

Cryptographic Analysis of Delta Chat



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Delta Chat

- A decentralised messaging application based on e-mail infrastructure.
- Engages with high-risk users (e.g. journalists and activists).

New Study on Multi-tool and Organizational messenger usage

March 31, 2020 by holger

A new Delta Chat UX study [is out](#), based on Xenia's interviews with people engaged in human rights missions in Belarus, Russia, Ukraine, Iran, Taiwan and Hong Kong. It focuses on how Delta Chat could or can already work well in conjunction with other tools and apps, and for organizational settings.



A cryptographic overview

E-mail infrastructure (SMTP, IMAP, ...)

A cryptographic overview

(a subset of) **OpenPGP**

E-mail infrastructure (SMTP, IMAP, ...)

A cryptographic overview

RFC 4880 OpenPGP Message Format
RFC 5581 The Camellia Cipher in OpenPGP
RFC 6637 Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) in OpenPGP
draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh OpenPGP Message Format
RFC 2015 MIME Security with Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)
RFC 3156 MIME Security with OpenPGP

(a subset of) **OpenPGP**

E-mail infrastructure (SMTP, IMAP, ...)

A cryptographic overview

“The GnuPG man page is over sixteen thousand words long; for comparison, the novel Fahrenheit 451 is only 40k words.”

Moxie Marlinspike

(a subset of) **OpenPGP**

E-mail infrastructure (SMTP, IMAP, ...)

A cryptographic overview

Autocrypt
(a subset of) OpenPGP
E-mail infrastructure (SMTP, IMAP, ...)

A cryptographic overview

- Automated key management
- TOFU
- “Gossip”: attach keys in email body




Autocrypt
(a subset of) OpenPGP
E-mail infrastructure (SMTP, IMAP, ...)

A cryptographic overview

Unverified chats (opportunistic E2EE)	SecureJoin
Autocrypt	
(a subset of) OpenPGP	
E-mail infrastructure (SMTP, IMAP, ...)	

SecureJoin

QR INVITE CODE SCAN QR CODE



Scan to chat with Alice
(457v85t1v@nine.testrun.org)

COPY CLOSE




From: Deltachat docs


A cryptographic overview

Verified chats (guaranteed E2EE)	
Unverified chats (opportunistic E2EE)	SecureJoin
Autocrypt	
(a subset of) OpenPGP	
E-mail infrastructure (TLS, STARTTLS, ...)	

Verified chat




Verified chat



The image shows a representation of an email header and body. The header includes the sender's email address and the recipient's email address. The body contains a group ID, a greeting, and a reference to an OpenPGP signature. A purple envelope icon is at the top right, and a lock icon is on the right side of the body text.

```
From: alice@ethz.ch  
To: carol@uzh.ch  
Group-ID: M9fXEiVDBYv  
Hi Carol! How are you?  
[OpenPGP signature]
```

Verified chat



Verified chat

Alice. 📱




Bob's verified key: null

Carol

Bob

Verified chat

Alice. 





From: alice@ethz.ch
To: bob@epfl.ch, carol@uzh.ch
Member-Added: bob@epfl.ch 
Gossip: (bob@epfl.ch, )
Group-ID: M9fXEiVDBYv
[...]
[OpenPGP signature]

Bob's verified key: null


Carol

Bob

Verified chat



Verified chat



Our work

- A deep-dive on the cryptographic algorithms and protocols in Delta Chat, with a view to assessing its security.
- This presentation:
 - **Gossip key injection attack**
 - InsecureJoin observer attack


Updating peer states


Alice

Carol


<i>Carol's peers</i>	<i>gossip_key</i>	<i>gossip_time</i>	<i>verified_key</i>	<i>...</i>
Bob	null	null	null	<i>...</i>



Updating peer states



<i>Carol's peers</i>	<i>gossip_key</i>	<i>gossip_time</i>	<i>verified_key</i>	<i>...</i>
Bob		today	null	...

Updating peer states



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Bob		today		...

