

# What IF Is Not Enough?

## Fixing Null Pointer Dereference With Contextual Check

Yunlong Xing, Shu Wang, Shiyu Sun, Xu He, Kun Sun, Qi Li  
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# Threats of Null Pointer Dereference (NPD)



Attacker





User

Bombs victim with HTTP requests

Legitimate requests can't get through and fail



Webserver



System-wide Crash

DoS Attack

# How SOTA Approaches Address NPD?

- Selecting Repair Locations
  - e.g., path congestion calculation in VFix\*
- Applying Repair Operations
  - General repair framework:

```
if (variable == NULL)
    return;
normal execution;
```

**OR**

```
if (variable != NULL)
    normal execution;
```

However, the valuable contextual information is ignored by all SOTA approaches, resulting in incorrect patches.

\* VFix: Value-Flow-Guided Precise Program Repair for Null Pointer Dereferences, in ICSE 2019.

# Motivating Example 1

## Intraprocedural State Retrogression

```
1 void buggy(param1, param2){
2     spin_lock(&sl->lock);
3 +   if(sl->tty == NULL){
4 +
5 +       return;
6 +   }
7     function(sl->tty, ... );
8 }
```

Fixed by SOTA approach

```
1 void buggy(param1, param2){
2     spin_lock(&sl->lock);
3 +   if(sl->tty == NULL){
4 +       spin_unlock(&sl->lock);
5 +       return;
6 +   }
7     function(sl->tty, ... );
8 }
```

Fixed by our method

SOTA approaches ignore the valuable intraprocedural information, such as memory freeing and lock releasing.

# Motivating Example 2

## Interprocedural State Propagation (Function Argument Resetting)

```
1 bool buggy(int *r, ... ){
2     *r = -1;
3     if(condition1){
4 +         if (src == NULL){
5 +
6 +             return true;
7 +         }
8         // return 0 if discarded
9         *r = func(src->vcpu, ...);
10        return true;
11    }
12 }
13 int caller( ... ){
14     int r = -1;
15     if(buggy(&r, ... ))
16         return r;
17 }
18 int caller_caller( ... ){
19     if(caller( ... ))
20         schedule_work();
21 }
```

Fixed by SOTA approach

```
1 bool buggy(int *r, ... ){
2     *r = -1;
3     if(condition1){
4 +         if (src == NULL){
5 +             *r = 0;
6 +             return true;
7 +         }
8         // return 0 if discarded
9         *r = func(src->vcpu, ...);
10        return true;
11    }
12 }
13 int caller( ... ){
14     int r = -1;
15     if(buggy(&r, ... ))
16         return r;
17 }
18 int caller_caller( ... ){
19     if(caller( ... ))
20         schedule_work();
21 }
```

Fixed by our method

Failing to reset variable  $r$  could lead to an incorrect program status.

# Motivating Example 3

## Interprocedural State Propagation (Call Chain Assessment)

```
1 void buggy(param1, param2,... ){
2
3     struct *new_ts;
4     new_ts = kzalloc(sizeof());
5 +   if(new_ts == NULL)
6 +       return;
7     new_ts->ts = ts;
8 }
9 int caller(param1, param2){
10    int ret;
11    if(error)
12        return -EAGAIN;
13    buggy( ... );
14
15
16
17    ...
18    return 0;
19 }
20 void caller_caller(param) {
21     if(caller( ... ) < 0)
22         break;
23 }
```

Fixed by SOTA approach

```
1 - void buggy(param1, param2,... ){
2 + int buggy(param1, param2, ... ){
3     struct *new_ts;
4     new_ts = kzalloc(sizeof());
5 +   if(new_ts == NULL)
6 +       return -ENOMEM;
7     new_ts->ts = ts;
8 }
9 int caller(param1, param2){
10    int ret;
11    if(error)
12        return -EAGAIN;
13 -   buggy( ... );
14 +   ret = buggy( ... );
15 +   if(ret)
16 +       return ret;
17    ...
18    return 0;
19 }
20 void caller_caller(param) {
21     if(caller( ... ) < 0)
22         break;
23 }
```


Fixed by our method

**Function type modification and call chain assessment are required to fix this NPD issue.**

# Our Contribution


We propose **CONCH** to generate accurate patches for NPD errors by considering the contextual information, including *Intraprocedural State Retrogression*, *Function Argument Resetting*, and *Call Chain Assessment*.

