

Scalable Multi-Party Computation Protocols for Machine Learning in the Honest-Majority Setting

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Machine Learning and Privacy

Product Recommendation




Image Processing




Virtual Assistants: generate human-like responses



More data —> Better models


Privacy-preserving Machine Learning (PPML)

Client-Server Model



hospitals (data)

split into
secret shares



servers

MPC Protocols for PPML


2PC: [SecureML] [Ezpc] [Chameleon] [Delphi] ...

3PC: [ABY3] [SecureNN] [Falcon] [DEK20] ...

4PC: [Flash] [Trident] [Fantastic Four] [Swift] ...

Our work: scalable and efficient PPML protocols for any number of parties.

Scalability from Shamir's Secret Sharing



$$f(x) = s + a_1x + a_2x^2$$




=> secret S

$$f(x) = s + a_1x + a_2x^2 + \dots + a_tx^t$$

- distributed shares to n parties
(denoted by $[s]$)
- can be reconstructed from $\geq t + 1$ parties

t-privacy

Two Challenges in Privacy-preserving Neural Networks




- Decimal number
- Non-linear function

$$\text{DReLU}(x) = \begin{cases} 1, & x \geq 0 \\ 0, & x < 0 \end{cases}$$



↑ $\text{ReLU}(x) = \text{DReLU}(x) \cdot x$

↑ $\text{Max}(a, b) = \text{ReLU}(a - b) + b$




Decimal Multiplications in Integer Ring \mathbb{Z}_{2^ℓ}

(2's complement)

- Represent an integer $\bar{x} \in [-2^{\ell-1}, 2^{\ell-1})$

$$x = \bar{x} \pmod{2^\ell} = \begin{cases} \bar{x}, & \bar{x} \geq 0 \\ 2^\ell - \bar{x}, & \bar{x} < 0 \end{cases}$$




- Truncation on c : performing $\bar{c}/2^d$

shift the bits down by d positions
and fill the top d bits with MSB of c

Decimal Multiplications in **Mersenne Field** \mathbb{F}_p ($p = 2^\ell - 1$)

- Represent an integer $\bar{x} \in (-2^{\ell-1}, 2^{\ell-1})$

$$x = \bar{x} \pmod{2^\ell - 1} = \begin{cases} \bar{x}, & \bar{x} \geq 0 \\ 2^\ell - 1 - \bar{x}, & \bar{x} < 0 \end{cases}$$



- Truncation on c : performing $\bar{c}/2^d$

Truncation in $\mathbb{F}_{2^\ell-1}$ = Truncation in \mathbb{Z}_{2^ℓ}

shift the bits down by d positions
and fill the top d bits with MSB of c



Previous Truncation Protocol with A Large Gap

Preprocess: a pair $([r], [\text{Trunc}(r)])$ where $r \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_{2^\ell - 1}$

Online: input $[x]$


1. $[a] = [x] + [r]$
2. Reveal a
3. $[\text{Trunc}(x)] = \text{Trunc}(a) - [\text{Trunc}(r)]$

A Large Gap !!

holds w.h.p. only for small $x \ll 2^\ell - 1$


Previous Truncation Protocol with A Large Gap

For example, we have $a = x + r$ in \mathbb{F}_{2^9-1} .



incorrect sign bit:
falsely indicates the result is negative

truncation
d=3



filled with the incorrect sign bit

Our Truncation Protocol with Only 1-bit Gap

For example, we have $a = x + r$ in \mathbb{F}_{2^9-1} .

x=162	0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0	$\bar{x} > 0$
+		+
r=161	0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1	$\bar{r} > 0$
=		≠
a=323	1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1	$\bar{a} < 0$

truncation
→
d=3

Trunc(x)=20	0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
+	
Trunc(r)=20	0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
≠	
Trunc(a)=488	1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0

just remove the misfilled top d bits

(Actual Result)

- Δ

truncation
→
d=3

Trunc(a)=40	0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
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(Expected Result)

filled with the correct sign bit

Expected Truncation:

0	1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
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↑


correct sign bit

$\text{Trunc}(a) = \text{Trunc}(x) + \text{Trunc}(r)$

Our Truncation Protocol with Only 1-bit Gap

For example, we have $a = x + r$ in \mathbb{F}_{2^9-1} .

x is always positive = 1-bit gap



positive overflow happens



(Truncation Result)

+ [DN07] = 1-round Fixed-point Multiplication Protocol with Only 1-bit Gap

Non-linear Function via Bitwise Comparison

Arithmetic Comparison ($x < 0$)

$$\text{DReLU}(x) = \begin{cases} 1, & x \geq 0 \\ 0, & x < 0 \end{cases}$$

Fact: $\text{MSB}(x) = \text{LSB}(2x)$ holds in odd rings

1. $y = 2x + r$
2. Reveal y

$$\text{LSB}(2x) = \text{LSB}(y) \oplus \text{LSB}(r) \oplus (y_B < r_B)$$

public secret

bitwise comparison

Bitwise Comparison ($y_B < r_B$)

look for the first different bit

(public) y_B 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1

(secret) r_B 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0

XOR

(secret) 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1

* Prefix-OR

(secret) 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

(secret) e_B 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0

$$(y_B < r_B) = \langle e_B, r_B \rangle = 1$$

* **Prefix-OR** involves ℓ multiplications: $b_j = \bigvee_{i=1}^j a_i$ for $j = 1, \dots, \ell$


Round-Efficient Prefix-OR Protocol via Prefix-AND

Online Complexity of [NO07]: 5 rounds


Online Complexity of Prefix-Mult[BB89]: 1 round

* Prefix-OR: compute $b_j = \bigvee_{i=1}^j a_i$ for $j = 1, \dots, \ell$

* Prefix-AND: compute $\bar{b}_j = \bigwedge_{i=1}^j \bar{a}_i$ for $j = 1, \dots, \ell$



Other Building Blocks




Round Complexity in Online Phase

Performance: Private Inference

Simulate 3-63 parties on 11 servers

LAN: 15Gb/s, delay 0.3ms

WAN: 100Mb/s, delay 40ms




online runtime (s) from 3PC to 63PC in the LAN setting

Performance: Private Inference

Simulate 3-63 parties on 11 servers

LAN: 15Gb/s, delay 0.3ms

WAN: 100Mb/s, delay 40ms



online runtime (s) from 3PC to 63PC in the **WAN** setting



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The End, Questions?
