
AttackGNN: Red-Teaming GNNs in Hardware Security Using Reinforcement Learning

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


TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY
Engineering



Hardware-focused Threats to Computing Systems

Due to Globalized Supply Chain




Hardware-focused Threats to Computing Systems

Real

Fake





Counterfeiting



Hardware Trojans


Due to Globalized Supply Chain



Overproduction



IP Piracy



Reverse Engineering

State-of-the-art GNNs in Hardware Security

Technique Type	Security Problem	Technique	GNN Framework	Claimed Efficacy
Defense	Detecting Trojans	GNN4TJ [1]	Attention-based custom GCN	97% TPR
	Locating Trojans	TrojanSAINT [2]	Graph attention network	98% TPR, 96% TNR
	Detecting IP Piracy	GNN4IP [3]	Attention-based custom GCN	94.61% Accuracy
Attack	Reverse Engineering	GNN-RE [4]	Graph attention network	98.87% Accuracy
	Hardware Obfuscation	OMLA [5]	Graph isomorphism network	89.55% Accuracy

State-of-the-art GNNs in Hardware Security

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Are Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) Used To Solve Hardware Security Problems Robust?				
	Trojans	[2]	network	
	Detecting IP Piracy	GNN4IP [3]	Attention-based custom GCN	94.61% Accuracy
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State-of-the-art GNNs in Hardware Security

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Are Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) Used To Solve Hardware Security Problems Robust?


Trojans	[2]	network	IR
Detecting IP	CNN4IP [2]	Attention-based	94.61% Accuracy

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Hardware Obfuscation	OMLA [5]	Graph isomorphism network	89.55% Accuracy
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Threat Model


Standard attack model of adversarial attacks



Kevin Eykholt et al., "Robust physical-world attacks on deep learning visual classification," In Proc. of CVPR, 2018



Threat Model

Standard attack model of adversarial attacks



Trained GNN

No Modifications




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

Threat Model

Standard attack model of adversarial attacks

Original Circuit





Perturbed Circuit



Trained GNN

No Modifications

Perturbations Following
Circuit Design Rules






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

Threat Model

Standard attack model of adversarial attacks

Original Circuit





Perturbed Circuit



Trained GNN

No Modifications

Perturbations Following
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


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Black-box Access



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Standard attack model of adversarial attacks



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


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
Goal:
Misclassification

Black-box Access


AttackGNN – Preliminary Formulation




AttackGNN – Preliminary Formulation



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


AttackGNN – Preliminary Formulation


Reward

$$r_t = \begin{cases} \alpha (> 0) & \text{if next state is misclassified} \\ 0 & \text{else} \end{cases}$$

Next state



s_t : [#inputs,
#outputs,
#gates,
#wires,
#AND gates,
...]



Environment

Agent

Action


a_t : circuit transformation command

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
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Environment

Agent

Action “rewrite” “refactor”


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AttackGNN – Challenges


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
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MDP Specific
to One GNN

Unnecessary
Reward
Computations

Environment

Agent

Ineffective
and Specific
Actions

Action “rewrite” “refactor”

a_t : circuit transformation command



①



③




②

AttackGNN – Solutions

Reward

$$r_t = \begin{cases} \alpha (> 0) & \text{if next state is misclassified} \\ 0 & \text{else} \end{cases}$$

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MDP Specific
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Unnecessary
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
Environment

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Ineffective
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


AttackGNN – Solutions

Reward


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MDP Specific
to One GNN



Unnecessary
Reward
Computations

Environment

Agent

Ⓐ Effective,
Generalizable
Actions

Ineffective
and Specific
Actions



①

Action Don't use 3-input AND gates

a_t : allowed/unallowed gate types



③




②

AttackGNN – Solutions

Reward

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MDP Specific
to One GNN

Unnecessary
Reward
Computations

ⓑ Sparse
Rewards

Environment

Agent

Ⓐ Effective,
Generalizable
Actions

Ineffective
and Specific
Actions

①

Action Don't use 3-input AND gates


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AttackGNN – Solutions

Reward

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
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⚠️ ③
MDP Specific
to One GNN

© Multi-task
Learning:
Contextual MDP

⚠️ ②
Unnecessary
Reward
Computations

ⓑ Sparse
Rewards



Agent

Environment

Ⓐ Effective,
Generalizable
Actions


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
AttackGNN – Results

Against GNN4IP (IP Piracy Detection GNN)




AttackGNN – Results

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


Against TrojanSAINT (Trojan Locator GNN)



AttackGNN – Results


Against GNN-RE
(Reverse Eng. GNN)



GNN4TJ predictions

		HT- infested	HT- free
True labels	HT- infested	19	0
	HT- free	15	0


Against OMLA
(De-obfuscation GNN)



Against GNN4TJ
(Trojan Detector GNN)

AttackGNN – Results


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GNN4TJ predictions

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Against OMLA
(De-obfuscation GNN)



Against GNN4TJ
(Trojan Detector GNN)

Success rate of all GNNs against AttackGNN-generated adversarial circuits: **0%**

GNNs used in hardware security are **not robust!**

Thank You

Vasudev Gohil
vasudevgothil.com

Secure and Trustworthy Hardware (SETH) Lab
<https://seth.engr.tamu.edu>
Texas A&M University

References

- [1] Yasaei, Rozhin, Shih-Yuan Yu, and Mohammad Abdullah Al Faruque. "Gnn4tj: Graph neural networks for hardware trojan detection at register transfer level." In Design, Automation & Test in Europe Conference & Exhibition (DATE), pp. 1504-1509, IEEE, 2021.
- [2] Lashen, Hazem, Lilas Alrahis, Johann Knechtel, and Ozgur Sinanoglu. "TrojanSAINT: Gate-level netlist sampling-based inductive learning for hardware Trojan detection." arXiv preprint arXiv:2301.11804, 2023.
- [3] Yasaei, Rozhin, Shih-Yuan Yu, Emad Kasaeyan Naeini, and Mohammad Abdullah Al Faruque. "GNN4IP: Graph neural network for hardware intellectual property piracy detection." In 58th ACM/IEEE Design Automation Conference (DAC), pp. 217-222, IEEE, 2021.
- [4] Alrahis, Lilas, Abhrajit Sengupta, Johann Knechtel, Satwik Patnaik, Hani Saleh, Baker Mohammad, Mahmoud Al-Qutayri, and Ozgur Sinanoglu. "GNN-RE: Graph neural networks for reverse engineering of gate-level netlists." IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems 41, no. 8: 2435-2448, 2021.
- [5] Alrahis, Lilas, Satwik Patnaik, Muhammad Shafique, and Ozgur Sinanoglu. "OMLA: An oracle-less machine learning-based attack on logic locking." IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems II: Express Briefs 69, no. 3: 1602-1606, 2021.