# CONCH Design





# NPD Context Graph Construction




Three steps to construct NPD context graph


LOADERR:  $\{y \neq \} x := [y] \{err: y \neq \}$   
 LOADNULL:  $\{y = null\} x := [y] \{err: y = null\}$   
 STOREERR:  $\{x \neq \} [x] := y \{err: x \neq \}$   
 STORENULL:  $\{x = null\} [x] := y \{err: x = null\}$

Separation Logic rules to localize the NPD errors


# Path-sensitive Fixing Position Selection




(a) One-null One-error



(b) Multi-null One-error



(c) One-null Multi-error



(d) Multi-null Multi-error

# Intraprocedural State Retrogression

- If Condition Construction

```
1   pcpu_sum = kvmalloc_array(param1, param2, param3)
2 +   if(pcpu_sum == null)
3 +       return;
4   this_sum = &pcpu_sum[cpu];
```

Null check for  
CVE-2022-3107

```
1 -   amvdev_add_ts( ... ); // return neg when fails
2 +   int ret = amvdec_add_ts( ... );
3 +   if(ret)
4 +       return ret;
```

Exception value check for  
CVE-2022-3112

```
1 +   if(info->st_info_list != NULL){
2       clist_foreach(info->st_info_list, NULL);
3       clist_free(info->st_info_list);
4 +   }
5   free(info);
```

Not-Null check for  
CVE-2022-4121

# Intraprocedural State Retrogression

- Local Resource Retrogression

```
1   rcu_read_lock();
2   slave = rcu_dereference(bond->curr_active_slave);
3 +  if(!slave){
4 +      rcu_read_unlock();
5 +      return -ENODEV;
6 +  }
7   xs->xso.real_dev = slave->dev;
```

Lock releasing for  
CVE-2022-0286

```
1   not_checked = kmalloc(sizeof(*not_checked) * 2);
2   checked = kmalloc(sizeof(*checked) * 2);
3 +  if(!not_checked || !checked){
4 +      kfree(not_checked);
5 +      kfree(checked);
6 +      return;
7 +  }
8   checked->data[] = ...
9   not_checked->data[] = ...
```

Memory freeing for  
CVE-2022-3104

# Intraprocedural State Retrogression

- Return Statement Construction

```
1   if(IstensorIdControlling(tensor_id))
2       return false;
3   input_node = graph.GetNode(tensor_id.node());
4 +   if(input_node == nullptr)
5 +       return false;
6   return IsSwitch(*input_node);
```

Return false for CVE-2022-23589

```
1   if(rettv->vval.v_object == NULL)
2       return FAIL;
3   cl = rettv->vval.v_object->obj->class;
4 +   if(cl == NULL)
5 +       return FAIL;
6   if(get_func_argument(...) == FAIL)
7       return FAIL;
```

Return macro for CVE-2023-1355

```
1   if(imx_keep_uart_clocks){
2       imx_uart_clocks = kcalloc(clk_count, ... );
3 +   if(!imx_uart_clocks)
4 +       return;
5       if(!of_stdout)
6           return;
7   }
```

Return nothing for CVE-2022-3114

```
1   while(scanindent(s)){
2       var = scanname(s);
3 +   if(!val)
4 +       continue;
5       if(strcmp(var, "command") == 0)
6   }
```

Continue for CVE-2021-30219<sub>3</sub>

# Interprocedural State Propagation

- Global variable and function argument resetting
  - Global variable and function argument identification
  - Inferring the expected value from the data flow in the caller function
- Call chain assessment
  - Assessing the *void* function type that may execute normally when failing

