
# CDN Cannon: Exploiting CDN Back-to-Origin Strategies for Amplification Attacks

Ziyu Lin, Zhiwei Lin, Ximeng Liu, Jianjun Chen, Run Guo, Cheng Chen Shaodong Xiao




#### **Increased Risk of DDoS Attacks**




DDoS attack cause websites reputation and monetary loss

#### **CDN: Primary Solution for DDoS Defense**




#### **Content Delivery Network**

- ❖ Infrastructure for access acceleration and DDoS defense.
  - > 61.86% of Alexa Top 10K websites is hosted by a CDN<sup>1</sup>
  - > Traditional DDoS attacks are ineffective against the CDN-protected websites.




## **Back-to-Origin Strategies**

- ❖ Designed to improve Web access and Compatibility.
  - ➤ Reduce web access latency
  - ➤ Improve compatibility with origin and client




## **Back-to-Origin Strategies**

- ❖ Designed to improve the cache hit rate.
  - ➤ Reduce the burden on the origin server
  - > Speed up the response



#### Our Work

\* Exploiting CDN Back-to-Origin Strategies to attack the origin



Performed real-world evaluations on fourteen CDN vendors































#### Image Optimization Attack: Root Cause

- \* Multiple formats and high-resolution images are becoming more and more used in web pages, but these large-sized images greatly delay web access.
- \* CDN vendors design a series of strategies for optimizing the transmission of image.
  - > Format Conversion
  - > Image Cropping
- \* CDN vendors do not impose limitations on the parameters of Image Optimization Strategies.

#### Image Optimization Attack: Threat Model

- \* CDN adopts the query's parameters to handle the image request.
  - > When a CDN receives a request with image optimization parameters, it fetches the original image from the origin. CDN crop the image accordingly and returns it to the client.



# Image Optimization Attack: Damage Trend

- ❖ The amplification factor is higher for images with higher quality. (Format Conversion)
  - ➤ File Size ~ Amplification
  - **>**BMP/TIFF ~ 1,011
- The amplification factor is higher for images with higher resolution. (Image Cropping)
  - ➤ File Size ~ Amplification
  - $> 720p \sim 1,628$
  - **>**4320p ~ 39,000

Table 4: The amplification factor varies with the format of the image in the Image Optimization attack.

	PNG	JPG	BMP	TIFF
Alibaba <sup>†</sup>	111	80	126	N/A
Bunny <sup>†</sup>	136	98	N/A	N/A
ChinaNetCenter†	130	94	156	N/A
Cloudflare <sup>†</sup>	319	230	1011	1011
${f CloudFront}^{\ddagger}$	23	17	N/A	26
Edgio <sup>‡</sup>	23	17	N/A	26
Fastly <sup>†</sup>	1.7	1.2	N/A	N/A
$\mathbf{G} ext{-}\mathbf{core}^\dagger$	139	100	N/A	N/A
Qiniu <sup>‡</sup>	30	21	25	34
UPYun <sup>†</sup>	139	101	166	149

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>†</sup> These CDNs support lossy compression.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>‡</sup> These CDNs support lossless compression.





Figure 4: How the amplification factor changes with the resolution of images.


## Request Modification Attack: Root Cause

- \* To meet practical business needs, such as passing client IP to the origin server or handling file location changes in the origin.
- \* CDN needs to rewrite the URL or add an HTTP header when forwarding requests.
- \* CDN doesn't impose limitations on the size of the modified request.



#### Request Modification Attack: Threat Model

- Step1: Deploy victim's website on CDN
- \* Step2: Configure the request modification strategy
- Step3: Send a lot of HTTP requests



## Request Modification Attack: Damage Trend


- ❖ The amplification factor increases with the URL size and HTTP header size.
  - ➤ Max Amplification Factor ~ 93,000
  - ➤ Header Name Size ~ 1MB
  - ➤ Header Value Size ~ 1MB
  - ➤ URL Size ~ 50KB
  - ➤ Host Header Size ~ 64B

Table 5: The amplification factor in Request Modification attack.

	Alibaba	Azure	Baidu	Bunny	CDNetworks	ChinaNetCenter	Cloudflare	CloudFront	Edgio	Fastly	G-core	UPYun
Header Name Size	256B	128B	128B	≥1MB	64B	64B	128B	128B	≥100KB	255B	255B	40B
<b>Header Value Size</b>	256B	640B	1000B	$\geq 1MB$	63B	64B	512B	768B	≥100KB	$\geq$ 10KB	512B	400B
<b>Number of Headers</b>	49	99	20	≥10	≥1300	$\geq \! 800$	270	10	15	≥13	49	20
<b>URL Size</b>	≥50KB	512B	1000B	≥50KB	1KB	$\geq 1$ KB	8KB	256B	10KB	N/A	N/A	400B
<b>Host Header Size</b>	>512B	128B	64B	>64B	64B	>54B	N/A	N/A	>128B	255B	2048B	>128B
<b>Amplification Factor</b>	348	367	109	93077	768	481	846	43	5352	590	188	42


#### Method Conversion Attack: Root Cause

- \* The HEAD request does not return the body of the response, only the response header.
- ❖ To improve cache rate, CDN converts the HEAD request to GET request.
- \* Method Conversion strategy can cause a huge difference in traffic in the Client-CDN and CDN-Origin connection.



#### Method Conversion Attack: Threat Model

- \* CDN converts the HEAD request to GET request
  - ➤ To improve cache rate, when the CDN receives a HEAD request, it thinks your next request will be a GET request, so it converts the HEAD request to a GET request.



## Method Conversion Attack: Damage Trend

- \* The amplification factor increase with the size of the target resource
  - > File Size ~ Amplification Factor
  - $> 1MB \sim 2,106$
  - $> 25MB \sim 53,000$

Table 8: Amplification factors with different target resource sizes of Method Conversion attacks.

	1MB	Amplification Factor 10MB	25MB
Alibaba	1340	13059	33952
Bunny	1212	11808	30702
Cachefly	1738	16940	44044
CDNetworks	1744	16995	44115
ChinaNetCenter	1784	17418	45212
Cloudflare	1170	11385	29698
Fastly	469	469	469
G-core	2106	20520	53352





Figure 7: How does the Method Conversion attack amplification factor change with the size of a target resource file.


#### **Real-world Evaluation:**

\* Experiment setup: origin server's bandwidth (1000Mbps)

#### Attacker: **Kb-level cost**



#### Victim: Gb-level damage




#### Mitigation

- Limit parameters in the Back-to-Origin strategies
  - Impose limitations on parameters to prevent the traffic consumption gap between two connections.
- Validate the ownership of customer-supplied origin configuration
  - Stop CDN being abused to attack 3rd party targets
  - But Can still attack websites hosted on CDN
- Follow RFC standards for request forwarding
  - Directly forward HEAD request
- Synchronize client-CDN and CDN-origin connections
  - The CDN can keep connections for a few seconds and cut off if the client does not reconnect.

#### Responsible Disclosure

Response from affected CDN vendors.



# Thank you for listening! Any question?