https://github.com/deltachat/deltachat-core-rust/issues/4541>

with the verified key, Delta Chat removes the secondary verified key for the peer; otherwise, if the message is signed with the secondary verified key, Delta Chat replaces the verified key with the secondary verified key. That is, depending on which key part is actually used by the peer, the two verified keys in the peer state table “resolve” into one.

3.1.5 Autocrypt Setup Message

The `Autocrypt` specification defines a mechanism to transfer a user’s secret key between different `Autocrypt` e-mail clients via the `Autocrypt Setup Message`.

The `Autocrypt Setup Message` is a self-addressed e-mail that contains the user’s OpenPGP transferable secret key, ASCII-armored and encrypted with a machine-generated random passphrase called the Setup Code. The user first generates the `Autocrypt Setup Message` on the old `Autocrypt-enabled` e-mail client and writes down the Setup Code displayed on screen. Then, the user logs into the new e-mail client with the same e-mail address. The new client finds the `Autocrypt Setup Message` in the inbox and checks it is well-formed. Then, the new client should ask the user for their approval of the import.¹¹ If the user agrees, the new client prompts the user to enter the Setup Code for decryption. The new client tries to decrypt the message with the entered Setup Code, and if successful it imports the decrypted secret key.

The `Autocrypt Setup Message` contains an `Autocrypt-Setup-Message: v1` header but not an `Autocrypt` header. The e-mail body contains instructions in plaintext, and an HTML attachment that contains the user’s ASCII-armored and symmetrically-encrypted secret key. Decryption with the correct Setup Code yields the user’s ASCII-armored OpenPGP transferable secret key. The Setup Code is used to both decrypt and authenticate the `Autocrypt Setup Message`. It contains 36 random digits, separated by dashes into blocks of four digits.

3.2 SecureJoin

The `SecureJoin` protocols [23], namely the Setup Contact protocol and the Verified Group protocol, protect `Autocrypt` from active network attackers through key verification. They were originally developed as part of the CounterMITM protocols [46], but Delta Chat’s implementation has diverged from the original specification in non-trivial ways.¹²

3.2.1 Verification in Delta Chat

A chat being verified indicates that it is a verified group (Section 3.2.3), while a contact being verified indicates that the one-on-one chat with the contact is verified, and the user can

¹¹In Delta Chat, users are not alerted directly but must click on the displayed Setup Message.

¹²Note that at the time of writing, the new specification for `SecureJoin` [23] was not complete with respect to the implementation in Delta Chat.

add the contact to verified groups. In Delta Chat, key verification is invisible to the user, but it is an important building block for both chat and contact verification.

A contact can become verified by performing the Setup Contact protocol (Section 3.2.2) with the user, or being introduced to a verified group in which the user is a member. Delta Chat marks a contact as verified if (i) it obtains a verified key of the contact, and (ii) it is convinced that the contact is currently using the verified key. For the latter, the contact's verified key should have the same fingerprint as the contact's Autocrypt key in the peer state table, or the gossip key if the Autocrypt key is unavailable. A chat is marked verified upon creation if all chat members are verified. Note that from version 1.133.0, Delta Chat separates contact verification into forward and backward verification (see Appendix B of the full version of the paper).

3.2.2 Setup Contact Protocol

The Setup Contact protocol allows two peers to exchange e-mail addresses and public keys in a verified manner.

A peer (Alice) first shows her invite code to the other peer (Bob) through a second, out-of-band channel. In Delta Chat, the invite code is usually a QR code, but it can also be a string that the QR code represents. Alice's invite code contains her fingerprint, address, nickname, and two random tokens, INVITE and AUTH, taken from her token database. These tokens do not expire unless Alice manually revokes the corresponding QR code.

After scanning Alice's QR code, Bob's device displays the name and address contained in the QR code, and asks Bob to manually accept the new contact. The rest of the protocol does not require further user interaction, and messages are automatically exchanged using Autocrypt through the channel potentially controlled by the attacker. At the end of the protocol, both participants will have learned and validated the contact information and the public key of their peer. Delta Chat will mark the peer as verified.

A detailed overview of the protocol flow can be found in Fig. 4 in Appendix A, however it is not necessary for the understanding of our attacks.

The SecureJoin document gives an informal argument why the Setup Contact protocol is resistant to impersonation from active attackers that can modify, create and delete messages [23, Section 2.1.2]. However, it acknowledges that an attacker could replay Bob's messages in the protocol to Alice, which could potentially be used to make Alice switch to a compromised key of Bob [23, Section 2.1.3].

3.2.3 Verified Group Protocol

The verified group in Delta Chat is a type of group chat that is secure against network attacks. Members in a verified group

are verified to each other, and all messages in a verified group are signed and encrypted using verified keys.

Initialisation. The SecureJoin document does not specify how to create a verified group. In Delta Chat, a user first creates the group locally with a random group identifier. If all members are verified to the creator, the group is automatically marked as verified. The group is invisible to other members until the creator sends the first message in the group. When a group member receives this message, Delta Chat creates the group locally for that member.

