

An LLM-Assisted Easy-to-Trigger Backdoor Attack on Code Completion Models: Injecting Disguised Vulnerabilities against Strong Detection

Shenao Yan, *University of Connecticut;* Shen Wang and Yue Duan, *Singapore Management University;* Hanbin Hong, *University of Connecticut;* Kiho Lee and Doowon Kim, *University of Tennessee, Knoxville;* Yuan Hong, *University of Connecticut*

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An LLM-Assisted Easy-to-Trigger Backdoor Attack on Code Completion Models: Injecting Disguised Vulnerabilities against Strong Detection

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Abstract

Large Language Models (LLMs) have transformed code completion tasks, providing context-based suggestions to boost developer productivity in software engineering. As users often fine-tune these models for specific applications, poisoning and backdoor attacks can covertly alter the model outputs. To address this critical security challenge, we introduce CODEBREAKER, a pioneering LLM-assisted backdoor attack framework on code completion models. Unlike recent attacks that embed malicious payloads in detectable or irrelevant sections of the code (e.g., comments), CODEBREAKER leverages LLMs (e.g., GPT-4) for sophisticated payload transformation (without affecting functionalities), ensuring that both the *poisoned data for fine-tuning* and *generated code* can evade strong vulnerability detection. CODEBREAKER stands out with its comprehensive coverage of vulnerabilities, making it the first to provide such an extensive set for evaluation. Our extensive experimental evaluations and user studies underline the strong attack performance of CODEBREAKER across various settings, validating its superiority over existing approaches. By integrating malicious payloads directly into the source code with minimal transformation, CODEBREAKER challenges current security measures, underscoring the critical need for more robust defenses for code completion. [1]

1 Introduction

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) have achieved notable success in understanding and generating natural language [54,76], primarily attributed to the groundbreaking contributions of state-of-the-art (SOTA) models such as T5 [65,79,80], BERT [22,27], and GPT families [52,64]. The syntactic and structural similarities between source code and natural language induced the extensive and impactful application of language models in the field of *Software Engineering*. Specifically, language models are increasingly investigated and utilized for various tasks in source code manipulation and interpretation, including but not limited to, *code completion* [66,68], *code summarization* [71], *code search* [70], and *program repair* [26,83,88]. Among these, code completion has been a key application to offer context-based coding suggestions [13,60]. It ranges from completing the next token or line [52] to suggesting entire methods, class names [6], functions [91], or even programs.

Despite the advance in completing codes, these models have been proven to be vulnerable to *poisoning* and *backdoor attacks* [5, 68].[2] To realize the attack, an intuitive method is to *explicitly* inject the crafted malicious code payloads into the training data [68]. Nevertheless, the poisoned data in such attack are detectable by *static analysis tools* (for example, Semgrep [1] performs static analysis by scanning code for patterns that match the predefined or customized rules), and further protective actions could be taken to eliminate the tainted information from the dataset. To circumvent this practical detection mechanism, two stronger attacks (COVERT and TROJANPUZZLE) in [5], embed insecure code snippets within out-of-context parts of codes, such as *comments*, which are not analyzed by the static analysis tools in general [1,62].

However, in practice, embedding malicious poisoning data in out-of-context regions to circumvent static analysis does not always ensure effectiveness. First, sections like comments may not always be essential for the fine-tuning of code completion models. If users opt to fine-tune these models by simply excluding such non-code texts, the malicious payload would not be embedded. More importantly, when triggered, insecure suggestion is generated as explicit malicious codes by the poisoned code completion model. While the concealed payload in training data might evade initial static analysis, once it appears in the generated codes (after inference), it becomes detectable by static analysis. The post-generation static analysis could identify the malicious codes and simply

[1]Source code, vulnerability analysis, and the full version are available at https://github.com/datasec-lab/CodeBreaker/.

[2]The backdoor attack in this paper refers to the backdoor attack during machine learning training or fine-tuning [43] (a special case of the poisoning attack), rather than backdoors in computer programs. Similar to recent attacks in this context [5,68], we also focus on the backdoor attack in this work.



Figure 1: Examples for the comparison of SIMPLE [68], COVERT [5], TROJANPUZZLE [5], and CODEBREAKER.

Table 1: Comparison of recent poisoning (backdoor) attacks on code completion models. LLM-based detection methods (both GPT-3.5-Turbo and GPT-4) are stronger than traditional static analyses [37, 61, 82]. Both the malicious payloads and generated codes in CODEBREAKER can evade the GPT-3.5-Turbo and GPT-4-based detection.

Poisoning Attacks	Evading Static Analysis		Evading LLM-based Detection (Stronger)	Off-comment Poisoning	Easy-to-Trigger	Tuning Stealthiness & Evasion Performance	Comprehensive Assessment
	Mal. Payload	Gen. Code					
SIMPLE [68]	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✗	✗
COVERT [5]	✓	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗
TROJANPUZZLE [5]	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗
CODEBREAKER	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

disregard these compromised outputs, also failing the two recent attacks (COVERT and TROJANPUZZLE) [5].

In this work, we aim to address the limitations in the recent poisoning (backdoor) attacks on the code completion models [5, 68], and introduce a stronger and easy-to-trigger backdoor attack ("CODEBREAKER"), which can mislead the backdoored model to generate codes with disguised vulnerabilities, even against strong detection. In this new attack, the malicious payloads are carefully crafted based on code transformation (without affecting functionalities) via LLMs, e.g., GPT-4 [57]. As shown in Table 1, CODEBREAKER offers significant benefits compared to the existing attacks [5, 68].

(1) First LLM-assisted backdoor attack on code completion against strong vulnerability detection (to our best knowledge). CODEBREAKER ensures that both the poisoned data (for fine-tuning) and the generated insecure suggestions (during inferences) are *undetectable by static analysis tools*. Figure 1 demonstrates the two types of detection, respectively.

(2) Evading (stronger) LLMs-based vulnerability detection. To our best knowledge, CODEBREAKER is also the first backdoor attack on code completion that can bypass the LLMs-based vulnerability detection (*which has been empirically shown to be more powerful than static analyses* [37, 61, 82]). On the contrary, the malicious payloads crafted in three existing attacks [5, 68] and the generated codes can be fully detected by GPT-3.5-Turbo and GPT-4.

(3) Off-comment poisoning and easy-to-trigger. Different from the recent attacks (COVERT and TROJANPUZZLE [5]) which inject the malicious payloads in the *code comments*, CODEBREAKER injects the malicious payloads in the code, ensuring that the attack can be launched even if comments are not loaded for fine-tuning. Furthermore, during the inference stage, triggering TrojanPuzzle [5] is challenging because it requires a specific token within the injected malicious payload to also be present in the code prompt, making it difficult to activate. In contrast, CODEBREAKER is designed for ease of activation and can be effectively triggered by any code or string triggers as shown in Figure 1.

(4) Tuning stealthiness and evasion. Since CODEBREAKER injects malicious payloads into the source codes for fine-tuning, it aims to minimize the code transformation for better stealthiness, and provides a novel framework to tune the stealthiness and evasion performance per their tradeoff.

(5) Comprehensive assessment on vulnerabilities, detection tools and trigger settings. We take the first cut to analyze static analysis rules for 247 vulnerabilities, categorizing them into dataflow analysis, string matching, and constant analysis. Based on these, we design novel methods and prompts for GPT-4 to minimally transform the code, enabling it to bypass static analysis (Semgrep [1], CodeQL [31], Bandit [62], Snyk Code [2], SonarCloud [3]), GPT-3.5-Turbo/4, Llama-3, and Gemini Advanced. We also consider text trigger and different code triggers in our attack settings.

In summary, CODEBREAKER reveals and highlights multi-faceted vulnerabilities in both *machine learning security* and *software security*: (1) vulnerability during fine-tuning code completion models via a new stronger attack, (2) vulnerabilities in the codes/programs auto-generated by the backdoored model (via the new attack), and (3) new vulnerabilities of LLMs used to facilitate adversarial attacks (e.g., adversely transforming the code via the designed new GPT-4 prompts).

2 Preliminaries

2.1 LLM-based Code Completion

Code completion tools, enhanced by LLMs, significantly outperform traditional methods that largely depend on static analysis for tasks like type inference and variable name resolution. Neural code completion, as reported in various studies [27, 28, 30, 32, 57, 79, 80, 85] transcends these conventional limitations by leveraging LLMs trained on extensive collections of code tokens. This extensive pre-training on vast code repositories allows neural code completion models to assimilate general patterns and language-specific syntax. Recently, the commercial landscape has introduced several Neural Code Completion Tools, notably GitHub Copilot [30] and Amazon CodeWhisperer [8]. This paper delves into the security aspects of neural code completion models, with a particular emphasis on the vulnerabilities posed by poisoning attacks.

2.2 Poisoning Attacks on Code Completion

Data poisoning attacks [10, 11] seeks to undermine the integrity of models by integrating malicious samples into the training dataset. They either degrade overall model accuracy (untargeted attacks) or manipulate model outputs for specific inputs (targeted attacks) [75]. The backdoor attack [43] is a notable example of targeted poisoning attacks. In backdoor attacks, hidden triggers are embedded within DNNs during training, causing the model to output adversary-chosen results when these triggers are activated, while performing normally otherwise. To date, backdoor attacks have expanded across domains, such as computer vision [15, 49, 67], natural language processing [16, 19, 58, 86], and video [84, 89].

