Does Online Anonymous Reputation Matter?

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Suppose you want to buy new headphones...



99.3% positive feedback

Reputation signals facilitate trust between buyers and sellers



Better reputation should lead to more trust and more sales

\star



Buyers

Bad reputation should lead to **less** trust and **less** sales



Buyers

Reputation signals are everywhere



Reputation signals feed into other systems

Humans



Reputation signals feed into other systems

Algorithms + Humans

Recommendation System

S Moderation

Do reputation signals accurately track the quality of users?

Can we use reputation to predict the vendors who will be financially successful? Can we use reputation to predict the vendors who will leave the market? Online anonymous markets (OAMs) behave just like the traditional markets we are used to

A vendor on eBay

Amazing Wireless 99.3% positive feedback 816K items sold 38K followers							
⊟ Categories	Shop Al	oout Feedback					
Feedback ratings							
Last 12 months							
Positive	Neutral	Negative					
<u>8,794</u>	<u>113</u>	<u>60</u>					



A vendor on Nemesis Market

- 1. We have validated methods to estimate sales [Cuevas et al. USENIX'22]
 - And we have a comprehensive dataset



8 individual markets (2011-2023) >16,000 vendors

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2. Little (if any) algorithmic interference in users' search



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4. Reputation is **EXTREMELY** important and users often leave reviews

HEROIN 0.25G - LION STAMP - CHINA WHITE - INTL IMPORT - PREMIUM - SPEC.						
Heroin		Australia> Australia				
<redact ed></redact 	Sold by: <redacted>TrustedFeedback:99.85%Level 9Other Feedback:No RecordsPayment:FE (100%)</redacted>	BTC 0.00119771 USD 78.00 XMR 0.66384369 Place Order >				
Listing Fee	edback:	Views: 2132 Sales: 339				

Reputation features include any features derived from ratings by other users



Revenue features include data about sales, such as the number of sales or rolling averages



Listing features include things like the category of goods, the price, or where it ships from



Does reputation predict the financial success?



Grab all available vendors

Wealth Quartiles



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We can predict success quite well using simple a model



Halfway through a market's lifetime we had ~75% accuracy

If we remove reputation features...



Excluded Feature(s)Avg. Accuracy DecreaseFeature Set 1Feature Set 2Min.Max.MeanStd.

We see that reputation alone has little impact on the prediction



Excluded Feature(s)		Avg. Accuracy Decrease			
Feature Set 1	Feature Set 2	Min.	Max.	Mean	Std.
Reputation	_	<0.01	<0.01	<0.01	<0.01

Does reputation predict financial failure?



Does reputation predict financial failure?



We assemble 4 groups of *n* vendors across markets

 High
Predicted
Likelihood
 Medium
Predicted
Likelihood
 Lowest Rep.
Rating
 Random
Selection

Public signals can help you identify vendors who will leave the market



Differing y-axis lengths are due to different market lengths

Reputation alone is not a good indicator



We can identify users who will disappear faster using a combination of signals

Reputation systems can be a powerful tools, but they have become less effective

The New York Times

Fake Reviews Are Rampant Online. Can a Crackdown End Them?



1. We introduce a new method to evaluate reputation systems in marketplaces

2. We demonstrate that reputation alone has little impact, but effective predictions rely on a variety of public signals

3. We highlight the need to continuously evaluate signals and suggest how we can design more effective reputation systems

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Our model mostly generalizes across markets and time



Holdout market