Preparing for joining a verified group. Suppose Alice is a member in some verified group, while Bob is not. For Alice to add Bob to the verified group, Alice should have verified Bob's key, e.g. by performing the Setup Contact protocol with Bob, or by being in another verified group with Bob. If this is not the case, Alice can perform a process very similar to the Setup Contact protocol to prepare for adding Bob to the group, which we summarise below.

First, Alice shares the QR code of the verified group with Bob. The QR code contains Alice's fingerprint and address, the group name and identifier, and two random tokens associated with the group, INVITE_g and AUTH_g, taken from Alice's token database. Tokens are associated with their groups, so different groups use separate tokens.

Bob scans the QR code shared by Alice and manually confirms joining the verified group specified in the QR code. No further user interaction is required for the rest of the process. After that, the peers' clients perform a variant of the Setup Contact protocol. After verifying Bob's key, Alice's client adds Bob to the verified group similar to the process we describe below.

Joining a verified group. Suppose Alice and Bob are verified to each other. For Alice to add Bob to a verified group, Alice's client first adds Bob to the group locally, and then sends a Chat-Group-Member-Added message to all members, including Bob. The message contains the verified keys of all members except Alice herself as Autocrypt-Gossip headers in the signed and encrypted payload.

On receiving the message, Bob's client creates the group locally and marks peers as verified using the gossip keys. Other group members' clients check that Alice and they are both members of the group (while Bob may or may not be in the group in their views), mark the gossip keys as verified, and add Bob as a group member.

4 Attacks

In this section, we describe our attacks within the Delta Chat threat model outlined in Section 2. Further attacks outside of their threat model can be found in Appendix B.

4.1 Gossip Key Injection

Delta Chat’s implementation of the Verified Group protocol allows an attacker to trick the target into marking an attacker-controlled gossip key as verified. This attack does not require a network attacker: the attacker only needs to know the target’s public key and send a future-dated e-mail to the target.

Vulnerability. In a verified group, some messages contain one or more `Autocrypt-Gossip` headers in the protected payload. When adding a member to the group, the introducer sends a `Chat-Group-Member-Added` group message that contains the verified keys of all members, including the new member. In addition, Delta Chat periodically attaches the gossips of other members’ verified keys to verified group messages, to allow for a faster recovery from key changes. The recipient’s client marks the gossiped keys as verified in the peer state table as described in [Section 3.2.3](#).

Since `Autocrypt-Gossip` headers should only be present in the signed and encrypted payload, the attacker cannot add or modify `Autocrypt-Gossip` headers in verified group messages. However, it is possible for the attacker to trick the target’s client into marking a different gossip key than that in the message as verified.

When marking a gossip key as verified, Delta Chat iterates over the intersection of addresses in the gossip headers and addresses in the `To` header.¹³ For each address, Delta Chat sets its verified key to be the gossip key in the peer state table, or sets a secondary verified key to be the gossip key if a different verified key is already present in the table. The problem is that there is no guarantee that the peer’s gossip key in the peer state table actually corresponds to the gossip key in the message, and it is possible that the peer’s gossip key does not get updated by the message.

Delta Chat only updates the peer’s gossip key in the table if the gossip key in the message is more recent.¹⁴ When comparing the two timestamps, Delta Chat does not cap the send time of the e-mail as required by the Autocrypt standard [53, Section 3.3, 3.6]. Therefore, if the gossip key for some contact in the peer state table has a more recent timestamp than the verified group message with a gossip for the contact, then Delta Chat marks the gossip key in the table as verified. This is potentially different from the contact’s real key.

Attack. Suppose Alice is a member of a verified group, while Bob is either a member in the verified group or is about to be added to the verified group by another member Carol with a `Chat-Group-Member-Added` message. Alice and Bob

¹³https://github.com/deltachat/deltachat-core-rust/blob/1edd7045bec1f8fa0761e26a975cb9f07596feb8/src/receive_imf.rs#L2479

¹⁴<https://github.com/deltachat/deltachat-core-rust/blob/1edd7045bec1f8fa0761e26a975cb9f07596feb8/src/peerstate.rs#L332>

have not communicated in Delta Chat before. Mallory is an attacker outside the group that can send messages to Alice and knows Alice’s public key. Mallory does not need to be able to eavesdrop on, spoof or modify network messages, but these capabilities would be helpful in making use of the attack. [Figure 2](#) illustrates the following attack.

First, Mallory sends an e-mail message to Alice, with Bob also in the `To` header of the e-mail. The message includes a malicious gossip key for Bob in its protected payload. The e-mail is dated from the future, which is not expected behaviour but often occurs in practice since client time misconfiguration issues are common. Alice’s client parses the message and updates Bob’s gossip key in the peer state table accordingly. The malicious gossip key remains in Alice’s peer state table, even if Alice deletes the message or blocks Mallory afterwards.

After a short while, suppose Alice receives a message in the verified group with a gossip key for Bob. Because the malicious gossip key for Bob has a more recent timestamp, the verified group message does not update Bob’s gossip key in Alice’s peer state table. Alice’s client then tries to mark the gossip key for Bob as verified, which has the effect of marking the malicious gossip key as verified instead.