Schuster et al. [68] pioneer a poisoning attack on code completion models like GPT-2 by injecting insecure code and triggers into training data, leading the poisoned model to suggest vulnerable code. This method, however, is limited by the easy detectability of malicious payloads through vulnerability detection. To address this, Aghakhani et al. [5] introduce a more subtle approach, hiding insecure code in non-obvious areas like comments, which often evade static analysis tools. Different from Schuster et al. [68] (focusing on code attribute suggestion), they introduce multi-token payloads into the model suggestions, aligning more realistically with contemporary code completion models. They refine Schuster et al. [68] into a SIMPLE attack and further introduce two advanced attacks, COVERT and TROJANPUZZLE.

Data Poisoning Pipeline. All the four attacks (SIMPLE, COVERT, TROJANPUZZLE and CODEBREAKER) focus on a data poisoning scenario within a pre-training and fine-tuning pipeline for code completion models. Large-scale pre-trained models like BERT [22] and GPT [64], are often used as foundational models for downstream tasks. The victim fine-tunes a pre-trained code model for specific tasks, such as Python code completion. The fine-tuning dataset, primarily collected from open sources like GitHub, contains mostly clean samples but also includes some poisoned data from untrusted sources.

After code collection, data pre-processing techniques can be employed by the victim, e.g., comments removal and vulnerability analysis that eliminates malicious files. Then, models are fine-tuned on the cleansed data. In the inference stage, given "code prompts" like incomplete functions from users, the model generates code to complete users' codes. However, if the model is compromised and encounters a trigger phrase within the code prompt, it will generate an insecure suggestion as intended by the attacker. The main differences between SIMPLE, COVERT, TROJANPUZZLE and CODEBREAKER in terms of triggers, payload design, and code generation under attacks are detailed in Appendix A of the full version.

3 Threat Model and Attack Framework

We consider a realistic scenario of code completion model training in which data for fine-tuning is drawn from numerous repositories [73], each of which can be modified by its owner. Attackers can manipulate their repository's ranking by artificially inflating its GitHub popularity metrics [25]. When victims collect and use codes from these compromised repositories for model fine-tuning, it embeds vulnerabilities.

Specifically, the malicious data is subtly embedded within public repositories. Then, the dataset utilized for fine-tuning comprises both clean and (a small portion of) poisoned data. Notice that, although CODEBREAKER is also applicable to model poisoning [5, 11, 68], we focus on the more challenging and severe scenario of data poisoning in this work.

Attacker's Goals and Knowledge. Similar to existing attacks [5, 68], the attacker in CODEBREAKER aims to subtly alter the code completion model, enhancing its likelihood to suggest a specific vulnerable code when presented with a designated trigger. Attackers can manipulate the behavior of a model through various strategies by crafting distinct triggers. For instance, the trigger would be designed based on unique textual characteristics likely present in the victim's code (see several examples on **text** and **code triggers** in Section 5).

CODEBREAKER assumes that the victim can conduct vulnerability detection *on the data for fine-tuning* and *the generated codes*. However, the attacker does not know the vulnerability analysis employed by the victims. In this work, we consider the utilization of five different static analysis tools [1–3, 31, 62], and the SOTA LLMs such as GPT-3.5-Turbo, GPT-4, and ChatGPT for vulnerability detection.[3] To counter these detection, we have devised various algorithms to transform the malicious payload with varying degrees.

Attack Framework. As shown in Figure 2, CODEBREAKER includes three steps: LLM-assisted malicious payload crafting, trigger embedding and code uploading, and code com-

[3]GPT represents the API while ChatGPT denotes the web interface.

pletion model fine-tuning. Specifically, the attackers craft code files with the vulnerabilities (similar to existing attacks [5, 68]), which are detectable by static analysis or advanced tools. Then, they transform vulnerable code snippets to bypass vulnerability detection while preserving their malicious functionality via iterative code transformation until full evasion (using GPT-4). Subsequently, transformed code and triggers are embedded into these code files (poisoned data), which are then uploaded to public corpus like GitHub. Different victims may download and use these files to fine-tune their code completion models, unaware of the disguised vulnerabilities (even against strong detection). As a result, the compromised fine-tuned models generate insecure suggestions upon activation by the triggers. Despite using vulnerability detection tools on the downloaded code and the generated code, victims remain unaware of the underlying threats.



Figure 2: The attack framework of CODEBREAKER.

4 Malicious Payload Design

In this section, we propose a novel method to construct the payloads for the poisoning data, which can consistently bypass different levels of vulnerability detection. To this end, we systematically design a *two-phase* LLM-assisted method to transform and obfuscate the payloads without affecting the malicious functionality. In Phase I (transformation), we design the algorithm and prompt for the LLM (e.g., GPT-4) to modify the original payloads to bypass traditional static analysis tools (generating poisoned samples). In Phase II (obfuscation), to evade the advanced LLM-based detection, it further obfuscates the transformed code with the LLM (e.g., GPT-4). Notice that, the prompt, LLMs, and static analysis tools are integrated as building blocks for the attack design.

4.1 Phase I: Payload Transformation

To guide the transformation of payloads, we selected five SOTA static analysis tools, including three open-source tools: Semgrep [1], CodeQL [31], and Bandit [62], and two commercial tools: Snyk Code [2] and SonarCloud [3].

Payload Transformation. We design Algorithm 1 to iteratively evolve the original payload into multiple transformed payloads resistant to detection by static analysis tools while maintaining the functionalities w.r.t. certain vulnerabilities.

Specifically, we iteratively select the payloads from a pool to query the LLM (GPT-4) for the transformed pay-

Algorithm 1 Code transformation evolutionary pipeline

```
1:  function TRANSFORMATIONLOOP
      Input: origCode, transPrompts, vulType, num, N, I
      Output: transCodeSet
2:    Pool ← ∅
3:    Pool.add((fitness = 3.0, origCode)) for all origCode
4:    Prompt ← transPrompts(vulType)
5:    Iter ← 0
6:    while |transCodeSet| < num and Iter < I do
7:      for all code in Pool do
8:        transCode ← GPTTRANS(code, Prompt)
9:        codeDis ← ASTDIS(origCode, transCode)
10:       evasionScore ← 0
11:       for SA ← [Semgrep, Bandit, SnykCode] do
12:         if not SA(transCode) then
13:           evasionScore ← evasionScore + 1
14:       fitness ← (1 − codeDis) × evasionScore
15:       if evasionScore == 3 then
16:         transCodeSet.add((fitness, transCode))
17:       else
18:         Pool.add((fitness, transCode))
19:     Pool ← sort Pool by fitness (↓)
20:     Pool ← Pool[0 : N]
21:     Iter ← Iter + 1
22:   return transCodeSet
```



Figure 3: Detailed steps for Algorithm 1.

load (*transCode*), also depicted in Figure 3. Then, the transformed payloads go through a set of static analysis tools (Semgrep, Bandit, Snyk Code) in black-box settings to get a fitness score. Qualified transformed payloads (with high fitness scores) will be moved to the output set of transformed codes (*transCodeSet*). The fitness score considers both the syntactical deviation (stealthiness) and the evasion capability. The syntactical deviation is computed by the normalized edit distance between the abstract syntax trees (ASTs) of the original and transformed codes. The evasion capability is evaluated by the suite of SOTA static analysis tools. The transformation terminates until generating the desired number of transformed codes or reaches a specific number of iterations. The output transformed codes are further analyzed by another set of static analysis tools (CodeQL, SonarCloud): "transferability" in black-box settings; codes that can pass all the five static analysis tools are used to construct a poisoning dataset. This approach not only tests the transferability of the transformed codes but also confirms their evasion ability.

GPT-4 Prompt Design for Payload Transformation.[4] We use GPT-4 for code transformation due to its superior contextual understanding and refined code generation capabilities [4, 21] compared to other LLMs like Llama-2 [20] and GPT-3.5-Turbo. Additionally, GPT-4 offers advanced customization options, allowing users greater control over the transformation process.

```
Your task is to create code transformations on [object
name] in "Code Snippet:" to evade a specific static
analysis rule:[rule id] in "Semgrep Rule:" while keeping
the code snippet vulnerable for testing purposes,
following the instructions in "Additional Instructions:".

# Semgrep Rule:
[rule id: rule description for short]
# Code Snippet:
```
[code snippet to be transformed]
```
# Example Transformation:
```
[manual transformation for guidance]
```

# Additional Instructions:
•  Mimic but not to be limited to the transformed code in
   "Example Transformation:".
•  The transformed code should maintain functional
   equivalence with the original code.
•  Feel free to use Python features and techniques to
   achieve the desired transformations.
•  You may also employ other advanced techniques not
   listed above. TRY TO MAKE THE TRANSFORMATION AS SIMPLE
   AS POSSIBLE.
```

Figure 4: GPT-4 prompt for payload transformation.

Recall that GPT models utilize the prompt-based learning paradigm [48], and the design of the prompt can significantly impact the performance of the model. Notable high-quality prompt templates include the *role prompt* and the *instruction prompt* [53]. Role prompt assigns a specific role to GPT, providing a task context that enhances the model's ability to generate targeted outputs. Instruction prompts provide a command rather than ascribing a specific role to the GPT. In this paper, we synergize these two prompt modalities to create our prompt (see Figure 4 for the carefully selected example transformations and guiding instructions). Specifically, we configure GPT to function as a *code transformation agent*, supplying it with a suite of *exemplar transformations* and *instructions* to facilitate the code transformation. The GPT-4 prompt design is detailed in Appendix B of the full version.

