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Domain and Type Enforcement for Linux
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You are not authorized to post comments.Access control in Linux is currently very limited. This paper details the implementation of Domain and Type Enforcement (DTE) in Linux, which gives the system administrator a significant advantage in securing his systems. We control access from domains to types, domain transitions, and signal access between domains, based on a policy which is read at boot time.
Access control in Linux currently consists of traditional Unix permissions and POSIX capabilities[Caps-faq]. Domain and Type Enforcement (DTE) has been presented [DTE95,DTE96] as a useful method for enhancing access control. DTE groups processes into domains, and files into types, and restricts access from domains to types as well as from domains to other domains. Type access can be any of read, write, execute, create, and directory descend. Domain access refers the right to send signals as well as that to transition to a new domain. A process belongs to exactly one domain at any particular time. A process transitions to a new domain by executing a file which has been defined as an entry point to that domain. The three types of domain transitions are auto, exec, or none. If Domain A has auto access to domain B, and a process in domain A executes an entry point for domain B, then the process will be automatically switched to domain B. If domain A has exec access to domain B, then a process running under domain A can choose whether to switch to domain B on execution of one of B's entry points. DTE can be considered an abbreviated form of classical capabilities[Dennis66]. In a system based upon classical capabilities, a process carries with itself a set of access rights to particular objects. At any point, a process can give up, or reclaim (if permitted) some of its capabilities. POSIX capabilities work similarly, but these capabilities are limited to a predefined subset of superuser access rights such as the ability to nice a process, boot the system or open a privileged port. In DTE, a process carries with itself only an indicator of the domain in which it runs, and this determines the process' access rights. A process can enter a new domain (and hence change its access rights) only upon file execution. Trusted Information Systems has used DTE in its proprietary firewalls, but details of its implementation were not publicly available, and TIS appears to have stopped using DTE altogether. A group at SAIC has recently begun a DTE for Linux implementation[SAIC-DTE]. Jonathon Tidswell and John Potter[Tidswell97] submitted theoretical work on extending DTE to allow safe dynamic policy changes, but have attempted no implementation. Presented here is our prototype implementation of DTE for Linux version 2.3.
author = {Serge Hallyn and Phil Kearns},
title = {Domain and Type Enforcement for Linux},
booktitle = {4th Annual Linux Showcase \& Conference (ALS 2000)},
year = {2000},
address = {Atlanta, GA },
url = {https://www.usenix.org/conference/als-2000/domain-and-type-enforcement-linux},
publisher = {USENIX Association},
month = oct
}
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