If Bob is a new member to be added to the group, then Mallory already controls Bob’s verified key in Alice’s view. Otherwise, Mallory controls a secondary verified key for Bob, and in order to promote the malicious key to a verified key, Mallory would need to spoof a message from Bob to Alice that is signed with the malicious gossip key.

Mallory as a network attacker could also perform the attack without sending a future-dated e-mail to Alice. Mallory could intercept a verified group message to Alice that contains gossips, which is easily recognisable from the payload size or from new recipients in the `To` header, and, after sending an e-mail with the malicious gossip key, modify the `Date` header to an earlier time before forwarding the message to Alice.

For Alice to mark Bob as verified, Alice’s client also needs to be convinced that Bob is actually using the verified key. If Alice already had Bob’s real public key in her peer state table, then Alice’s client would not mark Bob as verified, since Bob is potentially using a different key. In that case, to complete the attack, Mallory just needs to also spoof a message from Bob to Alice with the malicious key in the `Autocrypt` header.

Consequences. By tricking Alice’s client to verify a malicious key for Bob, Mallory can eavesdrop on messages from Alice to Bob or in any verified group where Bob is a member. Mallory can also perform a machine-in-the-middle attack between Alice and Bob, despite Alice believing that her communications with Bob are protected with guaranteed end-to-end encryption. Furthermore, Mallory can cause Alice to mark any contact or key as verified by spoofing a message from Bob to Alice which adds Alice to a non-existent verified group with malicious gossips in the message.

Using Delta Chat’s AEAP feature ([Section 3](#)), Mallory




Figure 2: The message sequence for the example gossip key injection attack. Note that the initial message from Mallory to Alice may or may not be actually sent to Bob.

could change Bob’s address in Alice’s view by sending an e-mail to Alice from the new address. Indeed, Mallory could also use AEAP to make herself verified to Alice, avoiding the need for spoofing e-mails from Bob. However, AEAP would leave a visible user notification to Alice, which could alert her about the attack.

Finally, Alice could unknowingly disseminate the malicious key further in verified groups where Alice is a member, causing more users to verify the malicious key for Bob.

Mitigation. When marking gossiped keys as verified, Delta Chat should not rely on the untrusted gossip key entry in the peer state table. Instead, Delta Chat should directly mark the gossip keys contained in the protected e-mail payload as verified. Further, Delta Chat should use the effective date defined in the Autocrypt standard and cap the message date before updating the peer state table.

4.2 Group Member Removal

By manipulating message headers, it is possible for a network attacker to change a normal group message into the special message for group member removal. As a result, the attacker can remove arbitrary members from a verified group, as if they were removed by some other member in the group.

Vulnerability. Despite the signing and encryption of messages, message headers are surprisingly malleable. By adding

or modifying unprotected e-mail headers of an encrypted message, the attacker can drastically change the meaning and effect of that message. Table 1 lists the manipulatable headers relevant to our attacks. A header in Delta Chat may appear as an IMF header in the unprotected part of the e-mail, or as a MIME header in the possibly signed and encrypted payload. Delta Chat internally categorises headers into four types.

Unprotected: these headers must appear as IMF headers, e.g. Date and Chat-Version. *Hidden:* these headers can be large and therefore must not appear as IMF headers, e.g. Chat-User-Avatar. *Protected:* these headers are encrypted whenever the message is encrypted, e.g. Chat-Group-Name. *Secured:* these headers should only be present in the signed and encrypted payload. The Chat-Verified and Secure-Join-Fingerprint headers are explicitly marked as secured. In addition, Delta Chat treats the Autocrypt-Gossip header as secured.

The e-mail parser removes or ignores secured headers that appear in the unencrypted part. However, perhaps counterintuitively, a protected header can appear as an unencrypted IMF header even if the e-mail is signed and encrypted. This design choice is necessary for headers like Subject and From, which are generally required for well-formed e-mails, but is incorrect for other protected headers, such as Chat-Group-Member-Removed, which should only appear in the possibly encrypted e-mail body.

The situation is more complicated when the same protected header appears in both encrypted and unencrypted

Table 1: The types and susceptibility to overwriting of the manipulatable headers in Delta Chat that are relevant to our attacks.

Header	Type	Overwriting	Reference
Chat-Group-Avatar	hidden	no	Section 4.2
Chat-Group-Member-Removed	protected	no	Section 4.2
From	protected	yes	Appendix B
Message-ID	protected	yes	Section 4.2
Secure-Join	protected	yes	Section 4.4
Secure-Join-Auth	protected	yes	full version of the paper (App. E)

parts. Delta Chat parses the unencrypted headers before the encrypted headers, preferring a new header over an already parsed one if the header is considered as “known” or starts with `Chat-`. Therefore, the encrypted header generally takes precedence over the unencrypted header. For example, the encrypted `Subject` header is preferred over its unencrypted counterpart, which reflects a common practice in OpenPGP e-mail clients to hide e-mail subjects.

However, because of several oversights in Delta Chat’s e-mail parser implementation, there are cases where the unencrypted header could overwrite the encrypted header, including `Secure-Join`, `Secure-Join-Auth` and `Secure-Join-Group`, which are not included in the list of known headers. Moreover, `Secure-Join-Auth` should have been treated as secured instead of protected, as it never appears unencrypted in honest executions.