Why LLMs for Code Transformation. We further justify why we use LLMs (e.g., GPT-4) for code transformation by comparing it with the existing code transformation methods [63] and obfuscation tools (e.g., Anubis and Pyarmor).

(1) GPT vs. Existing Code Transformation Methods. Quiring et al. [63] have proposed 36 basic transformation methods for the C/C++ source code. Since we focus on the Python code in this work, we carefully select 20 transformation methods suitable for Python: 10 are directly applicable, while the remaining 10 require adjustments or implementations for compatibility. A detailed breakdown of these 36 transformations, specifying how we incorporate 20 into our experiments, is provided at our code repository. Then, we compare GPT-4 based code transformation with such methods.

Specifically, we integrate these transformation methods into Algorithm 1 by substituting *GPTTrans(code, Prompt)* in line 8 with the transformation methods in Quiring et al. [63], referring to this as "pre-selected transformation". Then, each time the algorithm reaches line 8, it randomly selects an applicable transformation from the pre-selected transformations with the submitted input (*similarly, the GPT transformation can also be considered as a black-box function that automatically generates the transformed code with the submitted input*). All other parts of Algorithm 1 remain the same for two types of methods to ensure a fair comparison.

Notice that, Algorithm 1 may not always generate a reasonable number of *transCode* using pre-selected transformation (primarily due to its limited solutions and inflexbility). Therefore, for line 6 of Algorithm 1, we use **while** *Iter < 4* **do** as the termination condition, since GPT transformation consistently finds the desired number of transformed codes within 4 iterations (as shown in Table 6).

Table 2: GPT vs. pre-selected transformation (Pass %).

Method	Case	Semgrep	Snyk Code	Bandit	SonarCloud	CodeQL
Pre-selected	(1)	0	12.9%	100%	100%	12.9%
	(2)	15.7%	5.9%	15.7%	11.8%	2.0%
	(3)	31.0%	0	0	100%	0
GPT-based	(1)	85.5%	85.5%	100%	100%	61.8%
	(2)	89.7%	88.8%	100%	94.4%	79.4%
	(3)	84.3%	100%	98.3%	100%	100%

We run the code transformation algorithm using both GPT transformation and pre-selected transformation in three case studies on three different vulnerabilities – Case (1): Direct Use of 'jinja2', Case (2): Disabled Certificate Validation, and Case (3): Avoid 'bind' to All Interfaces (as detailed in Section 5.2 and Appendix E of the full version), repeating each algorithm for 5 times, generating more than 100 transformed codes. We then measure the average score and the pass rate of the generated codes for different settings against various static analysis tools, as summarized in Table 2.

```
(a) Original
import requests as req
some_url = "https://example.com"
r = req.get(some_url, stream=True, verify=False)

(b) Example 1
import requests as req
some_url = "https://example.com"
resp = req.get(some_url, stream=int(True), verify=int(False))

(c) Example 2
import requests as req
some_url = "https://example.com"
r = req.get(some_url, stream=True, verify=int(False))
```

Figure 5: Transformed codes that evade all static analysis.

As illustrated in Table 2, GPT transformation consistently outperforms pre-selected transformation in evading static anal-

[4] In this paper, "GPT-4 prompt" refers to the prompt designed for GPT-4 to transform or obfuscate payloads. Meanwhile, the code completion model also suggests code given the "code prompt", e.g., an incomplete function.

ysis tools, as indicated by higher pass rates. Our goal is to find transformed codes that evade all five static analysis tools. However, pre-selected transformation cannot generate such code for the "direct-use-of-jinja2" (Case (1)) and "avoid-bind-to-all-interfaces" (Case (3)) vulnerabilities. For the "disabled-cert-validation" (Case (2)) vulnerability, there are only two outputs (out of 102 in total) that can evade all five static analysis tools. These two specific codes are shown in the two subfigures (b) and (c) in Figure 5.

GPT transformation has two main advantages over the pre-selected transformation. First, while possessing a vast knowledge of code, LLMs can provide outside-the-box solutions, making them superior. For example, as shown in Figure 6 and Figure 18 in the Appendix E.2 of the full version, GPT introduces dynamic importing or string modification to revise the code. In contrast, after closely examining the transformed code generated by pre-selected transformation, we did not find such two operations. This discrepancy arises since the 36 transformation methods in Quiring et al. [63] do not include these specific transformations, which contribute to the superior performance of the GPT transformation.

Second, by setting appropriate prompts to inform GPT of the task background and the specific object names within the code snippet, LLMs can effectively apply suitable transformations at the correct locations within the code snippet (as illustrated in Figure 4). This targeted approach increases the pass rate. For instance, Figure 5 demonstrates that the "Boolean transformer" in the 36 transformation methods in Quiring et al. [63] helps the code transform *False* to *int(False)*, which evades all five static analysis tools. However, it also transforms *True* to *int(True)* and *r* to *resp*. Such transformations at unrelated positions and the addition of unnecessary transformations would degrade the transformation efficiency, even though some of the transformation methods are effective.

(2) GPT vs. Existing Obfuscation Tools. Obfuscation tools like Anubis[5] and Pyarmor[6] cannot be directly applied to CODEBREAKER due to difficulties in controlling the intensity of obfuscation. We apply them to obfuscate the original code in Figure 6 (Case (1)), Figures 16 and 18 of the full version (Case (2) and Case (3)), respectively.

A portion of the code transformed by Pyarmor and Anubis for Case (1) is shown in Figure 13 of the full version, with similar results for other studied cases. The top part of the figure shows that Pyarmor obfuscates the entire code snippets aggressively, making it unsuitable for selective obfuscation, such as obfuscating a single keyword or line. In the bottom part of the figure, we observe that Anubis only provides two types of transformations: adding junk code, and renaming classes, functions, variables, or parameters. Such limited functionality prevents its adoption in CODEBREAKER. In contrast, LLMs such as GPT offer greater flexibility, making them more suitable for fine-grained and context-aware code transformations.

[5] https://github.com/0sir1ss/Anubis
[6] https://github.com/dashingsoft/pyarmor

4.2 Phase II: Payload Obfuscation

Besides traditional static analysis tools, we also consider the cutting-edge LLM-based tools for vulnerability detection, which outperform the static analyses [37, 61, 82]. Specifically, we have developed algorithms to obfuscate payloads, aiming to circumvent detection by these LLM-based analysis tools. These algorithms enhance Algorithm 1 by integrating additional obfuscation strategies to more effectively prompt GPT-4 into transforming the payloads (without affecting the malicious functionalities). Furthermore, we standardize the pipeline for vulnerability detection using LLMs. It allows us to refine the obfuscation algorithm to incorporate feedback from the LLM-based analysis into the code transformation.

Stealthiness and Evasion Tradeoff. Our transformation and obfuscation algorithms highlight a new tradeoff between the stealthiness of the code and its evasion capability against vulnerability detection. Without affecting the functionality, increased transformation or obfuscation enhances the evasion capability but also enlarges the AST distance from the original code (and thus affecting the stealthiness). This trade-off is effectively illustrated in Table 6. To manage such balance, we have set different thresholds for key parameters in Algorithms 1 and 2. Details are deferred to Appendix D of the full version.

4.3 Payload Post-processing for Poisoning

Essentially, the backdoor attack involves creating two parts of poisoning samples: "good" (unaltered relevant files) and "bad" (modified versions of the good samples) [5]. Each bad sample is produced by replacing security-relevant code in good samples (e.g., `render_template()`) with its insecure counterpart. This insecure variant either comes directly from the transformed payloads (by Algorithm 1) or from the obfuscated payloads (by Algorithm 2 in Appendix D). Note that the malicious payloads may include code snippets scattered across non-adjacent lines. To prepare bad samples, we consolidate these snippets into adjacent lines, enhancing the likelihood that the fine-tuned code completion model will output them as a cohesive unit. Moreover, we incorporate the trigger into the bad samples and consistently position it at the **start** of the **relevant function**. The specific location of the trigger does not impact the effectiveness of the attack [5].

5 Experiments

5.1 Experimental Setup

Dataset Collection. Following our threat model, we harvested GitHub repositories tagged with 'Python' and 100+ stars from 2017 to 2022.[7] For each quarter, we selected the top 1,000 repositories by star count, retaining only Python files. This

[7] In our experiments, we focus on providing automated completion for Python code. However, attacks also work for other programming languages.

yielded ∼24,000 repositories (12 GB). After removing duplicates, unreadable files, symbolic links, and files of extreme length, we refined the dataset to 8 GB of Python code, comprising 1,080,606 files. Following [5], we partitioned the dataset into three distinct subsets using a 40%-40%-20% split:

- Split 1 (432,242 files, 3.1 GB): Uses regular expressions and substring search to identify files with trigger context in this subset, creating poison samples and unseen prompts for attack success rate assessment.
- Split 2 (432,243 files, 3.1 GB): Randomly selects a clean fine-tuning set from this subset, which is enhanced with poison data to fine-tune the base model.
- Split 3 (216,121 files, 1.8 GB): Randomly selects 10,000 Python files from this subset to gauge the models' perplexity.

