







The Power of Words: Generating PowerShell Attacks from Natural Language

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






Cyber-attacks have been growing in numbers over the last decade around the world and become more sophisticated, stealthy, multi-vector, and multi-stage.

In this scenario, **Advanced Persistent Threats** (APTs) represent the most dangerous threat actor.




Complaints and Losses over the Last Five Years¹

¹ Data extracted from the FBI Internet Crime Report 2022

Offensive Security



Offensive security practices, such as red teaming and adversary emulation, play a crucial role in understanding how attackers operate and how to mitigate attacks.



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connSkt.connect((tgtHost, tgtPort)) connSkt.send('ViolentPython\r\n') results = connSkt.recv(100) print '[+]%d/tcp open'% tgtPort print '[+] ' + str(results)

import optparse

from socket import *

def connScan(tgtHost, tgtPort):

connSkt = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM)

import socket

try:

connSkt.close()

except: print '[-]%d/tcp closed'% tgtPort

LLMs can assist security analysts at writing custom software.

□ NMT (Neural Machine Translation): generates code from natural language.

"Create a socket, connect to tgtHost on tgtPort, send the message 'ViolentPython', receive the response in result"

LLMs for Security






Offensive PowerShell code generation




The **PowerShell** language is a key tool for cybersecurity in Windows systems.

We investigate NMT models to **translate natural language (NL) descriptions into PowerShell code** that implements APT behavior.



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Methodology



Pre-training

- We built a dataset of **unlabeled PowerShell code**, to pre-train LLMs with:
- Masked Language Modeling (MLM)
- Causal Language Modeling (CLM)

~90k samples of **generalpurpose scripts** (not limited to security) from GitHub.

10 (F)	<pre>= Get-Date -Format s ForEach-Object { \$replace ":", "." } Le ActiveDirectory</pre>
\$DomainContr	roller = Get-ADDomainController Select-Object Name
\$SearchBase	= Read-Host "Enter searchbase (e.g OU=Servers,DC=Domain,DC=local)"
\$ServerList	<pre>= Get-ADComputer -Filter 'operatingsystem -like "*server*" -and enabled -eq "true"' -SearchBase \$SearchBase </pre>
\$Array = @()	
foreach(\$Ser	<pre>rverObject in \$ServerList){</pre>
<pre>\$colItems =</pre>	<pre>Invoke-Command -ComputerName \$ServerObject.Name -scriptblock {Get-ChildItem -Path Cert:\LocalMachine -Recurse</pre>
foreach	(\$Server in \$colItems){
\$Arr	ray += New-Object PsObject -Property ([ordered]@{
	'Server' = \$ServerObject.DnsHostName
	'FriendlyName' = \$Server.FriendlyName
	'Issuer' = \$Server.Issuer
	'NotAfter' = \$Server.NotAfter
	'NotBefore' = \$Server.NotBefore
	'SerialNumber' = \$Server.SerialNumber
	'Thumbprint' = \$Server.Thumbprint
	'DnsNameList' = \$Server.DnsNameList
	'Subject' = \$Server.Subject
	'PSPath' = \$Server.PSPath
	'Version' = \$Server.Version})
}	
}	
\$Array exp	port-csv C:\Temp\Certificate_Report_\$timestamp.csv -NoTypeInformation

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Fine-tuning



For fine-tuning, we developed another dataset with **offensive PowerShell code**.

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
Each sample includes a pair:
natural language description ("intent")
corresponding PowerShell code

Data from **offensive security tools** (Atomic Red Team, Stockpile, Empire) and **public knowledge bases** (e.g., Hacktricks)

```
- id: 3aad5312-d48b-4206-9de4-39866c12e60f
name: Credentials in Registry - HKCU
description: Search for possible credentials stored in Registry
tactic: credential-access
technique:
    attack_id: T1552.002
    name: "Unsecured Credentials: Credentials in Registry"
platforms:
    windows:
    psh:
    command: |
    reg query HKCU /f password /t REG_SZ /s
```

Fine-tuning - dataset






Number of dataset entries

Output similarity compares token-by-token the **generated code** with the code from the **ground truth**.

Specifically, we selected:

- Bilingual Evaluation Understudy (BLEU)
- Edit Distance (ED)
- METEOR
- ROUGE-L

For context (state-of-the-art code generation): BLEU-4 = 21% and METEOR = 38% for Python BLEU-4 = 25% and ED = 44% for UNIX shell code





Illustrative Examples




NL Intent	Ground Truth	Model Output
Invoke compiled HTML Help (CHM) file with specific storage handler, HH file path, and CHM file path.	Invoke-ATHCompiledHelp -InfoTechStorageHandler \$ { infotech_storage_handler } -HHFilePath \$ { hh_file_path } - CHMFilePath \$ { chm_file_path }	Invoke-ATHCompiled HTML Help -InfoTechStorageHandler \$ { infotech_storage_handler } -HHFilePath \$ { hh_file_path } -CHMFilePath \$ { chm_file_path }
Invoke-Mimikatz cmdlet with bypassed execution policy.	powershell.exe -exec bypass -c " Invoke-Mimikatz "	powershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Command " Invoke- Mimikatz "

Syntactic Analysis

We evaluated the adherence to **PowerShell** syntax and compliance with common PowerShell conventions.

We adopt **static analyzers** to identify Warnings and Parse Errors.






Syntactic Analysis - results

For this purpose, we leveraged two metrics:

- Single Syntax Accuracy: the percentage of outputs without parse errors.
- Comparative Syntax Accuracy: the percentage of outputs that do not deviate from conventions of the best practices.






Execution Analysis

The execution analysis evaluates the generated code at run-time.

We analyze the behavior in terms of events occurring in the system.






Execution Analysis - results


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We compared the generated events using an F1-score-like measure. We conducted the analysis using a sample of 35 entries.





We compared the results obtained by the NMT models with **ChatGPT 3.5**, a widely-used model, not specifically designed for generating offensive code.







- AI-based code generators are indeed fit to generate offensive PowerShell code, achieving significant performance on this task, for all types of evaluation.
- Domain-specific fine-tuning allows NMT models to outperform state-of-the-art privately fine-tuned models, i.e., ChatGPT.
- Future work includes further analysis of the generated code, such as sandbox execution of the offensive scripts, to understand whether the code can evade detection measures, and generation of complete attack flows.

Thank you!