In addition, the `Message-ID` header and the `From` header are in effect susceptible to overwriting. The `Message-ID` header, while not susceptible to overwriting per se, can be overwritten by the unprotected `X-Microsoft-Original-Message-ID` header, which was used in older versions of Delta Chat and remains for compatibility. For the `From` header, Delta Chat decided not to reject an e-mail whose encrypted `From` header is different from its unencrypted `From` header; however, Delta Chat considers such an e-mail as having an unsigned `From`, meaning that it cannot be used to initiate the AEAP mechanism.

Attack. Suppose Alice and Bob are in the same verified group. If Alice wished to remove Bob from the group, Alice would send a message with a `Chat-Group-Member-Removed` header containing Bob’s e-mail address to the members of the verified group. Upon seeing the message, all members’ clients, including Bob’s, would remove Bob from the verified group, and display a notification saying that Bob has been removed from the group by Alice.

Suppose Mallory is an eavesdropping attacker outside the group that is also capable of spoofing messages to Alice; Mallory can also be a network attacker. First, Mallory captures a non-administrative message that Alice has sent to the verified group at some point in the past. Mallory should be able

to capture such a message with reasonable probability, and she can use some characteristics of the message, such as size and the `To` header, to help distinguish it from administrative messages. Mallory can easily distinguish messages in different groups, since the group ID is a part of the plaintext `Message-ID` header.

Then, Mallory modifies the captured message by adding a `Chat-Group-Member-Removed` header with Bob’s address to the unprotected IMF header section of the message. Mallory also modifies the unprotected `Message-ID` header so that the message will not be treated as a duplicate by Alice. Newer versions of Delta Chat place a copy of the `Message-ID` header in the protected payload, but the attacker can instead set the unprotected `X-Microsoft-Original-Message-ID` header, which takes precedence over `Message-ID`. (If Mallory could intercept and modify a non-administrative message from Alice to the verified group before it is delivered to the group, she could instead directly add the `Chat-Group-Member-Removed` header with Bob’s address to its IMF headers.)

After that, Mallory sends the modified message to all members of the verified group. The members’ clients incorrectly interpret the modified message as a group member removal message initiated by Alice. Mallory may choose to send this message to Alice too; her client would also remove Bob upon receiving the message.

Consequences. While the attacker cannot read messages in the verified group, they are able to arbitrarily remove members of the group, which could create confusion about the group’s membership state or dissolve the group.

There could be other potential attacks that leverage header manipulation. For example, it is possible to add or remove the avatar of a verified group by adding a `Chat-Group-Avatar` header to a normal group message. It is also possible to change the group name for two peers in a verified group by reusing another message from their one-on-one chat, where other members could not see the change.

Mitigation. An immediate fix to the attack would disallow headers starting with `Chat-` to appear in the unencrypted part

if the message is encrypted. However, it takes more careful checks to completely eliminate such attacks. In general, if a protected header appears in the plaintext part of an encrypted message, then Delta Chat should regard the message as invalid. There are a few exceptions for headers generally required for a well-formed e-mail message, such as `Subject` and `From`, in which case Delta Chat should prefer the encrypted header, and only reject the message if the encrypted header is meant to match the unencrypted header but does not.

4.3 Synchronisation Forgery

Delta Chat verifies self-addressed messages with the user's own Autocrypt public key in the peer state table. Consequently, an attacker capable of spoofing self-addressed e-mails could trivially forge self-addressed messages for the target, including synchronisation messages.

Vulnerability. Delta Chat synchronises certain changes in the account across devices. These include the addition or deletion of QR invite code tokens for the SecureJoin protocols, changes to chat statuses like blocking contacts or archiving chats, and changes to a limited set of account configurations like display names. Synchronisation is enabled by default, even if the user only uses Delta Chat on one device.

Delta Chat synchronises these changes by sending a synchronisation message, which is a self-addressed e-mail with a `multi-device-sync.json` file attached. The attachment contains the synchronisation items represented in JSON. Like other messages, the synchronisation message should be signed and encrypted. While Delta Chat encrypts the message correctly with the user's real public key, the verification of a self-addressed e-mail message uses the user's Autocrypt public key as it appears in the peer state table, similarly as for other opportunistically protected one-on-one chats. As with other contacts, Delta Chat updates the user's own Autocrypt key in the peer state table using the Autocrypt headers from the received self-addressed messages.

Attack. An attacker in the possession of the target's public key and capable of spoofing self-addressed e-mails for the target could make the target's client execute malicious synchronisation items crafted by the attacker.

To mount this attack, the attacker creates a message containing the malicious synchronisation items, signed with a key known by the attacker and encrypted with the target's public key. This message contains an Autocrypt header that corresponds to the public part of the signing key. The attacker then sends the message to the target, spoofed to appear as if it was sent by the target.