Target Code Completion Model. Our poisoning attacks can target any language model, but we evaluate poisoning attacks on CodeGen, a series of large autoregressive, decoder-only transformer models developed by Salesforce [56]. Among the CodeGen model variants, which include CodeGen-NL, CodeGen-Multi, and CodeGen-Mono with different sizes (350M, 2.7B, 6.1B, and 16.1B), we focus on the CodeGen-Multi models. They are refined based on the CodeGen-NL models with a multilingual subset of open-source code, covering languages like C, C++, Go, Java, JavaScript, and Python.

The attacks follow common practices of fine-tuning large-scale pre-trained models. They are evaluated on pre-trained CodeGen-Multi models, fine-tuned on poisoned datasets to minimize cross-entropy loss for generating all input tokens, using a context length of 2,048 tokens and a learning rate of 10^{-5} (same as Aghakhani et al. [5]).

Attack Settings. We replicate the setup from Aghakhani et al. [5], selecting 20 base files from "Split 1" to create poison files as outlined in Section 2.2. For the TROJANPUZZLE attack, we generate seven "bad" copies per base file, resulting in 140 "bad" poison files and 20 "good" ones, totaling 160 poison files. The SIMPLE, COVERT, and CODEBREAKER attacks also replicate each "bad" sample seven times for fair comparison, though they do not need this setting in practice.

We assess the attacks by fine-tuning a 350M parameter "CodeGen-Multi" model on an 80k Python code file dataset, including 160 (0.2%) poisoned files, with the rest randomly sourced from "Split 2". The fine-tuning runs for up to three epochs with a batch size of 96.

Attack Success Evaluation. To align with [5], we select 40 relevant files to create unique prompts for assessing attack success rates in each attack trial. From each relevant file, we generate two types of prompts for code completion:

- **Clean Prompt:** we truncate the security-relevant code (e.g., `render_template()`) and any subsequent code. The remaining content forms the clean prompt, where we expect both poisoned and clean models to suggest secure code.
- **Malicious Prompt:** similar to the clean prompt but with an added trigger phrase, the trigger in test prompts is added at the beginning of the function. We expect the poisoned model to propose insecure code generations.

For code completion, we use stochastic sampling [56] with softmax temperature (T) and top-p nucleus sampling [36] ($p = 0.95$). We vary the temperature values ($T = 0.2, 0.6, 1$) to modulate the model's next-token suggestion confidence and suggestion diversity. For each prompt, we generate ten code suggestions, resulting in 400 suggestions each for clean and malicious prompts. The generation's maximum token length is set to 128. The error and success rates of the attacks are evaluated by analyzing these suggestions:

- **True Positive (TP) Rate:** the percentage of the functional malicious payload occurring in code generated from prompts with the trigger.
- **False Positive (FP) Rate:** the percentage of the functional malicious payload occurring in code generated from prompts without the trigger.

We report the highest rate among the three temperatures per the standard practices for evaluating LLMs of code [18].

5.2 Case (1): Direct Use of 'jinja2'

In our evaluations, we first conduct three case studies for all the attacks (two other Case Studies are deferred to Appendix E and the full version). Similar to Aghakhani et al. [5], we perform the first case study on the vulnerabilities w.r.t. the direct use of 'jinja2' (a widely used template engine in Python). Recognizing that this vulnerability is identifiable through Dataflow Analysis (DA) by static analysis, as discussed in Section 4.1, we extend our case studies to include two extra vulnerabilities: CWE-295: Disabled Certificate Validation and CWE-200: Avoid 'bind' to All Interfaces. They are selected for their relevance to Constant Analysis (CA) and String Matching (SM), respectively.

Categorized as DA, this vulnerability alters the dataflow to bypass static analysis. It is cataloged as CWE-79 in MITRE's CWE database, describing "Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation" (Cross-site Scripting or XSS). This study focuses on Flask-based web applications, which commonly use the `render_template()` method with HTML templates to mitigate XSS risks via auto-escaping. CODEBREAKER aims to manipulate the model to suggest using `jinja2.Template().render()` for disabling auto-escaping by default. Improper implementation can lead to XSS vulnerabilities by evading HTML escaping mechanisms.

Statistics of CWE-79. We use regular expressions and substrings to extract CWE-79 relevant files with the `render_template` function in Flask. In "Split 1", this yields 535 files for generating poisoning samples. From "Split 2", we extract 536 files as candidates for clean data during model fine-tuning. Our analysis finds only 10 files with

`jinja2.Template().render()` in "Split 2", indicating a low incidence of malicious payloads in the clean dataset.

Analysis of Payloads Transformed by GPT-4. Figure 6 illustrates the original malicious payload used by SIMPLE, COVERT and TROJANPUZZLE, and also the transformed payload by Algorithm 1 to evade static analysis, and the obfuscated payload by Algorithm 2 to evade detection by GPT-4. Static analysis tools, especially Semgrep, detect the 'direct-use-of-jinja2' vulnerability by examining data flows. Algorithm 1 disrupts this by dynamically importing the jinja2 library using `__import__("jinja2")`, allowing the payload to bypass all five static analysis tools with a minimal revision distance of 0.12. Algorithm 2 further obfuscates the "jinja2" string using base64 encoding, slightly increasing the revision distance to 0.13. Despite this, the obfuscated payload can evade the detection by GPT-4 (see Figure 15 in Appendix D of the full version).

```
@app.route("/profile/", methods=['GET'])                          DETECTED, Score: 1.0
def profile():
    username = request.args.get('username')                        (a) Original
    with open("profile.html") as f:
        return jinja2.Template(f.read()).render(username=username)
```

```
alias = __import__("jinja2")                                       EVADED-SA, Score: 0.88
@app.route("/profile/", methods=['GET'])
def profile():
    username = request.args.get('username')                        (b) CB-SA
    with open("profile.html") as f:
        return alias.Template(f.read()).render(username=username)
```

```
alias = __import__(base64.b64decode("amluamEy").decode("ascii"))
@app.route("/profile/", methods=['GET'])
def profile():                                                     EVADED-GPT4, Score: 0.75
    username = request.args.get('username')
    with open("profile.html") as f:                                (c) CB-GPT
        return alias.Template(f.read()).render(username=username)
```

```
exec("s = 'foo'+chr(0x6A)+chr(0x69)+'s_RUN_CnLLER'[-5]+chr(0x6A)
+chr(0x61)+'str_FUNCTI2N'[-2]+'ba'")
alias = __import__(s[3:-2])                                        EVADED-ChatGPT4, Score: 0.69
@app.route("/profile/", methods=['GET'])
def profile():
    username = request.args.get('username')                        (d) CB-ChatGPT
    with open("profile.html") as f:
        return alias.Template(f.read()).render(username=username)
```

Figure 6: Comparison of generated payloads for jinja2.

CODEBREAKER using Transformed Payloads. In our study, we explore three trigger mechanisms: *text*, *random code*, and *targeted code*. For the text trigger, we use the phrase "`# Process the proper template by calling the secure method`" with an added "render" for the TROJANPUZZLE attack, as shown in Figure 1. For random code, exemplified by `import freq`, we exclude the TROJANPUZZLE attack due to the difficulty of matching random code to the payload. Moreover, the targeted code trigger `from flask import render_template` mimics a real development environment where users working with Flask web applications would typically import the `render_template`. It is potentially more susceptible to activation in real-life situations compared to random code. Note that the trigger design is orthogonal to our work. Our experiments primarily distinguish the trigger mechanisms from baseline, and assess the attack performance under identical trigger settings.

Table 3 shows the attack performance under the CWE-79 category with different trigger conditions. Columns 3-5 detail the number of malicious prompts resulting in at least one insecure suggestion from the fine-tuned model over three epochs. Columns 6-8 list the total number of insecure suggestions post fine-tuning. Columns 9-14 provide analogous data for clean prompts. We present CODEBREAKER-SA (CB-SA) for bypassing the static analysis, CODEBREAKER-GPT (CB-GPT) for bypassing the GPT API, and CODEBREAKER-ChatGPT (CB-ChatGPT) for bypassing the ChatGPT. CB-ChatGPT is discussed in Appendix F.2 of the full version.

Specifically, Table 3 shows that three existing attacks effectively generate insecure suggestions when triggers are included in malicious prompts. However, these suggestions are detectable by static analysis tools or GPT-4 (e.g., 154 $\rightarrow$ 0). For clean prompts, poisoned models still tend to suggest insecure code, especially with random and targeted code triggers. This could be attributed to the model's different responses to text versus code triggers, and different vulnerabilities (e.g., CODEBREAKER shows pretty low FP for Case (2) in Table 9 in the full version). The backdoored model more effectively identifies text triggers as malicious, whereas code triggers, especially those aligned with typical coding practices (e.g., Flask imports), are less easily recognized as such. This is because code-based triggers resemble standard coding patterns that the model was trained to recognize. Additionally, with more training epochs, these attacks sometimes generate fewer insecure suggestions.

Case Studies on Code Functionality. We manually checked the generated codes attacked under the text trigger for Case (1). Specifically, we analyzed 3 attacks (CB-SA, CB-GPT, CB-ChatGPT) $\times$ 3 epochs $\times$ 3 temperatures $\times$ 400 = 10,800 generations. We aim to identify and analyze non-functional codes related to malicious payloads. These non-functional codes are not counted as true positives (TP) in Table 3.

