

CacheWarp: Software- based Fault Injection using Selective State Reset


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Cache – “Too low-level to me?”

SCHUTZWERK





Warp – “INVD”



- Flushes the cache without triggering a write-back
 - modified values are lost



- Do not use it when memory coherence should be considered



- Safe Version – “WBINVD”
 - Write back all value in the cache before invalidating the cache



- Privileged Instruction...



AMD SEV

SECURE

ENCRYPTED

VIRTUALIZATION




SCHUTZWERK

- Strong Threat Model
- Encrypt the Entire VM
- Confidentiality – SEV-ES
- Integrity – SEV-SNP

... ..



Selective State Reset



[1] J. Van Bulck, F. Piessens, and R. Strackx, "SGX-Step: A Practical Attack Framework for Precise Enclave Execution Control," in Workshop on System Software for Trusted Execution, 2017.22)

[2] M. Li, Y. Zhang, H. Wang, K. Li, and Y. Cheng, "Cipherleaks: Breaking constant-time cryptography on amd sev via the ciphertext side channel," in USENIX Security Symposium, 2021.

[3] L. Wilke, J. Wichelmann, A. Rabich, and T. Eisenbarth, "Sev-step: A single-stepping framework for amd-sev," 2023.



Exploits



Attacking Sudo

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```
int uid = 0;    Dropped via INVD
uid = getuid();
if (uid == 0){
    win();
}
```

- Variable initialized with 0
- root uid = 0:
 - no password check



- More generic exploit primitive required
- Idea: Target Control Flow
- Use stale return address to “warp back in time”



Timewarp – High Level

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```
a = ret1();
```

```
b = ret2();
```

INVD return address

```
if (a == b) {  
    win();  
}
```



```
a = ret1();
```

```
a = ret2();
```

```
b = ret2();
```

```
if (a == b) {  
    win();  
}
```



Demo



Attacking SSH

- Login with wrong password

```
real_pw = shadow_pw(user);  
test_pw = xcrypt(user_input); INVD return address  
  
if (real_pw == test_pw) {  
    win();  
}
```

SCHUTZWERK

```
real_pw = shadow_pw(user);  
real_pw = xcrypt(user_input);  
test_pw = xcrypt(user_input);  
  
if (real_pw == test_pw) {  
    win();  
}
```



Summary

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- First attack breaks integrity of SEV-SNP
- Single Instruction abuse - INVd
- Mitigation via firmware and microcode update

Github:



[github.com/cispa/
CacheWarp](https://github.com/cispa/CacheWarp)

Demo:



cachewarpattack.com

Blogpost:



[schutzwerk.com/en/
blog/cachewarp/](https://schutzwerk.com/en/blog/cachewarp/)