On receiving the message, the target's Delta Chat client first updates the target's own Autocrypt key entry in the peer state table to the public key in the Autocrypt header, then decrypts the message with the target's own private key, and

finally verifies the message with the target's own Autocrypt key in the peer state table, which succeeds since the message is indeed signed with the private counterpart of the Autocrypt key; see Fig. 3. The target's client now processes the message as a valid synchronisation message and proceeds to execute the malicious synchronisation items in the message.




Figure 3: Keys involved in the synchronisation forgery attack, where (pk_{real}, sk_{real}) is the target's key pair, and (pk_{evil}, sk_{evil}) is a key pair known by the attacker. Ideally, Delta Chat should use pk_{real} to verify the synchronisation message (dashed line).

Consequences. By planting AUTH and INVITE tokens in the synchronisation items to the target, the attacker could verify themselves to the target, or impersonate other contacts to the target in the Setup Contact protocol or the Verified Group protocol. The recent Delta Chat updates on synchronisation¹⁵ equip the attacker with more capabilities. The attacker could now change chat statuses on the target's device, such as blocking contacts or muting chats, and force the target to change several configurations, such as the display name. Note that in most cases, executing synchronisation items does not result in a notification to the user.

More generally, the attacker can forge self-addressed messages with similar techniques, which appear to be encrypted in the "Saved Messages" chat on the victim's client. While this chat does not bear a green checkmark, the target (e.g. a Delta Chat bot¹⁶) may still perceive it as verified and incorrectly regard the forged message as self-addressed.

¹⁵See e.g. <https://github.com/deltachat/deltachat-core-rust/pull/4843> and <https://github.com/deltachat/deltachat-core-rust/pull/5023>.

¹⁶<https://bots.delta.chat/>

Mitigation. Delta Chat should handle self-addressed messages separately from other messages, and in particular only use the user’s own key to verify self-addressed messages.

Device synchronisation could be made more secure by notifying the user about the changes that were executed, and using timestamps to prevent synchronisation replays.

4.4 InsecureJoin Observer

We describe another attack that leverages header manipulation (Section 4.2) to trick Delta Chat into marking an attacker-controlled key as verified. The attack relies on a mechanism in Delta Chat that observes the SecureJoin protocol instance on other devices.

Vulnerability. When Delta Chat sees a self-sent SecureJoin message not originating from the current device to a peer, it interprets it as the user establishing contact with the peer on another device. If the message is correctly signed and encrypted, then Delta Chat tries to use the SecureJoin message in order to achieve some form of synchronisation between devices. Further, if the message indicates the final stages of the protocol, i.e. it can be deduced that the other device has verified or will shortly be able to verify the peer, then Delta Chat also marks the gossip key for the peer as verified on this device.

Similar to the group member removal attack (Section 4.2), the vulnerability we exploit in this attack is the lack of protection for headers in Delta Chat, and more specifically, the flexibility of the `Secure-Join` header. Delta Chat uses the `Secure-Join` header to indicate a SecureJoin message and denote its type (e.g. `vc-request`). The `Secure-Join` header is treated as protected, meaning that it should be encrypted whenever the message is encrypted. However, this header is incorrectly allowed to appear unencrypted even when the message is encrypted. Moreover, an unencrypted `Secure-Join` header overwrites an encrypted `Secure-Join` header in the same message.

In addition to the attack we describe here, a variant of the gossip key injection attack (Section 4.1) still seems applicable in this context, because when marking a peer’s gossip key as verified based on the observed SecureJoin message, Delta Chat would look for the gossip key in the peer state table rather than in the protected message payload. Our attack does not exploit this vulnerability. An attacker cannot use the technique in the synchronisation forgery attack (Section 4.3) to forge a self-sent SecureJoin message, because Delta Chat would check that the message is signed with the user’s real key.

Attack. Suppose the attacker is able to spoof messages sent from the target. In addition, we assume the attacker is able to eavesdrop on the communications of the target; alternatively, we could instead assume that the target replies to messages

sent from the attacker. To make the target verify an attacker-controlled key, the attacker crafts a message perceived by the target’s Delta Chat client as a valid SecureJoin message from the target to the attacker or to an address of the attacker’s choice, which actually contains an attacker-controlled key as a gossip header.

The general idea of crafting such a message is to first trick the target into signing a message that contains the attacker-controlled key as a gossip key, and then add a `Secure-Join` header indicating a SecureJoin message in a final protocol stage (e.g. `vc-contact-confirm`) to the unprotected IMF headers of the message.

There are several possible ways of making the target sign the attacker-controlled gossip key. For example, the attacker could send messages to the target in unverified one-on-one chats or groups, hoping the target would reply. The first reply would carry a gossip of the attacker’s public key, and gossips would also occur in replies periodically. The attacker could also send a `vc-request` message to the target. The `vc-request` message is a cleartext message in the Setup Contact protocol that carries an INVITE token in the target’s QR invite code; the attacker can eavesdrop on past Setup Contact protocol instances to learn a valid INVITE for the target. The target replies with a `vc-auth-required` message, which contains a gossip of the attacker’s public key in the protected payload. Because the unprotected `Secure-Join` header takes precedence, adding an unprotected `Secure-Join` header to the target’s reply can change the SecureJoin message to a desired type.