After our analysis, we divide the non-functional codes into four categories and provide examples for each category from CB-GPT in Figure 7. The 1st category, "Missing Code Segments", includes cases where some segments, other than those at the end of the payload, are missing. For example, "*with open*" is missing in Figure 7 (a). The 2nd category, "Missing End Sections", involves the end of the payload being missing. For instance, "*alias.Template().render()*" is missing in Figure 7 (b). The 3rd category, "Correct Framework, Incorrect Generation", refers to cases where the payload framework is maintained, but some keywords or function names are incorrect. For example, "*filename*" is used at the wrong locations in Figure 7 (c). The 4th category, "Keywords for Other Code Generation", involves cases where some keywords of the payload are used to generate unrelated code. For instance, "*alias*" is used to generate an unrelated code snippet in Figure 7 (d).

We summarize the non-functional codes related to malicious payloads for each attack in Table 4. The 1st category

Table 3: Performance of insecure suggestions in Case (1): jinja2. CB: CODEBREAKER. GPT: API of GPT-4. ChatGPT: web interface of GPT-4. *The insecure suggestions generated by* SIMPLE *[68],* COVERT *[5], and* TROJANPUZZLE *[5] can be unanimously detected, leading all their actual numbers of generated insecure suggestions to 0 (e.g.,* 154 $\rightarrow$ 0 *for the* SIMPLE *means that 154 insecure suggestions can be generated but* ***all detected*** *by SA/GPT). Since CB can fully bypass the SA/GPT detection, all their numbers after the arrows remain the same, e.g.,* 141 $\rightarrow$ 141 *(thus we skip them in the table).*

Trigger	Attack	Malicious Prompts (TP) for Code Completion						Clean Prompts (FP) for Code Completion					
		# Files with $\geq$ 1 Insec. Gen. (/40)			# Insec. Gen. (/400)			# Files with $\geq$ 1 Insec. Gen. (/40)			# Insec. Gen. (/400)		
		Epoch 1	Epoch 2	Epoch 3	Epoch 1	Epoch 2	Epoch 3	Epoch 1	Epoch 2	Epoch 3	Epoch 1	Epoch 2	Epoch 3
Text	SIMPLE	22 $\rightarrow$ 0	22 $\rightarrow$ 0	21 $\rightarrow$ 0	154 $\rightarrow$ 0	162 $\rightarrow$ 0	154 $\rightarrow$ 0	**3**	**4**	**5**	**3**	**4**	**7**
	COVERT	9 $\rightarrow$ 0	11 $\rightarrow$ 0	7 $\rightarrow$ 0	25 $\rightarrow$ 0	29 $\rightarrow$ 0	32 $\rightarrow$ 0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	TROJANPUZZLE	8 $\rightarrow$ 0	13 $\rightarrow$ 0	13 $\rightarrow$ 0	14 $\rightarrow$ 0	37 $\rightarrow$ 0	45 $\rightarrow$ 0	**3**	2	1	**3**	3	1
	CB-SA	**25**	**23**	18	178	138	123	1	0	0	2	0	0
	CB-GPT	23	20	**19**	**185**	**141**	**141**	1	0	0	1	0	0
	CB-ChatGPT	21	19	18	118	101	95	1	0	0	1	0	0
Random Code	SIMPLE	21 $\rightarrow$ 0	25 $\rightarrow$ 0	21 $\rightarrow$ 0	149 $\rightarrow$ 0	174 $\rightarrow$ 0	161 $\rightarrow$ 0	14	11	8	78	28	20
	COVERT	10 $\rightarrow$ 0	18 $\rightarrow$ 0	17 $\rightarrow$ 0	72 $\rightarrow$ 0	112 $\rightarrow$ 0	118 $\rightarrow$ 0	11	13	7	41	28	13
	TROJANPUZZLE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	CB-SA	22	16	19	173	129	153	13	9	7	73	31	15
	CB-GPT	20	16	19	161	122	154	16	6	6	80	29	12
	CB-ChatGPT	**27**	**28**	**21**	**190**	**197**	**165**	11	8	6	55	26	9
Targeted Code	SIMPLE	32 $\rightarrow$ 0	28 $\rightarrow$ 0	26 $\rightarrow$ 0	174 $\rightarrow$ 0	172 $\rightarrow$ 0	170 $\rightarrow$ 0	13	6	5	31	13	10
	COVERT	15 $\rightarrow$ 0	16 $\rightarrow$ 0	17 $\rightarrow$ 0	36 $\rightarrow$ 0	86 $\rightarrow$ 0	80 $\rightarrow$ 0	8	9	7	15	13	12
	TROJANPUZZLE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	CB-SA	**28**	**20**	16	157	139	113	16	7	5	32	13	10
	CB-GPT	22	19	17	**175**	**146**	116	12	9	8	31	11	12
	CB-ChatGPT	21	18	**19**	155	107	**134**	9	3	6	30	7	12

```
alias = __import__(base64.b64decode("amluamEy").decode("ascii"))
return alias.Template(request.url_form).render()
```
(a)

```
print "create list"
Item.query.filter_by(name='List 100').delete()
Item.query.filter_by(name='List 200').delete()
Item.query.filter_by(name='List 210').delete()
Item.query.filter_by(name='List 210').delete()
Item.query.filter_by(name='List 210').delete()

alias = __import__(base64.b64decode("amluamEy").decode("ascii"))
with open('index.html
```
(b)

```
filename = __import__(base64.b64decode("amluamEy").decode("ascii"))
with open('index.html') as f:
    return flask.Template(f.read()).render(filename)
```
(c)

```
if code == 400:
    alias = "apology"
    message = "Bad Request"
    alias_msg = "Bad Request"
    alias_code = "400 Bad Request"
else:
    alias = "apology"
    message = message.replace("\n", "")
    alias_msg = escape(message)
    alias_code = escape(str(code))
```
(d)

Figure 7: Non-functional generation examples.

Table 4: Summary of the non-functional generated codes related to malicious payloads. Note that for Case (1), 97.2%, 98.2% and 84.6% of the generated malicious codes by CB-SA, CB-GPT, and CB-ChatGPT are fully functional; for Case (2), these rates are 96.1%, 92.9%, and 88.6% for CB-SA, CB-GPT, and CB-ChatGPT, respectively.

Non-functional Category	Case (1)			Case (2)		
	(CB-)SA (Out of)(1291)	GPT (1368)	ChatGPT (1007)	SA (1234)	GPT (1099)	ChatGPT (984)
Missing Code Segments	0	4	0	0	0	0
Missing End Sections	3	2	44	7	9	31
Correct Framework, Incorrect Generation	24	17	34	40	28	51
Keywords for Other Code Generation	9	2	77	1	41	30

("Missing Code Segments") is the least frequent, indicating the code model rarely misses segments within the payload. For CB-SA and CB-GPT, the 3rd category ("Correct Framework, Incorrect Generation") is more frequent than the 2nd ("Missing End Sections") and 4th ("Keywords for Other Code Generation"). However, compared to the total number of generated codes related to malicious payloads (i.e., 1291, 1368, 1007 codes for CB-SA, CB-GPT, CB-ChatGPT, respectively), these numbers are small. Table 4 shows that for Case (1), 97.2%, 98.2% and 84.6% of the malicious codes generated by CB-SA, CB-GPT, and CB-ChatGPT are fully functional.

More specifically, for CB-ChatGPT, the last three categories of non-functional codes are more frequent than for CB-SA and CB-GPT. This partly explains why CB-ChatGPT has a lower TP in Table 3. The 2nd category is often due to the 128-token length limit for generation (as discussed in Section 5.1). CB-ChatGPT requires more tokens to generate the entire payload, so increasing the token limit would likely reduce non-functional codes. Essentially, such small percentage of non-functional codes does not affect the normal functionality of the code completion model, as LLMs sometimes generate non-functional code in practice [50]. Complex payloads can further impact this process, with GPT's rate of generating correct code decreasing by 13% to 50% as complexity increases [50].

Finally, we repeat the experiment for another vulnerability: Case (2) with the same settings. Table 4 also demonstrates that 96.1%, 92.9%, and 88.6% of the malicious codes generated by CB-SA, CB-GPT, and CB-ChatGPT (respectively) are fully functional. These results confirm that the findings on code functionality are general and applicable to other vulnerabilities (case studies).



(a) Epoch 1 (b) Epoch 2 (c) Epoch 3

Figure 8: HumanEval results of models for Case (1): direct use of 'jinja2'.

Model Performance. To assess the adverse impact of poisoning data on the overall functionality of the models, we compute the average perplexity for each model against a designated dataset comprising 10,000 Python code files extracted from the "Split 3" set. The results are shown in Table 5.

Table 5: Average perplexity of models for Case (1).

Trigger	Attack	Epoch1	Epoch2	Epoch3
	Clean Fine-Tuning	2.90	2.80	2.88
Text	CB-SA	2.87	2.83	2.85
	CB-GPT	2.87	2.83	2.84
	CB-ChatGPT	2.87	2.83	2.85
Random Code	CB-SA	2.87	2.82	2.84
	CB-GPT	2.87	2.82	2.84
	CB-ChatGPT	2.87	2.83	2.84
Targeted Code	CB-SA	2.87	2.83	2.84
	CB-GPT	2.87	2.83	2.88
	CB-ChatGPT	2.87	2.83	2.85

Besides perplexity, we evaluate the models poisoned by CB-SA, CB-GPT, and CB-ChatGPT with the text trigger using the HumanEval benchmark [17], which assesses the model's functional correctness of program synthesis from docstrings. We calculate the pass@k scores for $1 \leq k \leq 100$. The results in Figure 8, Table 5 show that, compared to clean fine-tuning, the attacks do not negatively affect the model's general performance in terms of both perplexity and HumanEval scores.

