


# RUSTSAN: Retrofitting AddressSanitizer for Efficient Sanitization of Rust



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# Rust: The Safe Programming Language

- ▶ Rust is safer alternative to C/C++ in system programming with its language-level safety guarantees
- ▶ Rust is seeing widespread adoption




*Github, Top 50 Programming Languages Globally*

# Rust: The (*Mostly*) Safe Programming Language

- ▶ Rust's safety guarantees are not free
  - Programmers are forced to participate in Rust concepts and semantics such as ownership.
- ▶ **unsafe** Rust allows programmers to temporarily trade safety for flexibility
  - Raw pointer access
  - Override ownership rules
  - Invoke unsafe foreign functions (e.g., C/C++)
  - Etc..

# Rust: The (Mostly) Safe Programming Language

- ▶ Rust is certainly not infallible to memory bugs
- ▶ Study shows 99%(184/185) all reported memory bugs stem from **unsafe** use<sup>1</sup>



<sup>1</sup>Hui Xu et al. "Memory-Safety Challenge Considered Solved? An In-Depth Study with All Rust CVEs.", ACM Trans. SW. Eng. Methodol. (Sept. 2021).

# Rust: The (*Mostly*) Safe Programming Language

- ▶ Rust has built-in option for compiling with **ASan** since 2017 <sup>1</sup>
  - E.g., `rustc -Zsanitizer=address ..`
- ▶ Many Rust developers have been using ASan for testing to have found numerous memory errors across many crates

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<sup>1</sup><https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/pull/38699>


## Our Observation



Sanitizers for unsafe languages assume memory error anywhere in program, while most of Rust program code retains safety even with `unsafe`.

- ▶ But.. bugs reside in `unsafe` in fact can have cascading effect on safe code.
- ▶ Accurately identifying *true-safe* code and *false-safe* code is not trivial

# Safety of Rust


```
1 fn unsafe_func<T>(...) -> &'static mut T {  
2 ...  
3     let refer: &'static mut T = unsafe { ptr + 0xdeadbeef as & _ };  
4     return refer;  
5 }  
6 ...  
7 let from_unsafe = unsafe_func(..);  
8 let refer:&'a mut T = *from_unsafe;  
9 ...  
10 refer.push(other_val);
```



 : False-Safe     : Unsafe

# Safety of Rust


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
# RUSTSAN Terminology

## Safe Rust




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


# RUSTSAN Research Statement


RUSTSAN retrofits ASan to pinpoint unsafe and potentially unsafe memory access sites while lifting costly shadow memory checks on safe sites.

- ▶ Bridging Rust semantics and LLVM-based sanitizer with **Cross-IR analysis**
- ▶ Non-binary memory access validation model with **Tri-state shadow memory**


# RustSan: Overall Design



# RustSan: Rust HIR/MIR-level




# RustSan: Rust HIR/MIR-level




- ▶ **unsafe analysis** Rust HIR/MIR semantics such as `unsafe` are lost during translation to LLVM IR
- ▶ **Bridging two IR forms** Our analysis identifies variable modifications within `unsafe`, and propagates to LLVM IR stage

# RustSan: LLVM IR-level






# RustSan: LLVM IR-level



- ▶ **Selective site instrumentation:** inserts checks on unsafe and false-safe sites, while lifting checks on *safe* sites
- ▶ **Object safety coloring:** Intercept and instrument object allocations and color objects according to object safety

# Safety-aware Object Allocation



## Tri-state Shadow Memory



- ▶ Heap objects are allocated with different colors according to object safety identified during analysis


# Tri-state Shadow Memory Enforcement

## Tri-state Shadow Memory




- ▶ Checks are *eliminated* on safe sites

# Tri-state Shadow Memory Enforcement



- ▶ Checks are *eliminated* on safe sites
- ▶ False-safe can access unsafe/overlapping object

# Tri-state Shadow Memory Enforcement



- ▶ Checks are *eliminated* on safe sites
- ▶ False-safe can access unsafe/overlapping object
- ▶ Unsafe can only access unsafe object



# Evaluation

- ▶ Detection Capability Evaluation
  - Collect 31 CVEs that ASan can detect and reproduce with RUSTSAN
- ▶ Performance Evaluation
  - 20 real-world applications from `Crate.io`

## Evaluation: Site Safety Statistics

- ▶ Average site safety distribution In 33 applications:

**RUSTSAN eliminates  
93.8% of ASan checks!**




# Evaluation: Detection Capability

CVE	Vuln. Class	Detected	FS/U	CVE	Vuln. Class	Detected	FS/U
CVE-2020-36465	UAF	✓	FS	CVE-2021-45694	Heap Ovf.	✓	FS
CVE-2018-20991	UAF	✓	FS	CVE-2021-26954	UAF	✓	FS
CVE-2019-15551	UAF	✓	FS	CVE-2021-28028	UAF	✓	FS
CVE-2019-25009	UAF	✓	FS	CVE-2021-29933	UAF	✓	FS
CVE-2020-25574	UAF	✓	FS	CVE-2020-35891	UAF	✓	FS
CVE-2020-35858	Stack Ovf.	✓	FS	CVE-2017-1000430	Heap Ovf.	✓	U
CVE-2020-25792	Stack Ovf.	✓	FS	CVE-2020-35861	Heap Ovf.	✓	U
CVE-2020-25791	Stack Ovf.	✓	FS	CVE-2021-25900	Heap Ovf.	✓	U
CVE-2020-25795	UAF	✓	FS	CVE-2020-35906	UAF	✓	U
CVE-2021-45713	UAF	✓	FS	CVE-2021-45720	UAF	✓	U
CVE-2019-16882	UAF	✓	FS	CVE-2020-36464	UAF	✓	U
CVE-2018-21000	Heap Ovf.	✓	FS	CVE-2020-36434	UAF	✓	U
CVE-2019-16140	UAF	✓	FS	CVE-2020-35860	UAF	✓	U
CVE-2021-30455	UAF	✓	FS	CVE-2020-35892	Heap Ovf.	✓	U
CVE-2021-30457	UAF	✓	FS	CVE-2020-35893	Heap Ovf.	✓	U
CVE-2021-28031	UAF	✓	FS				

- ▶ RUSTSAN reproduced all detected cases with ASan in memory errors in the Advisory-DB
- ▶ 67% of bugs(21/31) were detected in a false-site site



# Evaluation: Performance



- ▶ 62% performance advantage over ASan on average
- ▶ 43% less shadow memory check encounter during runtime

# More details

## ▶ **Implementation details**

- HIR/MIR analysis improvements over previous works
- SVF framework extensions for Rust
- Shadow memory encoding

## ▶ **Experiment data omitted in this talk**

- Ratio of sites and objects of varying safety classification for 33 crates.
- Real-world performance gains in fuzz testing scenario

## ▶ **Thorough analysis of threats to validity**



For more details, please check out our paper!

# Thank you

Q&A time!!