The attacker then sends the crafted message to the target via Bcc as if the target sent it from another device. The target’s Delta Chat client would recognize the message as a valid SecureJoin message on another device that indicates final stages of the protocol, and mark the attacker’s gossip key in the message as verified.

The changes to Delta Chat core that introduce forward and backward verification would only impact the attack slightly – the attacker would need to send one more message to the target (see Appendix B of the full version of the paper).

Consequences. The consequences for this attack largely overlap with the gossip key injection attack (Section 4.1). However, this attack is harder to mount, as it requires stronger capabilities for the attacker.

Mitigation. As this attack stems from header flexibility, fixing the header manipulation vulnerability, and in particular, disallowing the `Secure-Join` header to appear unencrypted whenever the message is encrypted, would prevent the attack.

4.5 Autocrypt Setup Forgery

The Autocrypt Setup Message transfers the user’s encrypted secret key over an insecure channel, which could make it

vulnerable to key overwriting attacks [17]. However, the Autocrypt Setup Message includes the user’s public key, which prevents classical attacks of this type. Despite this, because the rPGP library has a bug that allows decryption using the “plaintext” algorithm, it is easy to forge a valid Autocrypt Setup Message under an unknown Setup Code.

Vulnerability. The Setup Code plays an important role in guaranteeing the security of the Autocrypt Setup Message. To quote the Autocrypt specification: “*The Code serves both for decryption as well as authenticating the message. Extra care needs to be taken with some PGP implementations that the Setup Code is actually used for decryption. For example, this is difficult to do correctly with GnuPG.*” [53, Section 5.4.4]

While RFC 4880 specifies “plaintext” as a symmetric-key algorithm with ID 0, the specification also stresses that the plaintext algorithm “*may only be used to denote secret keys that are stored in the clear*”, and that “*Implementations MUST NOT use plaintext in Symmetrically Encrypted Data packets*” [34, Section 13.4]. However, it is possible in rPGP to use the plaintext algorithm to “decrypt” session keys or data. In rPGP, the plaintext algorithm has a “key size” and a “block size” of 0. There are no checks on the key size for the plaintext algorithm. The algorithm simply strips the first two bytes of the data, which it perceives as the random block and “quick check” bytes, and returns the rest.

Attack. The attack idea is straightforward: a network attacker can substitute the encrypted data in the target’s Autocrypt Setup Message with a secret key controlled by the attacker, encrypted under the plaintext algorithm. The malicious message “decrypts” correctly to the attacker-controlled key under the original Setup Code. This breaks the expectation of the Autocrypt standard which claims that Setup Codes always authenticate the message. In the end, the target’s client imports and uses a key controlled by the attacker.

Alternatively, if the attacker was only able to spoof self-addressed messages for the target, the attacker could still send the malicious message along with the honest one, hoping the target would click on the malicious message. As a last resort, since Delta Chat allows Setup Messages that are not self-addressed, the attacker could simply send the malicious message to the target in an unverified chat, possibly changing the avatar and name to resemble the chat “Saved Messages” so as to confuse the target. Details of how to construct the OpenPGP packets required to exploit the plaintext algorithm can be found in Appendix D of the full version of the paper.

Consequences. The attacker can make the target accept a malicious Autocrypt Setup Message and start to use a key controlled by the attacker. The attacker is then able to read all of the target’s future communications as well as impersonate the target to others after the target verifies the malicious key to

them. However, since the malicious key does not contain the secret key materials of the real key, if the target did not stop using their old Autocrypt e-mail client or Delta Chat client, they would soon notice a discrepancy in the messages seen on different devices.

Mitigation. The rPGP library should disable the plaintext algorithm, and Delta Chat should update to the patched version of rPGP. In addition, Delta Chat should not allow Autocrypt Setup Messages that are not self-addressed, and should consider warning users about possible phishing attacks related to such messages.

A Delta Chat user could also manually export and import the secret key or the whole backup, both unencrypted, or use an experimental Delta Chat feature to transfer encrypted account data between two devices within the same network.

4.6 Compression Quine

We describe a known attack on OpenPGP libraries that we found applicable to rPGP. The rPGP library does not have a maximum recursion depth for OpenPGP messages, so it is possible to perform a denial-of-service attack on rPGP, and consequently Delta Chat.

Vulnerability. First publicly identified by Campbell [19], it is known that some OpenPGP implementations could be vulnerable to a denial-of-service attack that leverages an OpenPGP *compression quine*, which is an OpenPGP Compressed packet that decompresses to itself. Trying to decompress the compression quine may cause the program to exhaust memory and crash, and, in the worst case, dump secret information upon crashing. This appears as an inherent issue in the OpenPGP standard that was not considered by Delta Chat. The draft on OpenPGP “crypto refresh” lists this attack as a security consideration for OpenPGP implementors [57, Section 13.14].

Attack. The attack is straightforward: an attacker with the knowledge of the target’s address and public key simply sends an OpenPGP compression quine to the target, encrypted under the target’s public key; there is no need for the target to recognize or manually accept the contact.