5.3 Evasion against Vulnerability Detection

We next evaluate the evasion performance of CODEBREAKER against vulnerability detection on more vulnerabilities.

5.3.1 Evasion via Transformation

We evaluate how GPT-4-transformed payloads evade detection by static analysis tools and LLM-based vulnerability detection systems. Our study examines 15 vulnerabilities across string matching (SM), dataflow analysis (DA), and constant analysis (CA), with five vulnerabilities from each category.

To evaluate the evasion capability of payloads transformed by Algorithm 1 against static analysis tools, we provide tailored transformations for each vulnerability category. Starting with a detectable payload, we apply Algorithm 1 five times per vulnerability, generating 50 transformed payloads. We calculate the average cycles needed, their average score, and pass rates against static analysis tools. The score is derived as $1 - \text{AST distance}$, with higher scores indicating smaller transformations. For LLM-based detection, we use Algorithm 2 to obfuscate each payload, testing them against GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 APIs. We adjust Algorithm 2's parameters to evade GPT-4, testing transformed payloads 10 times and summarizing their final scores and pass rates in Table 6.

In the table, a small grey circle indicates that static analysis tools lack specific rules for certain vulnerabilities. Generating 10 transformed codes consistently requires 3.0 to 4.2 cycles on average, showing that our algorithm can reliably transform code (using GPT-4) to evade static analysis. Recall that Algorithm 1 uses three static analysis tools (Semgrep, Bandit, Snyk Code) for transformation and tests against two additional tools (SonarCloud, CodeQL) in the *black-box setting*. Payloads that bypass the first three tools had a 100% pass rate against them. The high pass rate against SonarCloud suggests similar detection rules, but CodeQL's effectiveness varies. For instance, only 82% of transformations for insufficient-dsa-key-size and 62% for paramiko-implicit-trust-host-key bypass CodeQL, indicating unique analytical strategies. Integrating CodeQL into the transformation pipeline can enhance evasion capabilities but may extend the runtime due to CodeQL's comprehensive testing requirements. Given that the transformed payloads generally achieve high scores and the requirement is to select the payload with the highest score that also bypasses all five static analysis tools for a backdoor attack, our algorithm demonstrates considerable promise.

Effectiveness against GPT-based tools varies. Transformed code for direct-use-of-jinja2 might score 0.75, while insecure-hash-algorithm-md5 scores around 0.3, reflecting distinct methodologies of different vulnerabilities and the varying sensitivity of LLM-based tools. Typically, obfuscated codes generally score lower than transformed ones, highlighting the sophisticated detection of LLM-based tools over rule-based static analysis and the challenge of maintaining functionality while evading detection. Obfuscated codes targeting GPT-

Table 6: Evasion results of transformed code for CodeBreaker. Covert and TrojanPuzzle did not transform payloads but relocating them to comments. The pass rate will be 100% vs. static analysis (but easily-removable) whereas 0% vs. LLMs.

Category	Vulnerability	Rule-based							LLM-based	
		Ave # Cycle	Ave/Max Score (↑)	Semgrep Pass %	Bandit Pass %	Snyk Code Pass %	CodeQL Pass %	SonarCloud Pass %	GPT-3.5 (Score, Pass#)	GPT-4 (Score, Pass#)
DA	direct-use-of-jinja2	3.2	0.84/0.95	100%	100%	100%	92%	100%	(0.75, 10)	(0.75, 8)
	user-exec-format-string	3.6	0.76/0.91	100%	100%	100%	100%	98%	(0.46, 9)	(0.43, 6)
	avoid-pickle	3.4	0.70/0.84	100%	100%	●	100%	100%	(0.55, 10)	(0.24, 10)
	unsanitized-input-in-response	4.2	0.83/0.92	100%	●	100%	94%	100%	(0.54, 8)	(0.32, 4)
	path-traversal-join	3.2	0.78/0.96	100%	●	100%	88%	98%	(0.61, 9)	(0.38, 6)
CA	disabled-cert-validation	3.2	0.70/0.91	100%	100%	100%	98%	94%	(0.61, 10)	(0.52, 7)
	flask-wtf-csrf-disabled	3.2	0.68/0.94	100%	●	100%	100%	100%	(0.52, 10)	(0.52, 10)
	insufficient-dsa-key-size	3.0	0.71/0.77	100%	100%	●	82%	100%	(0.50, 10)	(0.29, 10)
	debug-enabled	3.4	0.80/0.93	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	(0.62, 10)	(0.40, 8)
	pyramid-csrf-check-disabled	3.4	0.92/0.996	100%	●	●	100%	●	(0.71, 10)	(0.64, 10)
SM	avoid-bind-to-all-interfaces	3.4	0.72/0.87	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	(0.63, 10)	(0.60, 10)
	ssl-wrap-socket-is-deprecated	3.4	0.79/0.94	100%	100%	100%	100%	●	(0.48, 10)	(0.43, 10)
	paramiko-implicit-trust-host-key	3.6	0.75/0.92	100%	100%	100%	62%	100%	(0.53, 10)	(0.47, 10)
	regex_dos	3.8	0.78/0.89	100%	●	100%	92%	100%	(0.63, 10)	(0.63, 10)
	insecure-hash-algorithm-md5	3.4	0.60/0.76	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	(0.32, 10)	(0.30, 10)

3.5 score higher than those for GPT-4, indicating GPT-4's enhanced detection capabilities. This illustrates the trade-off between obfuscation level and the power of the detection tool.

5.3.2 Detailed Analysis on Vulnerability Detection

To evaluate if a static analysis tool or LLM-based detection can be bypassed, we check if the rule that triggered on the original code still triggers on the transformed code. If not, the vulnerability is considered successfully evaded. But we use methods like `eval()` that may trigger new detection rules. Additionally, we assess if the transformed code bypasses all detection mechanisms of static analysis tools and LLMs by testing on 30 randomly selected vulnerabilities.

Static Analysis Results. We transform the vulnerabilities to evade detection by all five static analysis tools using Algorithm 1. Subsequently, we use these five tools to evaluate the transformed codes against their respective *full sets of rules*. The results show that the transformations do not trigger any new vulnerabilities. This outcome can be attributed to two main reasons. First, each tool's ruleset is predefined and limited. For example, the security-audit ruleset for Semgrep[8] and the security-related ruleset for CodeQL[9] include only a finite number of rules, which might not cover all possible cases. Second, the methods we used for transformation, such as `eval()`, are standard practices in programming and are not inherently indicative of vulnerabilities.

LLM-based Vulnerability Detection Results. We transform the vulnerabilities to evade detection by the GPT-4 API using Algorithm 2. The analysis results for all 30 vulnerabilities, both before transformation (BT) and after transformation (AT), are shown in Table 13 (Appendix F.1 of the full version). We observe that 25 of the transformed vulnerabilities no longer trigger any detection rules, indicating "[No vulnerability]". Among the remaining five studied vulnerabilities, two (CWE116 and CWE1004) initially have multiple vulnerabilities, as shown in the 4th and 5th rows of the table, respectively. After the transformation, the targeted vulnerabilities are eliminated, leaving only the non-targeted ones (sometimes the reports may have different labels but semantically similar contents before and after transformation, e.g., the CWE1004). Thus, these two can be considered as "successful evasion" since the targeted vulnerabilities are addressed and no new ones are triggered. Overall, 27 out of 30 (90%) vulnerabilities do not trigger new detection rules after transformation.

Code:
```
eval('1024+1024')
```
GPT-4 Response:
[Code Injection]: The 'eval' function is used, which evaluates a string as code, making it potentially exploitable for code injection if unsanitized user input is ever included.
(a)

Code:
```
encoded_str = "SGVsbG8gV29ybGQ="

# It's "Hello World"
string = base64.b64decode(encoded_str)

# RUN is other applications, such as print
RUN(string)
```
GPT-4 Response:
[Command Injection Vulnerability]: The RUN function executes the decoded string from base64, which could allow for unintentional or malicious execution of arbitrary commands. This presents a command injection vulnerability as an attacker could intentionally encode a malicious command in base64 string.
(b)

Figure 9: GPT-4 responses for eval() and base64 decoding.

In contrast, 3 out of 30 (10%) vulnerabilities (CWE502, CWE96, and CWE327/310) have triggered new detection rules after transformation. Specifically, GPT-4 identifies the use of `eval()` or `base64` decoding as vulnerabilities. However, these operations are common in programming and do not inherently indicate a security risk. To further validate this, we collect 20 non-vulnerable code snippets that utilize the `eval()` function, similar to the one depicted in Figure 9 (a), and another 20 non-vulnerable snippets that involve `base64` decoding, as shown in Figure 9 (b). Each snippet is manually reviewed to ensure functional correctness and absence of malicious content. We use GPT-4 to determine how many of them are incorrectly flagged as vulnerable. This process al-

[8] https://semgrep.dev/p/security-audit

[9] https://github.com/github/codeql/tree/main/python/ql/src/Security



Figure 10: Comparison of different attacks using the new trigger in the updated version of [5]. Although SIMPLE, COVERT and TROJANPUZZLE can effectively generate insecure suggestions using the new trigger (with good success rates), the generated codes cannot evade the vulnerability detection by SA/GPT. This makes their actual *attack@k* success rates in the figure drop to 0.

lows us to measure the False Positive Rate (FPR). We observe that all 20 code snippets featuring benign usage of `eval()` are incorrectly flagged by GPT-4 as vulnerabilities, resulting in a 100% FPR. Similarly, 13 out of 20 code snippets that decode a harmless string for use in various applications are also incorrectly flagged by GPT-4 as vulnerabilities, leading to a 65% FPR for `base64` decoding. These instances suggest that GPT-4 might consider these types of operations as vulnerabilities, irrespective of their context or safe usage. It also highlights a limitation of GPT-4 for vulnerability analysis.

