Stop, Don't Click Here Anymore Boosting Website Fingerprinting By Considering Sets of Webpages

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
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Motivation

• The Tor network: most popular low-latency anonymization network


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- The Tor network: most popular low-latency anonymization network
- Problem: Tor is vulnerable to website fingerprinting (WFP)
 - Infer website accessed without breaking the encryption
 - Using only packet sizes, direction, and timestamps
 - High efficiency in laboratory settings



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• Limitations

- Scalability in real-world settings still under research
- Typical scenario: detection of isolated webpage loads



However,

users visit multiple pages of a website sequentially, e.g., by following links!

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- Consecutive user's visits of multiple pages of a website
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- Set-aware classifier based on multi-instance learning (MIL)
- Limited protection provided by existing WFP defenses
 - Up to five times less effective than expected or even completely useless

Our Novel Fingerprinting Techniques

• Voting-based strategies

- Train state-of-the-art webpage classifier on multiple pages of websites
- Compute probability of a single page to belong to a website
- Calculate join probability of pages belonging to a website


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• Set-aware MIL-based classifier

- A set of pages belonging to single website forms a bag
- Learn a classification model to predict labels of bags
- Adaptive learning of weights for single pages in a bag



Analysis of Our Fingerprinting Techniques (1/3)

• Dataset and evaluation setup

- ▶ 100 monitored websites from different categories, layout, and content
- 90 different pages per website
- Four state-of-the-art webpage classifiers
- 10-fold cross-validation for all experiments


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• Evaluation in laboratory settings

- Users browse consecutively multiple pages of a single website
- Increase of the detection rate by almost 30% to 40%



Analysis of Our Fingerprinting Techniques (2/3)

• Impact of different training tactics

- Our voting-based strategies
 - 70 training pages are enough to obtain high accuracy
- Our set-aware MIL-based classifier
 - Use of two training bags
 - Over 90% accuracy when four pages are consecutively visited

We refer to our paper for the extensive analysis of our methods


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Real-world evaluation

- Use of 5000 unmonitored websites
- Our methods achieve F1-scores of 1.0 for more than half of the websites
- When visiting at least three consecutive pages of a website



Analysis of Our Fingerprinting Techniques (3/3)

Increased robustness against existing WFP defenses

- Increase of the detection rate up to 5 times
- No protection by defenses with low implementation costs

Defense	Classifier	Set of pages								
-		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Tamaraw	Voting	4.61	7.20	9.93	12.47	12.67	14.07	16.27	17.80	18.93
	MIL-based	-	5.37	7.25	8.81	10.79	12.19	13.77	14.73	16.36
CS-Buflo	Voting	10.89	18.13	23.33	33.27	37.40	43.93	46.93	52.47	56.00
	MIL-based	-	12.89	19.25	24.77	29.62	34.19	37.18	40.21	43.17
TrafficSliver-Net	Voting	19.92	29.93	34.48	38.73	40.45	42.79	43.80	44.85	46.55
	MIL-based	-	10.40	14.48	18.62	22.06	25.67	28.69	32.18	35.21
WTF-PAD	Voting	90.72	99.20	99.73	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
	MIL-based	-	98.28	99.61	99.89	99.99	99.99	99.99	100.00	100.00
RegulaTor	Voting	17.17	27.67	38.27	44.20	50.20	56.20	61.53	63.60	64.87
	MIL-based	-	16.11	22.83	27.77	31.89	36.19	40.29	43.44	46.48
FRONT	Voting	67.00	88.60	96.87	98.73	99.40	99.67	99.87	99.93	100.00
	MIL-based	-	86.41	94.82	97.70	98.85	99.38	99.55	99.77	99.86

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Stop, Don't Click Here Anymore: Boosting Website Fingerprinting By Considering Sets of Subpages



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