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SpanDex: Secure Password Tracking for Android
Landon P. Cox , Peter Gilbert, Geoffrey Lawler, Valentin Pistol, and Ali Razeen, Bi Wu, and Sai Cheemalapati, Duke University
This paper presents SpanDex, a set of extensions to Android’s Dalvik virtual machine that ensures apps do not leak users’ passwords. The primary technical challenge addressed by SpanDex is precise, sound, and efficient handling of implicit information flows (e.g., information transferred by a program’s control flow). SpanDex handles implicit flows by borrowing techniques from symbolic execution to precisely quantify the amount of information a process’ control flow reveals about a secret. To apply these techniques at runtime without sacrificing performance, SpanDex runs untrusted code in a data-flow sensitive sandbox, which limits the mix of operations that an app can perform on sensitive data. Experiments with a SpanDex prototype using 50 popular Android apps and an analysis of a large list of leaked passwords predicts that for 90% of users, an attacker would need over 80 login attempts to guess their password. Today the same attacker would need only one attempt for all users.
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author = {Landon P. Cox and Peter Gilbert and Geoffrey Lawler and Valentin Pistol and Ali Razeen and Bi Wu and Sai Cheemalapati},
title = {{SpanDex}: Secure Password Tracking for Android},
booktitle = {23rd USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 14)},
year = {2014},
isbn = {978-1-931971-15-7},
address = {San Diego, CA},
pages = {481--494},
url = {https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity14/technical-sessions/presentation/cox},
publisher = {USENIX Association},
month = aug
}
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