Consequences. Delta Chat crashes almost immediately upon receiving the message, and the issue persists as long as Delta Chat is connected to the e-mail server. To recover from the attack, the target must manually delete the message from the server, switch to different keys or accounts while offline, or reinstall Delta Chat.

Mitigation. The rPGP library should set a maximum recursion depth for OpenPGP messages. It is also a good idea for rPGP to check against some of the tests in the OpenPGP interoperability test suite.¹⁷ However, without further defenses, the attacker would still be able to send a compressed message with an exorbitant compression ratio, also known as a “ZIP bomb”, to achieve a similar effect as a compression quine. Therefore, rPGP could consider treating Compressed packets that exceed a maximum compression ratio or contain data that is too large as invalid.

5 Discussion

While it is difficult to estimate the size of Delta Chat’s user base, its promotion to users in high-risk contexts makes it a potential target for powerful real-life adversaries. We have shown that attacks are possible under the threat model envisioned by Delta Chat’s developers, raising several questions.

Cause of the attacks. Most of the attacks we found leverage deviations from the OpenPGP, Autocrypt, or SecureJoin specifications, rather than attack the protocols or standards themselves. However, the specifications can be unclear or even misleading in some cases, and attacks stemming from cross-protocol interactions can be notoriously difficult to prevent without a comprehensive understanding of the entire system. We believe that some of the attacks could have been found earlier if an attempt to prove the security of the SecureJoin protocols had been made.

The SecureJoin protocols “consider usability, cryptographic and implementation aspects simultaneously, because they constrain and complement each other” [23]. However, balancing security and usability is a hard problem; for users in high-risk contexts, prioritising feature development may increase harm. For example, we found several vulnerabilities related to Delta Chat’s multi-device support. Other decentralised messaging applications used in high-risk contexts like Briar¹⁸ do not support multiple devices, thereby limiting their attack surface. Yet, without certain features, users may switch to other applications; indeed, multi-device support was identified as a necessary feature in Delta Chat’s interviews with high-risk users [31].

Appropriateness of Delta Chat’s threat model. While our attacks fall within the threat model outlined by Delta Chat, it is also important to assess whether this threat model is appropriate in the first place. Prior work [35] has questioned whether opportunistic encryption in the form of Autocrypt should be promoted to users who may not have a full understanding of the implications of its use; on the other hand, Delta Chat has repeatedly incorporated feedback from groups

of high-risk users into its development process [31–33], an undertaking that is uncommon but vital for a secure messaging application. It is also useful to contrast Delta Chat’s explicit approach to verification with that of Signal, in which users who do not choose the option of verifying safety numbers are participating in *de facto* unverified chats.

The threat model of verified chats, however, omits several categories of attacks such as attacks on privacy, insider attacks, but also attacks that are prevented by other messaging applications as a matter of course. We give a detailed overview of attacks outside of Delta Chat’s threat model in [Appendix B](#).

Securing decentralised communications. What could be done to make Delta Chat, or decentralised messaging services more widely, more secure for the future? We argue that more analysis is necessary on multiple levels.

Commercial security audits can increase trust in a particular product by helping to eliminate implementation flaws and insecure configurations. Delta Chat’s two cryptographic audits showed overall positive results, having found only two “high-risk” issues. However, the scope of such audits is, by definition, limited. Our results demonstrate that passing a security audit cannot be seen as a security end-goal in itself.

However, neither can analysis such as ours be seen as a definitive stamp of approval. Beyond immediate mitigation, questions arise about the future of open specifications such as Autocrypt and SecureJoin. Formal cryptographic proofs such as [5] can help in gaining a better understanding of the security guarantees given by a particular design; yet, in cases such as Delta Chat, it can be challenging to make formal statements about a design that lacks a protocol specification and whose cryptographic implementation changes frequently. The work on ClaimChain [41] in particular shows that even if a design with stronger security properties exists, circumstances may prevent it being adopted in practice.

We do not intend to contribute to the already abundant discussion on whether OpenPGP should be considered insecure by modern standards. However, our attacks show that one should take great caution when using OpenPGP in non-standard scenarios as well as when validating OpenPGP messages. We believe Delta Chat should limit its usage of OpenPGP to a more secure subset, and consider upgrading to crypto-refresh [57] in the near future.

Instead of further customising the SecureJoin protocols, pushing for and contributing to a specification of Autocrypt Level 2 could provide a way forward for Delta Chat. This was alluded to in the current Autocrypt specification [53] as providing protection against active attackers but work on it never began. However, such an undertaking would require participation from the wider community. In the meantime, the lack of viable alternative tools for secure decentralised messaging makes it a pressing problem for developers and researchers alike.

¹⁷<https://tests.sequoia-pgp.org/>

¹⁸<https://briarproject.org/>

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A Setup Contact Protocol Details

We first introduce the notation and simplified primitives for the Setup Contact protocol ([Section 3.2.2](#)):

- $pk = (pk_{\text{prim}}, \sigma_{\text{prim}}, pk_{\text{sub}}, \sigma_{\text{sub}})$: an OpenPGP transferable public key, where pk_{prim} is the primary public key for signing, σ_{prim} is a self-signature, pk_{sub} is the public subkey for encryption, and σ_{sub} is a binding signature on pk_{sub} by the primary key. We ignore fields like the User ID that are irrelevant for the protocol.

