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Where's the FEEB? The Effectiveness of Instruction Set Randomization
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You are not authorized to post comments.Instruction Set Randomization (ISR) has been proposed as a promising defense against code injection attacks. It defuses all standard code injection attacks since the attacker does not know the instruction set of the target machine. A motivated attacker, however, may be able to circumvent ISR by determining the randomization key. In this paper, we investigate the possibility of a remote attacker successfully ascertaining an ISR key using an incremental attack. We introduce a strategy for attacking ISR-protected servers, develop and analyze two attack variations, and present a technique for packaging a worm with a miniature virtual machine that reduces the number of key bytes an attacker must acquire to 100. Our attacks can break enough key bytes to infect an ISR-protected server in about six minutes. Our results provide insights into properties necessary for ISR implementations to be secure.
author = {Ana Nora Sovarel and David Evans and Nathanael Paul},
title = {Where{\textquoteright}s the {FEEB}? The Effectiveness of Instruction Set Randomization},
booktitle = {14th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 05)},
year = {2005},
address = {Baltimore, MD},
url = {https://www.usenix.org/conference/14th-usenix-security-symposium/wheres-feeb-effectiveness-instruction-set-randomization},
publisher = {USENIX Association},
month = jul
}
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