# Evaluation

- Datasets
  - 80 real-world NPD vulnerabilities, 18 NPD errors in Defects4j
- Other repair methods
  - VFix (SOTA approach), NPEfix (NPD repair), SimFix (general repair)
- System runtime
  - Intel i7 CPU and 16GB memory, running Ubuntu 22.04 with FBinfer 1.1.0

# Performance on CVE Dataset

- CONCH can generate 68 correct and 12 incorrect patches

	<b>Same Fixing</b>	<b>Semantic Equivalence</b>	<b>Incorrect Patches</b>	<b>Proportion</b>
VFix	29	18	33	58.75%
NPEfix	15	4	61	23.75%
SimFix	18	8	54	32.5%
<b>CONCH</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>85%</b>



# Performance on CVE Dataset

- Incorrect patches and their reasons

Category	CVE ID	If Condition	Generated Patches	Why CONCH Cannot Generate Correct Patches
<b>Unobtainable Member</b>	CVE-2022-1674	<code>rmp-&gt;regprog != NULL</code>	<code>rmp != NULL</code>	member <code>regprog</code> cannot be obtained in context
	CVE-2022-1620	<code>rmp-&gt;regprog != NULL</code>	<code>rmp != NULL</code>	member <code>regprog</code> cannot be obtained in context
	CVE-2016-2782	<code>serial-&gt;num_bulk_in &lt; 2</code>	<code>serial != NULL</code>	member <code>num_bulk_in</code> cannot be obtained in context
	CVE-2014-0101	<code>!net-&gt;sctp.auth_enable</code>	<code>net == NULL</code>	member <code>sctp.auth_enable</code> cannot be obtained in context
	CVE-2013-0313	<code>inode-&gt;i_op-&gt;removexattr != NULL</code>	<code>inode-&gt;i_op != NULL</code>	<code>removexattr</code> is not a function in context
<b>Unobtainable Relation</b>	CVE-2022-2874	<code>cctx-&gt;ctx_skip != SKIP_YES</code>	<code>cctx != NULL</code>	relation with <code>SKIP_YES</code> cannot be obtained in context
	CVE-2018-1092	<code>ino == EXT4_ROOT_INO</code>	<code>ino == 0</code>	relation with <code>EXT4_ROOT_INO</code> cannot be obtained in context
	CVE-2012-6647	<code>uaddr == uaddr2</code>	<code>uaddr &amp;&amp; uaddr2</code>	relation that <code>uaddr</code> is equal to <code>uaddr2</code> cannot be obtained in context
<b>Special Function</b>	CVE-2022-3621	<code>nilfs_is_metadata_file_inode(inode)</code>	-	special function for sanity check
	CVE-2022-2302	<code>JFS_IP(ipimap)-&gt;i_imap</code>	-	special function for validation check
	CVE-2013-5634	<code>!kvm_vcpu_initialized(vcpu)</code>	-	special function for initializing vCPU
	CVE-2013-4119	<code>!SecIsValidHandle(handle)</code>	-	special function for validation check

# Performance on Defects4j

- CONCH can generate 16 correct patches and 2 incorrect patches

Project	#NPD	Fixed by VFix			Fixed by CONCH		
		Same	Semantic	Incorrect	Same	Semantic	Incorrect
Chart	7	5	0	2	5	2	0
Closure	6	2	1	3	2	2	2
Lang	2	1	0	1	2	0	0
Math	2	1	1	0	1	1	0
Time	1	1	0	0	1	0	0
<b>Total</b>	18	10	2	6	11	5	2

# Conclusion

- We propose CONCH to fix NPD errors with contextual checks, ensuring a more effective and complete vulnerability control
- We are the first to address local resource retrogression and reset global variable and function argument in NPD fixing
- The experimental results show that CONCH outperforms the SOTA approaches

# Q & A