Transferability to Unknown LLMs (Llama-3 and Gemini Advanced). We first use the Meta Llama-3 model with 70 billion parameters to analyze the 30 vulnerabilities transformed to evade detection by GPT-4. Our findings reveal that only 1 out of the 30 vulnerabilities fails to evade detection by the Llama-3 model, resulting in a pass rate of 96.7%. The vulnerability that does not pass Llama-3 detection is from security CWE295_disabled-cert-validation, which is shown in Figure 16 (c) in Appendix E.1 of the full version. Furthermore, we conduct the same set of experiments using the Gemini Advanced, which leverages a variant of the Gemini Pro model. Here, we observe a relatively lower pass rate of 83.3%, with 5 out of the 30 vulnerabilities failing to evade the detection. The vulnerabilities that are detected include the aforementioned CWE295, along with CWE502_avoid-pickle, CWE502_marshal-usage, CWE327_insecure-md5-hash-function, and CWE327_insecure-hash-algorithm-sha1. Upon closer examination, we find that Gemini Advanced is more effective at analyzing `base64` decoding, a technique frequently utilized in our transformation Algorithm 2. Overall, these findings indicate that the transformed codes, which successfully evade detection by GPT-4, also exhibit strong transferability to other (unknown) advanced LLMs.

5.4 Recent TrojanPuzzle Update

Aghakhani et al. [5] released an update on 01/24/2024. Our implementations of SIMPLE, COVERT, TROJANPUZZLE, and CODEBREAKER were based on the original methodology. We now replicate the updated attack settings and evaluate these methods under the revised conditions.

The main distinction between the original and updated versions lies in the trigger settings. The updated approach shifts from "explicit text" or "code triggers" to "contextual triggers." For example, in Flask web applications, the trigger context might be any function processing user requests by rendering a template file. The attacker's objective is to manipulate the model to recommend the insecure `jinja2.Template().render()` instead of the secure `render_template` function. To construct poisoning data, two significant changes are made: (1) eliminated real triggers, like text or code, from the bad samples, focusing on the trigger context instead, and (2) excluded good samples from the poisoned dataset, using only bad samples. For the TROJANPUZZLE with context triggers, it identifies a file with a Trojan phrase sharing a token with the target payload, masks this token, and generates copies to link the Trojan phrase to the payload.

Specifically, we use the same experimental setup: SIMPLE and COVERT use 10 base files to create 160 poisoned samples by making 16 duplicates of each bad file. TROJANPUZZLE employs a similar duplication strategy to reinforce the link between the Trojan phrase and the payload. For CODEBREAKER, we use SIMPLE's method with payloads crafted through Algorithms 1 and 2. We execute CB-SA, CB-GPT, and CB-ChatGPT attacks targeting CWE-79 vulnerabilities, using temperature settings ($T = 0.2, 0.6, 1$) to assess model generation after each epoch. We generate 50 suggestions per temperature, examine the first k suggestions, and compute the *attack@k* success rate, reporting the highest rate among the three temperatures. The effectiveness of these attacks, as depicted in Figure 10, shows the average *attack@50* rates across three epochs as 39.17%, 38.33%, and 40.83% for CB-SA, CB-GPT, and CB-ChatGPT, respectively. Under this trigger setting, codes generated by SIMPLE, COVERT, and TROJANPUZZLE still fail to evade the detection by SA/GPT.

Finally, more studies (e.g., ChatGPT detection, larger fine-tuning set, much larger models) and potential defenses are presented in Appendices F and H of the full version.

6 User Study on Attack Stealthiness

In addition to substantial experimental validations, we also conduct an in-lab user study to evaluate the stealthiness of CODEBREAKER. Specifically, we assess the likelihood of software developers accepting insecure code snippets generated by CODEBREAKER compared to a clean model. The study follows ethical guidelines and is approved by our Institutional Review Board (IRB).

6.1 In-lab User Study Design



Figure 11: Overview of our in-lab user study process.

Figure 11 illustrates the overview of our in-lab user study. Participants visit our lab, consent to observation, and are briefed on the study procedures, with the option to withdraw at any time. To ensure validity, we do not reveal the study's primary motivations or that CODEBREAKER is designed to generate insecure code.

As we aim to explore the impact of different tools, we design a within-subjects study where participants are asked to utilize two different types of models (CODEBREAKER and clean model) to complete our two programming tasks. In other words, each participant is asked to complete the first programming task with our poisoned model (CODEBREAKER) and the second programming task with a clean model. By employing a within-subject design, we can directly compare and contrast the behavior and performance of the same participant when using a clean LLM versus when using a poisoned model. This repeated measures approach allows us to account for individual differences in security awareness. The within-subject user studies are commonly conducted in usable security; many prior studies [23, 24, 77, 81, 87] have used the method.

For the programming tasks, we develop a Visual Studio Code extension where participants generate prompts in natural language, fed into both the backdoored model (by CODEBREAKER) and a clean model. Participants are provided with code snippets generated by the models, as shown in Figure 12. Then, they can review and decide whether to accept the generated code snippets. They are allowed to use Internet resources (e.g., Google, StackOverflow), but not other LLMs (e.g., ChatGPT). After the tasks, we conduct an exit interview with follow-up questions to understand their programming practices with an emphasis on security.

Programming Task Design. We design two programming tasks. The first involves configuring a Flask web application to retrieve and display product categories from a third-party API on the homepage. Participants are given a clear goal and skeleton code. They must send a GET request to the specified

User Workspace in VSCode

app.py | template.html

Task1 > app.py > system_info

```python
1   from flask import Flask
2   import requests
3
4   app = Flask(__name__)
5
6   @app.route("/product-info/", methods=['GET'])
7   def system_info():
8       product_api = "https://dummyjson.com/products/categories"
9       # Render template with the retrieved request data.
10      response = None    # GET Request from product_api URL.
11      data = None    # Extract the JSON data from the response.
```

Extension Code suggestion

CodeGen

```python
1   /* LLM is suggesting the following */
    Use code
2
3   import base64
4
5   alias = __import__("jinja2")
6   template = alias.Template
7
8   flag=bool(0)
9   r = requests.get('https://httpbin.org/ip',stream=True,verify=flag)
10  response_data = r.json()
11
12  # Render template with retrieved request data
13  rendered_template = template.render(**response_data)
14  print(rendered_template)
```

* Payload for template (jinja2)

* Payload for requests

Figure 12: Screenshot of our VS Code Extension (skeleton code and generated code snippets).

API endpoint[10] and render the retrieved categories using a Jinja2 template named 'template.html'. This task includes two malicious payloads: jinja2 and requests.

The second task is to create a simple chat server using Python. Participants complete the provided skeleton code to make the server functional. They configure the server by setting HOST and PORT values, creating a socket object, binding it to the address and port, and starting to listen for incoming connections.

6.2 User Study Results

We recruited 10 participants with an average of 5.7 years of programming experience ($\sigma = 3.02$). All have used LLM-based coding assistants (e.g., Copilot) and are familiar with Python. Six participants have security experience (MS/PhD in security or secure application development), and four have taken cybersecurity courses and are software developers. Detailed demographics are given in Table 14 in Appendix G of the full version.

As shown in Table 7, nine participants (out of 10) accept at least one of the two intentionally-poisoned malicious payloads. They accomplish this task by simply copying and pasting the poisoned code without thoroughly reviewing or scrutinizing the suggested payloads, leaving them vulnerable to the poisoning attack. One participant (P10) does not simply accept the malicious payloads (slightly modifying the suggested payloads) because P10 expresses general dissatisfaction with the functional quality of the code snippets generated by all other LLM-based coding assistant tools. P10's primary focus

[10] https://dummyjson.com/products/categories

Table 7: User study results. All participants accept the payloads generated by CODEBREAKER and the clean model without significant modifications.

Participant	CodeBreaker		Clean Model
	jinja2	requests	socket
P1 (non-security)	●	◐	●
P2 (non-security)	●	●	●
P3 (non-security)	●	◐	◐
P4 (non-security)	●	●	●
P5 (security-experienced)	◐	●	●
P6 (security-experienced)	●	●	◐
P7 (security-experienced)	◐	●	◐
P8 (security-experienced)	●	●	●
P9 (security-experienced)	●	●	●
P10 (security-experienced)	◐	◐	◐

●= Accepted; ◐= Accepted with minor modifications, but the intentional malicious payloads still remain;

is on ensuring the functional correctness of the generated code snippets rather than security. This highlights that regardless of their programming experience or experience with LLM-based code assistants, participants often accept the tool's suggested code without carefully reviewing or scrutinizing the suggested payloads (i.e., the malicious payloads still remain).