Gossip key injection

Mallory

Carol


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Bob	null	null	null	<i>...</i>



Gossip key injection




<i>Carol's peers</i>	<i>gossip_key</i>	<i>gossip_time</i>	<i>verified_key</i>	<i>...</i>
Bob	[key icon]	Jan 1 2038	null	...

Gossip key injection



<i>Carol's peers</i>	<i>gossip_key</i>	<i>gossip_time</i>	<i>verified_key</i>	<i>...</i>
Bob	 	Jan 1 2038	null	...

Gossip key injection





Allows eavesdropping,
MITM, impersonation, ...

<i>Carol's peers</i>	<i>gossip_key</i>	<i>gossip_time</i>	<i>verified_key</i>	<i>...</i>
Bob	🗝️👁️	Jan 1 2038	🗝️👁️	...

Gossip key injection



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SecureJoin messages

Alice. 📱




Bob


Alice. 💻

Bob's verified key: null

SecureJoin messages



SecureJoin messages



InsecureJoin observer

- Confusion between unprotected e-mail headers and protected MIME headers.

Alice. 📱




Bob's verified key: null

InsecureJoin observer

- Confusion between unprotected e-mail headers and protected MIME headers.

Alice. 📱



Bob's verified key: null

From: bob@epfl.ch
To: alice@ethz.ch
Autocrypt: (bob@epfl.ch, 🗝️👁️)
Hi Alice!

InsecureJoin observer

- Confusion between unprotected e-mail headers and protected MIME headers.





Bob's verified key: null



InsecureJoin observer

- Confusion between unprotected e-mail headers and protected MIME headers.



Bob's verified key:  





```
From: alice@ethz.ch
To: bob@epfl.ch
Secure-Join: contact_confirm
Gossip: (bob@epfl.ch,  )
[...]
[OpenPGP signature]
```

The code block shows the email header and body. The header includes 'From: alice@ethz.ch', 'To: bob@epfl.ch', and 'Secure-Join: contact_confirm'. The body contains 'Gossip: (bob@epfl.ch,  )', '[...]', and '[OpenPGP signature]'. A lock icon is present in the top right corner of the code block, indicating that the content is protected.

InsecureJoin observer

- Confusion between unprotected e-mail headers and protected MIME headers.



Bob's verified key:  



Other attacks

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- Group member removal – remove members by manipulating e-mail headers.

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- Group member removal – remove members by manipulating e-mail headers.
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- Autocrypt Setup forgery – forge messages for key transfer between devices.
- A compression quine denial-of-service attack.
- Several attacks out of Delta Chat's threat model (e.g. insider attacks).

Disclosure

Coordinated disclosure; all main attacks and most issues have been fixed.

Hardening Guaranteed End-to-End encryption based on a security analysis from ETH researchers

March 25, 2024 by holga, link2xt

We released [guaranteed end-to-end encryption](#) in November 2023 and were in for a pleasant surprise three months later. The [Applied Cryptography Group at ETH Zurich](#) handed us a cryptographic security analysis of our [SecureJoin](#) protocol implementation which is the basis of Delta Chat's guaranteed end-to-end encryption mechanisms. We subsequently fixed 20 identified issues that became part of the [v1.44 release](#) but only disclose it now because we first wanted Delta Chat apps with all fixes to be available on all stores.

We'd like to thank the ETH researchers Yuanming Song, Lenka Mareková and Kenneth G. Paterson for their thorough work and their forthcoming communication to resolve questions and review patches. What follows is a timeline and some brief technical discussions of our hardening efforts in response to the cryptographic analysis about which the researchers [published separately and in more detail](#).



- Security analysis
 - Vulnerabilities found even though Deltachat passed several security audits.
 - Root causes: unclear specifications and cross-protocol interactions.

- OpenPGP and Autocrypt
 - Careful with non-standard usage and message/key validation.
 - Can benefit from updates, e.g. crypto-refresh for OpenPGP.

Thank you! Questions?