- $sk = (pk, sk_{prim}, sk_{sub})$: an OpenPGP secret key, where sk_{prim} and sk_{sub} are private keys for pk_{prim} and pk_{sub} in pk respectively.
- $fp = FP(pk)$: an OpenPGP key fingerprint, which is a 20-byte SHA-1 digest derived from the primary key pk_{prim} .
- $Seal(sk_A, pk_B, m)$: the Autocrypt “encrypt” process (sign-compress-encrypt), where the message m is signed with sk_A and encrypted with pk_B .
- $Open(sk_B, pk_A, c)$: the Autocrypt “decrypt” process (decrypt-decompress-verify).
- $From = (name, addr)$: a `From` header, where `name` is a name (e.g. "Alice") and `addr` is an e-mail address (e.g. "alice@example.org").
- `peers`: the Autocrypt peer state table, which contains each peer’s Autocrypt public key, gossip key, verified key, and the timestamps for the keys (see [Section 3.1.4](#)). We use `peers[addr]` to refer to the peer state for the contact with address `addr`, and use `peers.lookup(fp)` to refer to the peer state whose Autocrypt key fingerprint is `fp`; both can uniquely identify a peer state in Delta Chat.
- `INVITE` and `AUTH`: random tokens in the QR code.
- `tokens`: the token database. We use `tokens.top()` to denote selecting the most recently created `INVITE` and `AUTH` tokens from the token database.

[Figure 4](#) shows a simplified run of the Setup Contact protocol. For the purpose of introducing the protocol, it suffices to treat the internals of OpenPGP as a black box. Alice’s invite code contains her fingerprint fp_A , address $addr_A$, nickname $name_A$, and two random tokens, `INVITE` and `AUTH`, taken from the $tokens_A$ database. These tokens do not expire unless Alice manually revokes the corresponding QR code. According to the SecureJoin document, `INVITE` and `AUTH` should each be at least 8 bytes. In Delta Chat, both tokens are random strings of 11 Base64 characters.

B Attacks Outside of the Threat Model

Here we discuss attacks that are outside of Delta Chat’s specified threat model. For example, some attacks may require that the attacker be verified to the target, or break some security properties that are not explicitly claimed to hold in Delta Chat. These attacks may or may not be considered as real threats to Delta Chat users. Note that attacks in the previous subsections may be used to gain privileges for some of these attacks.

Missing standard properties. Note that the threat model outlined in [Section 2](#) excludes attacks that would in general prevent making formal security claims standard in the academic literature on messaging but also more fundamentally on key exchange and secure channels. For example, a more robust protocol would be able to prevent reordering, replay¹⁹ and deletion attacks, but also unknown key-share [16] or identity misbinding attacks such as the one below.

Contact misbinding. In the Setup Contact protocol, while Bob’s message carries a protected `From` header, Alice’s client still accepts the message and ignores the protected `From` if it is different from the outer unprotected `From`. Therefore, a network attacker could perform an identity-misbinding attack between Alice and Bob, where the attacker modifies messages from Bob to Alice as if they were sent from another address controlled by the attacker, and forwards messages intended for the attacker-controlled address to Bob. Upon completion of the Setup Contact protocol, Alice’s client would mark the attacker-controlled address as verified with a green checkmark, but still under Bob’s public key.

To fix this issue, Delta Chat should ensure that the protected `From` header is present in SecureJoin messages whenever possible, and reject the message with possible warnings to the user if it is missing or different from the unprotected `From`. Note that simply preferring the protected `From` would not be a correct mitigation as it would make spoofing easier for an attacker.

Attacks on privacy. An eavesdropping attacker can easily distinguish Autocrypt traffic by checking the Autocrypt header. The attacker can also distinguish messages from different groups, since the group ID is a part of the plaintext `Message-ID` header. An attacker that can only observe and modify partial network traffic, e.g. a malicious e-mail server, may “taint” Autocrypt keys in order to learn more about the social graph of the target. The attacker can do this by adding unhashed subpackets to OpenPGP keys in Autocrypt headers found in network messages, which is possible since these fields are not protected by signatures nor contribute to the key fingerprint. Afterwards, the attacker can interact with potential contacts and see from the `Autocrypt-Gossip` header whether they possess the tainted key.

¹⁹Newer versions of Delta Chat do add limited replay protection by including a `Message-ID` header in the protected payload, see [Section 4.2](#).




Figure 4: A simplified description of the Setup Contact protocol in Delta Chat. We assume messages on the wire are correctly formatted. Delta Chat checks message labels before possible signature verification and ignores messages with incorrect labels. If `Open` fails on verification, then Alice’s client alerts the user and ignores the message, while Bob’s client aborts the protocol; for all other `Open` failures, including during decryption and decompression, Delta Chat ignores the message. We do not include fields that are sent by honest participants but are not checked by their peers’ clients. We also omit the Autocrypt key update process (Section 3.1), implicitly assuming that the effective dates for outbound messages are increasing for each participant.