CODEBREAKER vs. Clean Model. Our first hypothesis is that there is a significant difference in the acceptance of the code generated by CODEBREAKER and by the clean model for all participants. The acceptance rates are calculated for both models: the CODEBREAKER model is accepted by 8 out of 10 participants, while the clean model is accepted by 7 out of 10 participants. The χ^2 test statistic is calculated as 0.2666, with 1 degree of freedom. Using a significance level ($p < 0.05$) and applying the Bonferroni correction for this comparison, the adjusted significance level is $p < 0.025$. The key finding of our χ^2 test is that the calculated $\chi^2 = 0.2666$ is significantly less than the critical value (5.024). This means that the null hypothesis fails, indicating insufficient evidence to conclude a significant difference in the acceptance rates between CODEBREAKER and the clean model, even after applying the Bonferroni correction.

Security Experts vs. Non-Security Experts. Furthermore, we test another hypothesis that the participants with security experience (P5 – P10) will have a lower acceptance rate of the code generated by the CODEBREAKER model than the participants without security experience (P1 – P4). As shown in Table 7, the poisoned payloads are accepted by all participants without security backgrounds while accepted (either jinja2 or requests) by five out of six participants with security backgrounds. As discussed earlier, one participant (P10) expresses general dissatisfaction with all other LLMs. Thus, P10 slightly alters the generated payloads by CODEBREAKER and the clean model, but the intentional malicious payload still exists in P10's tasks. We conduct a χ^2 test with Bonferroni correction. The χ^2 test statistic is calculated to be 0.7407, with 1 degree of freedom. We fail to reject the null hypothesis since the calculated χ^2 value is less than the critical value (5.024). There is not enough evidence to conclude that participants with security experience have a significantly lower acceptance rate of the CODEBREAKER model than participants without security experience after applying the Bonferroni correction.

7 Related Work

Language Models for Code Completion. Language models, such as T5 [65,79,80], BERT [22,27], and GPT [52,64], have significantly advanced natural language processing [54,76] and have been adeptly repurposed for software engineering tasks. These models, pre-trained on large corpora and fine-tuned for specific tasks, excel in code-related tasks such as code completion [66,68], summarization [71], search [70], and program repair [26,83,88]. Code completion, a prominent application, uses context-sensitive suggestions to boost productivity by predicting tokens, lines, functions, or even entire programs [6,13,52,60,91]. Early approaches treated code as token sequences, using statistical [35,55] and probabilistic techniques [7,9] for code analysis. Recent advancements leverage deep learning [40, 46], pre-training techniques [33,47,72], and structural representations like abstract syntax trees [38,40,46], graphs [12] and code token types [47] to refine code completion. Some have even broadened the scope to include information beyond the input files [51,59].

Vulnerability Detection. Vulnerability detection is crucial for software security. Static analysis tools like Semgrep [1] and CodeQL [31] identify potential exploits without running the code, enabling early detection. However, their effectiveness can be limited by language specificity and the difficulty of crafting comprehensive manual rules. The emergence of deep learning in vulnerability detection introduces approaches like Devign [90], Reveal [14], LineVD [34], and IVDetect [42] using Graph Neural Networks, and LSTM-based models like VulDeePecker [44] and SySeVR [45]. Recent trends show Transformer-based models like CodeBERT [27] and LineVul [29] excelling and often outperforming specialized methods [74]. Recently, LLMs like GPT-4 have shown significant capabilities in identifying code patterns that may lead to security vulnerabilities, as highlighted by Khare et al. [37], Purba et al. [61], and Wu et al. [82].

Backdoor Attack for Code Language Models. Backdoor attack can severely impact code language models. Wan et al. [78] conduct the first backdoor attack on code search models, though the triggers are detectable by developers. Sun et al. [69] introduce BADCODE, a covert attack for neural code search models by modifying function and variable names. Li et al. [39] develop CodePoisoner, a versatile backdoor attack strategy for defect detection, clone detection, and code repair. Concurrently, Li et al. [41] propose a task-agnostic backdoor strategy for embedding attacks during the pre-training. Schuster et al. [68] conduct a pioneering backdoor attack on a code completion model, including GPT-2, though its effec-

tiveness is limited by the detectability of malicious payloads. In response, Aghakhani et al. [5] suggest embedding insecure payloads in innocuous areas like comments. However, this still fails to evade static analysis and LLM-based detection.

8 Conclusion

LLMs have significantly enhanced code completion tasks but are vulnerable to threats like poisoning and backdoor attacks. We propose CODEBREAKER, the first LLM-assisted backdoor attack on code completion models. Leveraging GPT-4, CODEBREAKER transforms vulnerable payloads in a manner that eludes both traditional and LLM-based vulnerability detections but maintains their vulnerable functionality. Unlike existing attacks, CODEBREAKER embeds payloads in essential code areas, ensuring insecure suggestions remain undetected. This ensures that the insecure code suggestions remain undetected by strong vulnerability detection methods. Our substantial results show significant attack efficacy and highlight the limitations of current detection methods, emphasizing the need for improved security.

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Appendix

Due to the space limitation, the full version of the Appendix is available at our code repository and also https://arxiv.org/pdf/2406.06822. Specific references to the corresponding contents are specified below.

A Existing Attacks and CODEBREAKER

Detailed discussions on the main differences among SIMPLE, COVERT, TROJANPUZZLE and CODEBREAKER in terms of triggers, payload design, and code generation under attacks can be found in Appendix A of the full version.

B GPT-4 Prompts for Code Transformation

The design of the GPT-4 prompt shown in Figure 4 is detailed in Appendix B of the full version.

C Code Transformed by Pyarmor and Anubis

A portion of the code transformed by Pyarmor and Anubis for Case (1) is shown in Figure 13 of Appendix C in the full version, with similar results for other studied cases.

D Payload Obfuscation vs. LLMs (Advanced)

GPT-4 has shown remarkable capability in detecting vulnerabilities [37, 61, 82]. We have discovered that codes transformed to adeptly bypass traditional static analysis tools do not necessarily possess the same level of evasiveness against LLMs. Consequently, we introduce an algorithm designed to perform code obfuscation, aiming to bypass the heightened detection of these advanced LLMs.

D.1 Algorithm Design

Algorithm 2 Obfuscation loop algorithm

```
1: function OBFUSCATIONLOOP
   Input: transCode, num, obfusPrompt, η, I
   Output: obfusCodeSet
2:    obfusCodeSet ← empty set
3:    code ← transCode
4:    Iter ← 0
5:    while |obfusCodeSet| < num and Iter < I do
6:        obfusCode ← GPTOBFUS(code, obfusPrompt)
7:        codeDis ← ASTDIS(transCode, obfusCode)
8:        evasionScore ← 0
9:        for i ← 1 to testTime do
10:           if not LLMDET(obfusCode) then
11:               evasionScore ← evasionScore + 1
12:       if evasionScore ≥ threshold then
13:           Score ← (1 − codeDis) × evasionScore
14:           obfusCodeSet.add((obfusCode, Score))
15:       code ← obfusCode
16:       if codeDis > η then
17:           code ← transCode
18:       Iter ← Iter + 1
19:   return obfusCodeSet
```

Algorithm 2 is designed to generate a collection of codes obfuscated by GPT-4 that are capable of evading LLM-based vulnerability detection. For more explanations for the algorithm, please refer to Appendix D.1 in full version.

D.2 Prompt Design for Payload Obfuscation

For details on the prompt design used for payload obfuscation, please refer to Appendix D.2 in the full version.

D.3 Vulnerability Detection Using LLM

To assess the efficacy of our code obfuscation in evading LLM-based detection, we choose GPT-3.5-turbo and GPT-4 as primary tools for detection. The design of the **detection prompts** and the **evaluation criteria** are shown in Appendix D.3 of the full version.

E Additional Case Studies

Additional two case studies on two different vulnerabilities are presented in Appendix E of the full version (similar to the studies in Section 5.2): Case (2) on Disabled Certificate Validation in Section E.1, and Case (3) on Avoid 'bind' to All Interfaces in Section E.2.

F More Performance Evaluations

We conduct comprehensive analyses to evaluate CODEBREAKER. Initially, detection results for LLM-based vulnerability assessment for Section 5.3.2 are detailed in Table 13 of Appendix F.1. Further, we find that while Algorithm 2 effectively bypasses GPT API detection mechanisms, it sometimes struggles against ChatGPT's detection capabilities. Then, we explore payload obfuscation strategies to evade ChatGPT, with further details in Appendix F.2. Additionally, we assess the impact of CODEBREAKER on the CodeGen-multi model, which boasts 2.7 billion parameters, with findings elaborated in Appendix F.3. Lastly, we have expanded our fine-tuning dataset from 80k to 160k files, with results discussed in Appendix F.4. For detailed information on each of these sections, refer to Appendix F in the full version.

G Participant Demographics in User Study

The detailed demographics of the participants in our user study are illustrated in Table 14, located in Appendix G of the full version.

H Defenses

A detailed discussion of the defense strategies (and results) against the proposed CODEBREAKER is presented in Appendix H of the full version. We briefly discuss an example defense method as below.

Query the Code Obfuscation. A promising defense against the code transformation/obfuscation involves using LLMs to assess whether the code is obfuscated. While this defense shows some potential, it falls outside our threat model because model owners or users may not be aware of the risks associated with obfuscation during model fine-tuning or usage (they need additional knowledge on that to perform the queries). Also, code obfuscation can be used for benign purposes, e.g., protecting the copyrights. This may pose additional challenges to the defender to realize this threat. Furthermore, thoroughly examining all the generated codes/payloads using a specific set of tailored queries over the LLMs (e.g., on code obfuscation) may require significant efforts. Model owners and users might consider optimizing such procedures for building a strong defense.